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How do inclusionary and exclusionary autocracies affect ordinary people?

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Abstract

We propose a distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary autocratic ruling strategies and develop novel theoretical propositions on the legacy that these strategies leave on citizens’ political attitudes once the autocratic regime broke down. Using data of 1.3 million survey respondents from 70 countries and Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort models we estimate between and within cohort differences in citizens’ democratic support. We find that inclusionary regimes – with wider redistribution of socio-economic and political benefits – leave a stronger anti-democratic legacy than exclusionary regimes on the political attitudes of their citizens. Similarly, citizens who were part of the winning group in an autocracy are more critical with democracy compared to citizens who were part of discriminated groups. This article contributes to our understanding about how autocracies affect the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens.

Keywords: Authoritarianism, public goods, micro-foundation, inclusion, exclusion, cohort analysis, political socialization.
Introduction

February 5, 2018 marked the day on which the Berlin Wall stood as long as it is gone - 28 years and 3 months. Yet, the legacy of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) is still tangible. The autocratic rule of the GDR has left an imprint on the political attitudes of its citizens that did not cease to exist with the Fall of the Berlin Wall, making many nostalgic about the autocratic past. Some have connected this so-called “Ostalgie” to anti-democratic resentment, which is widespread in East Germany. The former GDR is not an exception. Anti-democratic political attitudes last usually longer than the autocratic regime in which they developed. Yet, the GDR represents a particular type of autocracy that placed heavy emphasis on equal education, a comprehensive health system, and a wide distribution of socio-economic benefits among the working class. Other regimes are less generous - in economic and political terms - towards their citizens.

Against this backdrop, our article is motivated by the question to what extent ruling strategies of autocratic regimes influence the political attitudes of their citizens, even after these authoritarian regimes broke down. In particular, our research sheds light on the mechanism of authoritarian nostalgia and anti-democratic sentiments that are a product of authoritarian socialization. To achieve this, we bring two strands of research into a dialogue. While the comparative authoritarianism literature has focused mainly on the inner workings of non-democratic rule (Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012), it paid less attention to the role of ordinary citizens. However, this is the starting point of the second strand of literature, the legacy literature, which is mainly interested in the effect that previous
non-democratic rule has on political beliefs and attitudes – once democracy is installed (Bernhard and Karakoc 2007; Neundorf, 2010; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017). Yet, it is surprising that the legacy literature remains rather mute towards addressing the effect of variation in autocratic ruling strategies on political attitudes.

Theoretically, we rely on political socialization theory and argue that the political environment and the ruling strategy that someone experiences during the so-called “formative years” not only impact on a citizen’s contemporary political attitudes, but also leaves a lasting imprint on her political attitudes in later life (Mannheim, 1928; Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Sears and Funk, 1999). In other words, the socio-political experience as a young adult coins how one assesses politics later in life. More concretely, we are interested in the legacy effect that different authoritarian ruling strategies have on the political attitudes of citizens, in particular towards democracy. Focusing on the legacy here further allows us to infer about the public support created by these various ruling strategies during the dictatorship.

We propose a typological distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary strategies. Building upon Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s work (2003), we distinguish between political and economic dimensions of inclusion and exclusion in autocracies. We argue that inclusionary autocracies tend to redistribute more of their political and economic resources towards their citizens in order to create a broad public support base. In contrast, exclusionary autocracies follow the opposite route and
channel political influence and economic benefits to a small group of privileged (and therefore loyal) individuals who help the leader survive in power.²

We show that these two different regime strategies of inclusion and exclusion affect the long-term political attitudes of ordinary citizens. To demonstrate the heterogeneity of the legacy effect and to arrive at a nuanced empirical picture, we test our theoretical argument with two complementary empirical strategies. First, we examine differences in political attitudes of citizens who were socialized under different autocratic ruling strategies on the one hand, and who were brought up under democracy on the other hand (between-regime comparison). Second, we further examine differences in political attitudes between individuals who were socialized under the same autocratic regime, yet had different socio-political statuses, i.e. belonging to an included group that profits from the regime or being particularly discriminated against and excluded from power (within-regime comparison).

The empirical analysis is based on a newly created, harmonized public opinion dataset that combines 1,070 (country x wave x study)³ existing surveys for 70 countries from around the world and data on authoritarian regimes’ ruling strategies from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al., 2016).

² This conceptualization does not exclude repression, nor are we oblivious to violence being an inherent feature of authoritarian politics (Svolik, 2012). Rather, by focusing on the provision of public goods, while holding repression constant, we simplify the focus of our theoretical argument. Thereby we are better able to disentangle the long-term effect of certain policies on citizens. Importantly, repression and inclusiveness seem be distinct strategies. Using data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem; more details below) shows that the correlation between providing public goods and hard repression is only R=0.37 in autocracies. Hard repression correlates also only moderately with providing more access to political power in autocracies (R=0.34).

³ The data is based on ten different cross-national studies such as the World Value Survey or the Latinobarometer that all have been collected in several waves at different points of time.
We use hierarchical age, period, cohort (HAPC) models to estimate the effect of these strategies on citizens’ attitudes towards democracy today.

We find that people who were socialized in exclusionary regimes are more supportive of democracy compared to citizens from more inclusionary regimes, and even democracies. As the policies of autocratic regimes become more inclusionary this finding is reversed. Citizens from inclusionary regimes are less satisfied with democracy compared to citizens from exclusionary regimes and democracies. We also find a mutual reinforcement effect between political and economic inclusion. This means that if an authoritarian regime is economically inclusive by providing public goods to its citizens, being politically inclusive and incorporating a broad variety of societal groups into political power, significantly decreases later democratic support. The within-regime analysis further supports our theoretical expectation that authoritarian ruling strategies matter for the formation of citizens’ political attitudes.

This research contributes to existing literature in three crucial ways. First, we propose a new typological distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary autocracies. By so doing, we focuses on the role of ordinary citizens under autocratic rule. Second, we are able to increase considerably the scope of former studies on authoritarian nostalgia that have mainly concentrated on post-Communist regimes. It is the first global analysis that includes 70 countries. Third, we are able to test rigorously the legacy effect that different autocratic ruling strategies have on citizens’ political attitudes. As such, our research has important implications for understanding the development of democratic dissatisfaction and anti-democratic
resentments that might be already anchored in the minds of the people even before democracy has been installed.

**Inclusionary and exclusionary authoritarian regimes**

We argue that dictators fall on a continuum between two types of ruling strategies: inclusionary and exclusionary. Our conception of inclusionary and exclusionary autocracy goes beyond the recent institutional focus in comparative authoritarianism. Instead of focusing on the institutional and elite power architecture (Geddes, et al., 2014; Hadenius and Teorell 2007) and the effect of formal and informal institutions in autocratic settings (Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2008; Schedler 2013; Svolik 2012), we focus on examining the effect on ordinary citizens of inclusion and exclusion from political power and economic benefits.4

We define an inclusionary regime as a regime that relies on a broad public support base.5 These regimes incorporate various social, economic and ethnic groups into their power structure by ensuring a wider redistribution of political and socio-economic benefits to the population. This strategy aims at minimizing the threats that can emanate from within the society by buying off the opposition with political and economic concessions that are available only if they support the regime.

