Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology

Simion, M. I. , Schnurr, J. and Gordon, E. C. (2021) Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology. Synthese, 198(15), pp. 3553-3564. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02165-1)

Abstract

Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we’re right, doxastic normativism offers little in the way of theoretical support for the claim that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are anything but garden-variety beliefs. The second concerns theoretical fruitfulness: we show that embracing a No-Belief view will either get us in serious theoretical trouble, or loose all anti-sceptical appeal.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Gordon, Dr Emma and Simion, Professor Mona
• Authors: Simion, M. I., Schnurr, J., and Gordon, E. C.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Research Group: COGITO
• Journal Name: Synthese
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0039-7857
• ISSN (Online): 1573-0964
• Published Online: 02 March 2019
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2019 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Synthese 198(15): 3553-3564
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons license