Higher-order defeat in collective moral epistemology

Carter, J. A. and Mortini, D. (2020) Higher-order defeat in collective moral epistemology. In: Klenk, M. (ed.) Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Series: Routledge studies in epistemology. Routledge: New York. ISBN 9780367343200

[img] Text
192026.pdf - Accepted Version



This chapter discusses methodology in epistemology. It argues that settling the facts, even the epistemic facts, fails to settle the questions of intellectual policy at the centre of our epistemic lives. One upshot is that the standard methodology of analysing concepts like knowledge, justification, rationality, and so on is misconceived. More generally, any epistemic method that seeks to issue in intellectual policy by settling the facts, whether by way of abductive theorizing or empirical investigation, no matter how reliable, is inapt. The argument is a radicalization of Moore’s open-question argument. In conclusion, the ramifications of this argument for the debate surrounding modal security, a proposed necessary condition on undermining defeat, are considered.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Mortini, Dario and Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Mortini, D.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Published Online:13 January 2020
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 Routledge
First Published:First published in Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology: Chapter 9
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record