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4 Please refer also to Appendix 7 in which we plot the distribution of inclusionary and exclusionary strategies by the three main regime types (one-party, military, personalist regimes) of Geddes et al. (2014).

5 We do not aim to explore the reasons why some dictators are more inclusive than others, or why they need a broader ruling coalition to stay in power. Rather, we are interested in providing a comprehensive typological distinction of authoritarian ruling strategies.
In contrast, we define an exclusionary regime as a regime with a narrow societal basis that excludes from power most social, religious, and ethnic groups. Its power stems from a narrow set of actors that obtain exclusive benefits. Exclusionary regimes rely more on redistributing particularistic goods to the members of the ruling elite, while actively restricting the access to power and economic redistribution to other groups from within society.\(^6\)

This conceptualization of autocratic ruling strategies borrows conceptually from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) selectorate theory. The selectorate benefits from the redistributive policies of the regime as it provides the regime with the necessary support to extend its survival. However, since not all members of the selectorate can participate in autocratic governance, autocrats rely on an inner sanctum of elites, the winning coalition, that endows the autocrat with sufficient power to remain in power (Svolik 2012; Geddes et al. 2014). Members of the selectorate that provide valuable service, and develop a network of support within their local organizations and communities can climb the political ladder and obtain positions in the winning coalition. Previous research in comparative authoritarianism has concentrated on the role of this winning coalition, but has under-theorized the

\(^6\) It could be reasonably assumed that, in result, inclusionary autocracies are more equal than exclusionary autocracies. Yet, it is beyond the scope of this article to contribute to the ongoing nuanced discussion about the effect of inequality and redistributive policies as drivers or hindrance to democratization. While Boix (2003) argued in favor of a negative linear relationship between inequality and the probability to democratize, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) proposed an inverted U-shape. In turn, Haggard and Kaufmann (2016) recently cautioned that we should not overestimate distributive conflicts as a driver for democratization. Moreover, Ansell and Samuels (2014: 2) challenged the “redistributivist thesis” and focused on elite competition instead, arguing that when rising disenfranchised groups accumulate income, this results in higher income inequality which again leads to growing demands for regime change as these new economic groups want to insure their status against autocratic arbitrariness.
effect of the governing strategies autocrats use to ensure the loyalty of its selectorate.

We use the selectorate theory as an important theoretical springboard. We build upon it and derive two separate dimensions. We distinguish explicitly between (1) political and (2) socio-economic inclusion and exclusion strategies. When it comes to the political inclusion, we argue that dictators regulate access to political power by making use of decisive “qualities” such as ethnic origin, religious belief, organizational, and/or class membership (e.g. military generals, workers in Communist regimes). The dictator serves as the gate-keeper that decides on the basis of these specific attributes whom to include in power. The dictator can adopt a more inclusive ruling strategy by widening his support base and incorporate more societal groups in power, or he can restrict it to a very few, hand-picked people whose support is necessary and sufficient to ensure autocratic survival.

Similarly, granting and withholding socio-economic benefits can be used by autocrats to ensure the loyalty of the selectorate and winning coalition. Like access to power, this dimension can be narrowed down to very few or can be spread more equally among citizens. In other words, the co-optation efforts take place either on a restricted elite level and target strategically important business and military personnel, or it can reach to the masses by gaining specific support among the wider population (Kim and Gandhi, 2010). As such, economic strategies of inclusion and

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7 We see three major dimensions in which we deviate from the original selectorate theory. First, we differ in the explanatory aim. We are not interested in explaining regime survival, but are interested in the long-term effects of different ruling strategies on political attitudes. Second, we do not develop a universal theory that holds across democratic and autocratic regimes, but focus only on the autocratic pole. Third, in our conceptualization we introduce the explicit distinction between economic and political inclusion/exclusion instruments.
exclusion range from the provision of public goods that do not discriminate against any social groups to a particularistic approach of distributing material benefits to very few.\textsuperscript{8}

**Regime Type and Their Effect on Ordinary Citizens**

From these two opposing ruling strategies, we can now formulate expectations on how inclusionary and exclusionary regimes affect their citizens’ political attitudes. Inclusionary regimes try to win the hearts and minds of their people, while exclusionary regimes’ survival hinges on the loyalty of very few elite members. Inclusionary autocracies act through a wide redistribution of socio-economic resources and political power and build a dense network of support in society. Furthermore, we argue that inclusionary regimes are proactive in instilling a climate of pro-regime support amongst its citizens, one in which the regime is seen as benevolent for offering the citizens benefits that would otherwise be inaccessible. In exclusionary regimes, the dictator is more concerned with maintaining the loyalty of its ruling elite, making sure that any member of the ruling coalition does not threaten his position in power. In result, exclusionary regimes dismiss ordinary citizens from influencing politics and exclude them from economic redistribution.

\textsuperscript{8} If we assume independent dimensions, inclusionary regimes are those that score high in terms of political and economic inclusion. Exclusionary regimes, in contrast, are those regimes that score low in political and economic inclusion. As such, these two types are extreme or ideal types. We are aware that by cross-tabulating the two dimensions, “hybrid” regimes emerge that either score high/low or low/high on political and economic inclusion. In Appendix 10, we provide an overview of the empirical distribution across these four types of authoritarian rule. We also show empirical evidence for the respective legacy effect of all four types of authoritarian rule on later democratic satisfaction.
Political socialization and the making of generations

We expect that citizens who are exposed to an inclusionary regime to be more supportive of the regime as these regimes actively try to develop a pro-regime sentiment amongst its citizens by providing them with benefits in exchange for their support for the regime. Unfortunately, we are usually not able to observe regime support during existing dictatorships, as representative and comparable public opinion research is almost impossible during authoritarian regimes (Kuran, 1997).\(^9\) Yet, we argue here that this is not necessary. Instead, we use the theoretical and methodological approach of cohort analysis, which allows the identification of distinct characteristics of those generations that were socialized under different political regimes. Generations thereby function like fossils that carry evidence of a long-gone past. Here, we assume that the political preferences of whole generations that grew up under inclusionary or exclusionary regimes have been shaped and remain prevalent in the population, especially for those that experienced these regime during the so-called formative years during adolescence.\(^{10}\)

