Epistemic norm correspondence and the belief-assertion parallel

Simion, M. (2019) Epistemic norm correspondence and the belief-assertion parallel. Analysis, 79(2), pp. 260-265. (doi:10.1093/analys/any048)

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Abstract

Several prominent philosophers assume that the so-called ‘Belief–Assertion Parallel’ warrants epistemic norm correspondence; as such, they argue from the epistemic norm governing one to the epistemic norm governing the other. This paper argues that, in all its readings, the belief–assertion parallel lacks the desired normative import.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Dr Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:Cogito
Journal Name:Analysis
Publisher:Oxford University Press
ISSN:0003-2638
ISSN (Online):1467-828
Published Online:13 August 2018

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