



Kaczmarek, M. (2019) Convergence or divergence? Visions of world order and the Russian-Chinese relationship. *European Politics and Society*, 20(2), pp. 207-224. (doi: [10.1080/23745118.2018.1545185](https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545185))

There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.

<http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/173045/>

Deposited on: 13 November 2018

Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow  
<http://eprints.gla.ac.uk>

# **Convergence or Divergence? Visions of World Order and the Russian-Chinese Relationship**

The version accepted for publication by *European Politics and Society*

Author: Marcin Kaczmarski

Abstract: Scholars studying Sino-Russian relations remain divided regarding the extent to which Russia and China's visions of the international order converge or diverge. This article addresses this question by comparing how Russian and Chinese elites interpret the evolution of world order and how they imagine the end goals of this evolution. My analysis shows that Russian and Chinese views on world order partly overlap and partly diverge. Russia and China's defiance of Western primacy in international politics provides a basis for cooperation. Both countries distrust the West and oppose a number of policies pursued by the United States and its European allies. At the same time, leaders in Moscow and Beijing do not fully agree on what alternative norms they would like to promote. While joint declarations paper over this divergence, the differences are more pronounced in the patterns of Russian and Chinese practical engagement with global governance and their attitudes towards globalization and anti-globalization movements. The Chinese leadership appears to be genuinely interested in contributing to political and economic stability, while Moscow seeks first and foremost the symbolic confirmation of its great-power status and does not mind the role of an occasional spoiler. The article concludes that these differences have the potential to slow down, if not derail, long-term cooperation between Russia and China.

Keywords: Russia; China; Russia-China relations; world order; global governance

---

## **INTRODUCTION**

The rise of powers such as China, India and Brazil as well as the resurgence of Russia have been the most visible signs of the ongoing global power shift. These states demonstrate capacity to contribute to the production of international and regional order and share an aspiration for a greater say in world affairs. The implications of their rise for the liberal international order have been at the centre of scholarly debate since the mid-2000s (for contrasting views, see Ikenberry, 2008; Kagan, 2008; Kupchan, 2012).

Russia and China stand out among the emerging powers due to a number of reasons, including permanent seats in the UN Security Council and substantial military and economic resources. Both states were identified as rivals by the United States in its 2017 National Security Strategy (White House, 2017, pp. 25-28). Indeed, many Western governments remain deeply disturbed by Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine as well as by China's aggressive pursuit of territorial claims in the South China Sea and its rejection of the ruling by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The questions of how Russia and China see the future of world order and whether they are willing and capable of changing it is thus one of the most pressing issues in the debate on rising powers.

If anything, the debate on Russian-Chinese relations and their long-term implications for the international order has accelerated in the aftermath of the 2014 Russian-Western conflict over Ukraine. The growing interest of scholars and analysts has resulted in an impressive number of books (Bolt and Cross, 2018; Kaczmarek, 2015; Lee and Lukin, 2016; Lo, 2017; Lubina, 2017; Lukin, 2018; Luzyanin, 2018), articles (Flikke, 2016; Korolev, 2016; Krickovic, 2017; Wilson, 2018; Wishnick, 2017) and reports (Bond, 2016; Chase et al., 2017; Duchâtel and Godement, 2016; Stronski and Ng, 2018) that explore particular aspects of the ties between Moscow and Beijing.

While most observers agree that Russia and China reject US primacy in global affairs, there is a significant dispute in the literature on the extent to which both states are dissatisfied with the existing liberal international order and whether their visions of a future order converge (Korolev, 2016; Lubina, 2017; Wilson, 2018) or diverge (Lo, 2017; Snetkov and Lanteigne, 2014). Some authors emphasise that Russia and China embrace multipolarity and envision a global concert of great powers (Lubina, 2017, p. 284) or point to "a consensual view on the international political system" (Wilson, 2018, p. 3). Others remain sceptical. Bobo Lo, for

example, argues that Moscow and Beijing differ in their attitudes towards the post-Cold War order, as their understandings of multipolarity vary (Lo, 2017, p. xx). According to Lo, both states have “contrasting visions of their respective places in the twenty first century global order” (Lo, 2017, p. xv-xvi). While Russia is on the “losing” end, China has vested interests in the preservation of at least some part of the present order. Likewise, Paul Bolt and Sharyl Cross speak of “common views on most major world issues” (Bolt and Cross, 2018, p. 1), but notice that Russia’s and China’s dissatisfaction with the liberal order is selective and differentiated (Bolt and Cross, 2018, p. 154-155).

In this article, I aim to contribute to this debate by comparing how Russian and Chinese elites interpret the evolution of world order. Juxtaposing these visions with Russian and Chinese practices in the realm of global governance, I will address the issue of convergence – i.e., to what extent these Russian and Chinese visions and practices are conducive to Sino-Russian cooperation in a long-term perspective.

At first sight, it seems as if Moscow and Beijing agree on the kind of international order they would like to establish. The ruling elites in both states repeatedly emphasise their countries’ unique global roles, especially with regard to international security and conflict resolution. They cherish the traditional, “Westphalian” definition of sovereignty, which they understand as the state’s impunity within its borders. At the same time, they broaden the notion of state sovereignty to encompass new global commons such as cyberspace (Nocetti, 2015). Moreover, the political elites in both countries are united in their rejection of several aspects of the contemporary liberal order, above all the Western promotion of democracy and its interventionist human rights agenda. Moscow and Beijing express their desire for a diminished role of Western states in general and the US in particular, which is reflected in their calls for a “democratization” of international relations. Membership in key global institutions, especially their permanent seats in the UN Security Council, enables both states to influence the global agenda according to their shared normative orientations. Apart from cooperation in existing institutions, Russia and China have also been working to create a parallel set of institutions at the global level, first and foremost by establishing the BRICS forum and supplementing it with a number of additional institutional arrangements, such as the New Development Bank.