These expectations build on the theory of political socialization, which argues that fundamental values are acquired largely in early adulthood. The theory goes back to the seminal work of Karl Mannheim and has been later refined and empirically tested (Mannheim, 1928; Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Sears and Funk, 1989; Geddes and Zaller (1989) on Brazil; Hainmueller and Kern (2009) on East Germany and some recent work on China (e.g. Wang 2017). However, these studies rely on unique national surveys and hence do not allow for variation on regime strategies.\(^9\) Some notable exceptions are the work by Geddes and Zaller (1989) on Brazil; Hainmueller and Kern (2009) on East Germany and some recent work on China (e.g. Wang 2017). However, these studies rely on unique national surveys and hence do not allow for variation on regime strategies.\(^9\) Some have argued that later-life learning is also important for the formation of political attitudes, even if these studies show that early learning still has the strongest effects (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2017). As we focus on early socialization (during dictatorships) and ignore later-life learning (during democracy) this should make our results more conservative, as we do not account for the potential revision of political attitudes during democratic times.\(^{10}\)
Young citizens, it is believed, are not yet set in their political ways and are subsequently more easily influenced by external factors such as the nature of the political regime in which they live (Bartels and Jackman, 2014). Political socialization theory argues that after the formation period in early adulthood, these attitudes and preferences remain relatively intact and constant. Fundamental change becomes rare (Jennings, 1989; Sears and Valentino, 1997).

We assume that citizens’ political attitudes that developed under autocracies are imprinted through the ruling strategies of the regime. As such, we expect to observe differences between the political attitudes of citizens socialized in inclusionary regimes and exclusionary regimes. More precisely, citizens from inclusionary autocracies will be more supportive of that regime, which in turn is expected to lead to higher nostalgia if the regime is overthrown. If citizens experience an inclusionary authoritarian ruling strategy in their formative years, they might value the gains of autocratic inclusion higher than potential liberal values of democratic systems.

Conversely, the majority of citizens that experienced exclusionary ruling strategies during their formative years will be less nostalgic about the autocratic past and hence are expected to embrace democratic values. They did not profit from the former autocratic regime as they were exempted from political power and material benefits. As such, they value the potential gains and promises of democratic societies higher compared to the previous autocratic situation. After democratization, they perceive themselves now on an even playing field that provides equal chances for economic success and political participation.
Finally, we should contrast citizens’ political attitudes that grew up in democratic and autocratic societies. We assume that citizens that were socialized in democracies should be generally more supportive of democracy than citizens from former autocracies since they developed democratic attitudes and preferences early on in their life by living in a democracy during their formative years (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015).

Based on the theory of political socialization under different regime forms, we formulate the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1 (H1): Generations that were socialized in inclusionary autocracies are more supportive of that regime and are therefore less positive with democracy than generations that grew up in exclusionary autocracies or in democracies.*

We further hypothesize that the two dimensions of inclusion - political and economic - interact and mutually strengthen each other. We argue that support for the authoritarian regime and the subsequent nostalgia and dissatisfaction with democracy becomes stronger when high economic inclusion during the formative years is met with high political inclusion. We expect political and economic inclusion to have a stronger effect together than in isolation. We argue that a doubly inclusive situation in which citizens are included politically and economically included amplifies support for the authoritarian regime. This, in turn, translates into a growing skepticism with democracy. Against this backdrop, we formulate a reinforcement effect in hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis (H2): High level of economic inclusion coupled with high political inclusion has a negative effect on democratic support.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 refer to differences between regimes. We expect to find clear generational differences in terms of political preferences of people who grew up under different regimes within the same country and between different countries. However, all autocratic societies are heterogeneous to some extent. The selectorate defines who is included and excluded from politics. It defines who might potentially profit from the regime and who is discriminated against. To be a member of the selectorate constitutes a necessary condition for profiting from an autocratic regime.

We define insiders of the selectorate as the potential “winners” of an autocratic regime, which are more included in terms of political and economic benefits, while outsiders of the selectorate are “losers”. While the members of the selectorate are addressed politically and profit, at least potentially, from socio-economic redistribution, the latter group has no access to power or material benefits. Against this backdrop, we can further break down our argument about inclusion and exclusion. We expand the between-regime comparison to the composition of society within an existing regime. We would expect that specific groups that were included in the power and socio-economic benefit structure (i.e. winners) are more supportive of the former regime than those that have been excluded for social, ethnic, or religious reasons (i.e. losers). Those suppressed groups within a regime should be more resistant to the regime socialization, as they experience first-hand the exclusive nature of the regime (Pop-Eleches and Tucker
2017). Further, we would expect them to be more positive about the democratic transition as they gained the most from the democratization. In this light, we derive the third hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 3 (H3): Social and ethnic groups included in the selectorate of an autocratic regime are more supportive of the autocratic regime and therefore less positive with democracy than social and ethnic groups excluded from it.*

**Research design**

In order to test our hypotheses, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of 70 (post-) authoritarian countries during the entire 20th century from around the globe that experienced variations of inclusionary and exclusionary regimes. As discussed above, we identify the effect of autocracies on their citizens by comparing generations within the same country and between countries that were exposed to varying contexts during their formative years. This empirical phenomenon of varying socialization experiences within the same country or regime gives us the opportunity to study the lasting imprint of political regimes, even after their existence. We are further able to contrast groups of generations that grew up under dictatorships and those that came of age under democracy.

To achieve this empirical test, we need to distinguish three co-linear time trends: age, period, and cohort (APC) effects. A person could have positive or negative views of democracy because she is young (the so-called life-cycle or ageing
effect), or because she lives in a country that faces a big political corruption scandal (the so-called period effect that affects everyone no matter their age or birth year), or because she was socialized at a certain point in history (the cohort effect). Here we are mainly interested in the cohort effect, which we argue contains the socialization effect of political regimes. This methodological approach allows us to indirectly test the impact autocratic ruling strategies have on the mass public.

We conduct two sets of empirical tests to investigate our three hypotheses. Firstly, we test our theory contrasting inclusionary and exclusionary regimes by contrasting them to democracies as a baseline (H1 and H2). Second, we conduct two within-regime analyses where we sub-divide the population into winners and losers of former authoritarian regimes, which test the direct effect of profiting from an autocratic regime or being particularly discriminated (H3).

**Individual-level data**

To test our hypotheses, we merge existing, publicly available survey data from numerous countries from around the globe - both well-established democracies as well as former dictatorships. We chose the datasets that have been designed to be fielded in several countries, which ensures that questions are less country-specific but rather to travel across borders. Furthermore, all studies have been conducted as academic studies and hence adhere to a certain standard. Moreover, we only chose studies that included questions related to democratic attitudes and political engagement. The newly created harmonized public opinion dataset combines 1,070 (country x wave x study) existing surveys for 70 countries from around the world
with a total of 1,422 different country-cohorts.\textsuperscript{11} We harmonized the data of the following public opinion surveys (including the years that they were fielded):

- World Values Survey (WVS), 1981-2014
- Latinobarometer (LB), 1995-2015
- Asian Barometer (ANB), 2001-2014
- Afrobarometer (AFB), 1999-2015
- Americas Barometer (AB), 2004-2014
- European Values Study (EVS), 1981-2010
- European Social Survey (ESS), 2002-2014
- Eurobarometer (EB), 1970-2002
- Central & Eastern European Barometer (CEEB), 1990-97

Pooling all these datasets together gives us about 1.3 million respondents for which we have valid data on two dependent variables and all control variables. The different survey questions included in the diverse datasets were harmonized so that a joint analysis is possible. More details on the question of harmonization decisions can be found in Appendices 3 and 4.

