Assessing and Mitigating the Impact of Organisational Change on Counterproductive Work Behaviour: An Operational (Dis)trust Based Framework

FULL REPORT
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There are also five Toolkits, a Manager's Guide and two e-webinars available at: www.crestresearch.ac.uk/cwb. To find out more information about the project visit: www.crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/counterproductive-work-behaviour

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report comprises the findings of CREST funded research into organisational change and insider threat. It outlines the individual, social and organisational factors that over time, can contribute to negative employee perceptions and experiences.

These factors can produce a reduction in an employee’s psychological attachment to, and trust in, their employing organisation which then allows them to undertake Counterproductive Work Behaviour (CWB). CWB concerns action which threatens the effectiveness, or harms the safety of, an employer and its stakeholders.

It can develop from small scale discretions (e.g., time wasting, or knowledge hiding) into serious insider threat activities (e.g., destroying systems or exchanging confidential information with malicious others).

Following past research linking CWB to both organisational change and trust breach, the aim of the study was to produce a (dis)trust based framework for predicting, identifying and mitigating counterproductive work behaviour and insider threat within the context of organisational change.

We posed the following research questions:

1. What effect does organisational change have in relation to counterproductive work behaviour (CWB) and insider threat acts?
2. What role does (dis)trust play in CWB during organisational change?
3. What preventative measures can be taken by organisations to help mitigate CWB and insider threat in organisational change initiatives?

To address these questions, we collected empirical data from a case study organisation undergoing change: two sets of interviews, i.) with selected managers and staff outlining the key changes in the organisation, ii.) with a range of stakeholders involved in/privy to one of three insider threat case studies in two different departments, iii.) a review of HR and security paperwork on the insider threat cases, and then, iv.) anonymous surveys of the workforce in the same two departments in which our case studies occurred. Using these methods, we explored individuals’ cognitions and emotions to understand why while some employees remain engaged, loyal and trusting during change, others become disengaged, distrusting and behave in deviant ways.

1.1 EFFECTS OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

Employees are not passive recipients of change, instead their experiences of change can form the crucible for individual revenge and collective retaliation in the form
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of CWB. This report highlights how organisational changes are being experienced within our case study organisation, ‘Plan B’. We outline the insider threat risks and show how these threats manifest through the following factors:

- Ineffective use of organisational systems
- Unintended consequences of security culture
- Moral disengagement and passive group-level insider threat
- Staff disengagement due to changes

Further, we demonstrate that change can produce four main negative impacts.

First, it makes the work environment less predictable. Therefore, employees’ attention becomes diverted to detect what is changing and to understand if it is different from what they have been told is changing.

Second, changes are often accompanied by inadequate communication, characterised by information which may be incomplete, inaccurate or untimely. As a result, misunderstanding and rumours can emerge.

Third, changes in organisations are often accompanied by leadership changes. This might be confined just to the top of the organisation, but equally it can cascade down to all levels.

Further, the way leaders are used in the organisation might change (e.g., through restructuring), meaning the types of behaviours expected from both leaders and employees may change in line with the new direction and with individual leadership styles.

Finally, in undertaking these transformations, there will be those who feel the process or the outcome of change is unfair; this is particularly likely for those who have lost power and influence.

1.2 THE ROLE OF (DIS)TRUST IN CWB DURING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

The diagram on below (Figure 1.2) exemplifies the dynamics that can be triggered during organisational change, commencing with a trust breach and culminating in CWB and insider threat.

![Fig.1.2 - Role of distrust in CWB within an organisational change context](image-url)
When perceived promises (or the psychological contract) are broken, the integrity and overall trustworthiness an individual considers their employing organisation and its leaders to have, declines. This low trust or distrust (through a process of attribution) changes the explanations employees make for events that have occurred in the past, those in the present and for the future. Consequently, individuals become more cynical towards the organisation and its leadership, perceiving a significant injustice to have occurred, which is potentially likely to re-occur.

This cynicism then triggers their moral disengagement towards work tasks and work colleagues; individuals who morally disengage from their work environment identify less with their role and organisation, which lowers their organisational citizenship behaviours. Individuals are, however, also more likely to become passive or active insider threats.

These individuals can retaliate through uncivil behaviours, such as anti-social behaviour and aggression, and through passive responses such as withdrawal of cooperation and depleted investment in resources. Both types are significant threats to any organisation, not least one that forms part of the critical national infrastructure like Plan B.

1.3 PREVENTATIVE MEASURES TO HELP MITIGATE CWB AND INSIDER THREAT IN ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE INITIATIVES

Through our study, we have produced the following strategies (FOCAL) to help mitigate against the threat of CWB and insider acts in organisational change initiatives across a variety of contexts. These are aimed primarily at organisational managers/leaders and are explored further throughout this report and in a standalone fashion in The Manager’s Guide (www.crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/cwb-managers-guide) and Practitioner Toolkit (www.crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/cwb-toolkit).

Be fair & consistent with HR procedures and managing people during times of change and stability. This will leave employees more resilient to the turbulence of organisational change and trusting in the vision that the projected change outcome.

Organisational Citizenship: Make CWB reporting part of employee safeguarding. Reporting is likely to be increased through creating an organisational value system in which reporting CWB or unusual activities

Fig.1.3 - Core skills for managers: FOCAL
among colleagues is considered a protective, rather than punitive, measure for the potential perpetrator and others around them. A key enabler in this approach is that all employees consider it their responsibility to report concerns, rather than solely managers, HR or security staff. Another is that good practice security norms must be made explicit and clear to all staff, rather than based on assumptions of understanding. The process for reporting concerns should also be made clear and easy for staff as well as confidential and non-discriminatory.

Communicate change initiatives transparently, consistently, regularly and collaboratively. Engage staff of all levels at an early stage in change initiatives. Early dialogue and collaboration with individuals on change projects will enable them to feel more in control of their working life, less vulnerable, and will reduce the sense of unpredictability change provokes.

Lead by example. Leaders act as role models for the organisation, demonstrating acceptable behaviours and morals which act as guides for employees in their everyday lives. When leaders consistently demonstrate concern for their employees and the kinds of citizenship behaviours which engender trust, employees build up resilience in the face of change.

Assess your various individual, local (team) and organisational environments for their vulnerabilities & tailor change initiatives accordingly. Change has different impacts on different individuals. This is due to both individual differences and an individual’s particular dynamics and challenges existent in any given team. Impact assessments should be conducted prior to change instigation which enables the identification of the particular support mechanisms which may be required across an organisation.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Organisations within the UK are experiencing an unprecedented level of unpredictability and change. This is due in large part to significant economic pressures (e.g., financial crisis, austerity measures, technological developments and demands for innovation), recent and ongoing political developments (e.g., Brexit) and social change (e.g., an increasingly diverse and cross-cultural population).

Another wider dimension is the heightened threat posed to organisations by radicalisation, increasing extremist sentiment and terrorist groups whose aims include the infiltration of organisations important to the national infrastructure (BaMaung et al., 2017). Sources of organisational change therefore comprise both external and internal sources that can impact on employees to create real and perceived threats and pressures that make them sensitive and vigilant to what lies ahead (Fugate et al., 2012) triggering different, often negative, kinds of work behaviour.

Employee experiences of work are amongst the most central antecedents for their level of commitment to an organisation (Meyer and Allen 1997; Meyer et al., 2002). Individuals’ experiences of change can cause breaches in their psychological contract with an employer which undermine their commitment to an organisation (Solinger et al., 2015), and alter their identities as employees (Ashforth and Schinoff, 2016).

In this way, experiences of change can form the crucible that leads to instrumental and hostile retaliations by individuals and collective protest in the form of Counterproductive Work Behaviour (CWB) (Kelloway et al., 2010), thereby making them an insider threat. In the maelstrom of uncertainties that accompany change, organisations may be particularly vulnerable to exploitation by employees or other insiders. Thus, change can make organisations and employees particularly vulnerable to internal threats, as well as those external to the organisation.

As a result there is an urgent need to develop new understanding of the risk posed by insider threat in order to improve its detection, mitigation and prevention.

**Fig. 2.1 - (Dis)trust based framework: CWB and Organisational Change**
This research proposes that one way of doing so is by considering the relationship between trust, CWB and organisational change. While business and management scholars have long appreciated the impact of trust on organisational success and safety, the security field has yet to fully appreciate its role.

Clearly, it is imperative that organisational managers and security practitioners can identify the factors that make individuals more likely to become a potential insider threat during organisational change. Following our past research into professional misconduct in health and social care (Searle et al., 2017a), we have developed a conceptual framework (see Figure 2.1) which guides our approach to both this literature review and our overall project.

The rest of this review is structured as follows. First, we define CWB and insider threat. Then, using our conceptual model above, we outline the main impacts of organisational change, before presenting the key individual, social and organisational factors which our review indicates are important triggers of CWB and insider threat during organisational change.

2.1.1 COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORK BEHAVIOUR (CWB)

Over the past decade, incidents of wrongdoing within organisations, including fraud, corruption and other unethical acts, have risen, increasingly becoming headline news (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005; Moore, 2015). These actions can be collectively termed ‘Counterproductive Work Behaviour’ (CWB), defined as a voluntary form of action which violates significant organisational norms and threatens the wellbeing of organisations and those working there, and/or those receiving services from them (Robinson and Bennett, 1995).

CWB includes acts which potentially or actually harm organisations and/or individuals, either by affecting the organisation’s normal function or its property, or through impairing employee effectiveness or safety (Fox et al., 2001).

It therefore has a detrimental impact on both the organisation and its members (Fida et al., 2015; Spector and Fox, 2005). CWB occurs when individuals lack the motivation (or capacity) to comply with normative expectations or organisationally-prescribed codes, or when individuals seek to exploit either vulnerable organisational systems or individuals for their own self-gain.

The rise in incidents and their contextual scope highlights how wrongdoing can take place in virtually every type of organisation and that it is not a rare occurrence (Anand et al., 2004).

2.1.1.1 Types of CWB

CWB can develop from small-scale indiscretions (e.g., time wasting or knowledge hiding) into more serious insider threat activities (e.g., destroying systems or divulging confidential information to malicious others).

Counterproductive work behaviour has been closely related to, or even used interchangeably with, a number of workplace problems, including anti-social behaviour (Giacalone and Greenberg, 1997); interpersonal conflict, including verbal aggression towards co-workers (Spector and Jex, 1998); delinquency (Hogan and Hogan, 1989); deviance (Hollinger, 1986; Robinson and Bennett, 1995); retaliation (Skarlicki and Folger, 1997) and revenge behaviours (Bies et al., 1997); mobbing/bullying (Zapf et al., 1996); and withdrawal (Carpenter and Berry, 2017).

Research into CWB has differentiated two forms of actions: those which are deliberate and include instrumental or premeditated actions, and those which are impulsive and not necessarily intentional (Berkowitz, 1993).

Taxonomies of CWB have categorised these types of behaviour using three distinct dimensions, including a behaviour-focused categorisation investigated in a recent meta-analysis (Marcus et al., 2016). The most renowned is Spector et al.’s (2006) work, which presents a five-factor model of production deviance, sabotage, theft, withdrawal and abuse of others.

There is also Grygus and Sackett’s (2003) eleven factor structure comprising: (1) theft and related actions; (2) property destruction; (3) information misuse; (4) time and resources misuse; (5) unsafe actions; (6) attendance; (7) quality of work; (8) use of alcohol; (9) use of drugs; (10) inappropriate verbal behaviour; and (11) inappropriate physical behaviour.
A further dimension examines the target of CWB, distinguishing between behaviour directed towards the organisation (CWB Organisational Deviance, ‘CWB-O’), from behaviour directed towards other people within the organisation (Interpersonal Deviance, ‘CWB-I’) (Fox and Spector, 1999; Robinson and Bennett, 1995). Recent meta-analysis (Marcus et al., 2016) reveals that a third category of target needs to be investigated here: self-destructive actions.

The final dimension used to categorise CWB focuses on impact, ranging from minor to severe implications (Robinson and Bennett, 1995). These different dimensions and the distinct types of CWB are captured in Figure 2.2.

Organisation-directed CWB can manifest in three main ways.

1. Production deviance concerns how job tasks and work roles are done (Hollinger, 1986), and includes deliberate actions which deviate from contracted obligations and requirements, such as deliberately not following standard instructions, poor record keeping and deliberately wasting resources. Such organisational misconduct contravenes the formal output and process controls of the organisation (Weibel et al., 2016), and the impacts can range from minor to severe. Production deviance can include active and passive behaviour, as well as those which are designed to directly or indirectly harm the organisation. Studies of CWB have revealed that this form of transgression helps perpetrators counteract the effects of perceived unfairness, specifically distributive and procedural injustices (Krischer et al., 2010).

2. Withdrawal is a more minor, organisation-focused CWB category, which includes the intentional avoidance of or disengagement from the work environment, job tasks, or the organisation as a whole. Importantly such actions are not motivated by a desire to harm the organisation (Carpenter and Berry, 2017), but instead involve a “lack of attendance, attention, or effort” by an employee (ibid., p. 837) and may be used as a coping strategy in response to working in high stress contexts. Historically, withdrawal has been investigated under a different route from other CWB; instead of focusing on negative work behaviour, its origins lie in the study of job satisfaction. This includes employees’ potential physical actions which are designed to remove them from their current work context. Such actions include daydreaming, taking excessive breaks while at work, working on personal matters rather than work duties, making efforts to stay away from work with unnecessary periods of absence, such as pretending to be unwell, or actions linked to timekeeping matters, such as frequent tardiness or finishing the day early. While such withdrawal actions include the withholding of effort (Fida et al., 2014), they may also include the withholding of key information (Connelly et al., 2012).

3. Property deviance is a more severe category of organisation-focused CWB (Robinson and Bennett, 1995), which centres on the deliberate misuse of the organisation’s resources. This includes: the intentional taking of organisational property for personal purposes or financial gain; fraud; the wrongful or criminal acts of deception concerning the exploitation of organisational assets for financial or personal gain and sabotage, which involves the deliberate destruction, damage, or
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obstruction of organisational processes or property with the intention to harm the organisation (Spector et al., 2006).

By contrast, interpersonally-directed CWB (CWB-I) includes less severe actions often called ‘political behaviour’, which comprises deliberate social interaction intended to gain personal or political advantage over another individual. It includes favouritism of key others, as well as gossiping about and undermining others in order to succeed in some strategic ‘game’. More severe CWB-I behaviour includes interpersonal aggression (Robinson and Bennett, 1995; Spector et al., 2006), which focuses on intentional physical and verbal aggression and incivility designed to be hostile towards or to harm or endanger another individual. This category also comprises physical attacks, which could include sexual harassment or assault; verbal insults and incivilities, such as deliberately being rude to another; bullying; spreading false rumours; making fun of others; playing pranks and jokes on a specific individual; and racial slurs. CWB-I can also include individual targeted theft, which is the same definition of theft as that noted earlier, except the target is another individual’s property.

2.1.2 INSIDER THREAT

Insider threat is closely related to, and arguably synonymous with, CWB. Insider threat refers to threat from a type of individual who has, due to their internal position in the organisation, a privileged level of access to the networks, systems or data of an organisation (Nurse et al., 2014). Insiders can include current or past employees, contractors or trusted third parties. Insider threat is arguably the most severe form of CWB and comes in two distinct forms: 1) malicious and 2) accidental/unintentional (ibid). In the case of malicious insider threat, the individual intentionally utilises their granted authorisation to access confidential or available organisational information and resources for a particular counterproductive purpose (Cappelli et al., 2012). The motivation is often to exploit one’s privileged access for personal or financial gain, or for the purpose of retaliation or revenge (Band et al., 2006). Such activities are perceived as the most common type of threat. The second form, accidental/unintentional or non-malicious threat, also causes harm or increases the prospect of future harm to the organisation’s assets or resources (confidentiality, integrity, availability) through non-malicious action or non-action. This type of insider threat activity includes both human error and mistakes, along with a range of non-malicious actions that may compromise the organisation, such as inadvertently leaking sensitive information on social networking sites, the loss of work devices, or falling for phishing and malware attacks. In addition, through the findings of the present research, we further differentiate between:

Active insider threat – behaviour carried out by someone with inside access to an organisation which threatens to harm the organisation and/or its members. This can include intentional and malicious, or unintentional and accidental behaviour; and

Passive insider threat – which includes the passive actions of an individual insider, such as the withdrawal of full effort from work tasks, as well as the unintentional behaviour of those around an insider which facilitates or tacitly condones the insider’s behaviour and consequently threatens or harms the organisation and/or its members.

Importantly, the triggers of such actions can follow significant events for employees, such as dismissal, disputes with employers, personal family issues (health, marital issues), new job opportunities (headhunting) or training (Claycomb et al., 2012). At the same time, research suggests that specific events do not have to actually occur in order to trigger an insider threat; for example, poor general organisational climate can be sufficient to cause an attack (Nurse et al., 2014).

The thread inherent in all of these issues is often that something has changed for individuals which triggers new behaviour or perceptions, impacting on their working lives. CWB and insider attacks regularly occur, for instance, following perceptions and experiences of inequality and injustice (Colquitt et al., 2001) during which trust in the organisation is broken (Restubog et al., 2008), and where there is a climate of stress (Chen and Spector, 1992). These issues are particularly likely to occur during times of organisational change.

We explore the role of these triggers further below, starting first with an overview of the importance of trust to CWB and insider threat, and the impact of organisational change.
2.2 TRUST, ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE AND ITS IMPACTS

Research demonstrates that organisations should be motivated to increase commitment, loyalty and trust among their staff (Rousseau, 1998). Linked to the same nomological net as organisational psychological attachment, are organisational commitment, organisational identity and organisational trust (Ng, 2015). While often viewed as separate, harnessing their interrelationships is essential for organisations if they are to retain the skilled workers needed to navigate increasingly turbulent and mobile economies (Briscoe et al., 2012).

Trust is defined as a psychological state that creates the willingness to be vulnerable based on positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another party (Mayer et al., 1995; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Rousseau et al., 1998). Vulnerability arises as a function of (inter)dependence and risk in a given situation. Trust therefore involves a decision to accept the risks associated with this dependence, based on the positive expectation that the other party will act beneficially or at least not inflict harm (Boon and Holmes, 1991). It comprises affective, cognitive and behavioural elements (Dietz, 2011).

Research attests to the benefits of having staff with high levels of trust in their employer. Such staff are more committed and remain with the organisation for longer, work harder and more cooperatively, share knowledge and problem solve more effectively (e.g., Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012; Tremblay et al., 2010; Whitener, 2001). In addition, trust in the employer enhances high performance work practices by moderating the effects of HR practices on justice perceptions and feelings of commitment (Alfes et al., 2012).

Conceptualizations of organisational trust use a variety of referents including individuals (e.g., trust in one’s supervisor), groups (e.g., management), the organisation and inter-organisational relationships (e.g., suppliers) (see Schoorman et al., 2007). Trust in these different targets is conceptually and empirically distinct, with differing antecedents and consequences (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012; Searle et al., in press; Zaheer et al., 1998). Trust in the organisation differs from interpersonal trust in terms of the referent and source(s) of confidence and vulnerability; there are also more diffuse risks associated with this kind of trust (Weibel et al., 2016). It concerns trust in a collective or a system, rather than a single person. It has been defined as ‘an individual’s expectation that some organized system will act with predictability and goodwill’ (Maguire and Phillips, 2008:372). In line with this, Giddens (1990:34) stresses that trust in organisations involves ‘reliability and faith in the correctness of abstract principles’. Gillespie and Dietz (2009:128) propose that employees’ trust in their employing organisation is based on assessments of the organisation’s collective competencies and characteristics that enable it to reliably meet its goals and responsibilities (i.e., ability), combined with organisational actions that signal both genuine care and concern for the well-being of stakeholders and adherence to commonly accepted moral principles, such as honesty and fairness (i.e., intentions). Thus, employees’ trust in the organisation is built on both competence based trust relating to expectations of ability, and affect based trust relating to expectations of care and respect (benevolence) and integrity behaviours (Colquitt et al., 2012; Searle et al., 2011).

Distrust, by contrast, is broadly concerned with the absence of confidence in others. It involves pervasive, negative suspicions regarding the motives, intentions and actions of others who are considered to be harmful or malicious in a way which implies little or no regard for the welfare of others (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015; Grovier, 1994). Initially distrust was conceptualised as antithetical to trust, with each occupying opposing ends of a single continuum (Bigley and Pearce, 1998); however, there is a growing consensus that distrust is distinct from trust (Lewicki et al., 1998; Saunders et al., 2014). Recent research has demonstrated that distrust represents a ‘tipping point’ which precludes the existence of trust altogether due to the pervasive...
negative expectations associated with the other party (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015).

Those studying distrust have identified the importance of situational factors and institutional frameworks, such as culture, legalistic mechanisms (e.g., formal control or contract processes), networks, normative practices, socialisation and structural constraints (Shapiro, 1987; Schoorman et al., 1996; Wekselberg, 1996). These shape the agency between actors, forging prevailing norms of a culture legitimising and promoting either trust or distrust.

A significant difference between trust and distrust is the enduring quality of the latter’s impact (Searle and Ball, 2004). Some argue that distrust is a durable psychological characteristic (Hardin, 1993), while others contend that the impact of dispositional antecedents can reduce after gaining personal knowledge of others (Rotter, 1980). Attention towards trust has tended to focus on the rational cognitive elements (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996), with common dimensions including competence, integrity and benevolence (Mayer et al., 1995).