The similarity of these visions stands in contradiction to the ways in which China and Russia present themselves to the external world, their respective places in global governance and their practices related to the construction of international order. In other words, both states differ increasingly not only in terms of power capabilities, but also in their interactions with the outside world. China supports economic globalization, even though it continues to protect large chunks of its economy. In many ways, it prefers the maintenance of the status quo for the sake of predictability and stability. Russia, on the other hand, seems to turn more towards protectionism and finds regionalization a better way for maintaining its position in the international pecking order. In recent years, moreover, Moscow appears to thrive on instability and chaos in international politics. For example, it seeks to propel and derive advantages from rising populism in the West. I argue that China and Russia's conflicting preferences create serious obstacles for the long-term stability of their cooperation.<sup>1</sup>

The article proceeds as follows. First, I reconstruct China's and Russia's overlapping visions of the international order. Second, I focus on the differences in both states attitudes towards and practices in global governance. In the third and concluding section, I explain the reasons for these differences and discuss the implications for long-term Sino-Russian cooperation.

## **THE JOINT VISION**

The overlapping Russo-Chinese vision of international order is most clearly expressed in numerous joint declarations and documents adopted during annual summits.<sup>2</sup> These documents provide insights into the scope of their shared interests and concerns as well as an understanding of the Russia-China relationship with regard to the dimension of global order. In addition, Moscow and Beijing have issued several joint statements dedicated specifically to international affairs that describe in more detail their shared positions on key global issues. In the last ten years, three such documents have been adopted: in 2008, 2011 and 2017. These documents are supplemented by joint issue-focused declarations, such as one on international law (2016) and strategic stability (2016).

---

<sup>1</sup> The complexity and internal contradictions of **Russia and China's visions** of world order makes it difficult to classify them in terms of status quo or (neo-)revisionist powers. For depictions of Russia as a 'neo-revisionist' power, see (Sakwa, 2017). For a view of China as a revisionist actor, see (Callahan, 2016).

<sup>2</sup> For a quantitative analysis of Russian-Chinese treaties and agreements, see (Ambrosio, 2017).

In these communications, several points of convergence between Russia and China can be identified: common views on the evolution of international order; emphasis on the centrality of the UN; common attitudes towards global and regional security challenges; and joint approaches towards multilateral cooperation in international affairs. Let us take a closer look at each of these points.

### ***Evolving Attitudes to International Order***

The shared idea of being entitled to a privileged position in international politics finds its reflection in Sino-Russian declarations that are adopted at annual summits. They usually provide a catalogue of the positions agreed to by the two states regarding ongoing conflicts, “hot-spots” and challenges to global and regional security. Moscow and Beijing emphasise that their cooperation contributes to international peace and stability and reaffirm recurrently their readiness to jointly tackle challenges to regional and global security (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018). The documents also maintain that Sino-Russian cooperation serves to sustain ‘strategic balance and stability in the world’ (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and contributes to strengthen peace, security and stability in regional and global dimensions (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012). It is important to note here that international security is interpreted by Moscow and Beijing in a state-centric manner. Both states prioritize the maintenance of the status quo insofar as they tend to support incumbents in domestic conflicts and civil wars. Regular references condemning “external interference” are usually directed at the West and its engagement or intervention in particular conflicts. Additionally, Moscow and Beijing state that their goal is to democratize international relations and to create a more just and ‘rational polycentric international order’ (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b, 2018).

In the beginning of the 2010s, Russia and China argued that the international system was undergoing a transition to “a polycentric basis”, while the global economic crisis had proven the ineffectiveness of the current global governance system (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 1). Over the course of the last decade, both states have come to see the pace of these changes accelerating against the backdrop of deepening interdependence between states and the pressing need for a reform of global governance mechanisms (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012, 2014b). In other words, Moscow and Beijing agree that world politics is moving towards

multipolarity (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012) and that global competition and rivalry has become more intense (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). In fact, the belief in an irreversible drive of the world towards multipolarity can be traced back to the previous decade (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008). The same goes for other features of contemporary global politics, such as the persistent tendency of Western states for undertaking unilateral actions and the deepening of economic globalization (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008). In recent years, both states have also recognized growing instability and unpredictability in the world, including high conflict potential, increasing geopolitical contradictions and protectionism (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018), along with weak economic growth and reversals of globalization (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017).

In several of their latest declarations, Moscow and Beijing have supported the pursuit of a “new type of international relations”, which is a clear reference to Chinese diplomatic vocabulary (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, 2018), although the phrase of “new international relations” had also been used previously by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. These “new international relations” should be based on win-win cooperation and the creation of a shared destiny community (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018), which once again borrows from the rhetoric of Chinese diplomacy. Already in 2008, for example, both states spoke of the creation of a harmonious international order – a concept that was strongly promoted at the time by the Chinese leadership. At the same time, when both states speak of equal participation of all states in global governance, the primacy of international law (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and especially the need to provide for equal and indivisible security (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018), one can see clear references to Russian diplomatic rhetoric. The presence of this type of wording in joint declarations suggests mutual recognition of each other’s strategic narratives towards global politics and international order.

### ***The Centrality of the UN and the Primacy of International Law***

Moscow and Beijing declare the United Nations to be the most important global institution.<sup>3</sup> Both states place the UN and their key institution – the UN Security Council (UNSC) – at the centre of their world order visions.

---

<sup>3</sup> (on China’s position, see also Godement et al., 2018).

The centrality of the UN is reflected in Russia and China's support of multilateralism as well as in both countries' affirmation of the UN's pivotal role in global governance (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and securing global peace (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). Moscow and Beijing deem the UN to be the most universal, representative and authoritative forum (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 2; 2012). Additionally, both Russia and China emphasize that the Security Council should retain its role as the major institution responsible for international peace and security. Thus, both countries strongly oppose attempts by other states to circumvent the UNSC when conducting military operations (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012, 2018).

