The explanation proffering norm of moral assertion

Simion, M. (2018) The explanation proffering norm of moral assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), pp. 477-488. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6)

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Abstract

In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little to no discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This paper aims to supply this lack: it defends a function-first account of the normativity of moral assertion. According to this view, in virtue of its function of reliably generating understanding in the audience, a moral assertion that p needs be knowledgeable and accompanied by a contextually appropriate explanation why p.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:Cogito
Journal Name:Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:1386-2820
ISSN (Online):1572-8447
Published Online:24 August 2018
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2018 The Authors
First Published:First published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21(3): 477-488
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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