Distrust, by contrast, is argued to be less rational in both its origins and consequences (Deutsch, 1973; Kramer, 1994; 1998; 2004). Researchers have distinguished between a flexible, responsive and rational distrust, versus an inflexibility which is characterised by irrationality or paranoia (Kramer, 2004). Distrust creates hyper-attention on negative situations, such as the omissions and failures of direct supervisors, and thus could arguably be related to the psychological contract.

Critically, once established, distrust appears difficult for individuals to change (Gambetta, 1988). For example, staff who have experienced perceived contract violation (grounds for suspicion), and then are made redundant (confirmation of suspicion), can find themselves unable to trust their subsequent employers (Pugh et al., 2003). Trust is therefore a fragile entity, yet few attend to its unravelling (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009; Lewicki and Brinsfield, 2017). Developments in trust research over the last twenty years, however, show organisational change can impact on trust which may be central to CWB (Kelloway et al., 2010; Fox et al., 2012). The next four sub-sections outline the key impacts of organisational change in this respect.
2.2.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT BREACH

A crucial way that trust is altered through change is in terms of the psychological contract. The psychological contract is a set of beliefs that guide how individuals understand the exchange arrangement between them and their employer (Rousseau, 1995; 2011). A breached commitment by either side can constitute a violation of the psychological contract, with many employees having to remain in the employment relationship regardless (Tomprou et al., 2015). The impact of these changes on trust can vary according to the type and level of change occurring (e.g., technological, structural and work role).

The types of change that are most likely to make trust salient are those which are characterised as novel, critical and disruptive (Morgeson, et al., 2015). Morgeson et al.’s (2015) model outlines how events can originate anywhere in a hierarchy but their effects can reach beyond that level and travel both within and outside of the organisation. Situations where contract breach is inevitable include downsizing (Skarlicki et al., 2008), or those involving large scale organisational change, such as restructuring in response to significant budget cuts (Conway et al., 2014). Extant evidence reveals that such violations create negative emotional responses, typically in the form of distress and anger (Robinson and Morrison, 2000). Often the level of perceived violation makes individuals feel unable to rely on the organisation afterward. Some employees in this situation adopt an approach-orientated strategy with problem-focused coping designed to resolve the contract discrepancy, and emotion-focused coping to resolve their own negative feelings (Tomprou et al., 2015). In contrast, those without the support and access to a ‘voice’ that would allow them to resolve their concerns (Holland et al., 2016) tend to pursue a strategy designed to avoid the stressor but which nevertheless creates negative emotions (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). This latter strategy produces both cognitive and behavioural disengagement, including becoming cynical about the organisation (Pugh et al., 2003) and diverting attention into other non-work activities (Tomprou et al., 2015). Studies show that employees’ values, notably their public service motivation, can play an important role in facilitating their acceptance of change (Wright et al., 2013).

Behavioural disengagement following organisational change includes strategies such as the withdrawal of discretionary effort; where possible, individuals often exit the organisation (Leana et al., 1998; Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002). At the core of these behavioural responses is a departure from previous work behaviour and a new directive to restore the lost equity caused by unfair treatment or to demonstrate the rejection of perceived unacceptable new working conditions (Withey and Cooper, 1989). Evidence shows that while strategies of avoidance rarely endure, they can have long term consequences for individuals and organisations. As a result of their experiences, people feel less obliged towards their employer (Eisenberger et al., 2001) and can become distrustful of current and future employers (Pugh et al., 2003). They are more likely to morally disengage, and behave in ways which cause the breakdown of their work relationships, such as undertaking revenge (see section 2.2.4) or neglecting their work duties (Barclay et al., 2005; Restubog et al., 2008). However, their actions can be finely calibrated and directed towards those they attribute as responsible for the situation. For example, a study of psychological breaches showed employees directed their retaliation by reducing their citizenship behaviour towards the organisation, while concurrently maintaining their commitment to co-workers and service users (Conway et al., 2014). The involvement of staff in major transitions can help ameliorate the negative impact of organisational change. For example, a large Australian study (Morgan and Zaffane, 2003) revealed that in addition to the type of change, the level of employee participation in change-making was a critical feature. Structural change was found to be the most corrosive for employees, with senior management playing a critical role, often with little direct consultation with staff.

2.2.3 INJUSTICE

The role of justice in the workplace is a dominant theme of organisational behaviour (Ambrose, 2002; Gelfand et al., 2007), with perceived injustice associated with organisational change (Smollan and Sayers, 2009) and considered a trigger of CWB (Fox et al., 2001). Over time, individuals who work together form a contextual and collective view of their organisation regarding justice that informs their subsequent attitudes, norms and deviant behaviours (Thornton and Rupp, 2016). Contexts with perceived injustice can provoke intense
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reactions from individuals towards wrongdoing or perceived harm to another (Bies, 2005). As events themselves vary in duration and timing so too can their impact; events can also strengthen their perceived power as they are shared with others (Morgeson et al., 2015). The sharing of events can give them renewed salience, changing their energy, even when the matter is resolved for the affected individual, their treatment can become a concern for others and affect how they view the organisation. Indeed, violations of employee trust can occur without an obvious infractions arising such as from an employee witnessing their colleague being poorly treated, even without them having been badly treated themselves (Searle et al., 2011). Thus breach can spill over to affect those not directly involved (Kim et al., 2004). Critically, in unjust contexts those with high moral identities have been found to be more sensitive and likely to respond to injustice through deviant behaviour as a means of correcting a perceived wrong (Thornton and Rupp, 2016). Extant research shows those with a high moral identity are more attentive to injustice (ibid), and are more likely to perceive employer information about organisational changes as untimely and inadequate (Skarlicki et al., 2008).

Two major forms of justice have been directly linked to CWB: distributive and procedural (Fox et al., 2001). Distributive justice is related to individuals’ perceptions concerning the fairness of outcomes relative to their contributions, compared to the contributions and outcomes of others. In contrast, procedural justice involves the fairness of the process used to make decisions (Folger and Greenberg, 1985; Levanthal et al., 1980). Fair procedures can strengthen relationships and play a key role in relationship repair mechanisms. Injustice in either the process or the outcome can result in the loss of trust in a supervisor who is perceived to be responsible for the injustice (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996), and trigger longer-term dysfunctional relationships and reduced future performance (Worthington and Drinkard, 2000). Therefore organisations with strong procedural justice climates can help channel and mitigate desires for revenge during change by instead creating a context of reconciliation and forgiveness (Andiappan and Treviño, 2010). For example, hallmarks of well-managed downsizing processes include transparent communications and fairly applied procedures, which can actually enhance trust in an employer (Hope-Hailey, et al., 2012). Studies show the enduring and pernicious impact of organisational

mistreatment on people’s lives, regardless of whether employees stay in or leave the organisation concerned (Pugh et al., 2003). Research suggests that all three forms of fairness – distributive (which concerns outcomes), procedural (which concerns the fairness of procedures) and interactional (which relates to fairness regarding interpersonal interactions and information) – are important in maintaining trust, but also the level of trust in top management, which can in turn affect the retention of remaining staff (Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002).

2.2.4 REVENGE

Accordingly, organisational change can create a context for employees to undertake various forms of revenge (Skarlicki et al., 2008), which can have serious consequences for an organisation and its other employees. Revenge has been defined as an effort by an individual to inflict damage, injury, discomfort or punishment on a party judged responsible for causing harm (Aquino et al., 2001; 2006). Acts of revenge include theft, workplace aggression and employee sabotage (Barclay et al., 2014). Counter-retaliation can also occur as a result of revenge, extending and escalating the period and level of conflict (Kim and Smith, 1993). Central to the decision to seek redress is an attribution that another party is responsible for injustice and unfairness (Barclay et al., 2014; Gouldner, 1960). For example, a study of an organisational downsizing process that had low levels of procedural justice revealed more negative actions from those who were told that their employer had tried to remove certain employees (dismiss condition) than for those who were told they had tried to retain certain staff (keep condition) (Brockner et al., 1995).

In understanding revenge behaviour, two further important factors have been found. The first concerns the prior perceived trustworthiness (integrity) of the employer, where those with low prior integrity are more likely to experience greater levels of retaliation (Skarlicki et al., 2008). These negative effects can be reduced through enhanced interactional justice in the form of timely and adequate explanations to staff; however, the impact of such information provision is mediated by its perceived sincerity (De Cremer and Tyler, 2007). A second factor concerns the moral identity of employees, which itself has two distinct functions. First, as noted above, moral identity can
impact on an individual’s sensitivity to violations of moral norms concerning how people should be treated (Thornton and Rupp, 2016). Such perceived treatment violates the right of staff to be treated with dignity, an important factor in positive self-regard (Rawls, 1971). Disregarding such a norm can produce powerful reactions and motivate retaliation (Bies, 2001). Second, moral identity provides a motivational justification for individuals that allows those undertaking reprisals to disengage from their usual normative framework. Thus when individuals focus on issues which are important to them, their moral identity triggers revenge responses towards the wrongdoers (O’Reilly and Aquino, 2011).

Now that the main negative outcomes of organisational change in relation to the underpinning themes of trust and CWB have been outlined, the next section considers the specific individual, social and organisational level triggers of CWB, both generally and, where the evidence exists, during change.

### 2.3 TRIGGERS OF CWB: INDIVIDUAL FACTORS

#### 2.3.1 PROPENSITY - TRAITS

Longstanding study of CWB has focused on the functionalist, trait-based approach, which contends that such deviance is an atypical form of behaviour, perpetrated by rogue outliers (bad apples) (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). Supporting this perspective, personality has been confirmed in meta-analysis as an antecedent for CWB (Dalal, 2005). Three personality dimensions are specifically associated with CWB, and these are collectively known as the ‘dark triad’: Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (O’Boyle et al., 2012). Machiavellianism concerns a manipulative personality, while narcissism includes facets such as grandiosity, entitlement, dominance and superiority; psychopathy involves high impulsivity and thrill-seeking along with low empathy and anxiety (O’Boyle et al., 2012). Individuals with these traits may carry out CWB as a means of feeling powerful or to abuse their already powerful position (Popovich and Warren, 2010; Searle et al., 2017a). Research shows that organisational interventions can help reduce negative outcomes such as CWB or abusive supervision associated with these personality traits (Spain et al., 2014). However, more recently there have been concerns about the overuse of these diagnoses, thereby allowing organisations to be absolved of their role in creating work experiences that perpetuate these traits (Fritzon et al., 2018). Similarly, attention has focused on detecting and deterring entry into employment of those with intentional self-gain motivations or malicious motives. There has been comparatively little consideration of the impact of change on such individuals, who may escalate their CWB if they perceive that the turbulence wrought by change might reduce the detection of their behaviours.

Further, extant research indicates two of the ‘big-5’ personality factors are associated with CWB - conscientiousness and agreeableness. Synthesis using meta-analysis found low conscientiousness as the best predictor of CWB such as theft, disciplinary problems, drug and substance abuse, damage to property, breach of organisational rules and other irresponsible behaviours (Salgado, 2002). Further work has dichotomised the relationship between personality and actions targeting either the individual (CWB-I) or the organisation (CWB-O). At an interpersonal level this study found direct inverse relations with agreeableness (e.g., good natured, cooperative, and trusting), while at the organisational level (CWB-O) there was a relationship with low conscientiousness (e.g., responsible, dependable, and achievement oriented) (Mount et al., 2006). It is noteworthy that a weak relationship was found between CWB and low emotional stability (e.g., those who are tense, nervous and highly strung), but that further investigation showed that emotional stability adds no further significance beyond that found for conscientiousness and agreeableness (Bowling and Eschleman, 2010). Other studies have revealed how an antecedent of CWB, namely managers’ disconfirming communication, has a particularly enduring negative impact on those with low emotional stability (Sniderman et al., 2016). This is an area for further research in the context of CWB. However, while personality dimensions are shown to be important in contributing to CWB and insider threat, other contextual factors including organisational culture significantly moderate their impact (O’Boyle et al., 2012).

#### 2.3.2 MORAL IDENTITY AND DISENGAGEMENT

Aside from personality, a further individual-level factor is moral identity, which includes a disposition
to care deeply and be motivated to be moral and behave ethically (Aquino and Reed, 2002). Factors associated with moral identity include cognitive moral development, idealism, moral empathetic concern and guilt, as well as personality traits including honesty-humility, conscientiousness and agreeableness (Detert et al., 2008; Egan et al., 2015; Johnson and Buckley, 2015; Moore et al., 2012; Ogunfowora and Bourdage, 2014). In contrast, the disposition to morally disengage has positive associations with Machiavellianism, external locus of control, trait cynicism, and moral relativism. Research indicates that this desire to ensure good behaviour (and also because dishonest behaviour motivates self-censure), people refrain from intentionally behaving in ways that violate their moral standards (Bandura, 1990; Bandura et al., 1996). However, there can be situations in which individuals deviate from their previously impeccable moral track records, becoming more susceptible to immoral actions (Merritt et al., 2010; Monin and Miller, 2001). In such circumstances, the usual self-sanctions become deactivated or weakened through cognitive processes (Bandura, 1991:71). To protect themselves, individuals try to minimise the gap by separating their moral standards from their real actions (Shu et al., 2011). The resolve to behave ethically can also be weakened by adverse emotional responses that arise from working in a high-stress context (Fida et al., 2015), which we will discuss further in a later section on self-regulation.

2.3.2.1 Mechanisms of moral disengagement

Three categories of moral disengagement mechanisms have been identified: i.) cognitive reconstruction of events; ii.) efforts to minimise the perpetrator’s agency; or iii.) focusing on changing the target (Bandura 1991; 1996; 1999; 2001). First, cognitive reconstruction of events includes moral justification, which comprises the reframing of immoral behaviours as defensible, through reducing obstacles of cognitive dissonance or anticipated guilt of unethical behaviour; euphemistic labelling, which includes obscuring reprehensible actions or re-labelling them to confer a more respectable status, for example civilians are not ‘killed’, rather bombs cause ‘collateral damage’ (Moore, 2015); and advantageous comparison, which builds on Festinger’s (1957) work to use a point of comparison which enables the perpetrator to appear less negative. The second category concerns efforts to minimise one’s role in harmful behaviour and includes displacing responsibility onto other parties; diffusing responsibility, such as through the use of bureaucracy, anonymity or devolving responsibility to a group as a means of minimizing moral agency of an individual; and distorting or disregarding the actual consequences of these unethical actions in order to weaken reactions that would deter an individual. The final set of mechanisms seeks to alleviate wrongdoing, either by dehumanising those targeted, for example implying they are a different and inferior category, or by attributing the blame of the unethical action on to the target. Through the use of such mechanisms situations are cognitively reconstituted to allow the perpetrator’s behaviour to no longer be subject to self-sanction. Studies show the clear relationship between moral disengagement and immoral behaviour; the more individuals morally disengage, the more likely they are to behave immorally (Aquino et al., 2007; Beu and Buckley, 2004; Detert et al., 2008; Pelton, et al., 2004). The context of change, intertwined as it is with psychological contract breach, perceived injustice and revenge, presents a prime context for moral disengagement.

2.3.3 SELF-REGULATION AND EGO-DEPLETION

An individual’s ability to actively inhibit negative behaviour draws on limited and exhaustible resources; the ability to manage behaviour and maintain good actions can become overwhelmed (Baumeister et al., 1998). The ego-depletion perspective highlights how an environment can have an insidious accumulative impact to overwhelm and erode an individual’s good intentions. Extant research shows that a range of situations can cause dynamic degradation to self-regulation. This includes continuous efforts at self-control, such as in the vigilance required to control temptation (Muraven and Baumeister, 2000); responding to high levels of stress (Fida et al., 2015; Fox et al., 2001), with a study of CWB in health professionals showing how over time stressful work contexts can overwhelm supervisors to produce uncharacteristic theft behaviour (Searle et al., 2017a); efforts to regulate negative emotions (Kiefer and Barclay, 2012); or in response to poor sleep quality (Spector et al., 2006). The resultant emotional exhaustion leads to CWB through depersonalisation and dis-identification (Bolton et al., 2012), or from a process of moral disengagement (Fida et al., 2015). Importantly these declines in self-regulation are found
to be far lower for individuals with high job satisfaction (Andreoli and Lefkowitz, 2009). Further, although this ego-depletion effect is not universal, it emerges as a byproduct of some individuals’ diminished ability to self-manage and inhabit negative responses, it is likely to have consequences for others in the workplace (Robinson et al., 2014) (see social processes section).

2.3.4 THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS

Until recently emotions had received relatively little attention in terms of their interplay with sensemaking, attitudes and behaviours, especially during threatening situations (see Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). Indeed, earlier scholars contend that emotions were an impediment to sensemaking (Weick, 1990; 1995), but more recent work has started to see them as important triggers to cognition (Maitlis et al., 2013). For example, emotions are a central component in directing current and future attention and can influence individuals’ subsequent attitudes and reactions (Fineman, 1993). They can affect whether individuals in the same context feel exhausted and overwhelmed, or have a sense of accomplishment (Zellars et al., 2004). They can determine whether employees show cooperative behaviours, performing tasks to help others and the organisation, or instead withdraw or act counterproductively (Barclay and Kiefer, 2014). Therefore it is important to recognise that emotions do not just function as a communication device in social relationships, but also characterize and inform experiences of organisational processes, such as where they are considered just or unjust (Barclay et al., 2005). Critically, emotional reactions can form a ‘hot’ antecedent that leads to impulsive forms of CWB (Fox et al., 2001; Spector and Fox, 2010).

Especially strong negative or positive emotions can be a catalyst behind employees’ struggles to find an explanation for their new situations. Generally, however, negative experiences have a greater and more enduring impact on individuals than positive ones (Baumeister et al., 2001; Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005). Negative emotions are found to constrain and narrow thinking, causing individuals to focus on identifying and managing the perceived threat, thus making it more salient and easily recalled. By contrast, positive emotions appear more diffuse in function, enabling individuals to relax and have greater capacity for creativity in their problem-solving, coping, sensemaking and relating to others (Fredrickson, 2013). Negative emotions can be a significant precursor, both to alert an individual that sensemaking is now required, but also to provide the energy necessary to undertake the cognitive processes involved to lead to CWB (Fida et al., 2015). For example, Steigenberger contends that those experiencing both fear and anxiety are likely to show avoidance behaviour, while simultaneous feelings of hope and anger result in decisive actions. Emotions mark the end of a sensemaking episode, denoted by coherence between the felt emotions and the new plausible explanation of the situation (Maitlis et al., 2013). The process of sensemaking itself is also likely to involve powerful and often negative emotions (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014).

More attention needs to be paid towards understanding the differences in the types of emotions individuals generate to reveal why some employees experience organisational change as a source of new opportunities and challenges, and others regard the same experience as placing substantial threats or undue demands onto them (Cartwright and Holmes, 2006). For instance, studies show how personality traits such as anxiety, when combined with felt emotions (in this case anger), can be antecedents for CWB (Spielberger and Sydeman, 1994). Recent research looking at the impact of organisational change on employees has differentiated seven types with distinct emotions and cognitions (Searle et al., 2017b). Searle et al., (2017b) explain that one group in a cohesive team whose leaders sought to engage them in the process showed relatively little effect on trust, while two other groups were relatively limited in their attention, by either not being alert to what was happening to gather more information, or through being resigned and without the energy to engage. In a further group of three, however, concerns were salient but confined to a specific area of concern, such as trust in the leaders at the top, or regarding the shifts in identity required for some roles. In contrast, the last group had a distinct and completely negative tone, characterised by a pervasive distrust that adversely affected all their relations. These distrusters appeared to be exercised about how the change had affected their personal goals.

There are particular challenges to studying emotions which have caused more attention to be given to distinct and negative emotions rather than towards multiple and differently valenced emotions (Briner and Kiefer,
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2.3.5 CHANGE APPRAISAL

Indeed, work focusing on the impact of change has shown that individuals’ appraisal of a stressful situation varies but can also change over time due to their perceived sense of control (Fox et al., 2001). Extant research shows that there is no single generic impact, only differences in individuals’ change trajectories (Solinger et al., 2013; Solinger, et al., 2015). These vary in part due to differences in change orientation (Fugate et al., 2008). For example, studies of the relationship between emotions and such appraisals reveal reciprocal relationships: those with a positive orientation towards change will have a positive appraisal and positive emotions, while the reverse assessment is associated with a negative appraisal and negative emotions (Fugate et al., 2011). Those with negative appraisals of change see themselves as less able to control events and therefore as having less of an ability to cope. Therefore, perceived control emerges as a significant antecedent of CWB, with those who feel they have lost control over their working lives acting in a more deleterious and damaging manner than others (Allen and Greenberger, 1980). Further, individuals who do not feel in control are likely to fail to actively engage with change, instead resorting to an escape coping strategy by hoping the situation will simply pass and they can return to their previous state (Takeuchi et al., 2002). Thus their capacity to cope with change becomes undermined and a downward spiral is created; for example, those with negative appraisals also have negative emotions which have been found to predict both their level of sickness absence and their decision to exit (Fugate et al., 2012).

In contrast, a study on how to enhance the effectiveness of change has explored the use of organisational inducements and employee psychological resilience (Shin et al., 2012): both factors were found to be positively related to employees’ commitment to change. Critically, those with a positive attitude towards change have a more positive set of associations towards change, which influences their subsequent appraisal of the changes they face. New models of individual responses towards change therefore differentiate between their primary appraisal processes, which focus on the congruence and resonance of goals, and a secondary

Furthermore, the role that a particular context might play in an individual’s emotional reactions is another relevant factor. Studies of CWB have found a significant relationship between stress and emotion. Critically, CWB is emerging as a behavioural response to strain, helping the individual manage a stressful situation and reducing their consequent negative emotions which threaten the organisation and its members’ well-being while also reducing effectiveness (Spector and Fox, 2005). For example, further study of job stress shows how CWB arises in response to feelings of frustration at the organisation, which can build from disruption to the individual’s job activities, work goals and/or job performance (Fida et al., 2014). Similarly, experiences of anger are particularly important in the targeting of specific individuals within an organisation (Fox and Spector, 1999). Negative outward emotions are associated with hostility, which itself arises from exposure to experiences such as unfairness, and these emotions are thought to be distinct from behaviour associated with inward-focused emotions such as guilt or shame (Barclay et al., 2005). Provocative situations however, can vary in their impact, with those demonstrating high-trait anger more likely to respond with physical and verbal antagonism. Such individuals are also revealed to have lower constructive coping capacities (Deffenbacher, 1992). These variations in individual emotional response and coping capacity underlines the complexity behind employees’ responses to organisational change.

2005). This is especially true of single-toned negative emotions, such as anger, rather than positive or mixed emotions (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 2013; Kiefer 2005). The most frequently examined emotions in the context of change have been discrete negative emotions, such as anger and frustration (e.g., Morrison and Robinson, 1997; Zhao et al., 2007; Lindebaum and Gabriel, 2016). Such work has been important, for example revealing anger to be an intense short-term emotion, and distinct from the withdrawal emotion of contempt. Anger has further been linked to active engagement connected with raised levels of concern (Folkman and Lazarus, 1985; Giner-Sorolla, 2013), and has also been linked to distrust (Jones and George, 1998). However, it has increasingly been recognised that emotions have a dynamic quality, making it therefore important to understand patterns in their progression from one type to another. For example, longstanding work has identified the evolution of frustration into anger (Dollard et al., 1939), and its subsequent development into contempt (Fischer and Roseman, 2007).
appraisal focused on their perceptions of their ability to cope (Oreg et al., 2018) (see Figure 2.3 above).

2.3.5.1 Resistance to change

Studies about change position those with negative responses to change as resistant to it (Bryant and Higgins, 2010). Resistance to change is defined as ‘A phenomenon that affects the change process, delaying or slowing down its beginning, obstructing or hindering its implementation’ (del Val and Fuentes, 2003: 148–9). Resistance is therefore a means of maintaining the status quo and perceived as a form of organisational deviance. Such individuals alter their perceptions of important personal or organisational norms to allow themselves to maintain a consistent and more positive perspective of their own actions, thereby failing to regard themselves as being deviant. This positioning of such individuals as being deviant is particularly relevant when analysing a form of organisational change that ‘interrupts normal patterns of organisation and calls for participants to enact new patterns’ (Ford et al., 2008: 363). Situations of change, however, rarely include all the information, and therefore the resulting ambiguity or incomplete information can exacerbate stress, triggering further negative threat appraisals (Fugate et al., 2012).

Research into employee experiences of large scale change highlights the critical importance of how the organisation communicates and manages these transition processes. For example, a study showed that altering employees’ perceived control and autonomy during a cost-cutting change could ameliorate some of the negative consequences (Kiefer et al., 2015). Specifically, where change was introduced as being innovative, rather than merely cost cutting, its impact was not only less negative, but actually enhanced employees’ job satisfaction, well-being and work engagement over time. This study, among others (see Hope-Hailey et al., 2012), attests that even when the changes introduced have negative consequences, such as reducing costs and causing redundancy, if they are done in a way that involves employees, ensuring procedural and informational fairness, then they will be better received and have more positive outcomes.

2.3.6 INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISTIC SPECTRUM DISORDER (ASD)

A critical difference that can affect an individual’s orientation towards and capacity to cope with change is Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD), also known as neurodiversity. Neurodiversity concerns a range of individual differences including autistic spectrum, dyslexia, dyspraxia and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. These conditions affect how people perceive and interact with the world around them. It is commonly accepted that those drawn to working in certain sectors, including maths, science and technology, have an aptitude for understanding and analysing predictable rule based systems (Ruzich et al., 2015). However, there...
is a growing body of evidence that many of those with such aptitudes and preferences display characteristics associated with the autistic spectrum, especially Asperger’s Syndrome (AS) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Billington, et al., 2007). These include individuals who can be crudely characterised as highly intelligent, socially awkward, having a narrow foci of interest which can be obsessive and those with communication problems stemming from an inability to relate to and empathise with others and to understand others’ intentions and feelings (National Autistic Society, 2018). They can also have specific skills such as pattern recognition, memory and mathematics, but can find the stimuli of workplace noise and lighting overwhelming and are particularly intolerant of uncertainty (Austin and Pisano, 2017). Those with neurodiversity, and specifically Asperger’s Syndrome (AS), prefer routines and habitual activities that can make them resistant to and inflexible towards change (Fitzgerald and Corvin, 2001).

Crucial to the successful employment and positive engagement of such workers is a focus on getting to know each individual well so that their particular vulnerabilities can be better managed (Austin and Pisano, 2017). For example, autistic people can be brutally honest about their own and others’ weaknesses. They can find it difficult to cope with unexpected and uncontrollable events which deviate from the goals they have, and to adhere to new processes when they simply do not understand why they have been changed.

Late adult diagnosis of AS has also been related to higher levels of mental health issues, specifically with depression and heightened suicidal tendencies (Cassidy et al., 2014). The stress associated with managing depression, and the secondary depression that arises from social isolation and feelings of exclusion and low self-esteem, appear to be contributing factors to such suicidal tendencies. Such findings suggest that greater attention should be devoted to diagnosis to help support such employees. In diverse workplaces, there could be considerable value in providing co-workers and managers with additional training, including using support circles and coaching that extends from work to include personal lives (Austin and Pisano, 2017).

In relation to insider threat activities, there is limited research into how ASD affects individuals’ behaviour. However, some studies of deviant behaviour demonstrate an important difference from that found in ‘neurotypical’ populations. For example, a study of computer science students showed that those on the autistic spectrum were more likely to steal others’ identities, to undertake cyberbullying, to write viruses and to be hackers (Seigfried-Spellar et al., 2015). It suggests that moral engagement may be different for such individuals; however, much more focused empirical research is required to investigate more precisely the role of neurodiversity in CWB and insider threat activities.

2.4 TRIGGERS OF CWB: SOCIAL FACTORS

The above section outlines the complex individual factors which can affect how an individual experiences and reacts to organisational change. In this next section we explore important social factors which should also be considered in any study of stable or change-related workplace behaviour.

2.4.1 WORKPLACE INTERACTIONS: SOCIAL LEARNING

Evidence suggests that individuals who demonstrate insider threat might not be identified as deviant or malicious people with little moral knowledge or self-sanctioning capacity at recruitment stage. Instead, it is important to recognise how previously positive employees can become disillusioned and cynical through their increasingly negative perceptions and experiences of colleagues, managers or the organisation as a whole. Meta-analytic study of colleague relationships shows their importance in terms of work perceptions, attitudes, performance and withdrawal (Chiaburu and Harrison, 2008). Chiaburu and Harrison (2008) found that both supportive and antagonistic peer relationships have distinct impacts on an employee over and above that of leaders. These can vary as a result of the emotional, content and social intensity of the work context.

As social animals, it is through our group memberships that we connect with more abstract entities such as our employing organisation. Studies of social learning show how social norms become altered for the worse after witnessing others’ unethical behaviours particularly where an individual identifies with those in the
unethical group (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). This type of learning is shown to have two components: descriptive norms, which involves the identification of what most people do in particular situations, and injunctive norms, which indicate the specific behaviours that most people endorse or reject (ibid). For example, Wenzel’s (2004) work on tax compliance found lower deductions were made in tax returns only when there was identification with the particular social group that appeared in the information provided. Thus, professionals can become corrupted from their exposure to other professionals’ unethical behaviour (Welsh et al., 2015). There are three possible ways in which individuals can acquire such social learning: through direct exposure as a target of CWB; from vicariously observing others’ CWB actions; and ambiently, by virtue of working in organisations characterised by the collective deviance of colleagues (Robinson et al., 2014). The impact of such different forms of exposure has yet to be fully empirically tested.

2.4.1.1 Social networks and processes

Social networks are accordingly important influences on individuals for good and ill. First, they can alter the cognitive process of sensemaking, as the framing and reframing of meanings is influenced by interactions with others who share their interpretations and frames of reference (Thornton and Rupp, 2016). Through these shared social processes, a group consensus emerges which extends to include moral identities and perceptions of justice, both of which are known to be important for CWB (Thornton and Rupp, 2016). A second key impact of social processes is to alter individual behaviour by initiating individuals into wrongdoing (Palmer and Moore, 2016) by adversely influencing their ethical behaviour (Kaptein, 2011). Through processes of socialisation, individuals acquire shared norms, values and exemplars of behaviour (Schein, 2009). These shared backgrounds and experiences, produce shared perspectives (Thornton and Rupp, 2016). Groups provide examples of traits or characteristics to emulate (Knoll et al., 2017), which can alter norms changing individuals’ behaviours (Felps et al., 2006; Jurkiewicz and Giacalone, 2016). Further, the relative position and relational closeness to such exemplars impedes individuals’ willingness to report a significant other’s wrongdoing (Miller and Thomas, 2005). Where the decline in behaviour occurs over a long period, rather than through a single event, those around them may simply fail to detect it; in this way, progressive decline often goes unnoticed (Gino and Bazerman, 2009).

Such is the power of these social influences, even those without the aforementioned traits or intentions can start to behave unethically (Moore and Gino, 2013). For example, a classic psychological study (Asch, 1951) shows how individuals conform to group pressures in order to fit in (normative influence) and can doubt their own individual judgment in favour of the collective judgment, even when they perceive this collective judgement to be wrong. As social animals the pressure to maintain membership of a significant group reduces cognitive efficiency, making the quality of group decision-making more lax (Janis, 1972). Mechanisms, including high social cohesion, can undermine ethical decisions and objective analysis. Thus, instead of individuals opposing and reporting wrongdoing, they stay silent or even undertake the same unethical actions themselves. This was evident in the case of the 2001 Enron scandal where a number of executives deliberately misled the board of directors and audit committee, but also pressured independent auditors not to report their CWB (Tourish and Vatcha, 2005).

2.4.1.2 Whistleblowing

Thus, when employees recognise wrongdoing in an organisation, they are presented with three decisions: remain silent (or even engage in the behaviour themselves), voice discontent (i.e., blow the whistle) or exit the organisation (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005). Whistleblowing has been defined as the ‘disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organisations that may be able to effect action’ (Near and Miceli, 1985:4). Factors influencing the decision to speak out include demographics (age, sex, level of education, higher-level or supervisory role, long tenure); personality variables (locus of control); high moral reasoning and morality (ethical judgements); and other characteristics (high organisational commitment, good job performance, and valuing whistleblowing above unethical behaviour) (Brabeck, 1984; Miceli and Near, 1984; Near and Miceli, 1996; Sims and Keenan, 1998). For example, those with long tenure may prefer to voice their discontent rather than exit.
the organisation because they feel they have an ability to effect change and prevent further wrongdoing (French and Raven, 1959). Individuals exposing organisational wrongdoing risk retaliation not only by their organisation (through job loss, decreased quality of working conditions or demotion), but also from the public (character assassinations). Therefore it is not surprising that contextual variables can moderate these decisions, particularly peer support, organisational size and climate, and the threat of retaliation. At the core of this decision-making is the perception of top management support and the choice of reporting channel (internal vs external) (Miceli and Near, 1992; 2002). In line with social exchange theory (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959), where there are higher levels of supervisory and co-worker support, internal reporting appears less threatening.

2.4.2 ROLE OF LEADERS

Leaders provide critical role models of how to behave, but their actions can also be triggers for CWB. Leaders’ behaviour is important in shaping the trust their staff have in them personally (Legood et al., 2016) and also influences the trust individuals have in their wider organisation (Windisch et al., 2017). Leaders can build trust with their followers by providing information, and thereby making themselves vulnerable to their staff and modelling trust by making the first move – this creates the basis for staff trust in them (Colquitt and Rodell, 2012). As such, it can be through trusting followers that leaders build trust (Nerstad et al., 2017).

The actions of leaders can positively influence the actions of those who follow them, but they can also skew them towards nefarious activities (Knoll et al., 2017). A classic psychological study (Milgram, 1965) shows how individuals undertake deviant behaviour to try to please and appease an authority figure. A further reason for this is that senior managers possess important means of directing and rewarding others’ actions; their organisational positions give them the power to reward and punish particular activities (French and Raven, 1959; Miller and Thomas, 2005). Powerful leaders can influence an individual’s decision to report a superior’s wrongdoing through either reducing or escalating fears for job security, which would be at stake for non-compliance (Modic, 1987). For example, attention has been devoted to what happens in toxic working environments when organisational leaders are unethical people who then corrupt and lead astray easily influenced followers (Padilla et al., 2007; Fischbacher-Smith, 2015). The reporting of wrongdoing can itself create a conflict (Chonko and Burnett, 1983), with many employees choosing to be socially compliant and follow their local leader, rather than reporting an unethical act (Miller and Thomas, 2005). The perceived organisational knowledge of a leader and the legitimacy of their position of authority also creates uncertainty as to whether the unethical act was actually acceptable behaviour (Greenberger et al., 1987). Thus, corrupt leaders can cause real dilemmas for followers. Distrust in leaders can be a catalyst for organisational disengagement (Windisch et al., 2017), and conceptually argued to be an antecedent for insider threat (Fischbacher-Smith, 2015).

Leaders can however play a positive role in helping their followers make sense of and adjust to new experiences (Browning and McNamee, 2012). During times of change, senior management can positively influence employee commitment (Lok and Crawford, 1999; Trevino et al., 2000), and help defuse employee cynicism about change (Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly, 2003). Other studies highlight the critical role of leaders in the successful implementation of change, with employees’ intentions to resist change positively related to leaders’ dispositional resistance to change, and negatively related to leaders’ openness to change and transformational style (Oreg and Berson, 2011). Leaders play a pivotal role in how employees view their experiences, by for example reframing the official company version of a lay-off more or less positively (Bean and Hamilton, 2006). One study used trust as a mediator to explore the antecedents and consequences of public sector employee trust in top management (Albrecht and Travaglione, 2003). Using data from two public sector organisations, the team again confirmed the importance of procedural fairness, but alongside organisational support, effective communication and job security in the retention of trust. Trust in top management was found to be a partial rather than a full, mediator. Other studies have found line managers to be particularly influential in all facets of an individual’s working experience (Nerstad et al., 2017).
2.5 TRIGGERS OF CWB: ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS

While local groups and teams in organisations can influence the nature of individual and collective workplace attitudes and behaviour, wider organisational level factors are also influential and can act as triggers of CWB. Many of these factors arise during periods of organisational change and are closely related to issues of trust.

2.5.1 HR SYSTEMS

The most important systems which impact on employees at work are Human Resource Management (HRM) systems. HRM systems are one of the most influential areas of an organisation’s policy and practice for trust (Searle, 2018). HRM policy involves the operationalization of strategic interventions focused on human capital, designed to identify and develop resourceful employees. Organisational development is an important component of HRM.

Trust implicitly permeates HRM in three key ways. First, the strategic policy choices of an organisation offer clues and signals of its trustworthiness towards both employees and external stakeholders. These clues can be discerned from a plethora of decisions, including the type of work contracts selected (Reilly, 1998) through to the approach taken in recognising and rewarding different groups and levels of employee. Such decisions are often made by senior managers, who have an important role in influencing both employee trust and organisational commitment (Farndale and Kelliher, 2013). Second, trust stems from how these policies are implemented, not only by HR professionals but increasingly by line managers to whom they have devolved responsibility for their day-to-day implementation (Searle, 2013). It is the fairness of such implementation that is critical (Searle et al., 2011).

One of the most regular HR processes that employees experience is performance management, which is underutilised in the management of successful change. As with other HR policies, trust here is related to the quality of the system itself and its execution. The perceived fairness and accuracy of the line managers’ assessment is critical (Fulk, et.al., 1985). As performance management includes distinct components of goal setting, collecting and evaluating evidence about past performance, provision of feedback and the quality of the performance review (Bragger et al., 2014), it is an important means of reducing employee uncertainty (De Cremer et al., 2010). However, in a context of change, it can be a critical tool for discussing the new direction required and demonstrating direct and ongoing support for any required transformation. Third, trust can be undermined through inconsistencies that emerge from outsourced HR policies, such as payroll or recruitment (Cooke et al., 2005), but also increasingly through the use of change project managers who do not remain in the organisation and so cannot be held accountable for any promises made. Trust is breached as a consequence of intra-organisational variations (Gould-Williams and Davies, 2005).

HRM policy can be viewed in terms of an employment journey which influences the dynamics of trust in that employer (Searle and Skinner, 2011). Employee experiences of change are often defining experiences, and have the potential to carry over into subsequent employment relationships (Pugh et al., 2003). Early employment experiences appear to be particularly crucial in setting initial expectations (psychological contract) to form the basis of employees’ subsequent trust and affective, cognitive and behavioural responses to employers (Robinson, 1996). As noted earlier, the breach of these ‘mutual obligations’ (Robinson and Rousseau, 1994), is often a central trigger for how and why change can lead to CWB. There is considerable attention given to early employment experiences, but little focus on post-violation impact or recovery (Tomprou et al., 2015). This omission is important: we require a more nuanced understanding about whether there is a particular impact of organisational change on longstanding employees, who through pension considerations are often less flexible in their ability to exit their organisation. This group are often previously loyal and committed employees, but they may experience the consequences of change differently.

2.5.2 CULTURE AND ORGANISATIONAL CONTROLS

Different organisational groups may also be more or less affected by certain elements and changes to organisational culture and controls. Organisational culture refers to the practices (both formal and informal) which are both routine and meaningful to organisational members. It includes the norms and expected behaviours
of staff and the values an organisation advocates for or represents. All of these aspects help create shared experiences and beliefs among organisational members (McAleese, 2010; Mumby, 1988; Schein, 2004). Culture is usually created over a long period of time, meaning that changes to organisational culture may go unnoticed by many employees, or be most acutely felt by long-serving employees.

Messages regarding appropriate and inappropriate behaviour are communicated by the organisation’s ethical culture to employees via the interplay of formal and informal systems of behavioural control (Treviño et al., 1998). Formal systems (such as reward systems, company policies, codes of ethics and selection systems) tend to be under the direct control of organisational decision-makers, whereas informal systems describe the way things are in the organisation as transmitted through behavioural norms, rituals, stories, and language (Weibel, et al., 2016). When organisational members perceive that expectations are communicated effectively by formal and informal systems, the organisation’s ethical culture is considered strong and employees are likely to abide by the clear and consistent messages about behavioural expectations. When these messages are seen as conflicting, the ethical culture is deemed weaker (Trevino and Youngblood, 1990).

Structural assurance within an organisation helps to ensure that conditions are safe and fair (Shapiro 1987; Wilson et al., 2008). Such conditions include contracts, guarantees, regulations, standard processes and technological features (McKnight et al., 1998). They can also include four different types of internal controls (Weibel et al., 2016): input controls, which determine who enters the organisation; process controls, which determine how things are done; output controls, which involve the final goals; and the use of sanctions and punishments to punish wrong-doers and deter others. For example, in a resource-constrained organisation the use of input controls (in the form of screening and non-selection of low conscientiousness and high emotional instability) would reduce the need for in-employment monitoring of this group, who are less effective in their handling of stress (Bowling and Eschleman, 2010). Whilst structural assurances seek to handle problematic scenarios (Wilson et al., 2008), individual responses to change, unfair treatment or inequality are commonly accompanied by negative emotions, such as anger, outrage and resentment (Folger, 1994), which are shown to be a tipping point towards CWB (Fida et al., 2015; Fox et al., 2001) but cannot be managed through controls alone.

During periods of change, CWB can escalate for a variety of reasons connected to control. In order to evaluate whether new ways of doing things are being adhered to, there can be more emphasis on control and monitoring in some areas. This may be achieved, however, through diverting and refocusing some of the control processes in a new context, therefore leaving other areas more vulnerable. In addition, it is likely that following these changes there will be more aspects of work that need attention, and so organisations can become simply overwhelmed and less attentive to exploitation. Finally, unless such changes to control are clearly communicated, intra-organisational inconsistencies are likely, which in turn creates ambiguities for employees that can result in unintended CWB.

2.5.3 ORGANISATIONAL COMMUNICATION

Communication plays a critical role in organisational functioning during times of stability and change. Communication is more than just information exchange: it is inherently social and creates meaning between individuals (Hargie, 2006). As such, communication signals the priorities, ethos and values of an organisation and plays a central role in employee trust development and maintenance. Various studies have demonstrated that effective communication is linked to positive organisational outcomes, including employee satisfaction, performance and commitment (Kumar and Giri, 2009; Tourish and Hargie, 2009). Communication has been shown to facilitate the development of a sense of community within an organisation (White et al., 2010), and the central role that communication plays in developing and maintaining trust has been widely acknowledged (Rockmann and Northcraft, 2008; Thomas et al., 2009). Conversely, employee dissatisfaction with organisational communication has been linked to reduced cooperation from employees, resentment and tension in the workplace (Wood, 1999), making it an important consideration in the mitigation or development of CWB.