With regard to a reform of the United Nations and the primary role of the UNSC, Russia and China stay on the side of maintaining the status quo. To be sure, they are ready – at least on the rhetorical level – to support a UNSC reform that would increase the participation of smaller and medium-sized states (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017), but prefer a “package reform” and oppose any “artificial” deadlines (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, 2018). In practice, such an approach equates postponing the reform for an indefinite period. One reason for this is that their permanent seats give them a veto over any “constitutional” policy shifts, which in turn allows them to protect themselves and their allies from interference promoted by Western great powers. The US or Western unilateralism is deemed unacceptable by Moscow and Beijing not least because it threatens to render their veto in the UNSC useless. Thus, it is both fundamental and instrumental for Moscow and Beijing to strengthen the UNSC. As is well known to observers of international relations, both China and Russia attempt to shape the agenda and practices in UN forums in such a way as to prevent the organization from interfering in the domestic affairs of particular states. Thus, from Beijing and Moscow's perspective, any shifts in how international order works should not undermine the central role played by the UNSC.

The declared respect for international law as a way to regulate inter-state relations follows from the preceding. Russia and China have recurrently emphasized their attachment to international law (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 3; 2018) and the need to reaffirm the primacy of international law (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012). Moreover, in 2016, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries adopted the Declaration on the Promotion of International Law (Russian Federation, 2016). In the declaration, the two states emphasised

the principles of sovereign equality (point 2) and non-intervention in “internal or external affairs” (point 4), rejected “unilateral sanctions” (point 6) and called for respecting obligations related to state immunity (point 8).

In short, Sino-Russian support for international law is tightly interlinked with calls for respecting state sovereignty. State sovereignty, non-interference and territorial integrity are regularly invoked by government officials in Beijing and Moscow as key elements of international order (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012, 2014b, 2017). In 2011, it was related to the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, with Russia and China calling for non-interference of external forces into domestic processes in the region (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 19). They also criticized the broadened interpretations of the UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973 related to Libya (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 20). In more recent years, both states have explicitly protested against regime change by means of illegal interference from the outside and against the extraterritorial application of national laws in contradiction with international law (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 3).

Finally, when declaring their support for such issues as human rights, both Beijing and Moscow emphasise that each state has their own right to choose the way of development (2017, point 7). Their declaration adds that states should respect historical heritage, cultural traditions and the right of each nation to define their future (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 3). They also protest against the “politicization” of human rights (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 7) and the imposition of parochial standards under the guise of their allegedly universal nature (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). Instead, Russia and China maintain that one should respect each state’s specific situation in the sphere of human rights (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008). This attitude is usually accompanied by support for inter-cultural and inter-civilizational dialogue (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008, 2012, 2014b).

### ***Global and Regional Security***

In terms of global and regional security, Russia and China rhetorically reaffirm their readiness to participate in the construction of an international security architecture that would be based on the non-use of force, non-interference in domestic affairs and political-diplomatic conflict resolution (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018). International security should remain common and

indivisible (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008, 2012), without any dividing lines in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian areas (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 12).

Striving to maintain “global and regional strategic balance and stability”, both states oppose the development and deployment of missile defence systems (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, 2018). Indeed, the issue of missile defence has been raised regularly and is connected with the non-militarization of space (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008, p. point 9; 2011). With regard to the outer space, both states continue to promote their joint draft treaty they put forward in 2014, which forbids deploying arms and weapons in space, and regularly warn of the threat of space militarization (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, 2018). At the same time, Russia and China support the non-proliferation regime (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017), although they have stopped short of declaring their support for the idea of a nuclear-free world, which could be found in earlier declarations (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 8).

Their state-centred view of international security notwithstanding, Russia and China pay increasing attention to non-traditional and non-military threats in policy documents. Both states emphasise the need to fight terrorism, which they usually link to extremism. At the same time, they condemn “politicization” or “double standards” with regard to this issue (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008; 2017, p. point 4; 2018). This can be interpreted as a veiled criticism of Western states’ policies on countering terrorism. The language has evolved over time towards a harsher critique, as for instance the 2011 declaration did not mention “double standards” and merely called for international cooperation (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 7). Russia and China also emphasize that the UN should have a coordinating role in the fight against international terrorism (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008, 2014b).

Likewise, both states have vowed to prevent the use of information and communication technologies for terrorist purposes (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 4) and appeal to respect each state’s right to choose their own model of managing cybersecurity (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 6). In fact, the topic of information security has appeared consistently in joint declarations throughout the last decade (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 10; 2014b, 2017). Relatedly, China and Russia have openly stated their uneasiness about the potential use of information technologies to undermine international stability and infringe upon state sovereignty (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b).

Moscow and Beijing have also warned of the surge in non-traditional security threats, such as the uncontrolled flow of migrants, highly dangerous pandemics and climate change (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017). In that context, it is interesting note that when referring to climate change, both have emphasized their readiness to cooperate closely with others (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). At the same time, China and Russia have invoked the principle of a “common but differentiated responsibility” (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008, p. point 11; 2011).

Regional conflicts and “hot spots” also continue to attract the attention of both states. They have declared to “respect each other’s interests in third states, regions and international groupings” (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and have coordinated their positions with regard to several regional issues. A case in point is the Syrian civil war. Moscow and Beijing have repeatedly called for respecting Syria’s territorial integrity (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012; 2017, p. point 19; 2018). They have also criticized Western states’ attempts to push for regime change (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012) and supported the process of chemical weapons liquidation (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). Likewise, the conflict in Afghanistan appears regularly in joint communications. Russia and China have called for a rebuilding of the country (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and declared their support for the ongoing peace process (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 20). They have also proposed to make Afghanistan an “independent state” (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012, 2014b). Indeed, in 2011, they suggested that Afghanistan should become a neutral country (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 21). The latter phrase, however, did not reappear in later communications.

Concerning the tensions on the Korean Peninsula, both states have emphasized the need to find a comprehensive solution (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and to pursue a denuclearization of the peninsula by means of political dialogue (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 17; 2017, p. point 17). They see a downscaling in military activities in the region and a return to the Six-Party Talks as the best way forward (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 17). Another nuclear proliferation-related issue, the crisis surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, has also attracted a lot of Russian and Chinese attention. Both states have promised to protect the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and cited it as an example of the benefits that result from “open international cooperation” (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 21). In their communications in previous years,

Moscow and Beijing pleaded for the resolution of the Iranian crisis by way of political-diplomatic means and protested vehemently against the application of extensive pressure on Iran, including unilateral sanctions (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012). In this context, it is also interesting to note that the Arab-Israeli conflict is mentioned only sporadically in joint Russo-Chinese documents (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b).