**Dependent variables: Authoritarian nostalgia and democratic support**

In order to measure the impact inclusionary and exclusionary regimes had on people’s hearts and minds, we ideally want to measure support for the authoritarian regime. Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure regime support in a direct way, as public opinion surveys are usually not available. An indirect measure for regime support is however whether people feel nostalgic for these regimes once they are overthrown. Using the third wave (1999/2000) of the EVS, we can use a question on

\textsuperscript{11} We only include countries for which we have at least three surveys that cover at least 10 years. This is an important prerequisite to estimate HAPC models, introduced below. The list of countries and the number of respondents per country can be found in Appendix 1.
evaluating the former Communist regime as good or bad\textsuperscript{12} for 14 Central and Eastern European countries.\textsuperscript{13} As we have postulated in our theory, we expect that nostalgia for the previous authoritarian regime affect the evaluation of democracy.\textsuperscript{14} The EVS data allows us to explore the relationship between authoritarian nostalgia (support) and democratic support, which we are able to measure across time and a large set of countries.

We assume that the higher nostalgia with the Communist regime the more critical people would be with democracy. Figure 1 plots this correlation with our two dependent variables – “satisfaction with democracy” (Fig. 1.A) and “democracy is the best form of government” (Fig. 1.B) - using our 14 countries and three generations, those that grew-up before, during, or after the Cold War. Plotting the average nostalgia and democratic support for each country-cohort, Figure 1 shows nostalgia is weakest among the generation that grew-up after the end of Communism, which is what we would expect based on our theory. The individual-level correlation between satisfaction with democracy and authoritarian nostalgia is $r=-0.43$, which is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} The exact question wording to evaluate today’s political system is as follows: “People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad; 10 means very good”.
\item \textsuperscript{13} These include: Bulgaria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
\item \textsuperscript{14} In order to test our hypotheses it is essential to identify the cohort effects properly and distinguish these from aging effects. However, the data that directly measures authoritarian nostalgia is not suitable for this. Firstly, having data only from one point in time does not allow the separation of age and cohort effects, which is crucial in our theoretical framework of authoritarian socialization. Secondly, the EVS data only includes former Communist countries, which do not give us variation on the key independent variable - regime inclusiveness. The regimes were too similar in this respect.
\end{itemize}
strong. The correlation is even stronger between democracy as the best form of government and Communist nostalgia ($r=-0.68$).^{15}

![Figure 1: Correlation between Communist nostalgia and democratic support](image)

The findings of Figure 1 supports our assumption that using measures of democratic support are suitable proxies for authoritarian support (nostalgia). For the remainder of the article we therefore use measures of democratic support, which have a higher longitudinal and geographic coverage and hence allow us to test our three hypotheses more accurately.

Political support is one of the key factors in the development of a democratic political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963; Easton, 1965). The aim is to measure the extent to which citizens support the democratic system using the satisfaction with the way democracy works. We thereby assume that the expression of satisfaction asks respondents to evaluate the performance of the political system (Norris, 1999; Appendix 5 includes further exploration of the measure of authoritarian nostalgia, including its prevalence and generational differences.)
Linde and Ekman, 2003). Further, asking citizens about the “satisfaction with democracy” is less abstract than the usual question of support for “democracy as the best way of government”, which we do however use in a separate test, too.

In the datasets that were harmonized for this study, respondents were asked uniformly how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country. Response categories however varied from 4 to 11. The variable was standardized to 0 to 100, whereas lower values mean less satisfaction with democracy. To account for the specific effects due to study design or questionnaire design, we include the study (e.g. WVS, ESS, etc.) as a control variable into the model, which also accounts for the difference in response categories.

**Individual-level control variables**

We control for the gender of respondents, the education level (primary or less, secondary, post-secondary) and a dummy variable whether a respondent is working as opposed to being unemployed, retired or any other reason why people do not work.

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16 In the analysis presented below we refrain from including countries in the analysis that are not classified as democratic at the time of the survey. We believe that it is not meaningful to ask respondents to evaluate how the democratic system works in their country if they do not live in a democracy. Using this restriction reduces the sample by 21 countries for which data would be available. The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these contemporary autocracies.

17 The question wording and response categories in each study are listed in Appendix 3.

18 The estimates of these are not reported in the results tables, but are available upon request from the authors.

19 For this we use the categorical variable that measures a person’s highest educational degree. In some datasets education was measured as years of education or age of leaving school. The coding scheme to classify respondents into the three education groups based on this is explained in Appendix 3. Combing the education variables (categorical and measured from years) leaves only 2% still missing.

20 Unfortunately, it is not possible to control a person’s income or economic well-being beyond working, as the measures were too diverse to be harmonized.
Measuring inclusionary and exclusionary regimes

Data on the inclusionary and exclusionary regime dimensions comes from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al., 2016). The unit of observation in our sample is country-year (1915-2015), for the 70 countries for which we have survey data.

We capture political inclusiveness by calculating the average score between two indicators: power distribution by social group and by socio-economic status. The former variable captures whether any social group is more politically relevant compared to other social groups in that country. It is an ordinal measure that ranges from monopoly of one group (value=0) to all social groups having equal political power (value=4). The later variable captures whether more wealth and income translates into more political power for citizens and groups. It is also an ordinal variable ranging from wealthy people enjoying monopoly over political power (0) to political power being more or less equally distributed across economic groups (4).

Economic inclusiveness of regimes is captured using a measure of the type of expenditures used by the regime. It is an ordinal variable ranging from particularistic spending targeted towards specific societal actors (0) to public spending being intended to benefit all groups within a society, including the poor or underprivileged (4).

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21 The V-Dem project collects data on political institutions with the help of more than 3,000 country-experts. The V-Dem project uses a Bayesian item response model to increase the reliability of the coding and eliminate as much of individual coders’ bias. Due to the richness and high quality of the data we prefer V-Dem over other data. It should moreover be noted that the level of agreement between V-Dem and other datasets is over 90% (Lührmann et al., 2018).

22 A social group can be delimited within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination of theses.

23 See part A6 of the online appendix for a full description of these variables.
As the hypotheses also focus on the distinction between autocracies and democracy, we use an indicator for regime type that is based on V-Dem’s electoral democracy index, whereby the absence of democracy measures autocracy. The index is continuous and ranges between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate democracy. We follow Lindberg (2016) and dichotomize this measure where a regime with a value of the index equal or above 0.67 is considered a democracy and an autocracy otherwise.