Further, communication is recognised as playing a critical role in how people react to and manage organisational uncertainty (Brashers, 2007; Kramer,
Both informative communication and communication which helps to create a sense of community within an organisation has been linked to employees’ readiness to change and to effective change in practice (Elving, 2005). The ability to communicate effectively about change has in turn been linked to employee trust in their organisation’s leaders (Saunders and Thornhill, 2003). Leaders who demonstrate openness and engage in dialogue with those they manage are able to effectively promote organisational goals (Bambacas and Patrickson, 2008), whereas poor leader-follower relations reduce employee commitment, productivity and can lead to other kinds of CWB such as absenteeism (Hargie et al., 1999). Indeed, much of the research in this area reveals that communication about organisational change is often ineffective. The dynamic and uncertain nature of organisational change often means that managers can’t share (or don’t always know) all relevant information with employees, and individuals’ search for clarity leads to rumours and the accessing of unofficial routes of information. This often leads to misinformation (Bordia et al., 2006) and increases individual feelings of uncertainty and vulnerability (Saunders and Thornhill, 2003), conditions not conducive to trust or to positive working relationships. As outlined in various studies (for a review see Hargie and Tourish, 2009) effective organisational communication involves fulfilling several dimensions, such as providing an adequate amount of information (including avoiding overload), providing knowledgeable sources, timeliness, suitable channels, clarity, transparency, credibility and trustworthiness.

2.5.4 ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSES TO BREACHES OF TRUST

Relatedly, how an organisation responds to a violation of employee trust is crucial to subsequent employee behaviour. There are relatively few studies of trust repair, but there is an agreement that there needs to be a transition from a current negative position to a more positive one before trust can be re-established (Sitkin and Stickel, 1996). A review of the literature on employee trust in organisations identifies three key approaches to trust repair (Searle et al., 2011). First, at an interpersonal level, trust repair can derive from cognitive changes to attributions, related to three forms of breakdown: locus of causality (focus on who was responsible), controllability (identifying how deliberate their intent was) and stability (how likely this is to happen again in the future).

Kim et al.’s work (2004) identifies two distinct routes to repair – competence-based violation is better appeased by an apology and an admission of culpability, whereas for integrity breaches denial of responsibility is more effective. The second approach, social equilibrium, positions breaches as being a disequilibrium in both the relationship and the social context, (Bottom et al., 2002; Reb et al., 2006) produced by differences between expectation and reality (Ren and Gray, 2009). This form of trust focuses on restoring equilibrium through social rituals, such as penance and punishment. For example, studies of CWB have looked at this form of repair in relation to revenge, deviant outcomes (Bies and Tripp 1996; Tripp et al., 2007) and non-cooperative behaviour (Bottom et al., 2002). Such studies highlight how firms with high justice climates tend to have better procedures to formally deal with violations, thus making forgiveness and reconciliation more likely (Aquino et al., 2006; Tripp et al., 2007). In contrast, those without formal channels tend to experience greater retaliation following violations (Tripp et al., 2007). The third approach includes structural mechanisms: legal remedies, such as incentives, penalties or monitoring (Sitkin and Roth, 1993); and social mechanisms, creating obligations between the parties. Repair of this form makes future exchanges explicit to reduce the likelihood of further breaches (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009; Nakayachi and Watabe, 2005; Sitkin and Roth, 1993).

2.6 CONCLUSION

This study explores the role of trust and organisational change in CWB and insider threat activities. The review of the literature demonstrates the array of individual, social and organisational factors which can influence how employees perceive and react to organisational changes. These factors and associated experiences trigger the decline of trust and emergence of distrust. Throughout the remaining sections of the report, we examine empirical evidence gathered in a high-security organisation and consider the significance of these factors for CWB during organisational change.
3. METHODOLOGY

Following our extensive literature review, primary data was collected from a case study organisation, Plan B, a security critical organisation who form part of the critical national infrastructure. To ensure a rigorous and robust methodology, a mixed-method approach was used involving the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. We outline the approach below.

3.1 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS:

In total we carried out 17 interviews as follows:

Context interviews were held with middle and senior managers of the organisation to collect data on two aspects: 1) the nature and impact of recent local and group level organisational changes and; 2) their experiences of anonymous instances of counterproductive working behaviour and insider acts within this same time frame, both generally and regarding the three selected case studies. Five individuals were interviewed including representatives from HR, security, and communications and engagement.

Critical incidence stakeholder interviews were undertaken for three insider threat cases. These cases were identified following discussion with senior management. In each case, we interviewed a range of stakeholders, including: the perpetrator (where possible – one case only), co-workers, line managers, group leaders, and security staff directly involved or at least privy to each case. These individuals were identified by the team’s security contact following guidance from the research team.

These interviews focused on the events leading up to each case, what occurred during that incident, and what happened after. In line with our theoretical framework, our stakeholders were prompted around their perception of the individual, social and organisational factors involved in each case. Additionally, we gained their insight into their experiences of organisational changes. In total 12 interviews were undertaken at this stage.

All interviews were carried out at the organisation’s premises (except one which was conducted via telephone due to interviewee availability). Interviews lasted approximately 60 minutes. They were voice recorded and later transcribed in full. Any quotes reported in our findings are anonymised in line with our ethics and to preserve the confidentiality of our informants (see other ethics information below). They are reported by an identifier ranging from I4 through to I20.

3.1.1 INTERVIEW ANALYSIS

Interviews were coded using primarily a deductive approach via the software package ‘Nvivo’. Nvivo allows text from interview transcripts to be highlighted and grouped in terms of themes or topics of interests for a research project. Following our extensive literature review outlined above, and an initial scoping of the data, we developed an a priori codebook to capture relevant insights.

This included sections about: change; emotions; home life events; self- regulation; identity of the perpetrator; personality of the perpetrator; perpetrator work behaviour; perpetrator quality of relationships; team climate; incident type (intentional/unintentional, malicious/accidental); moral disengagement; organisational communication; organisational controls; organisational culture; security culture; power; trustworthiness. Where pertinent unforeseen matters emerged from the interviews the codebook was adapted and used to recode the relevant data.

To assign data extracts to our codebook categories, the coding of the interview data was conducted mainly at the explicit level (i.e., what was actually said rather than what could be inferred). The results were then organised thematically, with findings based on the recurrent themes and patterns which crossed individual codes (Deacon et al., 2007). Thus we moved from deductive and inductive ‘first-order codes’ to inductive ‘second-order themes’ (Brown and Coupland, 2015).

Coding was carried out by a qualified research assistant with expertise in organisational change and qualitative data analysis, after training and guidance from the research leads on the codebook. Resultant coding was independently checked and verified or negotiated by the two lead researchers in terms of interpretation and
assignment to categories; this activity was undertaken on an ongoing basis after each interview transcript was coded, and then again collectively after all interviews were coded.

Further, we used the thematic analysis results (and the HR/security documentation outlined below) to help us construct timelines for each insider threat case, which we represent visually in our findings section.

### 3.2 ANALYSIS OF HR AND SECURITY DOCUMENTATION ON THE THREE INSIDER THREAT CASES.

We reviewed the available security and HR documentation for each case. This included, disciplinary letters, scripts of interviews with perpetrators, investigation reports and organisational/HR policy documents following the incidents. This information was used for context purposes and to assist with the development of the timelines we developed for each case.

### 3.3 ANONYMOUS SITE SURVEYS

Anonymous site surveys were used to assess the organisational climate as well as the current level of, and motivation for, CWB. We included validated scales for: personality (Donnellan et al., 2006); trust and distrust towards the organisation (Searle et al., 2011b) and towards line managers (Mayer et al., 1995); quality of change communication (Mohr and Sohi, 1995); type of social support (Wanberg and Kammeyer-Mueller, 2000), emotional experience (Yik et al., 2011); change readiness and confidence (Fugate et al., 2008); identity (Ashforth and Mael, 1989); and counterproductive work behaviour (Spector et al., 2006). The survey was administered only in the two departments in which our case studies occurred. Following consultation with departmental management, we decided to use a paper format in response to staff concerns about the confidentiality and security of our usual online survey platform. The survey was distributed following departmental meetings with an accompanying addressed envelope to allow its return to the research team. A total of 47 completed surveys were returned. This represented a response rate of 6 managers and 28 staff in Department 1 which was the location for insider threat Cases 1 and 3; and 2 managers and 5 staff in Department 2 in which Case 2 resided. This represents a response of 7% and 40% respectively. Although these numbers are relatively low, the surveys do nonetheless reveal some interesting findings (discussed in the next section). Further, due to the cross-sectional data it is not possible to identify causation, but we do show a number of statistically significant correlations between perceptions of relationships, trust and CWB. These are reported in the findings section.

### 3.4 ETHICS

This research was subject to rigorous ethical review by both Coventry University’s Ethics Team and our CREST’s ethical review (informed by ESRC standards). Required modifications were made following these reviews and all ethics documentation was approved before project commencement.

Prior to their interview, individuals received a participant information sheet and signed an informed consent form. The voice recordings of the interviews were subsequently erased in line our ethics and the transcripts anonymised and held securely on an encrypted data storage site. Similarly, those who responded to the surveys received a participant information sheet and signed an informed consent form and responses were anonymous. All of the data reported in our thematic findings section has been anonymised in line with our ethical procedures and to preserve the confidentiality of our informants.
4. FINDINGS

Our findings are divided into two parts. In this section (Part 1) we focus on the results of our change context interviews and the survey results. In Section 5 (Part 2) we examine each of the three selected case studies of insider threat in detail.

Part 1 findings are split into four sections. First we focus on change, particularly the issue of continual and cultural change. We identify the critical types of change perceived by employees in our case study organisation and the impacts, most notably on job security and future personal goals.

In the second section we examine how and why uncertainty arises across the organisation following change instigation. We provide evidence of uncertainty development through ineffective organisational communication and perceived limited support. We explore trust in terms of the organisation and its key actors to show the significance of leadership changes and the importance of line manager trust.

The third section examines organisational systems and processes. We draw attention to the compliance culture and employees’ experiences of key systems. In the final section we look at the impact of change in terms of outcomes for the organisation. We identify the current emotional climate of the organisation and then look at insider threat risks and counterproductive work behaviour.

4.1 CHANGE

Both the survey and context interviews depict an organisation experiencing ongoing turbulence. There were two speeds of change evident. First, continual slow-paced change was identified in relation to the changing culture of the organisation, as well as alterations to the physical environment in the form of new buildings and workspaces. Second, ongoing fast-paced change was a feature, associated with change to the organisation’s top management, specifically CEOs.

4.1.1 TYPES AND SPEED OF CHANGE

4.1.1.1 Continual change

There was a strong perception from those interviewed that change occurred regularly in the organisation but without a clearly defined long-term goal. For example, a shared sentiment was: “We are always changing but we never seem to get there…tends to go round in circles” (I7). Another interviewee similarly stated:

*It's going through such a period of transition and then one period of transition will fail so they will bring another in...and then try and put it in another direction and that will fail. I must have seen about 8 different transitions...the years I have been here, which is ridiculous (I15).*

This ongoing exposure results in employees becoming cynical towards any new changes that are occurring in the organisation, a key characteristic of distrust (Cho, 2006), as further illustrated below:

*We always get promised this [and that]...but those of us who have been here for 30 years...we don’t actually see very much change...so there is a healthy level of cynicism about whether change will actually happen. [There is therefore] a degree of push back against change in the organisation (I1).*

4.1.1.2 Cultural change

The cynicism around change initiatives and the aforementioned ‘push back’ appeared to be historically linked to the previous civil service culture of the organisation and the high proportion of longstanding employees with military backgrounds and habitual ways of working. One interviewee explained:

*Most of them look at the problem in the same way. So when I come in and I challenge them it's a totally different angle, I'm a different age, I am a different gender, got a different background. I have got less experience so they just dismiss my view a lot of the time, which I can understand [as you have] consensus over here versus just this one voice, but it's 'this is how we have always done it' attitude, which is not good (I8).*
Others echoed this sentiment through referring to the bureaucratic nature of the organisation which restricted change initiatives:

*Change happens, but there is still a sense of the civil service about [Plan B] and there is a lot of bureaucracy and a lot of inertia. So I don’t think anything happens particularly quickly here (I5).*

Research shows that cynicism impacts on work performance, depressing voluntary behaviour (Chiaburu et al., 2013); it also undermines trust and organisational commitment. Cynicism is also more apparent in contexts with high role conflict, low autonomy and low levels of assertiveness (Naus et al., 2007).

Long-established roles and ways of working are common to a large proportion of staff in Plan B, but this is at odds with the cultural change the organisation’s top management is seeking to deliver. For example, one individual explained:

*We have come from a place of being a very parent-child, rule compliant organisation, with everything written down of expectations of staff, absolutely every written consequence, to moving to a place of more trust and peer-peer relationships, and maybe there is more flexibility in that… From a security perspective there’s some risk linked to that…but actually it’s all about giving some parameters for people to work in but giving them more choices, and being responsible, and taking grown up decisions for themselves… And I think that’s a massive change for lots of people who work here (I4).*

The survey results show a shared view that there is frequent change, but that this is not necessarily transformational for those in Department 1, where staff from that department are also more uncertain about change (see Figure 4.1). Interestingly those in Department 2 have a more positive orientation to change, while staff in Department 1 are the most confident about change (Change Self-Efficacy), but the differences were not significant between the departments. There were higher levels of involvement in change by managers across both departments.

### 4.1.2 WHAT IS CHANGING

In addition to the general context of change outlined above, a number of discrete and critical changes were identified by respondents in both the survey and the interviews, namely changes to job security (due to redundancies and restructuring) and pension changes.
The survey results from both departments show some variation in the perceived threat arising from change, with Department 1 managers indicating more areas as being under risk (see Figure 4.2). Specifically, they were aware of threats to job desirability, training investment, pride in the organisation and reduced ability to provide service to the country (these differences in perceived threat from change in Department 1 is something we will discuss in more detail in terms of CWB). Both staff and managers in Department 1 were more cognisant of a risk to their benefits and rewards, but all groups indicated benefits and rewards as an important matter for them. One clear group difference is that the importance of the changes was heightened for Department 2 managers (see Figure 4.3).

The interviews with members of the wider organisation (i.e., not just Department 2 and Department 1 but also HR, Communications and Security) revealed more insight into the types of change staff were aware of and their impacts.

4.1.2.1 Job Security: redundancies and restructuring

Job security in this organisation has changed fundamentally through the introduction and implementation of redundancies. It is a change with significant negative impacts, if not for each individual personally, then certainly for many of their colleagues. The impact is magnified as it has involved further shifts to policy, personnel and physical location. As a result, it was clearly regarded as a source of threat, as the next quote reveals:

*It didn't directly affect our group...but it's certainly been visible across site. I speak to people in other teams, people are aware of it when they say, ‘Oh there might be redundancies’, everybody sort of wonders, will it be my group who is going to be affected next?* (14).

Redundancy is a novel event, which undermines the previous predictability of organisational life. As such
it triggers greater attention and sensemaking (Maitlis and Lawrence 2007; Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012). It demands information processing and decisions about not only current but also future behaviour, as the following quote further illustrates: “It does make me concerned…you think, well I could go elsewhere” (I4).

4.1.2.2 Procedural and distributive injustice

Mirroring past research (e.g., Gelfand et. al., 2007) an important reason for the largely negative perception surrounding this change was the sense of injustice in both how the redundancy process had been carried out and the actual outcome of the process. As one interviewee explained:

Lots of people have worked here their whole life and wanted to be made redundant to get a big pay out [but] the company actually rejected a lot of people because it would cost too much to get rid of them. So if you think about that, they rejected people who wanted to go, and ejected people who wanted to stay (I18).

More generally, there was evidence of the poor management and communication of redundancies with implications for relationships within the departments affected and in some cases the erosion of trust in the senior team as a whole, as the next quote illustrates:

It looks very personal…it made me think I really don’t trust the boss AT ALL. It made me also question the integrity of senior management across the whole department to be really honest because I thought, you are supporting that person to make those decisions and you are enabling them to happen, they should have been challenging... and then on top of that once the redundancy period finished there was no, at least legitimate, reason that was communicated to the department... to actually explain why they amalgamated two jobs into one. So again it looked to be personal. So it’s not been a good place to work recently (I18).

(C.4.iv will provide survey results pertaining to overall and distributive fairness in the organisation).

4.1.2.3 Pension change

A further change mentioned by interviewees was the reduced pension benefits, which not only made the organisation a less attractive employer, but also led to uncertainty in terms of individuals’ long term personal goals and security. Critically for insider threat, this change has meant previously engaged employees are re-considering the long-term viability of their current employment. Past research has demonstrated how the revisiting of commitment can be a precursor to organisational exit (Tzafrir and Enosh, 2011). The negative impact of this change has become amplified due to the perceived breach in psychological contract.
Assessing and mitigating the impact of organisational change on counterproductive work behaviour

(Robinson and Morrison, 2000). There was a view that a key value of the organisation had been violated, reducing the organisation’s trustworthiness. Research shows such violations can be linked to CWB (Jensen et al., 2010). Significantly, the impact of this shift extended into the future, altering employees’ plans (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001) and leading to a reduction in feelings of control about the future. There was a consequent feeling of disengagement among interviewees, for example one individual stated:

Since I joined back in the 90’s it has been one of the strong points of the job here. Guys often refer to it as the handcuffs. People joined [the organisation], the pay wasn’t brilliant but the pension was fantastic and people were reluctant to go to better paid jobs because of the pension. Now that’s all changed. Because the pensions aren’t affordable and everyone has to accept the fact that it needs to be something different. So the job’s not as attractive as it used to be anymore. And I think across site people are a little bit disappointed by the fact it just seems like it’s gone and there is nothing we can do about it (I5).

Another interviewee similarly stated:

It’s one of the few times I probably feel, well, actually is it worth it? Don’t get that benefit anymore… So yes it does change your philosophy. It's impacting people’s belief because it was a strong foundation culturally of the organisation. The organisation’s culture was built on, people taking not a role, but an organisational employment for life… Where as now, without that foundation, I don’t think the organisation has strong enough rewards to replace that (I7).

Like redundancies, these changes to pension arrangements caused a sense of injustice and unfairness, which for some individuals permeated into a general loss of trust towards the organisation as a whole:

I think more importantly at the moment is trust, or giving people confidence that they are paid fairly…I am being really general here, but money is not a driver of your average [names specific role]. However knowing that you are being treated fairly by your organisation, that you thought that you absolutely have a level of trust with and yet last year, psychologically we took that final salary pension away which as you know to some people... it’s such an integral part… we had that social contract of, ‘But you were looking after me, I knew what I was going to get’, that’s gone (I20).

Importantly the strength of feeling about pensions was moderated by the length of tenure in the organisation:

Now is the time to make that bold decision. Close it and look at something else. So I may have looked at it differently if I'd had 28/30 years of service with another 5 years to go... the people who have been here longer are the ones that are more upset by it (I10).

The process of determining how much effort to expend on resolving the impact of change can in and of itself make further resourcing demands on individuals and teams (Morgeson and DeRue, 2006). As a result, new behaviour is likely to emerge which can create the need for further attention. The next quote highlights the responses of some to resolve their concerns: “There was a period of people writing to their politicians saying, what the heck, you know, can you not sort this out?” (I5). Further, there were constant reminders of this change through the visible actions of some employees, as noted in the following quotes: “There is an ongoing disagreement with the unions here striking every so often so we are very aware of it” (I4); “There is quite a lot of anger and resentment around the pension issue” (I20); “Industrial action is potentially impacting delivery, so it’s quite a significant talking point” (I7).

4.1.2.4 Powerlessness towards senior management

While cognisant that similar changes were occurring across other UK workplaces, in part due to changes in government policy, employees in this organisation ultimately held top managers responsible for pension changes. While injustice was a common theme, there was also a palpable sense of powerlessness for some:


**Fig. 4.4 - Perceived quality of organisational change communication**

The pension is a big disappointment. It's something that if I could be bothered I might have found out more about, and maybe been more animated about it. But I figure the management are going to do what they are going to do (I6).

Furthermore, while top managers were at pains at the start of communication about this change to explain that everyone would be impacted in the same way, the change by the CEO to become employed under a different part of the wider parent organisation and therefore escape detrimental pension changes, appeared to undermine the credibility of their claims and instigate distrust in the top team.

### 4.2 MANAGING UNCERTAINTY

The data collected from the survey and interviews demonstrates that change in this organisation creates a heightened level of uncertainty. Three aspects emerged as important in the management of this uncertainty. These include: the use of formal communication; types and level of support; and trust.

#### 4.2.1 FORMAL COMMUNICATION

The survey indicated that the quality of formal communication about organisational change that employees received was relatively low: across all five areas, major shortfalls were perceived in the messaging. Across all departments and levels there was consensus that the information received had been incomplete, inadequate, and untimely (see graph 4). Further, there were some differences in its perceived credibility, with Department 1 not considering the information provided to be credible.

The interviews added further insight into organisational communication, with broad agreement that there was considerable room for improvement in terms of the changes within the organisation.

First, the reason for changes had not been given adequate attention, as the next quote illustrates: “People don’t really like change when they don’t see a need for it. Things like diversity haven’t been communicated very well” (I14). Second, there were perceived differences due to bureaucratic and hierarchical levels within the organisation which were thought to disrupt clear communication:
I think sometimes communication is poor about changes. I think there is a lot of organisational change going on across the business that not everybody understands why...I still don't know how you get it from the top filtering all the way down, because it has to come down through several layers and it's a bit like Chinese whispers by the time it gets to one layer I sometimes think that it's you know, it doesn't come through with the same message. So it's about consistency of messages as well (I17).

Another individual similarly commented:

They just can't make their mind up which direction they are going to go. And again, my lowly level I probably don't have the understanding of an exec but, I am sure there is a reason for it, but I can't make head nor tail of it (I15).

Critically, communication was often considered to be used to pacify rather than involve or empower employees. For example one individual explained:

They have got to the stage where they are communicating to the point which bores people. It always comes out in opinion surveys, we need better communication and that means that they flood more information towards you... But that's not leading better (I6).

There were clear perceived hierarchical differences between employees versus managers in terms of the amount of influence they could have in organisational decisions:

It does seem a little bit like, there is management and workers and the management are going to manage and they are still going to be very distinct from the workers no matter what you do. Workers are always going to want more control or more leverage...we need the leadership to lead better and they took that to mean communicate with us better. I think leadership is also to do with backing certain projects, or you know putting your money where your mouth is (I6).