Regional conflicts in the respective neighbourhood of Russia and China are an especially sensitive topic. In 2011, China recognized Russia's efforts to protect its vital interests and contribute to regional peace and stability in the South Caucasus and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 16). In 2014, both states expressed their serious worries about "domestic conflict in Ukraine" and called for de-escalation and a nationwide dialogue (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). Whereas China was willing to acknowledge that Russia has special interests in the post-Soviet space, it stopped short of supporting its offensive foreign policy moves in this region. Beijing did not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence and Russia's annexation of Crimea. Moscow has mirrored this policy with regard to China's policy towards the South China Sea. This is to say that Russia has retained a neutral stance but nuances its position by declaring that outside powers should not interfere in the South China Sea disputes. As these examples illustrate, Russia and China walk a fine line with regard to each other's regional disputes. On the one hand, they are ready to tolerate the other's aggressive behaviour in its respective "near abroad". On the other hand, neither of the two is willing to openly support such actions.

### ***Multilateralism in International Order***

Russia and China present themselves as staunch proponents of multilateral cooperation. In each communication, they enumerate particular formats of cooperation and declare their support for them. The catalogue encompasses the BRICS format, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA), the G-20 Group, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Russia-China-India triangle, the Asia-Europe Forum (ASEM) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) formats of external cooperation (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b, 2017).

Both countries also support rhetorically an open, just and non-discriminatory system of global trade (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012). In terms of economic multilateralism, Russia and China

regard the WTO as the core of the global trade system (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018), with regional arrangements playing a subsidiary role (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 8). At the same time, they emphasize the need for reform of the international financial architecture and a broader role for developing states (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). In particular, Moscow and Beijing welcome a growing role of the G-20 in the areas of global finance and economics (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 3) and hail collaboration pursued within the BRICS grouping (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 4). Russia and China actively push for the transformation of BRICS into a mechanism of cooperation and coordination with regard to global financial-economic and international-political problems (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). Moreover, Moscow and Beijing jointly oppose the imposition of unilateral economic sanctions as well as unfair trade practices (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018). This falls in line with their opposition towards the unilateral use of force and reveals a general dislike of unilateral actions over which they have no veto power. Both have also declared their support for sustainable growth, stability of the international financial system, and the liberalization of trade and investment (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017; 2018, p. point 8). Moreover, in the realm of development cooperation, Russia and China have repeatedly declared their support for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and the UN Development Agenda by 2030 as well as called for strengthening global development partnerships (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, 2018).

In sum, it becomes clear that there is substantial overlap between Russia and China's world order visions. As illustrated by this analysis, the content of joint statements has evolved over time but with regard to details rather than fundamental issues. The ensuing changes can be ascribed either to shifts and corrections in Russian or Chinese foreign policies, or to the emergence of new global and regional issues, which required Moscow and Beijing to react. In general, there is no doubt that the declarations reflect a "common denominator" between the two states regarding international affairs. Thus, judging by the number of areas in which Moscow and Beijing have similar views, one might expect them to cooperate closely in the realm of global governance. This is not the case, however, as the next section will show.

## **RUSSIA AND CHINA'S DIVERGING ATTITUDES TO AND PRACTICES IN WORLD ORDER**

Notwithstanding the apparent convergence between Russia and China's world order visions, both states portray their roles in the international arena in quite different ways. Two paradigmatic statements by both states' leaders symbolize this discrepancy: Vladimir Putin's speech delivered at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 (Putin, 2007) and Xi Jinping's speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2017 (Xi, 2017).

The Russian government's message to the world remains grounded in Putin's Munich speech. Moscow sees itself first and foremost as a great power and a bulwark against US dominance and unipolarity. Russia seeks affinity with all actors dissatisfied with US policies. This message has been repeated regularly, the most recent example being Putin's 2018 address to the Federal Assembly, where he emphasized Russia's military prowess and reaffirmed his readiness to resist the US. This approach overshadows other attempts by Russian policymakers to present their country as an important economic actor in world politics.

China, in turn, focuses more on the economic sphere and depicts itself the locomotor of globalization. This self-branding is best represented in Xi Jinping's Davos speech. Using Donald Trump's protectionist rhetoric as a counterpoint, Xi portrayed China as a defender of globalization and presented China's economic rise as an opportunity for the world, developing and developed states alike. While Beijing admits that China itself is still a developing country in the process of modernization, the fact remains that China has enormous material capabilities and resources. This in turn enables it to support other countries economically when Western states fail to do so. Of course, this does not mean that China shies away from demonstrating its military power, as proven by the growing global presence of the PLA Navy, including its participation in joint naval drills with Russia in the Mediterranean and the Baltic Seas. However, Beijing's goal clearly is to impress international audiences with China's economic success rather than with its military might. For example, when Xi Jinping referred to international security issues at the 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (Xi, 2014), he wrapped Chinese political ambitions and security goals in the language of win-win cooperation and emphasised the inclusive nature of Chinese proposals in the realm of security.

That said, it must be noted that the tone of debates in Chinese-language publications, addressed towards the domestic audience, is much more critical towards the West. There is

no such discrepancy in the Russian discourse. The self-representations of China and Russia directed towards the external audience are not, however, mere PR-exercises. Rather, they reveal deep differences between Moscow and Beijing in their attitudes towards the existing global order as well as divergences in their long-term aims. The attitude of China's ruling elite towards contemporary international order is nuanced. While Beijing remains dissatisfied with some elements of the existing order, in particular US primacy, it recognizes the benefits that the post-Cold War period has brought to China (Breslin, 2016). As a result, China prefers an incremental shift in international status hierarchies and international arrangements that will empower Beijing. Any change in the global order should neither undermine general political-economic stability nor harm economic openness. The Russian elite, on the other hand, does not consider the current arrangements of international order as beneficial to Russia's great-power interests. Moscow appears determined to regain its privileged position in a rather short period, including with the use of its renewed military capabilities. Moreover, Moscow is ready to fuel populism and an anti-globalist agenda and seeks to exploit international turmoil to enhance its own position.

