Assertion: knowledge is enough

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: knowledge is enough. Synthese, 193(10), pp. 3041-3056. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0914-y)

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Abstract

Recent literature features an increased interest in the sufficiency claim involved in the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-Suff). This paper looks at two prominent objections to KNA-Suff, due to Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey, and argues that they miss their target due to value-theoretic inaccuracies. It is argued that (i) the intuitive need for more than knowledge in Brown’s high-stakes contexts does not come from the epistemic norm governing assertion, but from further norms stepping in and raising the bar, and (ii) Lackey’s purported quality-driven case against KNA-Suff boils down to a quantitative objection. If that is the case, Lackey’s argument will be vulnerable to the same objections as Brown’s.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:Cogito
Journal Name:Synthese
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0039-7857
ISSN (Online):1573-0964
Published Online:21 September 2015
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Springer Science+Business Media
First Published:First published in Synthese 193(10): 3041-3056
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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