There was acknowledgement of attempts being made to improve in this area:

I think it's improving. I think there is a lot of people engagement in teams and things like that... it's whether or not we as an organisation can demonstrate the value of those things... [showing that] we can make it better for ourselves, we are empowered to

Fig. 4.5 - Sources of support during change
drive that change and to take responsibility for that change...But it’s a matter of whether that becomes too forced. I think it’s in between at the moment (I7).

These findings demonstrate the communication problems organisational change has been found to produce in many other contexts (Hargie and Tourish, 2009) and the fine line between engaging individuals through communication about change and fuelling further cynicism (Johnson and O’Leary Kelly 2003; Naus et al., 2007). Importantly, research shows a relationship between cynicism and discretionary behaviours, of which CWB is one (Chiaburu et al., 2013).

4.2.2 SOURCES OF SUPPORT

The second aspect of uncertainty management revealed in the survey was the various support resources perceived as important during change. Survey results revealed that in both Department 1 and Department 2, the direct line manager was an important source of support. There were differences however between Department 2 managers and the other respondent
groups who identified the team and trade union as having a distinct role (see below graph 5). In contrast, staff in Department 2 were more likely to find support outside the organisation. In Department 1 there was little difference between the two levels, identifying their line manager, their team and external family and friends as their main sources of support.

Research shows that while social support, especially the quality of relations with line managers, plays an important role in dissipating the impact of stress, it is not effective in reducing CWB (Rupprecht et al., 2016; Viswesvaran et al., 1999).

As graph 6 shows, the quality of this support is impacted by the quality of the relationships, with the survey showing differences between the two departments and employee-management levels. In Department 1, managers perceive less strong relationships and report reduced capacity to cope with tensions and conflicts (termed Tensility (Carmeli and Gittell, 2009)), when compared with Department 2 managers. Managers in both departments report greater interest in others. Accordingly, a critical element of managing uncertainty is trust (Weibel et al., 2016). Trust in the organisation and other actors refers to the extent to which an employee holds confident and positive expectations about their manager’s and employing organisation’s intentions and likely future efforts towards them. Trustworthiness has two distinct dimensions. **Cognitive-based** trust involves being seen as having the skills and abilities to operate effectively and efficiently (i.e., demonstrating competence), and in conducting this activity according to principles of fairness and honesty (i.e., showing integrity towards staff and other stakeholders). In contrast, **affect based** trust involves behaving in ways that signal care, concern and respect towards the interests of others (i.e., behaving with benevolence).

### 4.2.2.1  Organisational trust

The survey results show some areas of consensus and divergence that offer insight into the role of trust in the management of uncertainty. While we found agreement across all four groups regarding the integrity of this organisation, Department 1 managers do not share the other three groups’ view of this being a competent organisation (Ability) (see Figure 4.7). Affect-based trust was highest among staff rather than managers.

### 4.2.2.2  CEO Turnover

Trust in an organisation is strongly associated with the top leadership (Hope-Hailey et al., 2012). Therefore, the impact of ongoing changes to the CEO in Plan B is likely to have an impact on trust levels. Indeed, the interviews show the key role of the new CEO in instigating the current programme of change. For example one individual stated: “*Obviously we are under a new chief executive now who is running things slightly differently, which always causes reorganisations and ripples*” (I5). The change in staff at the top creates instability for employees making them cynical of the necessity and
value of change. It was viewed as a demonstration of power, rather than necessarily being in the best interest of the organisation, as the next quote illustrates:

*People feel like the organisation is changing direction all the time as the CEO moves on... the CEO, the first thing they do, they come in they want to do something big that is going to put their stamp on the organisation, so they exercise control that way... and there is a new set of initiatives, that don't feel like the old initiatives even though actually under the hood they are very similar* (I12).

The effect of successive new leaders has created a lack of consistent direction for the organisation, as the following quote outlines: “The CEO thing is really quite important for direction setting... for the time period we have been talking about, 13 to 17 different CEOs, different ideas, different promises, end games, different visions” (I16). Additionally, it was clear that there is a perception of mixed ability of various CEOs, as the next quote makes clear: “I think he appears to say the right [things]... he acts in a way you would expect a person who would get results to act. So he's a breath of fresh air really. I think he is good, credible. But he has followed some real dingbats. So he is going to look credible.” (I6)

### 4.2.2.3 Line manager trust

Another significant form of trust is trust in line managers. These individuals are responsible for shaping the local experience of the organisation (Nienaber et al., 2015). The survey shows little differences between the groups regarding the level of perceived trustworthiness of line managers (see Figure 4.8). Nonetheless, while both groups of staff have similar levels of cognitive-based trust in their local leaders, Department 2 managers perceive their leaders (i.e., top level managers) to be more competent than any other group, and Department 1 managers regard their managers as having more integrity. The perceived level of affect-based trustworthiness (benevolence) is, however, lower for all groups, except for Department 2 managers.

Importantly, there was a higher level of distrust for non-managers in Department 2, who also felt more dependent on their managers; this group had the lowest levels of benevolence trustworthiness, a factor which is known to be central in positive social exchanges between leaders and followers (Colquitt et al., 2012). Further, past research shows that trust is strongest (and therefore feelings of vulnerability are low) when all elements of trustworthiness are fulfilled (Mayer et al., 1995). Thus it is not surprising that across all four employee groups there was consensus in a high level of alertness and vigilance.

The interviews offer further insights into trust issues, specifically the impact of organisational leadership on the working lives and experiences of employees, both generally and in relation to specific organisational changes.

### 4.2.2.4 Leadership Style

Top leaders provide role models of leadership and behaviour further down the organisation (Kalshoven and Den Hartog, 2009). Some of those at the top in this organisation had, according to interviewees, demonstrated positive examples of leadership, but there were other negative examples that were then emulated by long-standing senior staff, as the following quote demonstrates:

*At the moment as far as I can see, he's [the CEO] demonstrating the right behaviour so that's good. If he could just get his tier 2's to do the same that would be great... we have got some of those across the company who have been here a while and don't necessarily show the right behaviour* (I10).

### 4.2.2.5 Inconsistency

The net effect of this instability created from CEO turnover and various leadership styles was to create inconsistencies in behaviour across hierarchical levels of the organisation. The ethics of directors were called into question by some who saw different rules applying across the organisation and were consequently cynical towards leadership:

*He's [the CEO] brought his own daughter in for work experience, which again, that's his right I suppose. He's brought his mates from other places...half of his board have got their sons or daughters working in roles...I actually raised [some of these issues] to*
4.3 ORGANISATIONAL SYSTEMS, CULTURE AND CLIMATE

The organisation we studied has specific systems and processes that are designed to recruit and manage suitable individuals and thereby ameliorate the risk of insider threat. Three types of controls categorised in recent work (Weibel et al., 2016) are evident: input (who does things – recruitment focused), process (how to do the job, formalised written HR procedures stipulating how employees should do their work and how procedural adherence should be monitored, as well as sanctioned or rewarded) and output (what employees produce, predefined targets and appraisal of results, use of goals). We explore these three control types in this next section, and then outline how their implementation and the wider organisational culture may actually undermine their effectiveness.

4.3.1 INPUT CONTROLS

4.3.1.1 Recruitment

This is a key policy determining who works in an organisation. The recruitment process in this particular organisation focuses on checking and verifying an individual’s past, especially their technical qualifications, and in detecting drug and alcohol use which might make individuals vulnerable to becoming an insider threat (Nurse et al., 2014). One interviewee stated: “We do pre-employment screening, checking peoples CVs and their academic qualifications to make sure they’re verifiable and they are not lying about their backgrounds” (I20). In addition to technical skills, important characteristics are used to determine successful applicants including loyalty, as the next quote shows:

The recruitment team are looking out for qualities that the organisation want and we feed in some security requirements to that, which again are more about loyalty and trustworthiness…the values of the organisation are trust, pride, innovation and excellence… so they are looking for people who are going to be consistent with those values (I19).

However while loyalty is to some extent attitudinal, we know that an individual’s work experiences can either reinforce or damage its presence, particularly damaging are experiences of role conflict and low autonomy (Naus et al., 2007).

At the same time, surprisingly little attention is given to using predictive tools such as psychometric tests; these, due to financial considerations, are only used to recruit some graduate and executive roles. For example:

I have talked about introducing enhanced DV with psychometric testing... [things like] suggestibility and conformity because in this environment that to me seems such an obvious thing to include...because you want to look at how likely is this person to be led astray (I18).
4.3.1.2 Vetting

A critical component of the recruitment process for this organisation is formal vetting. Vetting is undertaken prior to clearance for employment by a third party and involves a background check and an in-depth personal interview. At an organisational level this process “provides another level of assurance about people” (I18). The impact of this process as one interviewee explained is that:

“Our recruitment, it’s quite narrow because of what we do already. So obviously you have got vetted roles. So everyone working here has [security clearance]. So they have already gone through a degree of scrutiny prior to employment (I20).”

While an important process for this security critical organisation, it can risk a lack of attention being paid to employee behaviour once they become part of the organisation, as the following quote illustrates:

“So traditionally we would have had a defined default setting which was you know, everyone here has a DV and once you have got vetting you are in you are trusted and we won’t worry about you for another 7 years until your vetting comes up for renewal. And we have decided that’s not good enough (I20).”

Further, an unintended consequence of the vetting process itself is to heighten a sense of anxiety for staff over subsequent disclosures, for example in relation to mental health concerns, as one individual explained:

“We are given these leaflets which tell you ways of seeking counselling if you like... but there is always the concern that what you say will come back on you.... It’s the whole thing of the [security] clearance (I4).”

Potentially more concerning is that the vetting process can fail to capture and disseminate important information. This may arise due to the deliberate hiding of personally embarrassing information, or more indirectly due for example, to anxiety reducing recall. However, it may also be produced through the failure of an external organisation to effectively communicate concerns to the organisation, as the next quote indicates:

“When somebody starts...UKSV don’t always communicate all of the flags to us. I mean from a DPA [Data Protection Act] point of view, I get why that might be. To some extent because it’s vetting in confidence, the vetting has been done by them with the individual so they hold that information. But as the sort of custodian of that employment you would think that they would share that information (I18).”

Such an issue reveals that ‘blind trust’ in an external vetting agency can have unintended negative consequences in terms of reducing individual vigilance towards inappropriate behaviour, as found in our recent study of the health and social care context (Searle et al., 2017a). Ongoing personnel security management in the organisation therefore relies heavily on line managers:

“So the member of staff should be telling their line manager anyway what the problem is. Purely from a point of helping them to do their job...but I think a lot of staff don’t do that. So some staff report to us, and haven’t told their line manager and then we [security] don’t tell their line manager because it’s down to the individual (I18).”

The emphasis on security as an external process imposed on individual employees and upheld by those with line management authority therefore potentially creates a false sense of security for employees of this organisation, through triggering two important mechanisms of moral disengagement: the diffusion of responsibility for security as a matter for others with authority, and the displacement of responsibility onto an external organisation (Bandura, 2002).

Further, vetting gives employees a particular status that distinguishes them. As the organisation is undertaking significant change to reduce the numbers of sensitive post holders, such change could be a source of discontent and identity shift for some members of staff. It may create distinct in- and out-groups and could result in the perceived erosion of status for some employees, whose identity is intertwined with their elevated clearance (Searle et al., in press).

Such changes need to be sensitively communicated to avoid a perceived breach of psychological contract. The
perceived downgrading of such employees’ importance may reduce their identification with, and commitment to, the organisation.

4.3.3 Autistic spectrum staff

As a science and technology-focused organisation, Plan B attracts and recruits increased numbers of employees on the autistic spectrum (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Ruzich et al., 2015). While these individuals have clear and important skills and talents to offer the organisation, their ability to manage change and uncertainty makes them a source of potential increased risk to the organisation. Further, research shows that those who have had a late diagnosis of this condition are more likely to be vulnerable to mental health issues, specifically depression and suicide that could significantly impede their capacity to self-regulate their behaviour (Cassidy et al., 2014). The interviews revealed wide variations in the levels of awareness and support within this organisation for those on the autistic spectrum. The organisation evidently needs to become better in its recruitment process in terms of identifying and offering bespoke support to such employees. Critically, our interviews revealed that:

“It has an ok box you have to click and accept that you understand that there is no right to privacy, and that everything can be monitored on a company system... I think to be honest with you our attitude to that would be that that's good enough, because we just need to prove that you clicked it... when you look at the bigger picture it's probably not that great because maybe it should change and then people are making a more informed decision every day. The hope is that they have read it once (I18).”

This issue is particularly relevant for line managers, in enabling them to more effectively support employees (Hagner and Cooney, 2005; Lorenz et al., 2016; Parr et al., 2013). For example, while cognisant of the challenges these employees might have in working in open plan offices, there seems little awareness of their potential vulnerability to manipulation by others (Faccini and Allely, 2017) (see case study 3), or their capacity to engage in particular forms of counterproductive work behaviour such as hoarding (Seigfried-Spellar et al., 2015).

4.3.4 Daily security reminders

A final important daily input control that is designed to reduce security risk is the daily IT Login. This system allows employees access to their workstation and comprises a daily reminder about security and the organisation’s right to access their files and monitor their activity. While it must be accepted in order for the system to open, it is routine and thus a habit which is likely to fail to make the issue of risk salient. The passive nature of the response required from employees renders it a de facto assurance tool for the organisation, rather than a means of altering malevolent intention or behaviour, as the following quote demonstrates:

“None of us are trained in diagnosing or even referring people for autism” (I8).

We are process driven a lot of the time in certain jobs. So for example a front line worker literally follows a script. So like turn a nut 3 times to the right, you know literally to that point (I18).

4.3.2 PROCESS CONTROLS

An important process control we identified in our case study organisation is straightforward compliance with procedures and instructions (Weibel et al., 2016). The following quote demonstrates the issue of complying with safety on a day to day level:

“We are process driven a lot of the time in certain jobs. So for example a front line worker literally follows a script. So like turn a nut 3 times to the right, you know literally to that point (I18).”

4.3.2.1 Employee Assurance

A more sophisticated process-focused approach to security was used by the organisation for employee risk assessment. Their technology-based method allows them to combine security, HR and team level information on individuals to better categorise individuals’ behaviour according to a risk matrix that considers change of work and personal habits, personality and other factors.

This technique is important as it captures any changes to certain personal and work-related behaviour and allows better detection and targeting of resources into those who are identified as having a heightened level of risk.
4.3.2.2 On-going personal welfare monitoring

In addition, efforts are made on an ongoing basis to encourage staff to observe and report their concerns. The following quote highlights how such control can be used to emphasise the well-being of others as opposed to perceived surveillance:

an individual who was just not themselves over a period of a week...the individual hadn't even noticed it in themselves... it was the team that first spotted the change in behaviour that led to the medical intervention. And we have used that as a bit of a security example to say, actually that might be early indicators of a potential security risk that someone is changed in their behaviour and they are being slightly different. Actually, for you to intervene and seek some help and talk to the individual... We have always said we don't really care where you raise the concern to. So actually it could be to security, it could be to HR, it could be to our ethics team, just raise it and then we will work behind the scenes to join up the dots (I19).

However, there are various barriers to this approach which we discuss in the organisational culture section.

4.3.3 OUTPUT CONTROLS

4.3.3.1 Role-related boundaries

A control that has been to some extent overlooked in this organisation is the effective communication about changes to role-related boundaries. Evidence from our interviews suggests that for new hires, work tasks may vary in the clarity with which they are explained, creating very different views of their role, what is expected from them and important boundaries. This was most pronounced with regard to access matters (see also 4.3.4.1 ‘need to know’ basis). Staff appeared anxious about policing their own behaviour due to for example, receiving either increased or reduced access as part of organisational restructuring, and so the resultant uncertainty could undermine their ease in detecting and challenging other’s information access as well (e.g., Case 3). The failure to clearly and explicitly communicate role boundaries and expectations creates ambiguity. Further, those on the autistic spectrum require explicit information; once given, they are likely to adhere strictly to operating within given boundaries. It is therefore important that any changes to security and access are clearly and consistently communicated to avoid uncertainty.

4.3.3.2 Progression and Promotion

Our case studies reveal that an important control system, progression and promotion, has changed in the organisation and has unintentionally provoked insider threat behaviour (e.g., see case study 3). In the past the transparent process allowed employees to easily understand how to progress to the next grade, however it is currently in flux and there is a resultant information vacuum about what is now required. This transition has been accompanied by a clear negative emotional tone among some staff:

It's been unclear about a way to progress, promotions, that has become unclear. The old ways worked and you know changes to performance review, new software is coming in, it's all left people a bit frustrated (I14).

4.3.3.3 Reward and recognition

Similarly, the new reward and recognition system introduced to the organisation represents a transition away from the previous focus on solely technical skills towards a potentially more ambiguous set of behaviours. While recognised as part of a CEO-led change to develop more effective line managers and leaders, it has again not been communicated as effectively as it could, according to interviewees:

He's [the CEO] putting a big thing on leadership... it doesn't matter how good you are technically, if you don't display the right behaviour and leadership, then that would bring you down (I17).

4.3.4 CULTURE

The interviews and survey reveal this organisation, like any other, to have a specific type of culture and climate which sets the parameters for how systems, processes and controls operate on an everyday basis. Culture has an ongoing role in creating and sustaining trust and
in setting the attention given to controls and security (Weibel et al., 2016).

4.3.4.1 Need to know basis

An important element of the work undertaken in this organisation is that it is security-sensitive. As explained, this is conveyed through the requirement of staff to have a specific level of security clearance, but also through the values embedded in the organisational culture of ‘need to know’. This means that staff should not discuss aspects of the organisation’s work that they are not involved in, nor access areas of the organisation’s network that do not relate directly to their own work. While there is a clear rationale in this approach to safeguard organisational capital, an unintended consequence is the reluctance of staff to challenge colleagues’ behaviour that they intuitively consider alarming, for fear of neglecting this ‘need to know’ boundary. The aforementioned concern following vetting makes them particularly sensitive to creating unnecessary security concern for others. While we found examples in our interviews of leaders noting and sharing staff concerns with each other, non-management actions were often different; employees were often aware of instances of process deviance, such as writing down codes (see Case 1) or the collection and sharing of information without an author’s permission (see Case 3), but were reluctant and/or often failed to report these matters formally.

These findings highlight the ambiguity that can surround informal organisational norms and the strong role of social influence in reducing individual whistleblowing (Moore and Gino, 2013).

Individuals further commented on the perverse effect of the ‘need to know’ principle being used as a status symbol, thereby restricting open communication between individuals. One individual reflected that:

*[we’re] not always that effective at communicating. And I think sometimes this need to know culture where you blinker things off, gets to an extreme where people don’t say anything. And then some people if you are not careful use it as sort of a one-upmanship, rather than, we can’t share for true assurance reasons. So, they kind of do it on the reverse, ‘I’m special, and you don’t need to know’. That’s a bad cultural thing if that happens. So those sorts of triggers, managers need to identify and work with those people and their behaviour and their leadership skills to demonstrate the right approach (I7).*

4.3.4.2 Fear and Distrust of HR and Security

A contributing factor undermining the likelihood of employees speaking out was the perceived negative or heavy-handed security and HR response, as the next quote highlights:

*The other thing is the fear of getting people into trouble, which is definitely there. The fear of mentioning something and then it’s an overreaction…. you know you are going to get somebody in an awful lot of trouble for doing something that might just be one document in one folder that they might have happened to have clicked on (I14).*

Another interviewee elaborated on this point but made a distinction between employee perceptions of security versus HR:

*It’s interesting, when we have gone to talk to people… they distrust HR. I think because it sets off disciplinaries and grievances too regularly, or their perception is you are into some formal process very quickly. So when we have run things like the [new security procedures] past the union representatives to say this is what we are intending to roll out, they were saying for goodness sake sell it as a security tool, not an HR tool” (I19).*

Prior research has also identified how HR’s handling of sensitive policies can undermine staff confidence and their trust in reporting concerns about others (Harrington, 2012).

4.3.4.3 Accountability

A further and related factor affecting organisational culture was accountability. The organisation has a strong sense of hierarchy, yet the accountability lines do not always appear clear to employees. Inconsistencies in the application of processes leave employees unclear as one interviewee noted:
It really depends on who you get on the end of the phone [with HR]. Sometimes I have been told, it is entirely up to you. Sometimes I’ve been told NO... we cannot allow this, it must be done to the blueprint and you know, that’s unnecessarily harsh, and then the person’s a bit disgruntled. It’s very uncertain. You never really know what you are accountable for (I14).

Importantly this lack of accountability was attributed in part to the ongoing changes and restructuring within the organisation: “In terms of accountabilities and responsibilities it’s unclear. Everybody is just muddling through at the moment because of transformation. So you know things are not joined up, you just muddle through” (I14).

4.3.4.4 Approach to security vs approach to performance

Additionally, there was a perceived disconnect, according to several interviewees, between the way security related matters versus performance related issues are dealt with in the organisation, illustrated by the following quote:

We have a disciplinary process fairly similar to any other organisation, with a fairly heavily unionised environment, in my experience fairly employee sensitive, if that makes sense... I don’t get the sense that we manage performance [well], certainly not in a behavioural context... certainly anything to do with security and safety, there’s a really hard line and I think the contract here, as in the informal contract, is so clear, that you know you potentially impinge on anyone else’s safety, or certainly with regards to security, then you know there is a very swift [move] to the door. But I think we are really reluctant to be bold in decisions in other areas where we have people who choose to be non-compliant, in a destructive way (I20).