### ***Globalisation and Global Populism***

Reluctance and resistance towards the West's domination in global politics has underpinned Russian-Chinese relations for the past two decades. Yet Russia and China's responses to anti-globalist movements and global populism differ significantly, as do their long-term expectations related to the future of globalization.

Russia appears to relish the West's internal difficulties, embracing and fuelling the populist and anti-globalization turn. President Putin has depicted globalization as a project in crisis, led by a selfish elite that has left the majority of people around the world impoverished and frustrated. Indeed, the Russian elite did not hide its satisfaction of Trump's victory in the US presidential elections. Russia also cheered the Brexit result and the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union, seeing it as a step to the further unravelling of Europe's post-war political and economic project (Bordachev, 2018). Over the past years, Russia has also established a network of contacts with Europe's far-right and, to a lesser extent, far-left political parties (Keating and Kaczmarska, 2017; Shekhovtsov, 2017).

China, on the other hand, has turned into a staunch supporter of globalization, viewing the turmoil in the West's political landscape with a mix of *Schadenfreude* and genuine concern. Chinese leaders argue that globalization cannot be blamed for all the world's problems and warn that a reversal of globalization is neither desirable nor possible (Xi, 2017, 2018). Consequently, China has opted for a mix of stability and incremental change. Beijing, for example, was in favour of the UK remaining in the EU. Having repeatedly declared its support for European unity, China has also denounced the rise of populist forces throughout Europe. Regarding the US presidential election, voices in China remain divided. Chinese state media has presented Trump's controversial campaign and his subsequent victory as the ultimate proof of democracy's inherent weaknesses. Although Hillary Clinton was not particularly popular in Beijing – due to her contribution to the US's pivot to Asia under President Obama – her election victory would have brought much more predictability to Sino-American relations, which is exactly what Beijing wants.

In many ways, China needs international stability more than Russia does. China's economic growth – which is the ultimate means of legitimizing the power of the Chinese Communist Party at home – relies on open trade, stable markets and wealthy Western consumers. China needs a co-operative international system in order to sell its goods, to export the overcapacity of its industry, and to invest its currency reserves. Russia, on the other hand, counts on “controlled chaos” and instability beyond its borders as a way of upgrading its relative position in the international realm.

The different attitudes towards globalization are also reflected in Russia and China's regional initiatives. For Beijing, the creation of the Silk Road Economic Belt is a way to increase China's ties with the world and deepen mutual interdependence. China aspires to reinforce openness generated by globalization and to prevent other powers from building closed regional blocs. China's goal behind the New Silk Road is to foster greater extra-regional integration and offer a new version of globalization. For Russia, on the other hand, the Eurasian Economic Union is a way to fence off the post-Soviet space from global influences and to introduce protectionist measures (Kaczmarek, 2017).

More specifically, the Russian elite attempts to achieve two contradictory goals with the help of the EEU. On the one hand, Moscow aspires to maintain political primacy in the post-Soviet

space, thus preventing other actors from gaining a foothold in the region without Russia's consent. On the other hand, the political establishment wants the Russia-led economic cooperation project to go beyond the post-Soviet space. After all, the post-Soviet space is not particularly promising for Russia in terms of possible economic benefits, especially when juxtaposed with either the EU or East Asia. This tension reflects a deeper contradiction in the Russian elite's thinking about international politics. Moscow-sponsored regionalism aims to protect the post-Soviet space and Russia from the negative consequences of globalisation and international turbulences, while simultaneously it is supposed to open new possibilities for Russia to increase its impact on global politics. In other words, Moscow aspires to make the EEU into one of the centres of the multipolar world order and a link between East Asia and Western Europe, while maintaining its regional focus. These two objectives are difficult to reconcile.

China's New Silk Road project is part of Beijing's ambition to rearrange its neighbourhood and to create a new structure of regional cooperation. However, the most outstanding feature of the Chinese project is its flexibility and the absence of strict geographical boundaries, which results in openness and low, if any, 'entry barriers'. Beijing's more recent additions, the so-called Polar Silk Road that includes the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route as well as presenting cooperation with Latin American states as part of the project, confirm how flexible the idea is and testify to Beijing's global ambitions. Defining its vision of cooperation in functional rather than spatial terms. China seeks to transcend existing regional arrangements and prevent other powers from the creation of closed political-economic blocs. The New Silk Road is thus evolving from a regional project towards a new version of globalization (Kaczmarek, 2017).

### ***Russia's and China's Diverging Practices***

In the realm of global economic governance, China pursues a dual-track policy of reinforcing its position in existing structures and establishing its own parallel institutions. China has worked hard to increase its share both in the World Bank and in the IMF (from 3.67% in the mid-2000s to 6.09% in 2018). Indeed, the IMF now includes the yuan as reserve currency. In parallel, China has established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015, despite the open opposition of the US, and convinced a number of American allies from Europe and Asia to join the AIIB. What is more, in the framework of the BRICS grouping, China has

supported the establishment of the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which duplicate the functions of the IMF and the World Bank. The fact that Shanghai was made the seat of the New Development Bank can be seen as a symbolic confirmation of China's leadership within the BRICS group. In contrast, Russia's role in global economic governance remains marginal. Whereas China has sufficient economic resources to upgrade its position within the international financial architecture, Russia has to struggle to retain its position in global financial and economic institutions. Despite joining WTO in 2012, Russia has not opened up to trade and was among the states erecting the biggest number of trade restrictions (Solanko, 2016, p. 6-7). Contrary to China, Russia has not managed to join the core group of WTO negotiators – that is, states which effectively exercises veto power in the negotiation process (Jordan, 2017, p. 465). Moreover, even though Russia and China jointly established the BRICS-led New Development Bank, it is the AIIB set up by China that is widely regarded as the more serious contribution to global governance in the economic sphere. This is illustrated by the fact that more than 50 states – including Russia – joined the bank as founding members. Meanwhile, Russia's Eurasian Development Bank, established more than a decade ago, remains limited to EEU members.

Russia and China's approaches to global security governance vary as well. Russia continues to stand out as the West's major challenger in the global strategic realm. Moreover, Moscow seeks to compensate for its economic weakness with intensified political-diplomatic activity, particularly with regard to international crises. For example, as is well known, Russia plays a key role in the Syrian civil war. Not only prevented Moscow a US military intervention in Syria in 2013, but it was able to intervene militarily itself in support of the Assad regime. China, on the other hand, maintains a relatively low profile with regard to international crises, in spite of its growing material capabilities and global ambitions. Regarding the conflict in Syria, China has joined Russia several times in vetoing UNSC resolutions proposed by Western states. Moreover, the Chinese state media presents Russia's military intervention in Syria in a positive light, as part of the war against terrorism. However, China does not provide any material or military support for Russia's actions there. The limited Chinese engagement in the Syrian civil war illustrates that Beijing tends to acquiesce to Russia's engagement in particular crises, but refrains from active support.

A look at three other areas demonstrates the growing discrepancy between China and Russia's engagement in global governance: participation in UN peacekeeping efforts, contributions to development cooperation, and the fight against climate change. These three areas also show how Russia's level of engagement has decreased in recent years, whereas China has gradually become more active.

To begin, China's participation in UN-led peacekeeping operations has steadily increased over the last decade. China now provides several thousand troops for this type of missions, ranging between 2,300 and 3,000 in 2015-2017. Moreover, in 2013, Chinese combat troops were for the first time ever deployed in a peacekeeping role in Mali (previously Chinese participation was limited to logistics and medical staff). Other missions with the participation of Chinese combat troops included South Sudan and Darfur. In 2015, China also promised to establish a 10-year, USD1 billion China-UN peace and development fund; it offered USD100 million to the African Union for the purpose of establishing a rapid reaction force; and it committed itself to the creation of a special police unit of up to 8,000 troops for UN peacekeeping operations. Even if China's increased engagement at times coincides with its commercial interests,<sup>4</sup> there is no doubt that Beijing has become more involved in UN peacekeeping efforts in recent years (Godement et al., 2018). Russia, meanwhile, has practically withdrawn from any participation in UN peacekeeping operations. The last Russian mission under UN aegis took place in 2006 in Lebanon. A partial exception is Russia's participation in the UN-led anti-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa since 2008. Russia also indirectly supports the peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR). In late 2017, the UN agreed for Russia to provide the CAR government with light weapons and training. Overall, however, it is clear that Russia's participation in peacekeeping missions is minimal. The reason is simple. The Kremlin does not see peacekeeping operations as increasing Russia's international prestige or bringing any tangible benefits.

Development cooperation is another area that illustrates the changing roles that Russia and China have come to play in global governance. Russia wanted to set up a separate national development assistance institution in 2007, when it adopted its first development cooperation strategy, later updated in 2014 (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014a). However,

---

<sup>4</sup> According to critics, this is the case of China's deployment of peacekeepers to South Sudan, see (Xie and Copeland, 2017).

following several years of bureaucratic infighting and the 2008-09 global economic crisis, the Kremlin decided to hand over development issues to the *Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo)*. Handing over the portfolio of development issues to an agency responsible for cooperation primarily in the post-Soviet space testifies to the limited, regional scope of Russia's ambitions. Between 2010 and 2012, Russia's official development assistance (ODA) was around USD500 million and increased to above USD1 billion in 2015 and 2016 (figures include debt cancellation). Bilateral development assistance makes up roughly 75% of overall ODA and remains concentrated on the post-Soviet space, with Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan being the biggest recipients (De Cordier, 2016; Zaytsev and Knobel, 2017). Following Russia's intervention on behalf of the Assad regime, Syria has emerged as the most recent recipient of economic assistance. This shows that Moscow tends to use development aid almost exclusively for narrower instrumental purposes rather than as a contribution to global public goods.

In contrast, China's development assistance is global in scope and provides developing states with substantial financial resources. Beijing prefers to finance the construction of infrastructure, with a focus on African states. According to the OECD, China's ODA in 2015 was USD3.1 billion, of which more than 90% was distributed via bilateral channels.<sup>5</sup> As the findings of *AidData* show, Chinese infrastructure investments have narrowed economic inequalities within developing countries (Bluhm et al., 2018). This generous policy does not preclude some negative side-effects, as states supported by China are prone to enter the debt trap, just as in the case of previous Western and Soviet development assistance. Finally, it is worth noting that China's growing experience in development assistance and plans for broadening it has led Beijing to establish a national development assistance agency in 2018.

Climate change is yet another area that testifies to the differences in Russia and China's participation in global governance. In the 2000s, Russia appeared to be a strong supporter of the fight against climate change. Instrumental considerations may have played a role, as the EU supported Russia's bid for WTO membership in 2004 in exchange for Moscow's participation in tackling climate change (Parker and Karlsson, 2010). Be that as it may, it was

---

<sup>5</sup> Other assessments provide higher numbers but the details of particular agreements are rarely released publicly.

China – together with the US – who blocked the emergence of a new climate agreement during the summit in Copenhagen in 2009, leaving Russia and the EU on the side-lines. In recent years, however, the roles of China and Russia have reversed. Beijing is now ready to reduce carbon emissions. A series of pledges by Beijing paved the way for the conclusion of the 2015 Paris Agreement (Godement, 2015). Beijing has also promised financial assistance for developing countries so that they can meet their own targets (Hilton and Kerr, 2017). Indeed, after the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement under President Trump, China has come to portray itself as a leader in climate change mitigation. While Russia also joined the Paris Agreement, scholars observed an important shift in the discourse on climate change in Russia towards a much more sceptical attitude (Tynkkynen and Tynkkynen, 2018). This shift coincides with the unambitious target declared by Russia in the Paris Agreement. Moscow has promised to limit greenhouse gases emissions to 70-75% of the 1990 level by 2030, which will not be difficult given that in 2012 Russia's emissions were below 68% of the 1990 level (Korppoo and Kokorin, 2017, p. 125).