![Figure 2: Average political power and economic inclusion by regime type](image)

Figure 2 shows the distribution of regimes based on the average measure of political power and economic inclusiveness by regime type. The countries in the bottom left corners in Figure 2 are regimes the exclude citizens based on social group membership and wealth, and also whose public goods spending is particularistic. We observe that, on average, democracies tend to have higher levels
of inclusion into power and more public goods provision. Conversely, autocracies that exclude citizens based on socio-economic status or social group membership also tend to use more particularistic spending rather than public goods provision. This pattern is consistent with the logic of the selectorate theory as regimes will be more likely to rely on public goods provision as the size of their selectorate and winning coalition increases (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

All variables are continuous, except the dummy variable that measures whether the regime was an autocracy or democracy. The macro variables are averaged across five-year intervals from 1915 to 2015 and matched to the corresponding national generation that came of age during a particular five-year period.24

**Macro control variables**

Several variables are included in the models to rule out the possibility that citizens’ democratic satisfaction is not explained by the current state of affairs in their polity and economy (Karp et al., 2003; Wagner et al., 2009). First, we include the economic development level by including GDP per capita at the 2011 PPP value of the dollar (source: World Bank), as we expect that economic performance of the regime affects people’s reported satisfaction with democracy (Lipset, 1960; Krieckhaus et al., 2013). Second, we include the current level of democracy, as the type of democratic political system in which citizens live affects their views of democracy (Wells and

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24 1915 is the starting point, as we do not have a sufficient number of individual-level observations that belong to generations born before 1900 and hence were socialized before 1915. Separating cohorts into five-year birth groups is standard practice in cohort analysis (Fienberg and Mason, 1979; Mason et al., 1973). As we do a cross-national analysis with 70 countries it is not possible to separate cohorts in more meaningful groups that overlap with historical events.
Krieckhaus, 2006; Anderson and Guillory, 1997). Third, we include the age of the
democratic system because the amount of time an individual has lived in a
democracy might affect a citizens’ democratic attitudes (Fuchs-Schündeln and
Schündeln, 2015). Finally, we include the level of political corruption\(^{25}\) (Wagner et al.
2009), as citizens engage in comparing how well democracy deals with corruption
compared to autocracies (Rose-Ackerman 1996).

**The model**

As outlined above, we take a generational perspective to test our hypotheses and
thereby rely on an age, period, cohort (APC) model. The most important covariates
are therefore, firstly, the age of the respondents, which we include as age in years.
Secondly, we measure cohorts in five-year groupings when respondents turned 15,\(^{26}\)
assuming that this is the time of socialization when the political regime has the
strongest and lasting impact on its citizens (Bartels and Jackman, 2014). Finally, we
include the year of the survey to capture the period effect. The problem of
estimating these three time effects simultaneously is the identification problem, as:

\[
\text{Cohort} = \text{Survey Year} - \text{Age}
\]

Yang and Land (2006) proposed to solve this identification problem by
including cohort clusters (in our case five-year groups) and survey years as random
effects into a Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort (HAPC) model. In this multilevel model

\(^{25}\) See section A6 of the appendix for a more detail description of the variables mentioned above.
\(^{26}\) We test the sensitivity of this specification by firstly changing the cohort grouping and secondly the
age of the formative years. The results are discussed below in the robustness test section as well as
in Appendix 12.
we consider periods and cohorts as cross-classified contexts in which individuals are nested. Including macro-level variables that capture the cohort context (inclusionary versus exclusionary autocracy at age 15) as well as the period context (current level economic and political measures in the same year as survey is conducted) allows to test the effect of these context variables on democratic attitudes. The model is specified as:

\[ \text{DemSupport}_{ijtc} = \alpha_{ojt} + \beta_1 \text{Age}_{it} + \sum_{m=2}^{M} \beta_m X_{mi} + \sum_{c=2}^{C} \gamma_c C + \epsilon_{ijtc} \]

where we model support for democracy of respondent’s \( i \) who belongs to cohort \( j \), was interviewed in year \( t \) and lives in country \( c \) as a function of her age and our individual-level control variables \( X \). We further include country-fixed effects to account for potential country-specific differences, such as responding to survey questions. The most important part of this model is the random intercept \( \alpha_{ojt} \), which can be written as:

\[ \alpha_{ojt} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{Autoc}_j + \gamma_2 \text{Incl}_j + \gamma_3 \text{Autoc}_j \times \text{Incl}_j + \sum_{p=4}^{P} \gamma_p V_{pt} + u_{0j0} + u_{00t} \]

where \( \gamma_0 \) measures the grand mean. \( \gamma_1-\gamma_3 \) measure the impact of the each cohort’s formative context, measured as five-year average contexts when respondents were between 15 and 20 years old, a specification which is scrutinized in a series of robustness tests. We test H1 with an interaction between the level of inclusiveness (political or economic) and whether the country at the time was an autocracy. If H1 is correct, we expect \( \gamma_3 \) to be negative and significant. The vector \( V \) measures the current period effects, which measured on the country-level at the year of the
survey. Here we treat our dependent variables as continuous, estimating linear HAPC models.

**Global analysis: Between regime variation**

In this section, we present the empirical results of a global cohort analysis of the impact of autocratic inclusiveness on democratic support that utilizes the *between* regime differences, with some people having experienced an autocracy and some not within the same country and across countries.

**Descriptive analysis**

First, we graphically explore the relationship between inclusiveness and democratic support. Figure 3 plots the average satisfaction with democracy, our main dependent variable, for each of the 1,422 cohorts in our 62 countries. We graphically distinguish between those generations that grew up in an autocratic (panels A and C) or democratic system (panels B and D) according to the level of political (top panels) and economic inclusion (bottom panels).

As Figure 3 clearly shows, cohorts that grew up in more inclusive dictatorships - whether economically or politically - are less likely to evaluate the democratic system as positive compared to cohorts that were socialized in more exclusive regimes. We compare these results to democracies that give us a reference point of the relationship between inclusiveness and democratic support. As the two right panels in Figure 3 confirm, the relationship is reversed in democracies. Cohorts that grew up in more inclusive democracies are also more positive towards the functioning of the democratic system today.
**Figure 3:** Mean satisfaction with democracy (by country-cohort) over political and economic inclusion during cohort’s formative years (at c)

In the next section, we use HAPC models to test whether the graphical pattern shown in Figure 3 holds when we use more rigorous models that account for age, period and cohort effects as well as include important control variables on both the micro and macro level.