The uncertainty around accountability coupled with the perceived security/performance incongruence facilitates two different kinds of behaviour. First, employees seek to protect themselves against potential transgression, but in so doing they actually behave in counterproductive ways, as the following example reveals:

In some people this is, this is going to sound a bit incongruent but the compliance with the rules. I see a mentality of kind of, I will almost follow that rule to spite the organisation or to spite myself but it’s the rule and actually I am safe if I follow that...
I do what it says on the tin… I think there is a bit of survivor syndrome (I20).

On the other hand, there was evidence that rules were not always followed as individuals sought to work autonomously without obstruction: “There are a lot of people that bypass the rules because it’s not conducive to the way they want to [work]” (I15). The failure to consistently detect and sanction those who do not adhere to the rules is a form of passive insider threat and symptomatic of disengagement and withdrawal behaviour (see section 4.4.3.2).

4.3.4.5 Justice and fairness

One of the underlying and consistent themes for this organisation concerns fairness. This was mentioned earlier regarding change, specifically, the sense of injustice in the implementation of the redundancy process (4.1.2.2.) and decision making for the pension changes (4.1.2.3.). This was identified as having long-term consequences for some teams. The survey results echoed that the organisation was perceived by some to be an unfair workplace (see Figure 4.9). Unusually (e.g., see Rupp, 2014; Searle, 2011) we found managers perceived the fairness of the organisation as lower than their staff. However managers in both departments, but especially Department 2, regarded the fairness of decisions as more fair than employees, indicating that they may be more privy to the machinations underlying organisational decisions. These results, however, are encouragingly not indicative of a low fairness organisation overall.

4.3.4.6 Work Climate

Similarly, work climate arises from the social processing of information, sensemaking and the collaborative decisions made by members of a work unit as they share stories and experiences. This study examined the motivational climate which is deemed important in the sharing of knowledge in organisations. Perceptions of motivational climates influence how employees relate to their work tasks as well as to each other, which goals they accomplish, and how willing they are to develop and learn. Line managers have a critical role in how motivational climates form, specifically in the level of autonomy and trust they show to subordinates. We assessed performance and mastery climates, as detailed below.

Performance climate relates to work situations which foster intra-team competition (Černe, 2014). They promote social comparison between employees regardless of whether there is any prior interest in such comparative information. They involve public recognition being given to those employees who demonstrate their ability and restrict rewards to only the best or top performers. As a result, in such contexts employees are more likely to perceive coworkers as competitors and rivals, reducing their sharing of knowledge to maintain their personal advantage. While

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**Fig. 4.10 - Core emotions of staff over the previous month**
these climates may foster individual competition and deliver results, they can actively obstruct knowledge sharing and the acquisition of knowledge and learning in the organization more widely.

Mastery climate, on the other hand, creates a context in which employees’ effort, cooperation, learning and development of skills are valued, supported, and rewarded (Černe et al., 2014). Here employees are encouraged to try their best, providing opportunities for improvement. Employees feel encouraged to evaluate or monitor their own progress toward their goals. The goals employees achieve in such climates typically exceed previous performance, motivating them to share information and actively support each other, thereby facilitating the development of norms that encourage effort. Through these means social responsibility emerges, with individuals sharing insight for the wider benefit of others’ learning and growth. They tend to be more cooperative contexts, promoting collective effort. Importantly, research shows it is employees feeling trusted by their line managers than is critical in mastery climates creating further information sharing, through such leaders’ modelling behavioural norms (Nerstad et al., 2017). Similarly, in this organisation a significant correlation was found between perceptions of a mastery climate and cognitive-based trust in both the organisation and the line manager ($r = 0.36$ and $0.51$ respectively).

Overall, in this organisation there was endorsement of a learning and mastery climate in both departments, with managers in Department 2 more attentive to sharing their information and learning with their colleagues (see previous graph). By contrast, in Department 1 managers endorsed a competitive performance-focused climate.

### 4.4 OUTCOMES

Our study identified a number of outcomes that arose from a turbulent context of change. The survey examined both positive and negative emotions, attitudes and behaviour.

#### 4.4.1 EMOTIONS

We measured Department 1 and Department 2 employees’ reported core emotions for one preceding month (October 2017). Emotions have been identified as important to other processes, including complex thought processes, recall and well-being (Yik et al., 2011). The results from Plan B showed differences between our four groups surveyed (see Figure 4.10). Specifically, we found managers in Department 2 strongly endorsed the positive emotions over the negative ones. These included deactivated pleasure, e.g., feeling secure (mean = 4.5), but also a high activation of pleasure (e.g., satisfied: mean = 4). Their staff were less strong in their activation of these emotions (mean = 2.8).
Department 2 staff also registered some unpleasant activation (mean = 2.2).

Staff and managers in Department 1 also registered their highest activation for pleasure (mean = 3.15 and 3.0 respectively). However, both Department 1 groups indicated some unpleasant deactivation (e.g., bored) (mean =2.61 managers, 2.2 staff), which research shows is a factor in CWB (Bruursema et al., 2011), for example, CWB has been found to be used by employees as means of coping with boredom (Spector et al., 2006). By contrast, staff in Department 2 and managers in Department 1 indicated unpleasant activation (e.g., anxious) (mean 2.2 and 2.5 respectively). Department 2 staff displeasure was also activated (e.g., dissatisfied) for some (1.93). Negative emotions particularly are known to be a trigger for CWB (Sakurai and Jex, 2012).

4.4.3 COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORK BEHAVIOUR

A range of counterproductive work behaviour was also measured in the surveys completed by the two departments; this assessed actions which impede or harm other employees or the organisation itself.

4.4.3.1 Knowledge hiding

The survey measures included knowledge hiding activities (Connelly et al., 2012), which provides an important demonstration of CWB withdrawal. There are three different strategies that can be used in hiding knowledge from others at work.

First, Rationalized hiding, where the hider provides an explanation (i.e., a rationale) as to why the requested information is not forthcoming. For example, hiders
may explain that they are not authorized to provide information to people who are not on a particular project, or they may explain that their boss has asked that they not release that information. This strategy is the most effective in retaining trust.

Second, **Evasive hiding**, in which hiders engage in behaviour designed to stall or delay the release of information or provide only part of what was requested. For example, hiders may provide an overly simplistic explanation of how something should be done, or they may say that they will provide information at a later date without the intention of ever following through. This strategy can undermine trustworthiness, especially if individuals have a reputation for being evasive.

Finally, **Playing dumb** where hiders feign ignorance and pretend that they do not possess the requested information. For example, they may deny any knowledge of that domain or they may minimize their competence in that area. This approach is the most detrimental to trust, with low trust and potentially distrust emerging as the truth emerges.

Knowledge hiding levels appear relatively low in this organisation. However, they are more pronounced for staff in Department 2, especially concerning rationalised hiding (mean 2.5). This type of behaviour may reflect the specific roles they are doing, but it is interesting to note a comparable level is not found among managers.

Similar levels of evasive hiding were self-reported by those in the two staff groups, who reveal that they use this tactic more often than their own managers. They also were more likely to use ‘playing dumb’ tactics. Interestingly, in the context of CWB, significant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CWB Category/Perpetrator type</th>
<th>Sabotage</th>
<th>Withdrawal</th>
<th>Prod Deviance</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Abuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department 2 Managers</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department 2 Non-Managers</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department 1 Managers</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department 1 Non-Managers</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td>46.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of overall sample</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>34.04</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>12.77</td>
<td>42.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
correlations were found between rational hiding (r = 0.45) and playing dumb (r=0.37) with line manager distrust. Thus, the sharing of information was curtailed where there was concern about the intentions of the line manager. This corresponds to prior research showing how the mechanism of reciprocated distrust inhibits knowledge sharing (Černe at al., 2014).

4.4.3.2 Types of Counterproductive Work Behaviour (CWB)

We measured types of counterproductive work behaviour (CWB) using a checklist that respondents completed about their own activities. The list differentiated five different types of activity (Spector et al., 2006). It included deliberate acts of sabotage against the organisation; stealing and theft; deviation from stated policy and procured (production deviance); withdrawal activities, which comprise actions that reduce time at work such as unnecessary sick leave, extending breaks or leaving work early; and actions of interpersonal abuse which included rude and uncivil behaviour against others, making jokes at others’ expense, through to physical threats and abuse. While a relatively small sample, the results do show that anonymous self-report is a useful means of detecting CWB. They show that self-declared transgressive activities are confined to a relatively small number of perpetrators.

Surprisingly, the highest average level of self-reported CWB activity was found among managers in Department 1. They also indicated greater levels of passive withdrawal behaviour (mean 1.25) and active interpersonal abuse (mean 1.17). Similar levels were self-reported for their subordinates (1.24 and 1.12) (see Figure 4.13).

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Although the average response on the checklist of CWB showed relatively low average levels, closer scrutiny of the results revealed patterns to this type of action. Important differences were evident between the two departments and between managers and their staff. Specifically, we found pockets of transgression evident in the results collected: we found six different groups – non-transgressors who reported never undertaking any CWB activity; ‘slippers’ who reported an action that occurred occasionally within one of the five CWB categories; repeat single type transgressors endorsing occasional activities within only one category; curtailed multiple occasional transgressors who undertook occasional transgression in more than two CWB categories; broad multiple occasional transgressors who undertook occasional transgression in more than two CWB categories; and frequent multiple offenders who undertook more frequent transgression across a number of CWB categories (see Figure 4.14).

Within Department 2, managers did not self-report any CWB, and only two forms of CWB were reported from staff members: one, a slipper, identified occasional acts of withdrawal in taking extending breaks, and the other was a multiple occasional transgressor with occasional employer-focused theft and occasional interpersonal abuse and incivility (see Figure 4.13).

Importantly, the CWB pattern was very different in Department 1; here respondents indicated they undertook all five forms of CWB (see Figure 4.13). In this department we found 50% of managers and 46% of staff were serial offenders. Most common across this department as a whole was the self-report of occasional acts of incivility and interpersonal abuse directed towards others often in the form of insulting or making fun of someone (56%), followed by withdrawal of labour (44%) through taking excessive breaks and not completing a full day’s work. We also found that 14% reported that they had undertaken theft in the form of removing organisational resources without proper authorisation and 6% indicated sabotage behaviour in the form of deliberately wasting resources. The prevalence of these activities, however, differed by level (see Figure 4.14). Thus while only 3 managers reported withdrawal behaviour, this constituted half of the managers in this department.

Thus CWB was much more apparent in Department 1. For example, amongst the managers in Department 1, all reported that they had undertaken some form of CWB; two identified themselves as slippers, one identifying occasional theft activity and the other occasional actions of interpersonal incivility; another was a repeat occasional interpersonal abuser; two were found to be curtailed multiple occasional transgressors,
FindingS

Assessing and mitigating the impact of organisational change on counterproductive work behaviour

undertaking withdrawal and interpersonal abuse actions, and the last reported broad multiple occasional transgressions, including sabotage, alongside the more common withdrawal and interpersonal abuse found in this department. The common form of transgression in Department 1 was interpersonal abuse (100%), followed by withdrawal (50%) and then theft and sabotage (17%). In terms of staff numbers, 39% reported undertaking no CWB. However, it was apparent that for those who did report CWB, its nature was distinct in three important ways: first they self-reported behaviour covering all five types of CWB; second, the number of behaviours within each CWB category was greater, thus while managers might indicate either a single action in a category or confined to one category (18% in the single slippers or repeat single type transgressors categories), more of their staff showed activity within and between CWB categories; and finally, the frequency of their actions was more pronounced than that indicated by their management, thus 6 managers reported interpersonal aggression then this was increased to 13 staff, showing a proliferation of CWB activities (14% self-identifying more frequent actions within one type of CWB, and 29% with behaviour that crossed more than two forms). This result shows a clear escalation in the frequency and range of CWB that occurs within Department 1.

The interviews confirmed interpersonal abuse was a present form of CWB, with some leaders using confrontational communication styles, as the following quote shows:

*It was just really the way he was, ‘it's my way or the highway’, that sort of stuff. ‘I am not listening to you, just get on and do as you are told’, ‘I don’t care. Get on with it’. Shouting at people in front of others, demeaning people in front of others that sort of thing, not good (I10).*

Importantly, this type of leadership behaviour was not confined to just Department 1. In our interviews, an individual reflected that despite results from the organisation’s own survey indicating the presence of bullying and harassment, managers appeared reluctant to acknowledge and tackle this behaviour:

*When our engagement results came in for last year [they] weren't very good. And they took us for an away day, to talk about what was wrong. And one of the things that had scored poorly is intimidation and bullying in the department and (my senior manager), I can remember him saying, ‘I mean, intimidation and bullying doesn’t happen in our department’. And I said to him, ‘yes it does because it’s happened to me’... and then he was like, ‘oh right ok’. And then later on we were having a big group discussion and again he said bullying and intimidation doesn’t happen in this department. And I thought, you didn’t listen to me (I18).*

4.4.3.4 Associations with CWB

We further analysed which activities had significant associations with CWB for the two departments surveyed. Specifically, we found those who sabotage were also likely to be abusive to others ($r=0.5$), while those who withdraw also undertake production deviances ($r=0.3$). Those who undertake production deviance regarding the rules and norms of how their job should be performed were also likely to sabotage ($r=0.3$), and to be interpersonally aggressive ($r=0.45$). A second scale, Interpersonal Conflict at Work Scale (ICAWS) (Spector and Jex, 1998), was also included in the survey to confirm the prevalence of interpersonal incivility and aggression. Analysis confirmed those indicating high levels of interpersonal aggression on the checklist also reported interpersonal conflict on the ICAWS ($r=0.5$). In line with other studies we found theft to be a distinct transgression which did not correlate with other forms of CWB (Spector et al., 2006).

Exploring associations of those who undertake CWB with aspects of change also revealed some significant associations. Specifically, we found that those who perceived pride in their role and thought their profession was being threatened by the changes were positively associated with four types of transgression: sabotage, withdrawal, production deviance and incivility ($r=0.45$). In contrast those who perceived that their organisational pride and the desirability of the job were being threatened by the changes were more likely to indicate they had undertaken sabotage and interpersonal abuse ($r=0.35$). Those who felt their relationship with their line manager was threatened by the change also had high associations with production deviance ($r=0.45$), while those who felt that the welfare
of others was being threatened were linked to self-report sabotage \((r=0.4)\).

Further those who identified change as personally difficult were more likely to report that they undertook CWB. Specifically, those low in change self-efficacy were also associated with undertaking production deviance \((r=-0.3)\), and such CWB activity was also associated with a less positive overall attitude toward change \((r=0.5)\). Research shows that during a period of stress high self-efficacy can play a critical role in ameliorating CWB (Fida et al., 2015). This result suggests production deviance is a form of CWB that is more common for those who have low endorsement and acceptance of change. This group were also found to be low in both forms of identity (career and work), which suggests that they may not regard their employer or career as central to their personhood however they indicated that their role and the pride derived from undertaking this role are significantly threatened. Prior research shows that threats to identity can be a trigger for CWB (Aquino and Douglas, 2003).

In contrast, those with high CWB withdrawal reported higher levels of job satisfaction \((r=0.4)\). This suggests they may feel some pleasure in their CWB activities. Those high in CWB interpersonal abuse paradoxically also reported that they had higher relationship quality in their team \((r=0.3)\) and also perceive higher levels of affect-based trust (benevolence) in their line manager \((r=0.35)\). This suggests that those who undertake interpersonal incivility may not be aware that such actions might undermine relationships, but perhaps also that they feel passively supported rather than sanctioned by their line manager.

Core emotion is a further area significantly associated with CWB. Specifically, we found in line with prior research (Fox et al., 2001; Spector and Fox, 2002; 2005; 2010; Sakurai and Jex, 2012) an association between negative emotions and CWB, indeed specific emotions accompanied each form of CWB (see Figure 8). For example, saboteurs were found to be significantly associated with the negative emotions related to active displeasure and displeasure \((r=0.4)\), while production deviators were more associated with other negative emotion areas (displeasure and deactivated displeasure) \((r=0.33\ & 0.4\ \text{respectively})\). In contrast, withdrawers were associated with slightly different negative emotions (deactivated displeasure and unpleasant deactivation) \((0.35\ & 0.4\ \text{respectively})\). Finally, those who indicated that they undertook interpersonal abuse had significant associations with all five of the negative emotions \((r=0.4)\). Critically, prior research argues that such negative emotions are important triggers of CWB, particularly in reducing self-regulation (Spector and Fox, 2002; 2005; Samnani et al., 2013).

**4.5 CONCLUSION**

The results from the interviews and survey show how the various ongoing and new changes permeate all areas and levels of the organisation. It highlights differences in threat perceptions between different parts of the hierarchy as well as between departments which can provoke different kinds of CWB throughout the organisation. The analysis reveals that a variety of positive and negative attitudes and behaviours are evident, which illustrate local team contexts and the overall organisational climate. There is clear discontent among employees regarding the process of, and communication of, some key organisational changes which leads to perceptions of powerlessness, dissatisfaction and injustice among some individuals. Inconsistent leadership appears to be a particular problem in propagating the uncertainty which organisational changes produce. Moreover, the strongly hierarchical nature of the organisation appears to make the role of managers critically important in setting the tone for acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. The findings show that informal norms and individual perceptions can significantly challenge the formal controls the organisation has in place.
5. FINDINGS – CASE STUDIES

As part of our study we examined three separate case studies of insider threat, occurring within the organisation in the past six years. These are outlined below to show how these events unfolded and to identify any important triggers of CWB.

5.1 CASE STUDY 1

5.1.1 OVERVIEW

Case Study 1 involved an incident where an employee who had worked at the organisation for several years took a confidential and highly sensitive document off-site and then lost it. The information was eventually found shortly afterwards and returned to the organisation by a contractor; nonetheless this represented a serious security and reputation breach of the organisation. While there was a variance of opinion about whether the perpetrator intended to breach security, the fact that they had failed to report the security breach and the loss of the document, and then recreated the document, was viewed by many as an attempt to cover up their wrongdoing. A further dimension to this case was the lack of appreciation the individual appeared to have for the severity of the situation. This incident can therefore be classified as a combination of both accidental (in the initial loss of the document) and intentional (in that the activity was not transparently reported and action was taken to avoid accountability). There does seem to be agreement among interviewees however, that the intention appears not to have been malicious at any point, but instead self-protective. The final outcome was the termination of the individual’s employment.

We interviewed four individuals associated with this case: two co-workers, the line manager of the individual involved and a security representative. We also consulted HR and security documents and the supporting paperwork for the incident. The disciplinary script outlined the process of an independent investigation and an indication of the timelines. It included mention of the individual’s ongoing suspension from work directly following the suspension interview, with regular (weekly) phone contact to follow. While details are provided of the named HR link for the individual, it was not clear from the script whether the person undertaking the suspension would be making this weekly contact or what the provision for face to face meetings was. Checks were required to ensure that the perpetrator was aware of the confidentiality of the incident and the named individuals with whom they could talk to about it. Further welfare support was offered through an employee assistance programme but it was not made explicit whether they could talk about the incident as part of the counselling support being offered. The disciplinary letter outlined the gross misconduct and that it was considered a ‘senior breach’.

The investigation report further outlined the lack of malicious intent, concluding that there had been a disruption to the usual routine of this person. The report indicated that this individual had previously demonstrated personal goal setting and planning and organisation behaviours, but ineffective communication with others. There were attributes of personal laziness identified with the perpetrator. The case reported a perceived lack of acknowledgment from the individual about the severity of the incident, but not how this view was arrived at. It identified a number of attempts to cover-up the error. The events were positioned as a breach of trust between the individual and the organisation. The report also outlined the lack of remorse over the incident and events that followed, but with no clear insight into how this conclusion was derived. The thematic analysis of the interview data from this case study is presented below.

5.1.2 PERPETRATOR CHARACTERISTICS

In terms of the perpetrator’s personal characteristics, there were a number of themes which occurred strongly across the interviews.

5.1.2.1 Different to Other Team Members

All interviewees commented that this individual was ‘different’ to other team members. This was in terms
of their demographic and junior position in the team and their introverted demeanour. For example, one interviewee commented: “We are a bunch of nerdy types, we are not, you know, royal marines and stuff but he was, even nerdy beyond the pale, compared to us” (I6). Another commented that being the youngest member of the team: “He didn't really bond with anybody else in particular” (I5). This impacted both on the individual’s proactive input at work and in their socialising with colleagues:

He tended to be quiet. So in a meeting you wouldn’t hear a lot from him. And I put that down to perhaps some insecurity about his technical knowledge. The rest of the team is quite experienced and quite knowledgeable. He was pretty much the junior member. He was also in his personality quite introverted (I5).

5.1.2.2 Team Relationships

While there was palpable tolerance for this difference within the team, it was clear that the individual did present some relational difficulties within the team. For example, one colleague commented: 

He could be quite rude and yet I was only trying to make conversation with him and be nice to him... at times he could say things that would offend me. And I would just think, how can you? I would say other people noticed he was problematic (I4).

Accordingly, there was consistent speculation among interviewees that the perpetrator in this case may have been on the autistic spectrum. While we have no official confirmation of this (the individual was not tested while working in the organisation), research shows that those on the autistic spectrum can have lower levels of co-operation than those who are neurotypical and demonstrate unusual social communication (Soderstrom et al., 2002). 

