On behalf of a bi-level account of trust

Carter, J. A. (2019) On behalf of a bi-level account of trust. Philosophical Studies, (doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01311-2) (Early Online Publication)

Carter, J. A. (2019) On behalf of a bi-level account of trust. Philosophical Studies, (doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01311-2) (Early Online Publication)

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Abstract

A bi-level account of trust is developed and defended, one with relevance in ethics as well as epistemology. The proposed account of trust—on which trusting is modelled within a virtue-theoretic framework as a performance-type with an aim—distinguishes between two distinct levels of trust, apt and convictive, that take us beyond previous assessments of its nature, value, and relationship to risk assessment. While Ernest Sosa (2009; 2015; 2017), in particular, has shown how a performance normativity model may be fruitfully applied to belief, my objective is to apply this kind of model in a novel and principled way to trust. I conclude by outlining some of the key advantages of the performance-theoretic bi-level account of trust defended over more traditional univocal proposals.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Early Online Publication
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr Joseph
Authors: Carter, J. A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0031-8116
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:17 June 2019
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2019 The Authors
First Published:First published in Philosophical Studies 2019
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons license

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