**Results HAPC Models**

We estimate a hierarchical Age, Period, Cohort (HAPC) model as introduced above to predict a respondent level of democratic support, which varies from 0 to 100, whereas higher values indicate higher support. Including an interaction effect of inclusionary strategies and whether the country was an autocracy at the time each cohort was socialized tests hypothesis 1.
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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.094*** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.086*** (0.004)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current context (at t)</th>
<th>M1 – Pol. Power</th>
<th>M2 – Public good</th>
<th>M3 – Interaction</th>
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<tr>
<td>Level of democracy</td>
<td>-34.547*** (8.561)</td>
<td>-34.656*** (8.560)</td>
<td>-34.684*** (8.548)</td>
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<td>Age of democracy</td>
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<td>-0.184*** (0.045)</td>
<td>-0.181*** (0.045)</td>
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<td>Log GDP (per C)</td>
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<td>2.864*** (0.737)</td>
<td>2.934*** (0.736)</td>
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<td>Political corruption</td>
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<td>-2.947 (7.547)</td>
<td>-2.829 (7.536)</td>
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<td>-0.400*** (0.047)</td>
<td>-0.401*** (0.047)</td>
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<td>0.282*** (0.065)</td>
<td>0.290*** (0.065)</td>
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<td>2.315*** (0.077)</td>
<td>2.321*** (0.077)</td>
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<td>Post-Secondary</td>
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<td>1.332*** (0.053)</td>
<td>1.320*** (0.053)</td>
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| Country FE                | yes            | yes            | yes            |
| Data FE                   | yes            | yes            | yes            |
| Intercept                 | 45.119*** (10.257) | 43.958*** (10.235) | 62.083*** (10.391) |

Variance Component

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<tbody>
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<td>2.437*** (0.079)</td>
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<td>2.046*** (0.068)</td>
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<td>11,584,437</td>
<td>11,584,211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** P<0.01. Data: Harmonized survey data from 1,070 national datasets. List of datasets in Appendix 2. V-Dem, 1915-2015.

Note: Entries are regression coefficients and their standard errors of a HAPC model. The dependent variable varies from e.g. 0="not satisfied at all" and 100="completely satisfied".

Table 1 reports the impact of two dimensions of regime strategies on satisfaction with democracy, our first dependent variable. Model 1 presents the results of the
impact of access to political power. The results confirm our hypothesis. The more access autocracies provided to their citizens the lower the satisfaction with democracy today \( (\gamma_3 = -4.864) \). With every unit increase in access to political power, democratic satisfaction is 2.183 lower among generations of former dictatorships. The main effect of the dummy variable capturing the regime type relates to autocracies that were completely politically exclusionary (holding all other variables at their mean), which produces higher democratic satisfaction levels even than compared to cohorts that grew-up in democracies \( (\gamma_1 = 6.815) \). The same pattern is confirmed for the second dimension of inclusiveness - access to political resources via public good provision – presented in Model 2. All effects are statistically significant on the 1% level.

**Figure 4**: Predicted satisfaction with democracy \((A+B)\) and agreement that democracy is best form of government \((C+D)\) by regime socialization
Note: The prediction is based on a linear HAPC model. Full results shown in Table 1. The results presented in panel C and D are reported in Appendix 8.

These effects are further illustrated in Figure 4, which plots the predicted values of the two dependent variables, for the varying levels of political and economic inclusion distinguishing for having been socialized in a democracy (dashed line) versus an autocracy (solid line). Figures 4.A and 4.B plot the predicted values of satisfaction with democracies, which is based on M1 and M2 of the results presented in Table 1. For example, Figure 4.A shows a steep, negative slope for autocracies. Satisfaction with democracy is predicted to be at 52 points (so positive) in former extremely politically exclusionary regimes (score=0). However, if a respondent grew up in a very politically inclusionary regime (score=4), predicted satisfaction with democracy is 8.732 points lower. We can also compare this effect to those that grew up in democracies. Here as one might expect, we find a positive effect. The more access to political power or economic resources were available in people’s youth the more positive they seem to be about democracy today.

Figures 4.C and 4.D further plot the main results for our second dependent variable, whether people agree that democracy is the best form of government. The results are less strong for this variable, however, H1 is nevertheless confirmed. As predicted by our theory, those exposed to more inclusive regimes are more critical with democracy, which we interpret as a form of nostalgia and support for the previous dictatorship.

In the next step we turn to our test of Hypothesis 2, which postulates that the political and economic dimension of inclusiveness reinforce each other. We test this
hypothesis using a three-way interaction between the values of our two dimensions and the regime type at the time when respondents were socialized. The results are presented in Model 3 of Table 1. Interpreting three-way interactions is not straightforward and we therefore focus on the graphical interpretation presented in Figure 5. Figure 5 plots the marginal effects of access to political power on satisfaction with democracy for different levels of public good provision. Again, we distinguish between the regime type - democracies (dashed line) and autocracies (solid line). The marginal effects can be interpreted as the regression coefficient for political power inclusiveness.

As Figure 5 demonstrates, in autocracies that rely on excessive public good provision (value=4), increasing political power will lead to a negative impact on satisfaction with democracy. Given the marginal effect of about 4.8, going from no political access to full access, would decrease democratic satisfaction by 19.2 points on a 0-100 scale. This impact of political inclusiveness is weaker in countries that are less economically generous, which confirms hypothesis 2.

Interestingly, Figure 5 also reveals that if an autocracy relies on the provision of particularistic goods only (value=0), increasing access to political power will have a positive effect on democratic satisfaction. Here the positive legacy effect of economic exclusiveness seems to outweigh the negative effect of higher political inclusiveness. The effect is however relatively small and significant only on the 5% level. In appendix 9 we further present these results plotting the marginal effects of public good provision against political power.27

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27 In Appendix 10 we present additional results replicating the analysis testing H3 by using a four-category regime typology of politically and economically exclusionary versus inclusionary regimes
Figure 5: Marginal effects of access to political power on satisfaction with democracy by public good provision

Note: The prediction is based on a linear HAPC model. Full results shown in M3 in Table 1.

Robustness tests

We test the sensitivity of our results using a series of additional tests, which are presented in Appendices 11 and 12. Firstly, we exchange our measure of economic inclusiveness by using income at the time of socialization instead of public good provision. We replace the level of economic inclusiveness of the regime (particularistic vs public goods provision) with the level of inequality for the following reason: the level of inequality of a regime should be the product of the redistributive policies of the regime. More simply, if a regime provides more public goods, then the level of inequality should be lower compared to cases when the regime provides particularistic goods. If that is true, then we should observe the following: citizens

with two hybrid types in the middle. The results confirm the findings presented above. Authoritarian regimes that were both inclusive in their access to political power as well as widely provided public good have the most critical citizens with democracy today. This confirms our reinforcement hypothesis.

Income inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient based on Haber and Menaldo (2011) and updated by V-Dem to today (Coppedge et al. 2016).
socialized under higher inequality should be more satisfied with democracy compared to citizens socialized under lower inequality. The analysis using inequality shows that satisfaction with democracy of post-1945 cohorts increase as the level of inequality of their regime increases.