#### **CONCLUSION: THE OBSTACLES TO LONG-TERM COOPERATION**

As the two previous sections demonstrate, Russia and China's views on world order partly overlap and partly diverge. This means that contrary to the opinions of some observers (Blank, 2018; see also Lukin, 2018; Luzyanin, 2018, p. 14), strategic cooperation between China and Russia cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, the tensions between elements of convergence and divergence with regard to world order may emerge as the most serious long-term obstacle to closer cooperation between these two powers.

To be sure, Russia and China's defiance of Western primacy in international politics provides a basis for cooperation. Both countries distrust the West and oppose a number of policies pursued by the United States and its European allies. Russia and China agree on several aspects of the present world order that they would like to contain or change. These are first and foremost norms promoted by the West, not least liberal democratic principles and limitations on state sovereignty. Both Russia and China rebuff Western primacy and regard it as a threat both to their foreign policy interests and to their domestic regimes. At the same time, however, they do not fully agree on what alternative norms they would like to promote. While joint declarations paper over this divergence, the differences are more pronounced in

the patterns of Russia and China's practical engagement with global governance and their attitudes towards globalization and anti-globalization movements. China appears to be genuinely interested in contributing to political and economic stability, while Russia seeks first and foremost the symbolic confirmation of its great-power status and does not mind the role of an occasional spoiler.

To some extent, these differences are difficult for Russia and China to avoid as they stem from the different positions the two states occupy in the international system. Russia is still struggling to prevent its long-term decline, especially after a decade of fast economic growth in the 2000s was replaced by a decade of slow growth, stagnation and recession. Russia's role in the global economy is basically limited to three sectors (energy resources, civilian nuclear power and the arms industry). China, in contrast, is a potential superpower, maintaining a fast pace of economic growth and being deeply integrated in the global economy. Moreover, several domestic challenges, such as environmental degradation and industrial overcapacity, push China to seek transnational solutions rather than rely on itself. As a result, China needs a relatively well-functioning world order much more than Russia does. Political and economic instability may harm Beijing's interests to a larger extent than those of Moscow.

The growing power gap between Russia and China contributes to both states' different expectations with regard to world order. While Russia has significantly improved its great-power status in the realm of global international security, mostly due to the intervention in Syria, it has not managed to upgrade its position in other global areas. It is rather following in China's footsteps than playing an independent role. China, meanwhile, is building up its institutional capacity to engage more efficiently with the existing world order. Examples include both multilateral institutions, such as the AIIB, as well as China's attempts to strengthen its domestic capacity – a case in point being the creation of China's national development agency. Beijing is willing to cooperate with others, but it is also ready to go it alone as the creation of the AIIB, the Belt and Road Initiative or the Forum of Cooperation with Africa illustrate.

This is perhaps not surprising. As indicated, Beijing has large economic resources at its disposal to shape practices of global governance, while Russia in most cases does not have much to offer apart from the provision of political-military support. Russia's limited engagement with

global governance structures does not have to pose an obstacle for China or slow down Sino-Russian cooperation. However, Russia's instigation of instability may indirectly harm China in the long-term and emerge as a key obstacle to deeper strategic cooperation. Because of limited integration with the world economy and a narrow focus on energy and arms, Moscow would not be hurt by the reversal of globalization and the rise of economic protectionism to the same extent as China would. Indeed, Russia's conflict with Ukraine illustrates Moscow's potential for unintentionally damaging Chinese interests. One of the railway corridors envisioned to form the Silk Road Economic Belt linking China with Europe was supposed to go through Ukraine. China also planned to build a deep-sea port in Crimea. Russia's takeover of Crimea and subsequent meddling in the Donbas region have practically eliminated the possibility of making Ukraine part of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, Russia's support for anti-establishment and populist movements worldwide may fuel growing anti-immigrant attitudes that have the potential to hurt the Chinese diaspora, which is much more numerous than Russian émigrés.

To sum up, the scope of shared interests between Russia and China, coupled with both leaderships' efforts to pre-empt potential competition, has enabled the two countries to develop close relations in spite of growing asymmetries between them. The similarities in how they regard world order may turn out numerous enough to promote further cooperation. The differences, however, are influencing the long-term prospects of the relationship and have the potential to slow down collaboration between Moscow and Beijing.

## REFERENCES

- Ambrosio, T. (2017). The architecture of alignment: The Russia–China relationship and international agreements. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 69(1), 110-156.
- Blank, S. (2018). Triangularism Old and New: China, Russia, and the United States. In *Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century*, edited by Jo Inge Bekkevold and Bobo Lo, 215-241. Springer.
- Bluhm, R., Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A. & Tierney, M. (2018). Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic Activity in Developing Countries. *AidData Working Paper*, 64.
- Bolt, P. J. & Cross, S. N. (2018). *China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bond, I. (2016). *Russia and China. Partners of choice and necessity?* “. London: Centre for European Reform.
- Bordachev, T. (2018). Uzhe skoro my uvidim sovsem druguyu Yevropu. *Vzglyad*, 27 iyuniya.
- Breslin, S. (2016). China's global goals and roles: Changing the world from second place? *Asian Affairs*, 47(1), 59-70.
- Callahan, W. A. (2016). China's “Asia Dream” The Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 1(3), 226-243.
- Chase, M. S., Medeiros, E. S., Roy, J. S., Rumer, E., Sutter, R. & Weitz, R. (2017). *Russia-China Relations: Assessing Common Ground and Strategic Fault Lines* “. Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research.
- De Cordier, B. (2016). Russia's international aid donorship: from diplomatic status symbol to “frontline aid”? *Global Affairs*, 2(1), 21-34.
- Duchâtel, M. & Godement, F. (2016). *China and Russia: Gaming the West*. “. Paris: European Council on Foreign Relations.
- Flikke, G. (2016). Sino–Russian Relations Status Exchange or Imbalanced Relationship? *Problems of Post-Communism*, 63(3), 159-170.
- Godement, F. (2015). *China: Taking stock before the Paris Conference*. “: ECFR.
- Godement, F., Rudolf, M., Julienne, M., Schwoob, M.-H. & Isenring-Szabó, K. (2018). *The United Nations of China: a vision of the world order*. “China Analysis”: ECFR. <http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/the-united-nations-of-china-a-vision-of-the-world-order.pdf>.

