Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals

Lombardi, M. and Yoshihara, N. (2018) Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. Games and Economic Behavior, 111, pp. 203-216. (doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.004)

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This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker notions of truth-telling. It models individual i's honesty standard as a profile of (possibly non-empty) collections of ordered pairs of outcomes, one for each member of society, over which individual i feels truth-telling concerns. Individual i is honest provided that she states her true preferences as well as rankings (not necessarily complete) of outcomes that are consistent with the true preferences of individuals in her honesty standard. Under this notion of honesty, we offer a condition, called S(N)-partial-honesty monotonicity, which is necessary for Nash implementation when there are partially-honest agents. In an independent domain of preferences, we show that this condition is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity provided that honesty means stating the orderings of individuals (in a honesty standard) truthfully and individuals' honesty standards are non-connected.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lombardi, Dr Michele
Authors: Lombardi, M., and Yoshihara, N.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Games and Economic Behavior
ISSN (Online):1090-2473
Published Online:28 June 2018
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc.
First Published:First published in Games and Economic Behavior 111: 203-216
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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