Secondly, other characteristics of authoritarian regimes could drive their legacy on democratic attitudes. We therefore re-run the analysis including two additional factors to account for the characteristics of regimes, when different generations were socialized. Firstly, we account for physical repression, measured by torture and political killings. Autocracies often use hard repression as another tool to control the mass population. The level of repression also could affect the inclusiveness of the regime, with more exclusive regimes using more physical force than inclusive regimes. We therefore add this control variable to our main models, presented in Table 1, Model 3, predicting satisfaction with democracy. The three-way interaction effect between the two dimensions of inclusiveness and growing-up in a dictatorship is slightly reduced (from b=-4.040, p<0.000 in M3 in Table 1 to b=-3.640, p<0.000). This differences is however not significant. This indicates that indeed some of the effect of regime inclusiveness is through the use of repression, which has a negative effect on democratic satisfaction. The less repressive the regime was during a respondent’s formative years, the more positive she is about democracy (b=4.080, p<0.001).

29 We use the physical integrity index from V-Dem that ranges from 0 to 1, whereas lower values indicate more repression. More information in Appendix 6.5.1.
Further, we account for the level of economic development at the time of regime socialization measured using logged GPD (per capita).\textsuperscript{30} We could argue that the level of political and economic inclusiveness depends in part how developed a country is in general. In poor countries, public provision of services and inclusion of ordinary citizens into the political process might be more important than in very developed countries, where citizens are less dependent on state provision. In order to test this argument, we include logged GDP (per capita) in the model as a control variable (see Table A11, M3.1 in the Appendix). Controlling for economic development significantly reduces the three-way interaction effect, which tests H2 (b=-2.080, p<0.000). This implies that some of the legacy impact of authoritarian ruling strategies is dependent on the level of economic development.

We explore this further by repeating the analysis on the subset of cohorts that grew up in autocracies and interacted the level of economic inclusiveness that they were exposed to and the nation’s logged GDP (see Table A11, M3.2). The impact of public good provision is the strongest for mid-level countries and insignificant when countries are very poor or very rich. Poor countries will not be able to credibly supply public goods to its citizens and in very rich countries it might not matter whether the regime provides goods or not, as citizens might just generally profit from the wealth of the country. Importantly, the results do confirm the hypothesis that more economically inclusive regimes produce long-term

\footnote{As our macro data goes back to 1915, we had to compile historical GDP using 1990 value of Geary-Khamis dollar from the Maddison project. In this model we excluded the measure of current (at time of survey) measure of logged GDP, as this is highly correlated with past GDP, when respondents where 15 years old (R=0.78), which shows the strong path-dependency in economic development.}
negative legacies on democratic satisfaction, especially in countries at the mid-range of economic development, where governmental actions might be most influential.

Thirdly, we changed the sample that we use in our analysis, by applying a more restrictive inclusion criteria for cohorts by excluding 242 cohorts (14 percent) that have fewer than 50 observations. These relatively empty cells are more prone to outliers. Re-running the analysis of M3, shown in Table 1, confirms our results that the more inclusive autocracies are during respondents’ formative years, the less positive they are with the democratic system (see Table A11, Model 4).

Lastly, we tested the sensitivity of our cohort specification by firstly altering the age at which we assume the formative years to take place and secondly, changing the cohort groupings. The results for both robustness tests are presented in Appendix 12. Regarding the first test, we estimate models that match the regime ruling strategies when respondents were 1) 5-10 years old; 2) 10-15 years old; 3) 15-20 years old (the specification used for the main results); 4) 20-25 years old; 5) 25-30 years old; and 6) 30-35 years old. It does not really matter at what age someone is exposed to certain regime strategies. The results are robust for all different specification of the formative years. However, we decided to follow previous theoretical and empirical evidence to determine the age of the formative years to be at between 15 and 20 (Bartels and Jackman, 2014).

In a second test we changed the cohort grouping by testing whether the results are sensitive to specifying the length of the formative years as 2, 5, 8 or 10-year intervals at the age of 15. This varies our number of country-cohorts from 3,607 to 785. As the results of Appendix 12.2 show, our findings are not sensitive to the
cohort length. For the main models presented above we however decided to keep the 5-year cohorts, as this is standard in cohort analysis (Fienberg and Mason, 1979; Mason et al., 1973).

**Within regime variation - Winners and losers of autocracies**

After having established that authoritarian ruling strategies have a lasting imprint on citizens’ democratic attitudes across countries, we now present two empirical tests to investigate the within regime heterogeneity of varying experiences of people that experienced the same ruling strategy. In order to test hypothesis 3, we firstly investigate eleven post-Communist countries by focusing on the working class as a social group that very much profited from the regime, while religious people were the most suppressed in practicing their beliefs. Secondly, we use ethnic power divisions as another example of winners and losers of dictatorships. In some regimes, certain ethnic groups are dominant in holding political power, while other groups are discriminated.\(^{31}\)

**Within-Regime Analysis I: Working Class vs. Religion in Former Communist Regimes**

Communist ideology is based on secularization and the empowerment of the working class. This creates clear winners – working class – and losers – religious people – of communist regimes. We test whether this led to varying levels of democratic support in the post-Communist era in eleven Central Eastern European countries using the data from the European Social Survey (ESS) only. The ESS

\(^{31}\) The list of countries included in both within-regime analyses is presented in Appendix 13.
included in five waves (2004 to 2012) the question about the occupation of the respondent’s father at the age of 14. We thereby contrast those that come from a working class with the rest. The rationale of using father’s occupation is that we firstly assume that the social class position during the formative years is most important for crystallizing a sense of belonging to the regime. More precisely, people that grew up in a working class family are expected to have been socialized into belonging to the selectorate of the communist regimes. Hence, they are likely to be more critical with the democratic system today, as they might feel that they lost out in the transition compared to socialist times.

Secondly, we use father’s occupation rather than the respondent’s own occupation, as there is potential social mobility and we can hence not know whether a person’s current social class corresponds to the social class of the time of socialization. We contrast these winners of socialism with religious people that were very much repressed by the state driven secularization of socialist societies (Mueller and Neundorf, 2012). Here we measure religion simply by denomination comparing those that are not religious with those that are Christians.

The results of these analyses are reported in Table 2. Here we interact whether a respondent belongs to the winners or losers with a dummy variable whether this person grew up during the Communist regime. The results are illustrated in Figure 6.
Table 2: Linear regression: Satisfaction with democracy (Eastern Europe only)

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<th>M1: Social class</th>
<th>M2: Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialization context (at c)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autocracy (Communism)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.389)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Father worker</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.441)</td>
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<td>Autocracy x father worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income: 20-40%</td>
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Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Note: The prediction is based on a linear regression with country FE, controlling for gender, education and working. Central European countries only (Bulgaria, Czech Rep., East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine); Data: ESS, 2004-2012.

