Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a labour production economy with unequal skills

Hayashi, T. (2020) Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a labour production economy with unequal skills. Japanese Economic Review, 71(2), pp. 221-232. (doi: 10.1111/jere.12222)

Abstract

This article characterises the class of strategy‐proof and efficient rules in a labour production economy in which technology is linear and individuals may have unequal labour productivities. As each individual’s wage per hour is determined by their labour productivity under efficiency, an allocation rule reduces to a lump‐sum transfer rule. We characterise how strategy‐proofness and other axioms put restrictions on the class of lump‐sum transfer rules, and we show that what we can do using lump‐sum transfers is quite limited.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Hayashi, Professor Takashi
• Authors: Hayashi, T.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
• Journal Name: Japanese Economic Review
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 1352-4739
• ISSN (Online): 1468-5876
• Published Online: 31 January 2019
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2019 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Japanese Economic Review 71(2): 221-232
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License