5.1.2.3 Self Interest

These interpersonal problems appear related to the perception that the individual was self-focused. For example, one interviewee commented that: “I found if I gave him something he enjoyed doing he would work at it solidly” (I5), but that issues arose in his motivation when it was a less desired task that was presented. Importantly the individual appeared to lack citizenship behaviour towards others, for example, in relation to sharing the burden of driving to social outings. One interviewee commented:

After 3 or 4 times you think, well maybe it's your turn to offer a lift you know. But he would never offer a lift because he would always want to have a drink when we got there... so he stopped going... Nobody else is driving, so I would have to drive, so I won't go tonight... he didn't try to get anybody back...I would then point out that sometimes it's nice to be sociable... He was just not on the same piece of paper. It was not an option. (I6)

This lack of social reciprocation and individual focus exemplifies characteristics of those on the autistic spectrum (Soderstrom et al., 2002; Baron-Cohen et al., 2004), but again this individual had not been formally diagnosed. Further, there is evidence of low levels of reciprocated empathy between the team and this individual which is common in cases of CWB (Moore et al., 2012).

5.1.2.4 Immaturity

A related issue was the individual’s perceived immaturity. This caused some issues with other team members, for example one interviewee commented:

after he had been here a few years everybody else was highlighting things he’d say as abnormal, weird and I would kind of defend him a bit. Figuring that basically he wasn’t nasty, he was just a bit wet behind the ears sort of thing...he would get under people’s skin in the same way as you know as a 10 year old boy would, you know has his own interests at heart and doesn't think of the bigger picture (I6).

Immaturity has been linked to cognitive diversity in previous research (Soderstrom et al., 2002) but also found to be a personality trait in other studies of insider threat (CPNI, 2013).
5.1.2.5 Identity Conflict

A further and perhaps underlying dimension to this individual’s perceived ‘difference’, was the multiple identity conflicts they encountered, occurring at personal, professional, and organisational levels. On a personal level, the individual experienced an identity conflict which appeared to affect them quite profoundly. For confidentiality reasons we cannot divulge the detail of this personal issue, however one co-worker explained: “I found him to be quite a troubled person... he always felt persecuted... he always felt like society was judging him” (I4). On a professional level, it was widely recognised by colleagues that “he wasn't particularly interested” (I4) in his work role. Unlike his other colleagues, the individual did not show a strong desire to work in the organisation or his particular role, nor were they motivated by the same kind of professional identification that other team members experienced: “On occasion he would talk to me about leaving here...I don't think he was satisfied here... it was local to him... that's more of how he ended up here... So people were aware that he wanted to do other things” (I4). Another stated: “At least we are a little bit more engaged with what we do, and more positive in what we do... we are working at a one-off place and there is an element of, it's a privilege to have a specialised job, I don't think he got that” (I6). This was made more apparent by the fact that the individual was considered highly competent: “He was clever. He was intelligent. He was good at doing what he did...he usually added value when he did things” (I6).

5.1.2.6 Emotional Instability

This matter led to the individual suffering from mental health issues which were recognised at work leading to medical and managerial support. Research shows that CWB can rise during a period of personal stress (Fox et al., 2001; Fida et al., 2015). While one interviewee commented that the individual’s mental health issue: “didn't often manifest at work” (I5), a triangulation of the findings across participants portrays a different picture. For example, another interviewee commented that the individual had voluntarily moved to a less sought-after position in the organisation, which may suggest an inability to cope or an act of self-sabotage: “It did surprise me yes, because where he was was certainly better... It was a better job where he worked... I think he was just unhappy. I think he could have moved anywhere to be honest” (I4). Another interviewee commented that in terms of the resultant breach that they had questioned how the individual’s mental health condition and medical treatment may impact on their decision making:

Because of vetting in confidence I couldn’t tell people there were [specific] issues maybe sort of burdening their mind so that so they are not as security conscious as they should be, because... we can't even give 100% of our attention span but it’s even less for somebody who is carrying an emotional weight, and also on top of that they were receiving medication for depression... I felt like, look, if this had been me, I would have wanted somebody to fight my corner and I would have wanted people to ask these questions... Nobody was interested... because a breach is a breach (I8).

Further, this individual was also undergoing quite a significant life-change concurrent to the incident, by moving house to live alone for the first time. While this is a significant life event for anyone, for this individual, if indeed on the autistic spectrum, its impact was likely to have been further amplified through: i.) disruption to normal routines, ii.) having to undertake for the first time home-related responsibilities, and iii.) reduced levels of social and practical parental support. There was therefore likely to have been a considerable spillover from these additional home responsibilities into work and in making greater demands on the individual’s cognitive resources, exacerbating further his forgetfulness and distractibility (discussed below).

A colleague commented that: “I think, because of his problems or circumstances he likes the privacy of being away from his parents. But I think perhaps organisationally, if that’s a word, I’m not sure he is best able to cope with it” (I4). While research shows that those who have a later diagnosis of autism are more likely to suffer from depression and suicidal tendencies (Cassidy et al., 2014; Lai and Baron-Cohen, 2015), this individual had not been diagnosed and thus the root of their emotional stability is unclear.

5.1.2.7 Limited Conscientiousness: previous breaches

A significant dimension to this case was the finding that the perpetrator had limited conscientiousness and
had breached organisational and security policy on a number of prior occasions.

5.1.2.8 Lack of awareness or disregard of rules

The individual frequently demonstrated a general lax approach to rule following and adherence to the norms of the workplace. His actions reveal moral disengagement in the form of distortion of consequences, and failing to see the need to comply with rules. For example one interviewee explained:

*I don't think he ever intentionally caused problems for anybody else. You have reminded me that, for a while he cycled to work and because of the nature of the work on site we have strict health and safety on site... on at least two occasions he got into trouble for forgetting his cycle helmet or not having cycle lights on in the dark. It was just another example, now I think about it, of him not taking something seriously that everybody else takes seriously* (I5).

In relation to the specific case study incident, this same individual commented:

*I don't think he deliberately did anything other than failed to tell someone that he had lost the document and create a copy... from my knowledge I can see that he may have thought he was doing the right thing there. But he probably was not aware of the number of rules he was breaking* (I5).

5.1.2.9 Forgetfulness and distractibility

A well-noted theme across interviewees in this case was that the individual displayed persistent forgetfulness (I4). The individual actually admitted in the investigation that they had become distracted. One interviewee explained that they believed this to be a key trigger of the incident in this case:

*he was a particularly forgetful individual, not strong organisational skills. Quite diligent and hard working in many ways but he had a reputation for forgetting things and having to be reminded to do things. And I can't help feeling that that was at the core of his problem, you know, he put this thing down and got distracted by something else. It was just a fundamental part of his character that he had problems remembering important things* (I5).

This forgetfulness was a further element which distinguished the individual from the team and was evident to, and problematic for, others:

*I found he had to write down a lot more than I expected... I had given him the password for a machine and then like 3 days later he had asked if I could give him the password. And I said I gave it to you 3 days ago. And he said, oh, I can't find that anywhere. And he said can you just write it down again. And I said well no, because if you have lost the password for it, now you have got to spend time now looking for the password. That is more important than anything else that you should be doing because that is a problem for us if you have lost the password* (I6).

Another commented: “*The fact that he was quite forgetful and we would have to explain certain things, technical aspects of the job, we would have to go over things over and over again. Some of the team found that frustrating*” (I5).

There was a recurrent theme among the team that the individual appeared absent-minded and “disconnected” (I6):

*It was quite strange...we would have group meetings where we would talk about what we had done in the past week...He wouldn't write down what he had done, but then he often wouldn't remember either... I would come out of the training course and I would say to him ‘what do you think about that?’ and he would pretty much have no recollection of the entire meeting, even though we had just walked out of it* (I4).

Thus the lack of appreciation for security breaches, coupled with his known forgetfulness caused the individual’s colleagues some concern, however, such prior experiences were not shared or flagged to
management or to the security team. One individual noted: “I know other people noticed it, but I don't know to what extent it caused problems for him” (I4). Rather than this issue being dealt with directly, the situation became a topic of casual team humour:

It was a standing joke...quite often other people would go, oh and you went to that meeting, and you did this thing and he was, ‘did I?’ So he didn't seem very switched on to the moment...and almost like you had to talk loudly, and at him to get him to even notice that he was part of the conversation (I6).

5.1.3 5.1.4 TEAM CLIMATE

5.1.3.1 Passive Insider Threat

Accordingly, the widely shared team knowledge about this perpetrator’s potential risk was made explicit by one interviewee: “if it was going to happen to anybody, it would have been him” (I5). Yet, it is quite striking that colleagues did not raise their concerns. This points to significant moral disengagement by other staff members through mechanisms including the diffusion of responsibility, demonstrated in the following quote:

He worked in our team for a number of years, and we had mentioned that he shouldn’t write things down all the time, and that if he loses a password that's a drop everything and fix it thing. It's not a thing where you can just you know, tut and walk on and do other things...[but] I don't think we probably impressed upon him more how serious they were (I6).

We consider passive insider threat to include the unintentional behaviour of those around an insider that facilitates or tacitly condones the insider’s threat behaviour and consequently threatens or harms an organisation and/or its members. Indeed, further insight into his own moral disengagement was apparent in his reaction to the sanction he received following the incident becoming public; it revealed how far the consequences of his actions had become distorted and how he failed to see the fundamental breach in trust that had been created:

He was a little bit surprised. He almost couldn’t appreciate it was a problem... and that perhaps he would just end up with maybe an improvement notice. I don’t think he ever fully appreciated how much trouble it had caused... I think given the fact that he was unable to appreciate precisely where he had gone wrong and the lead investigator made a comment to me that at no point did he try to apologise for it either, she used the words, ‘it’s as if he doesn’t know what he has done’. I felt that he probably wouldn’t be able to continue with us. Because how long before the next episode happens (I5).

Clearly this suggests a problem with the individual’s personal accountability. However, interviewees did acknowledge that: “If it was going to happen to anybody, it would have been him” (I5). Other evidence indicates a ‘bystander effect’ and a diffusion of responsibility among the team where such concerns were cognitively restructured as solely a management preserve, as the next example reflects:
I, as not [being] the line manager, had the option of sort of just, not wasting an hour of my life, sort of taking him under my wing... because I wasn’t his line manager I then didn’t take it that I needed to further impress on him or start nagging him. I said what I thought should happen and if he chose not to do it, then, it wasn’t my problem. And he didn’t, I suppose (I6).

This division of security tasks as being the role of the line manager exemplifies the importance placed on the formal hierarchy within this organisation, with accountability afforded only to management roles, as highlighted in Part 1. This creates an abdication of responsibility among staff for speaking up and sharing their concerns about a colleague who is evidently struggling to fit into this organisation and meet the demands of their role. Further, there was little evidence of HR playing an active role in supporting this staff member, despite undertaking a surprising lateral and potentially downward job change in the organisation.

5.1.3.2 Organisational culture

In reflecting on the culture of the organisation, interviewees considered that a shift in the organisation’s security and overall culture may have contributed to the individual’s behaviour and to the behaviour of some of those around them:

I suppose I have been institutionalised because I have been here so long but when I started, combinations, keys and passwords were kind of a serious big issue you know, the sort of thing that should make you have a cold sweat if you do it wrong. Maybe because when I started here people were a lot more, I don't know, a bit strict. It was maybe a little bit less liberal of a place to work. You know you knew you could lose your job over things like that. Maybe he didn't have that feeling about the place. Maybe because you know, we are quite a friendly, it’s a nice relaxed place but maybe we didn’t impress upon him enough how big a deal that is (I6).

5.1.3.3 Empathy blocks reporting

In addition to reporting being considered a line manager responsibility and a more lenient organisational culture, there was a feeling of empathy towards the individual, which left colleagues reluctant to speak out about their prior breaches and unsafe behaviour. One interviewee explained:

It felt a little bit like if you said something unkind that you were kind of kicking a puppy sort of thing...I like to think that I don't deliberately go out of my way to draw people’s attention to negative behaviour because it seems unkind. But... there was a bit in most team meetings where everybody kind of looked at each other, including management, and sort of grinned as if to say, ah he's gonna miss the point here... everybody kind of knew but nobody had a clever way to bring it up I suppose, without it being hurtful, is how I perceived it. (I6).

Critically, as discussed in Part 1, such empathy was underpinned by a concern about the effect of registering such concerns for security clearance: “It’s the whole thing of, you get the DV clearance, and that's quite probing and I think you are always concerned you know that, if you said something it would come back on you on your clearance” (I4). Past research reveals that empathy, care and concern for others can actually facilitate reporting on others’ behaviour through a desire to show sympathy or in response to other’s distress (Eisenberg et al.,1998), however for continued information sharing this must be matched by an empathetic and respectful approach from the authorities who receive such reports (Thomas et al., 2017).

5.1.3.4 Team response/learning post incident

Following the incident, there were some reflections on how the team had reacted and the learning that had been derived from it. The incident was not openly discussed within the team, instead management reminded staff of the procedures around security ‘anonymously’ and ‘conversationally’ (I6). In fact, the individual’s departure was learned via rumour and assumption a few weeks after the event. While this might respect the anonymity of the individual involved, it reduces the
in-depth explicit learning that could have been gained from openly discussing the incident, and inadvertently may increase a climate of closed communication, which appears to be at the root of many security issues as well as low organisational trust.

5.1.4 CASE STUDY 1: CONCLUSION

In conclusion, to illustrate our overall findings we have derived a timeline of the triggers which led to the insider threat activity in Case 1. First, we propose that poor input controls around the time of recruitment may be responsible for why the individual, who appears to have had poor role and organisational ‘fit’, was accepted into the organisation. Thus it is important to acknowledge issues of not only an individual’s job engagement (Moore et al., 2016) but also their suitability to their role and organisation. Other clear triggers of this incident involve the individual’s low conscientiousness (found in other studies, e.g., CPNI, 2013), and high levels of distractibility and forgetfulness. When coupled with immaturity and emotional instability, along with poorly developed coping mechanisms, this led to repeated counterproductive work behaviour and security breaches.

Critically, such behaviour was abetted by the moral disengagement of the individual’s colleagues, culminating in a passive insider threat as concerns were not flagged to management or security. In part this arose due to empathy with the individual’s personal circumstances on the one hand, and the individual’s low agreeableness on the other. Concurrently there was anxiety from colleagues that raising such concerns would produce an over-reaction from HR and security; this reduced the willingness of colleagues to speak out. Through these competing forces, the group remained focused on protecting themselves at the expense of their employing organisation or the individual perpetrator.

While the individual did receive some emotional support from the organisation (both formally and through their line manager and some individuals in the team), it does not appear to have been tailored strongly enough to their individual needs. During this time period, the magnitude of the change to the individual’s routine, and turbulence in his psychological, home, and working lives coupled with limited or depleted coping and social skills (linked to possible undiagnosed ASD) created a crucible for CWB. In hindsight it appears that much of this incident deals with routine and predictable behaviour of this individual, which suggests the event was preventable. While many of the individual’s actions were not considered official ‘security’ warning signs (e.g., such as excessive copying or staying after hours), they were certainly flags of unsafe behaviour whose frequency did seem to be increasing; this should have made it a particular concern for the organisation.

5.2 CASE STUDY 2

5.2.1 OVERVIEW

Case Study 2 involved an incident where a Removable Hard Drive containing sensitive information went missing from an office. After a period of extensive searching by the organisation’s security teams lasting around two weeks, the item was found unconcealed in the manager’s drawer (which had already been searched, where it had not been there earlier). The general consensus was therefore that someone (an unknown perpetrator) had ‘planted’ the missing drive in the drawer as an act of sabotage, or at least put it there to avoid accountability. The incident could therefore be classified as intentional and malicious or accidental and non-malicious. Given the ambiguity around the events and as no individual was found responsible (the manager in whose drawer the disk was considered innocent given previous searches), the analysis of this case in terms of perpetrator characteristics is limited.

There was speculation from interviewees as to who the perpetrator may have been; there were various team problems which raised suspicion towards certain individuals. However, all members of the team received a written warning and new procedures (i.e., the ‘two person rule’, meaning individuals must be accompanied by at least one other person in secure locations) were implemented for a period of time after the incident. The following analysis takes account of discussion around possible perpetrators but largely focuses on the local climate, which appears significant in triggering this case.

We interviewed five individuals associated with this case, including the team manager, one team employee and three security representatives. We also consulted the limited HR and security documents relating to the incident comprising two process files and an email. These documents all outline the changes to access
There is a lot of umbrage, if you get the impression that someone comes in and they either want to bring in their own people, or they want to get rid of, don’t respect the people that are there, or their experience. Or, you know they seem to have a hidden agenda to reduce numbers or get rid of a function (I7).

Accordingly, in the wake of the incident, there was a perception that some individuals within the team may have wanted to deliberately sabotage the manager. While prior to the incident, some suggested that “relationships between the team members were affable” (I11), other suggested that there was a uniting factor: “the team gelled quite well, because they have had one common individual [the line manager] who they may not get on with I guess, or respect” (I7).

5.2.2.2 Intra-team conflict

However, the interviews revealed that team relationships were not always cohesive:

I don’t think there was a high level of morale. There wasn’t a very unified performance. Perhaps behaviours weren’t as positive or strong in terms of teamwork and pulling together and delivering, people are getting more isolated and independent in their work and behaviour... people were getting frustrated with those that weren’t actually delivering, there is a link also in terms of behaviour in those individuals being disruptive to the team putting additional pressure on those ones who were trying to be supportive (I7).

This toxic mix of distrust towards the team’s manager, coupled with within-team discontent was considered to have provided the foundation for this incident, according to some interviewees: “would I be surprised looking back at some of the behaviour, the dissatisfaction with some of the team members that may have acted and done something deliberately? Not fully surprised” (I7).
5.2.3 IMPACT ON THE TEAM

5.2.3.1 Climate of Suspicion

After the incident occurred, team members were interviewed within a strong climate of suspicion, as one interviewee explained:

So it's not complacency but there is a general feeling here that if you have been given one of these [security passes] you are trustworthy, and you all work together and we trust each other and you do each other no harm. So, that was shattered. It had quite a bad impact on the team, de-motivational because they all felt that they were held guilty for something that they hadn't done (I9).

The previously poor relationships in the team coupled with the pervasive taint of suspicion produced a heightened level of discontent within the team, as another individual reflected: “It was a very difficult situation in there anyway, not a happy pleasant atmosphere to begin with, and after the incident it deteriorated” (I11).

At the same time, a central focus of blame started to coalesce around one particular individual:

Now the contentious point here is that... people were trying to look for a culprit... people were almost making their minds up, because we have one awkward person in the department at one point in time, maybe it was them...[but] there was no evidence anywhere (I9).

A number of individuals considered this suspicion as unfair scapegoating that ultimately contributed to this individual’s decision to exit the organisation:

I don't think it was fair. Without any evidence it was just a suspicion, because he was not the flavour of the month kind of thing... he'd never been happy from sort of the time of the incident...he was real close to depression and all that sort of thing (I10).

Another commented that upon leaving the organisation, the individual concerned: “was very critical of the way he was treated and his management...he got the impression that it was...a personal feel and no one else” (I11).

5.2.3.2 Injustice

There was consensus across interviewees on the need for a thorough investigation of the incident in this security critical context. For example one individual noted: “As an employee, I recognise the importance of security and assurance...that is part of the terms of who you work for, and why you work here. So that's fair and reasonable” (I7). Nonetheless, an important outcome for the team was the collective sense of injustice for team members and those working in security. Without an admission of accountability, the team felt tainted by association with all members receiving a written warning. This was clearly a controversial strategy: “I think they were all treated badly following the incident. How can you give everybody a written warning when you don't know who has done it? You don't know what's happened?” (I10).

This decision created a widespread perception of distributive injustice against the whole team, and with further perceived interpersonal injustice towards more than just the one individual under the most suspicion:

I have not been promoted since then...this incident came and basically went, not the time to do it. Ok fair enough... So I thought ok, I am not going to stay....I moved... which was a shame, because I loved the job. It was THE job in the company I wanted to do... if they had promoted me, I would have been quite happy to stay there and do that job... that was the job I liked, that was the job I wanted. I don't dislike this job but it's just not 'the one’ (I10).

These insights indicate how an insider threat event when not managed in a way that is perceived as equitable by remaining employees, can pose an ongoing legacy of disgruntlement and distrust. This perceived injustice increases the risk of further insider threats (Furnham and Siegel, 2012).
5.2.3.3 Anxiety

Following the incident, the sense of injustice was coupled with a heightened negative emotional tone and a strong sense of anxiety. As one interviewee explained: “I was thinking ‘bloody hell’ cos I felt conscious and guilty and thinking ‘oh blimey could I have made a mistake?’ so you go through your memory thinking, ‘no, no…. I had done all of those things [I should]’” (I7). Another commented: “It was a really, totally unpleasant day, devastating, I would have to say the worst point in my career by far” (I9). How individuals in the team felt that they were dealt with by management also created an emotional legacy:

It made me feel angry as well, surprised, shocked, concerned for my job...You expect, if you have messed up and we potentially messed up, a sort of, telling off, some sort of one-way discussion on the facts, what you should have done, what you didn't do. But a telling off for 20 minutes, rant, raised voices... is not what you expect (I10).

5.2.3.4 Trust breach

Specifically, individuals clearly experienced distrust towards other members of the team following the incident, but there was also evidence of a more generalised decline in trust towards the organisation. For example, one individual reflected that:

I think your balance of trust changes a little bit. If I take time anyway naturally to trust others I guess it might have heightened that... because obviously you are in a position where you have got to have that trust, and yet you may have been let down by someone who you trusted within that team. So I think subconsciously, probably so (I7).