First of all, we see generally much lower levels of satisfaction with democracy for the generation that grew up under communisms contrasted to those that belong the post-Communist generation that grew up in democratic times. Nevertheless, the pattern emerging from Figure 6 clearly confirms Hypothesis 3. Respondents that were raised in a working class family are most critical with democracy today, while
those that are religious are significantly more satisfied with democracy. The difference between winners and losers is small, but significant.

**Figure 6**: Predicted Satisfaction with democracy by social background, religion and regime socialization

*Note*: Predictions and 95% confidence intervals are based in the results shown in Table 2.

**Within-Regime Analysis II: Ethnic Political Power Relationship**

Our second within-regime analysis focuses on ethnicity as a source for creating winners and losers, i.e. membership in the autocratic selectorate. For this purpose, we rely on data from the World Values Survey, which included a detailed measure of ethnicity as well as the dependent variable in Wave 4 (1999-2004). We match the ethnicity code of the WVS to that of the data of Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) project (Vogt et al., 2015). The EPR provides annual data (1946-2013) on politically relevant ethnic groups, their relative size as a share of the country population, and their

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32 Ethnicity is defined as a subjective experience. It is a sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture. Ethnic groups are considered to be relevant if either at least
access to power. We included in our data only the groups that could be clearly identified to avoid collapsing too much EPR heterogeneity into one category. Finally, we have 77 ethnic groups from 21 countries. In order to adjust for sampling of different groups, we correct the results by using population weights provided by the WVS.

EPR codes the access to power of ethnic group on an ordinal scale, with three main categories, which are then divided into sub-categories. Here we contrast only two types of political power ethnic groups can have. Firstly a group can be dominant by ruling alone (EPR classification: monopoly or dominance) or a group can be discriminated by being excluded from power (EPR classification: powerless or discriminated). We do not count self-exclusion as a form of discrimination.

Table 3 reports the results of a linear regression on satisfaction of democracy, where we identify whether a respondent belongs to an ethnic group that was discriminated or dominant during an autocratic regime at the time of socialization (Model 1). In Model 2 we further measure the size of the discriminated (M2a) and dominant group (M2b). Again we interact these variables with the political regime (democratic vs. autocratic) at time of adolescence. The results confirm Hypothesis 2,

one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of the group in the national political arena or if group members are systematically and intentionally discriminated in the political sphere.

33 For instance, in Georgia, EPR identifies the following ethnic groups: Georgians, Armenians, Azeri, Ossetians and Abkhazians. In contrast, WVS has two categories: Georgians and others. Then, the Georgian ethnic group can be easily identified and matched with the EPR data on power relations. However, the remaining four ethnic groups cannot be collapsed into one category because it would mean to conflate powerless groups (Armenian and Azeri) with self-excluded groups (Ossetians and Abkhazians).

34 See Appendix 6.6 for the exact classification of ethnic power position by the EPR.
as people that belong to a discriminated group at time of the autocracy are significantly more positive with democracy today.

Table 3: Linear regression: Satisfaction with democracy and ethnic power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M1: Dominant vs. discriminated Coef.</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>M2a: Discriminated Coef.</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>M2b: Dominant Coef.</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.046*</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>0.052**</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>0.041*</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialization Context (at c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>-0.472</td>
<td>(0.900)</td>
<td>-1.164</td>
<td>(0.905)</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>(1.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminated (vs. dominant)</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>(1.269)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of discriminated group</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>(5.226)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of dominant group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>(1.560)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Autocracy x ethnic group</td>
<td>3.174**</td>
<td>(1.456)</td>
<td>20.595***</td>
<td>(5.442)</td>
<td>-0.751</td>
<td>(1.733)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual-level controls</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.567</td>
<td>(0.617)</td>
<td>-0.413</td>
<td>(0.603)</td>
<td>-0.612</td>
<td>(0.619)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Secondary</td>
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<td>(0.799)</td>
<td>1.631**</td>
<td>(0.806)</td>
<td>0.745</td>
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<td>1.587*</td>
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<td>Working</td>
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<td>0.562</td>
<td>(0.645)</td>
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<td>(0.659)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>34.330***</td>
<td>(2.157)</td>
<td>34.332***</td>
<td>(2.159)</td>
<td>34.205***</td>
<td>(2.251)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N (of respondents)</td>
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<td>AIC</td>
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<td>124,396</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Data: WVS, wave 4 only. Weighted by population weight.
Figure 7: Predicted Satisfaction with Democracy by ethnic power position and regime socialization

Note: Predictions and 95% confidence intervals are based in the results shown of Model 1 in Table 3.

These effects are illustrated in Figures 7 and 8. As Figure 7 shows, there is a 6 points difference in democratic satisfaction between those that belong to the dominant group and those that belong to the discriminated group. Turning to the size of the ethnic group in Model 2 and Figure 8, it is striking how strong the effect is especially if a large group was suppressed. If a minority ethnic group ruled an autocracy and the discriminated group is in the majority, satisfaction with democracy is much higher. This clearly supports the idea that there is a feeling of liberation for such a discriminated group.
Figure 8: Predicted Satisfaction with Democracy by size of ethnic power position and regime socialization

Note: Predictions and 95% confidence intervals are based in the results of Models 2a and 2b shown in Table 3.

Conclusion

This article proposed a distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary ruling strategies of autocracies that cast a long shadow on political attitudes even after the regime broke down. We argue that citizens’ political attitudes towards democracy are shaped by the policies of the authoritarian regime in which they spent their formative years. Our theoretical expectations were that citizens who were socialized in more inclusionary regimes are more critical with democracy than citizens who spent their formative years in exclusionary regimes. The intuition behind this expectation was that inclusionary regimes are better at creating general regime support of citizens by a wider redistribution of political and economic resources. Further, we also expected to observe within regime differences in political attitudes,
as citizens who were part of the winning group of autocracy are less satisfied with democracy than members of the losing group.

These expectations were tested using hierarchical age, period, cohort (HAPC) models with harmonized public opinion data, regime data from V-Dem, and ethnic group data from the Ethnic Power Relations data. The results support our contention that people who were socialized in exclusionary regimes are more supportive of democracy compared to citizens socialized in inclusionary regimes, and even democracies. Also, we find that citizens that are part of the winning group in an autocracy are less satisfied with democracy compared to citizens who were part of discriminated groups. We interpret these democratic attitudes as an indicator about the nostalgia for the old authoritarian regime.

This study offered a micro perspective of authoritarian politics by examining the governance strategies used to build a loyal citizenry. Further, it showed the long-term effects of authoritarian politics and their legacy long after the regime has collapsed. These results indicate that we should pay more attention to the role of ordinary citizens in autocracies and that political attitudes towards democracy are shaped long before citizens even experience democracy.
Bibliography


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