Fair Mixing: the Case of Dichotomous Preferences

Aziz, H., Bogomolnaia, A. and Moulin, H. (2019) Fair Mixing: the Case of Dichotomous Preferences. In: 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC '19), Phoenix, AZ, USA, 24-28 Jun 2019, pp. 753-781. ISBN 9781450367929 (doi:10.1145/3328526.3329552)

186577.pdf - Accepted Version



We consider a setting in which agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes. The agents have dichotomous preferences: each outcome is liked or disliked by an agent. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is strategyproof and guarantees to any group of like-minded agents an influence proportional to its size. It is easier to compute and more efficient than the familiar Random Priority rule. Its worst case (resp. average) inefficiency is provably (resp. in numerical experiments) low if the number of agents is low. The efficient Egalitarian rule protects individual agents but not coalitions. It is excludable strategyproof: I do not want to lie if I cannot consume outcomes I claim to dislike. The efficient Nash Max Product rule offers the strongest welfare guarantees to coalitions, who can force any outcome with a probability proportional to their size. But it even fails the excludable form of strategyproofness.

Item Type:Conference Proceedings
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve and Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna
Authors: Aziz, H., Bogomolnaia, A., and Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2019 Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy
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