- Hilton, I. & Kerr, O. (2017). The Paris Agreement: China's 'New Normal' role in international climate negotiations. *Climate Policy*, 17(1), 48-58.
- Jordan, P. A. (2017). Diminishing returns: Russia's participation in the World Trade Organization. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 33(6), 452-471.
- Kaczmarek, M. (2015). *Russia-China relations in the post-crisis international order*. Abingdon; New York: Routledge.
- Kaczmarek, M. (2017). Non-western visions of regionalism: China's New Silk Road and Russia's Eurasian Economic Union. *International Affairs*, 93(6), 1357-1376.
- Keating, V. & Kaczmarek, K. (2017). Conservative soft power: liberal soft power bias and the 'hidden' attraction of Russia. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, online first. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0100-6>.
- Korolev, A. (2016). Systemic balancing and regional Hedging: China–Russia relations. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 9(4), 375-397.
- Korppoo, A. & Kokorin, A. (2017). Russia's 2020 GHG emissions target: Emission trends and implementation. *Climate Policy*, 17(2), 113-130.
- Krickovic, A. (2017). The symbiotic China-Russia partnership: Cautious riser and desperate challenger. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 10(3), 299-329.
- Lee, R. W. & Lukin, A. (2016). *Russia's Far East : new dynamics in Asia Pacific and beyond*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Lo, B. (2017). *A Wary Embrace, Lowy Institute Papers*. Sydney: Penguin Random House Australia.
- Lubina, M. (2017). *Russia and China: a political marriage of convenience-stable and successful*: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
- Lukin, A. (2018). *China and Russia: The New Rapprochement*: Polity.
- Luzyanin, S. (2018). *Rossiia-Kitai: formirovaniye obnovlennogo mira*. Moskva: Ves' mir.
- Nocetti, J. (2015). Contest and conquest: Russia and global internet governance. *International Affairs*, 91(1), 111-130.
- Parker, C. F. & Karlsson, C. (2010). Climate change and the European Union's leadership moment: an inconvenient truth? *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48(4), 923-943.
- Putin, V. (2007). *Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy*. Retrieved from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>.

- Rossiyskaya Federatsiya. (2008). *Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki po osnovnym mezhdunarodnym voprosam*. Retrieved from [http://news.kremlin.ru/ref\\_notes/240](http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/240).
- Rossiyskaya Federatsiya. (2011). *Sovmestnoye zayavleniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki po tekushchey situatsii v mire i osnovnym mezhdunarodnym voprosam*. Retrieved from [http://news.kremlin.ru/ref\\_notes/967](http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/967).
- Rossiyskaya Federatsiya. (2012). *Sovmestnoye zayavleniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki o dalneyshem uglublenii rossiysko-kitayskikh otnosheniy vseobyemlyushchego ravnopravnogo doveritelnogo partnerstva i strategicheskogo vzaimodeystviya*. Retrieved from <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/1230>.
- Rossiyskaya Federatsiya. (2014a). *Kontseptsiya gosudarstvennoy politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v sfere sodeystviya mezhdunarodnomu razvitiyu (utv. Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 20 aprelya 2014 g. N 259)*. Retrieved from [http://www.mid.ru/foreign\\_policy/official\\_documents/-/asset\\_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/64542](http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/64542).
- Rossiyskaya Federatsiya. (2014b). *Sovmestnoye zayavleniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki o novom etape otnosheniy vseobyemlyushchego partnerstva i strategicheskogo vzaimodeystviya*. Retrieved from [http://news.kremlin.ru/ref\\_notes/1642](http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/1642).
- Rossiyskaya Federatsiya. (2017). *Sovmestnoye zayavleniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki o tekushchey situatsii v mire i vazhnykh mezhdunarodnykh problemakh*. Retrieved from <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5219>.
- Rossiyskaya Federatsiya. (2018). *Sovmestnoye zayavleniye Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki*. Retrieved from <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5312>.
- Russian Federation. (2016). *The Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the Promotion of International Law*. Retrieved from [http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign\\_policy/news/-/asset\\_publisher/ckNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2331698](http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/ckNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2331698).
- Sakwa, R. (2017). *Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order*: Cambridge University Press.
- Shekhovtsov, A. (2017). *Russia and the Western far right: Tango Noir*: Routledge.

- Snetkov, A. & Lanteigne, M. (2014). 'The Loud Dissenter and its Cautious Partner'—Russia, China, global governance and humanitarian intervention. *International relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 15(1), 113-146.
- Solanko, L. (2016). Opening up or closing the door for foreign trade – Russia and China compared. *BOFIT Policy Brief*, 8.
- Stronski, P. & Ng, N. (2018). *Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East and the Arctic*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Tynkkynen, V.-P. & Tynkkynen, N. (2018). Climate Denial Revisited:(Re) contextualising Russian Public Discourse on Climate Change during Putin 2.0. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 1-18.
- Wilson, J. L. (2018). Russia's relationship with China: the role of domestic and ideational factors. *International Politics*, online first, 1-17.
- Wishnick, E. (2017). In search of the 'Other' in Asia: Russia–China relations revisited. *The Pacific Review*, 30(1), 114-132.
- Xi, J. (2014). *New Asian Security Concept For New Progress in Security Cooperation*. Retrieved from [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/zxxx\\_662805/t1159951.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml).
- Xi, J. (2017). *Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth*. Retrieved from <https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum>.
- Xi, J. (2018). *Full text of Chinese president's speech at BRICS Business Forum in South Africa*. Retrieved from [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/26/c\\_129920686.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/26/c_129920686.htm).
- Xie, Y. & Copeland, C. (2017). To intervene or not? China's foreign policy experiment in South Sudan raises questions. *South China Morning Post*, 2 October.
- Zaytsev, Y. & Knobel, A. (2017). Ekonomicheskaya pomoshch Rossii drugim stranam v 2016 godu. *Monitoring Ekonomicheskoi Situatsii v Rossii*, 17 (55), 14-18.