Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption

Simion, M. (2019) Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption. Philosophical Studies, 176(8), pp. 1951-1966. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-018-1105-8)

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Abstract

One very popular assumption in the epistemological literature is that belief and assertion are governed by one and the same epistemic norm. This paper challenges this claim. Extant arguments in defence of the view are scrutinised and found to rest on value-theoretic inaccuracies. First, the belief-assertion parallel is shown to lack the needed normative strength. Second, I argue that the claim that assertion inherits the norm of belief in virtue of being an expression thereof rests on a failed instance of deontic transmission. Third, the inheritance argument from the norm for action is proven guilty of deontic equivocation. Last but not least, it is argued that, on a functionalist normative picture, assertion and belief are governed by different epistemic norms, in virtue of serving different epistemic functions.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Dr Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:Cogito
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0031-8116
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:02 May 2018
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2018 The Author
First Published:First published in Philosophical Studies 176(8):1951-1966
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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