Dividing bads under additive utilities

Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F. and Yanovskaia, E. (2019) Dividing bads under additive utilities. Social Choice and Welfare, 52(3), pp. 395-417. (doi:10.1007/s00355-018-1157-x)

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Abstract

We compare the Egalitarian rule (aka Egalitarian Equivalent) and the Competitive rule (aka Comeptitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) to divide bads (chores). They are both welfarist: the competitive disutility profile(s) are the critical points of their Nash product on the set of efficient feasible profiles. The C rule is Envy Free, Maskin Monotonic, and has better incentives properties than the E rule. But, unlike the E rule, it can be wildly multivalued, admits no selection continuous in the utility and endowment parameters, and is harder to compute. Thus in the division of bads, unlike that of goods, no rule normatively dominates the other.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve and Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna
Authors: Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F., and Yanovskaia, E.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Social Choice and Welfare
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0176-1714
ISSN (Online):1432-217X
Published Online:16 October 2018
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2018 The Authors
First Published:First published in Social Choice and Welfare 52(3): 395-417
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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