Assertion: knowledge is enough

Simion, M. (2016) Assertion: knowledge is enough. Synthese, 193(10), pp. 3041-3056. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0914-y)

Abstract

Recent literature features an increased interest in the sufficiency claim involved in the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-Suff). This paper looks at two prominent objections to KNA-Suff, due to Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey, and argues that they miss their target due to value-theoretic inaccuracies. It is argued that (i) the intuitive need for more than knowledge in Brown’s high-stakes contexts does not come from the epistemic norm governing assertion, but from further norms stepping in and raising the bar, and (ii) Lackey’s purported quality-driven case against KNA-Suff boils down to a quantitative objection. If that is the case, Lackey’s argument will be vulnerable to the same objections as Brown’s.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Simion, Professor Mona
• Authors: Simion, M.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Research Group: Cogito
• Journal Name: Synthese
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0039-7857
• ISSN (Online): 1573-0964
• Published Online: 21 September 2015
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2015 Springer Science+Business Media
• First Published: First published in Synthese 193(10): 3041-3056
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy