Simion, M. (2019) Epistemic norm correspondence and the belief-assertion parallel. Analysis, 79(2), pp. 260-265. (doi: 10.1093/analys/any048)
Full text not currently available from Enlighten.
Abstract
Several prominent philosophers assume that the so-called ‘Belief–Assertion Parallel’ warrants epistemic norm correspondence; as such, they argue from the epistemic norm governing one to the epistemic norm governing the other. This paper argues that, in all its readings, the belief–assertion parallel lacks the desired normative import.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Simion, Professor Mona |
| Authors: | Simion, M. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Research Group: | Cogito |
| Journal Name: | Analysis |
| Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
| ISSN: | 0003-2638 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1467-828 |
| Published Online: | 13 August 2018 |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record
Deposit and Record Details
Deposit and Record Details