Attitudes and practices

Pettigrove, G. (2019) Attitudes and practices. Australasian Philosophical Review, 3(3), pp. 288-304. (doi: 10.1080/24740500.2020.1859233)

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Abstract

The philosophical literature on forgiveness has ignored a distinction that has a profound bearing on when we should forgive, namely, the distinction between attitudes and practices. Most of the literature focuses on the attitudes called for in the aftermath of wrongdoing. And it attempts to derive the ethics of forgiving directly from the ethical profile of those attitudes. However, attitudes underdetermine what one ought to do. I argue that assessing what we should do also requires us to consider practices. Although I focus on forgiveness, the argument generalizes to other areas. Taking the distinction between attitudes and practices seriously will change the way we approach not only the question, ‘When should one forgive?’ but also, for example, ‘When should one be grateful?’ ‘When should one blame?’ ‘When should one honour?’ or any other activity that includes an attitude as a defining feature.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Pettigrove, Professor Glen
Authors: Pettigrove, G.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Australasian Philosophical Review
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN:2474-0500
ISSN (Online):2474-0519
Published Online:11 March 2021
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2021 Australasian Association of Philosophy
First Published:First published in Australasian Philosophical Review 3(3): 288-304
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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