On the Complexity of the El Farol Bar Game: A Sensitivity Analysis

Chen, S.-H. and Gostoli, U. (2016) On the Complexity of the El Farol Bar Game: A Sensitivity Analysis. In: Agent-Directed Simulation Symposium, Pasadena, CA, USA, 3-6 Apr 2016, p. 4. ISBN 9781510823150

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Abstract

In this paper, we carry out a sensitivity analysis for an agent-based model of the use of public resources as manifested by the El Farol Bar problem. An early study using the same model has shown that a good-society equilibrium, characterized by both economic efficiency and economic equality, can be achieved probabilistically by a von Neumann network, and can be achieved surely with the presence of some agents having social preferences, such as the inequity-averse preference or the 'keeping-up-with-the-Joneses' preference. In this study, we examine this fundamental result by exploring the inherent complexity of themodel; specifically, we address the effect of the three key parameters related to size, namely, the network size, the neighborhood size, and the memory size. We find that social preferences still play an important role over all the sizes considered. Nonetheless, it is also found that when network size becomes large, the parameter, the bar capacity (the attendance threshold), may also play a determining role.

Item Type:Conference Proceedings
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Gostoli, Dr Umberto
Authors: Chen, S.-H., and Gostoli, U.
College/School:College of Medical Veterinary and Life Sciences > School of Health & Wellbeing > MRC/CSO SPHSU
ISBN:9781510823150
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