5.2.3.5 Change to procedures

In addition to the emotional and psychological impacts on team members, tangible changes were made to security and general working procedures within the team. This was evident in the immediate aftermath of the incident: “So it just changed the whole ethos, we had cupboards in other areas, they had to be locked, and two people had to go there if you wanted to go to those. So total utter lockdown” (I9). It also had a lasting more positive impact in this respect: “It probably was a real wake-up call for us...we have been a lot more careful about how we go about things. But also the company has tightened up its procedures as well” (I9). Indeed following the incident, individuals did note that key learning had been derived: “I think in terms of sharing and assurance and also working collectively as a team ...the values of that I think is good for the organisation” (I7). Another reflected that this learning had been shared across the organisation: “as things settled down...I then agreed to go and give talks to large groups of people who were quite shocked” (I9).

5.2.4 CASE STUDY 2: CONCLUSION

In conclusion, to illustrate our overall findings we have derived a timeline of the triggers which contributed to this case of insider threat.

First, given the suspicion around certain team members and counterproductive work behaviour related to the team climate, input controls at the recruitment stage are unlikely to have helped identify individuals unsuitable for the organisation. However, poor adherence to process controls around security sensitive tasks appeared to have facilitated this incident. Relatedly, intra-team conflict and team discontent was clearly a trigger in a context where issues were not discussed openly but left to fester. Particularly, poor team relations with, and distrust towards, the team leader featured heavily in mention of potential sabotage.

Following the incident, a climate of strong suspicion surrounding the team and a period of further turbulence emerged in which team members either exited or moved to other parts of the organisation. However, this process was shrouded in rumour and a lack of transparency which further exacerbated the distrustful climate within the team and perceptions of injustice among those involved in the incident; they felt wronged by how the incident had been handled by management.

All of this occurred at a time of ongoing macro-level organisational change, including changes to pensions and restructuring which was likely to have increased feelings of disgruntlement and insecurity amongst employees. Critically, this incident provides a potential legacy for future insider threat incidents: it created a key memory with employees able to recall how they
felt at the time of the incident, producing profound impacts on the relationship employees still have with their colleagues and leaders.

It is therefore already an anchoring event for some staff members (Ballinger and Rockmann, 2010) and remains an enduring experience (Morgeson et al., 2015). It is important that in cases such as this, problems within the team (and with leadership) are discussed transparently and fully resolved so as to limit the ongoing legacy of injustice and potential further insider threat acts.

5.3 CASE STUDY 3

5.3.1 OVERVIEW

Case Study 3 involved an incident in which an employee who had worked at the organisation for eight years had been accessing and ‘hoarding’ top secret files from the organisation’s network without reason or authority to do so. This activity was carried out by the individual over a period of seven months. Following the last recorded incident, an official investigation was launched, which revealed prior warnings about similar activities. The perpetrator justified their actions on the grounds of ‘natural curiosity’ and after security and managerial investigations, this reasoning was accepted. This incident can therefore be classified as intentional, but not malicious (Nurse et al., 2014). The individual apologised for their actions and demonstrated a subsequent change in behaviour. A disciplinary outcome of ‘gross misconduct’ was found and a final written warning was given to the individual.

We interviewed four individuals involved in this case: the individual (perpetrator), the group leader, the team leader and a security representative. We also consulted HR and security documents relating to the incident comprising five items: the security and the investigation report for this case, the discipline record and the formal outcome, and a signed disclosure document. The documents record that the individual had been warned on three occasions before the incident, and then received a final written warning. The hearing identified the motivation for the accumulation of this information as allowing a “bigger picture” of the organisation to be obtained. There is a suggestion that this individual was aware of his hoarding actions, but that the content of the documents accessed were confined solely to the team and were regarded as a form of good team citizenship (discussed later). The investigation and hearing reports recorded the frequency of the data access which offers some support for the compulsive nature of the individual’s behaviour - an average 371 accesses each month. The outcome file highlighted that the rule that had been broken was: “browsing the company’s files or folders and/or the disseminating of documents where no clear business need or ‘need to know’ exists.” The sanction given had two components, a time limited warning but also a note of this behaviour to permanently remain on the individual’s HR record. There was also recorded recognition that the individual’s behaviour may revert.

The thematic analysis of this case study is presented below.

5.4 PERPETRATOR CHARACTERISTICS

5.4.1 INTROVERSION

The perpetrator was discussed as having notable characteristics, with interviewees unanimously concurring that they were strongly introverted. This would manifest in the individual not openly communicating with many others in the team, consequently meaning their activities were not always well known:

He's the most introverted person you will ever meet. He does not talk much at all, he's the quietest person in the team. He latches on to people and that's quite a good thing in that he can build relationships with people one person at a time... you kind of know that he is happy because someone else will say, oh, he's happy with what he is doing at the moment, because he won't say much (I14).

Further, as with case study 1, this individual was considered not to have acted maliciously, but instead his actions were attributed to naivety or immaturity:

“I think this person is good at their job and just in this case has just been a bit silly. There was nothing malicious in any of this” (I14). This type of immaturity is a characteristic of those on the autistic spectrum (Soderstrom et al., 2002).
Indeed there was speculation from those interviewed that the individual’s introverted nature may be linked to their neurodiversity/ASD: “We have quite a lot of shyer types...there’s a lot at that end of the spectrum I guess you might say. More introverted, more quiet. So there are plenty of people like him” (I12). While initially there was a perception that the individual was ‘on the spectrum’, a term widely used throughout the organisation without an underpinning official diagnosis, following the incident, the individual was officially diagnosed as being on the autistic spectrum. Therefore, these characteristics were conceivably linked to his compulsive curiosity about the information held in online folders.

5.4.3 CHANGE IN ACCESS

However a crucial trigger for the individual’s behaviour appears to have been a change in access provision. One interviewee explained: “They were just curious, they wanted to learn more and they thought they had a legitimate way of accessing it” (I12). Prior to this incident, the individual and his team could not access this particular kind of information:

Previously we didn’t get that sort of information, it never came over to our area so we never needed to worry too much about it...suddenly you find yourself on distribution lists for documents that are a lot more sensitive and... this person starts to troll through that information searching for interesting things (I14).

Similarly, another stated that “that’s a fault of this system that people can just go through it” (I15).

This change in access provision and the ensuing hoarding was supported by the perception that the individual may have regarded their behaviour to be legitimate by means of their professional role and the access granted to the area. One interviewee explained:

He kind of half knew what we were on about, but he was half shocked if that makes any sense... he knew that he had a lot of stuff in his folder but I think more the shock was, well, why can’t I because I am a researcher... and that’s what I am doing. And again it’s his perception and belief that he had the tools (I15).

These quotes suggest twin mechanisms of moral disengagement (Bandura et al., 1996), including displacement of responsibility away from the actions of the individual, and the distortion of consequences, which serve to reduce the impact of such behaviour based on their role related intention. However, it is also characteristic of neurodiversity that the individual’s self-insight into their actions was reduced (Soderstrom et al., 2002).
5.4.3.1 Mixed messages

Nonetheless, it was evident that employees in this context were operating in an ambiguous area, with inconsistent and unclear rules regarding the accessing of information, or exactly how the ‘need to know’ principle should be applied. For example, one individual stated:

*It could well be that when he first started the job someone went, right you have got clearance… crack on, have a look where you want. They might really have just not said to him, every time you go on the folder, this is only to be used for X Y Z, it’s not here for this, it’s not here for that (I15).*

Another concurred, stating that clearer communication and reinforcement of process controls in this respect was needed in the organisation: “People just shouldn’t just nose around because they can… it was highlighted to us during training, but still I think that subtlety can be lost” (I12). Particularly for individuals with cognitive diversity, it is important that clear, consistent and unequivocal messaging is given regarding organisational protocol and boundaries. While individual employees can experience a lack of clarity on security issues, those in leadership roles also commented that messaging from HR could also be inconsistent concerning the appropriate sanctions and processes for dealing with employee behaviour (e.g., I14).

5.4.3.2 Removing the psychological barrier

Lastly, according to those privy to the case, online access removed a psychological barrier to the individual’s activity that in another context would have been deemed unacceptable. One interviewee explained:

*It can be tempting to view information on a computer as different to information in the real world. If you were in someone’s office, you wouldn’t riffle through someone’s desk or cabinet just to take reports. But on a computer somehow, that psychological barrier isn’t there. I think that was in the case, the problem (I12).*

Another concurred, stating that clearer communication and reinforcement of process controls in this respect was needed in the organisation: “People just shouldn’t just nose around because they can… it was highlighted to us during training, but still I think that subtlety can be lost” (I12). Particularly for individuals with cognitive diversity, it is important that clear, consistent and unequivocal messaging is given regarding organisational protocol and boundaries. While individual employees can experience a lack of clarity on security issues, those in leadership roles also commented that messaging from HR could also be inconsistent concerning the appropriate sanctions and processes for dealing with employee behaviour (e.g., I14).

5.4.4 TEAM CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOUR

Another vital trigger in this case was the value in accessing this information for the individual concerned, by assisting his own and other team members’ promotion opportunities. One individual explained, as noted in Part 1, that the changes to promotion procedures reduced the transparency of the process as compared to the previous criteria used:

*Under these organisational changes we have been through, it’s very unclear now. You know it’s not obvious to me how anybody in the team can get promoted. We still haven’t got job descriptions yet… it used to be a fairly straightforward recipe (I14).*

Thus the individual, as part of their ‘hoarding’ activities was in fact providing his colleagues with information useful to their progression. One explained:

*Oh [the behaviour] it was to help them [colleagues] with their promotion board. So this other person had a promotion board and had asked had we got any documents that talk about our academic strategy, and this person had said yes, I do and emailed it to him (I14).*

In this way the actions of the team member were viewed by their colleagues as a harmless means to mitigate an opaque promotion process, and a form of team citizenship behaviour on behalf of the perpetrator.

5.4.4.1 Social Positioning

The interview data illustrates that this individual had used their informal role – as an information supplier – to position themselves as a critical member of the team. Through this, the impact of their poor social skills was diminished as he became more influential, possessing expert and informational power (French and Raven 1959):

*He’d become a person that, if you needed something you’d probably turn to him. Because he would know where it was in the folders… In fact other people going for promotion came to see him and said you know, could I have a look at this information you’ve built up… So it’s probably no surprise...*
that if somebody was getting the information inappropriately, it would have been him (I14).

A further way this ‘social positioning’ was reinforced was through the use of team jokes and ‘banter’ about the individual’s information provider role. In hindsight the team recognised how it may have encouraged these hoarding activities. In combination with the individual’s lack of ease in social contexts and their highly introverted nature, it was recognised that:

You know the whole jokey thing has egged him on a little bit to be that person, to be that kind of figure, he knows all the information. And so we stopped that, but we should have stopped a lot sooner. We should never have been accepting those type of jokes sustained over years of him working here... ‘egging him on’ was probably a slang phrase for saying it made him feel part of a team I think. You know because he was laughing with everybody else, because he's such a quiet person you know there was an opportunity there for him to have a joke and a laugh with people, he would sit there sniggering... I think it made him feel like it was normal and it was good (I14).

The individual therefore was able to gain power and a sense of inclusion in the team beyond what he could have achieved by himself due to his limited social skills. These two factors must be viewed as significant motivators for their behaviour.

5.5 PASSIVE INSIDER THREAT

As in Case 1, colleagues were aware of the individual’s previous security breaches but did not report them and similar statements to those in Case 1 were made by those who worked closely with the individual, that such an outcome was not unexpected: “Of anybody in the team... I would probably say that it was going to be him” (I14).

5.5.1 FEAR OF OVER-REACTION

As with Case 1, a driver of the team’s non-response was concern about the security and HR outcomes. One colleague reflected that: “the line manager at the time said, you know, next time I will be more vigilant, to these kind of early warning signs. It can be too easy to dismiss them. Not one to cause a fuss” (I12). Concern about the potentially disproportionate reactions of security and HR was a clear inhibitor to the raising of concerns about their colleague’s inappropriate behaviour:

When little safety things happen you don’t mention them because you know there is going to be an overreaction... you can end up closing down entire facilities because somebody didn’t do their shoelace up or something...you tend to think I am not going to mention that one, because it would be an over-reaction if people get hold of it (I14).

Another interviewee stated that when the individual was first approached about the incident: “He just started getting a bit ‘oh I'm in trouble’ and all the usual kind of signs... because again, the culture side is that once you get a visit from security or HR then you are going down the route of going out [the door]. That’s generally the feeling on site” (I15).

These perspectives again demonstrate disengagement mechanisms through the distortion of consequences and the displacement of responsibility (Bandura et al., 1996), as well as trait empathy (Moore et al., 2012), in which sympathy lies with the perpetrator rather than the organisation. Thus, concern was focused on protecting team members from being subject to an organisational injustice. In this way the identity of these individuals as being part of a team superseded that of the organisation as a whole (Searle et al., in press), with members reticent about registering concerns about their colleagues to the wider organisation.

5.5.2 ATTENDING TO ‘ROUTINE’ SECURITY WARNING SIGNS ONLY

Concurrent with their anxiety over disproportionate organisational reactions, was acknowledgement that employees often attended only to the more typical security red flags, such as staying late in the office or conducting excessive photocopying. Thus the less common, or perhaps more widely accepted, security issue was diminished: “Complacency can be an issue sometimes as well. People get very used to patterns and they forget the reasons behind them” (I12).
The inattention to evident warning signs in this case suggested a feeling of reduced accountability from team members towards insiders who threaten the organisation in some way. The attention of staff is also focused on a narrow predefined set of activities, with evidence showing how cognitive restructuring was occurring for some in the team, rather than these individuals having a broader and active moral self-concept (Aquino and Reed, 2002); this is shown in the following extract:

if it was a big pile of printed information...I would say shred it now, shred it immediately. That's one of the warning signs... it [the guidance] was watch out for a change, in particular, like coming into the office either late or very early and this person had done neither of those... Folder surfing was never a warning sign that we were trained in. You know I can't ever remember reading anywhere in any document that says if somebody is looking through folders, that that's a security thing (I14).

5.5.3 VARYING LEADERSHIP STYLES

Another factor which reinforced a ‘blind eye’ to such behaviour was the inconsistent approach of various team/group leaders to security-breach behaviour. This team has had a number of ongoing changes with different managers in charge. For instance, one individual commented that:

We merged in with another group. We were suddenly exposed to a lot more than we had been before... suddenly you have got a different boss... and he is far less tolerant of sharing things, that's when it starts to trigger, ah yes, I need to warn people that you know, just having a folder full of information might not be acceptable (I14).

Coupled with the change of access noted earlier that may have freshly stimulated this individual’s curiosity into novel material, variable leadership made informal security warning signs far less likely to be consistently detected and acted upon. This kind of discrepancy can again create a particular ambiguity for those individuals on the autistic spectrum who require clear and consistent rules to follow but it also impacts on norms of behaviour within the wider team (Bean and Hamilton, 2006).

5.6 IMPACT ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE TEAM

5.6.1 POST-INCIDENT LEARNING

Following the incident becoming known within the team and the fact that the perpetrator had received a serious disciplinary for their behaviour, team members felt shocked and concerned for their colleague. This reflects the level of trait empathy for the perpetrator in this team (Moore et al., 2012). As outlined earlier, there was a recognition from those around the individual that they could have directly or indirectly encouraged and condoned the behaviour; a clear sense emerged of wanting to support the individual from going any further and to desist from the non-malicious but clearly unhelpful ‘banter’ that surrounded their activities. However, as with the previous two cases, there was little open discussion of this incident:

We don't like to tell people about it, you know it might embarrass the person. There was something in our group brief... and the group leader stood up and said, 'you know there has been an incident where someone has been sharing information that they shouldn't have or something, but not a big thing made of it... this incident hasn't been made public. There has not been any emails or anything to warn people about folder surfing. There has been nothing. There haven't been any briefs or communications. It's just been left dead quiet (I14).

Certainly it is sensible that individuals are not named in de-briefs of counterproductive work behaviour or acts of insider threat. However, a more transparent discussion about the incident would ensure that serious learning could be derived for the future, so as to diminish the potential for further incidents of this nature from occurring. It also might enable employees to reflect on their use of moral disengagement mechanisms, particularly the diffusion and displacement of responsibility.
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Nonetheless, in addition to the individual taking “concrete steps demonstrating that he understands what to do in the future” (I12), there was evidence of a general change in behaviour within this team following the incident. This was linked to both the individual’s personal development and to the wider shift in organisational culture towards a more open climate:

“The way that we have been trained now is get away from a telling culture and switch to an asking culture, so he probably feels more involved” (I14).

5.7 CASE STUDY 3: CONCLUSION

In conclusion, as with the preceding cases, to illustrate our overall findings we have devised a timeline of the triggers which led to the insider threat activity in Case 3. First, we again highlight the limited role of input controls here at the time of recruitment which may have been an early flag for this incident. Specifically, a psychometric test could have identified that this individual was on the autistic spectrum much earlier in their career, which would have enabled more tailored attention and support to be provided and better monitoring assigned to his activities. The individual’s introverted nature and limited social skills meant that any attention from team members, in this case through jokes about his ‘hoarding’, served as encouragement.

As in Case 1, colleagues noticed the individual’s counterproductive behaviour but did not officially raise concerns; first, because of fear of an over-reaction from HR and security, and second, because they were actively benefiting from the behaviour. A change in team composition, new access to security-critical online areas alongside varying levels of tolerance toward ‘folder surfing’ behaviour were all crucial triggers of this incident, particularly for an individual who required routine and clear procedures and rules to follow.

All of this was occurring at a time of ongoing organisational change which provided a context of uncertainty around key issues such as progression opportunities, further incentivising any routes to gain clarity. Certainly there have been strong lessons learnt by the individual involved, who seems to have thrived since the resolution of the incident. There has likewise been significant local learning for the team involved. However, as with Case 1 (and to a certain extent Case 2), there has been limited sharing of further learning from the incident across the organisation, particularly in terms of the negative perceptions of both HR and security. It therefore seems that it would be beneficial and important to address many of the issues raised in this case on a wider scale in the future.

5.8 PART 2 CONCLUSION

5.8.1 OVERALL CASE STUDY INSIGHTS: PERPETRATOR WARNING FLAGS

In conclusion, the three cases of insider threat we analysed comprise their own distinct local contexts and individual perpetrator characteristics. In this sense, it is difficult to generalise across the cases to any great extent. Indeed, our study focused on one organisation within the security industry and our findings must therefore be considered within their particular context, rather than as a means to typify insider threat activity more generally. Nonetheless, we have identified a number of indicators that may suggest that an individual could be at higher risk of insider threat activities or at least, counterproductive work behaviour. These are as follows:

Poor fit. In two of our three cases (we cannot say categorically for the third due to the unknown identity of the perpetrator) we identified an element of ‘poor fit’ among perpetrators. This was in terms of their misalignment with organisational goals and objectives; their identification with their job role and possession of the appropriate skills; their dissimilarity to other team members; and in terms of their own identity, either personal or professional (or both).

Self-focus. We derived a component of self-focus across the perpetrators in the case studies. That is, the prioritisation of either personal or work-related goals above, or at the expense of, wider organisational goals. We found that self-focus can arise in the form of disregarding organisational protocol in order to fulfil desired objectives or to avoid inconveniencing oneself (Cases 1 and 3), through self-preservation actions (Cases 1-3), a general lack of appreciation of the impact of their behaviour on colleagues or the organisation.
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(Cases 1 and 3), and to proactively sabotage others to gain revenge for a perceived injustice (potentially Case 2).

**Immaturity.** Relatedly, in two of our cases (1 and 3), the perpetrators displayed the trait of immaturity. This was evident in their under-appreciation of the consequences of their actions, in terms of how they would affect themselves, others or the organisation. It was also clear in terms of the individuals’ relations with other team members, where they would need support with basic work tasks or behave dependently on others (Case 1), or where they fulfil the role of a junior member.

**Emotional instability.** We found that in at least one case (Case 1) the perpetrator possessed an element of emotional instability or mental health issues. This contributed to the decision making and behaviour involved in the insider threat activity, we contend, through depleting the individual’s capacity to function at work and thus their conscientiousness.

**Individual vulnerabilities.** An issue which links closely to the traits outlined above is the issue of individual vulnerabilities. We found these fell into two main categories – those related to particular social difficulties and those related specifically to ASD/neurodiversity. We found that in at least two cases, the perpetrators displayed some difficulties in interacting with their team members. We found that these individuals were to some extent socially isolated and when attempts were made to form relationships, this often created problems e.g., inappropriate topics of conversation with colleagues (Case 1) and boundary failures (Cases 1 and 3).

Further, in Case 3, we found that CWB can actually be used as a form of currency in relationship building, i.e., through information sharing with others which violated organisational protocol. Individuals with identified neurodiversity issues exhibit many of these same issues in addition to more specific problems of compulsive/hoarding behaviour (Case 1) and an inability to fully appreciate the impact of their actions on others (Cases 1 and 3).

In addition, we found that in all of the cases we studied, at least some of the warning flags around perpetrators were known to colleagues and managers, but that various factors impacted on whether these were reported at an early stage and addressed or whether they were left to escalate to the types of incidents outlined in our three case studies (passive insider threat). We deal with this issue in our next two sections, Discussion and Conclusions.
6. DISCUSSION

This report has identified the factors underlying actual and potential insider threat in our case study organisation during a context of organisational change. Our analysis reveals that both active and passive threat and various types of CWB are evident in the organisation. Both the case studies and the survey identified those who breach security in different ways. We found examples of perpetrators whose CWB was known prior to a threat event and yet this knowledge was not shared. We also discovered examples of team and managerial distrust, which discouraged citizenship behaviour and even bred revenge behaviour. In both ways, the capacity and resilience of the organisation to handle insider threat is reduced. Critically, our results show that such outcomes were often an unforeseen consequence of the existing ‘need to know’ security culture and in part, the perceived heavy-handedness of HR and security teams, with whom staff feel reluctant to share their concerns about others. The reasons for this reluctance are complex.

First, individuals do not want to create problems for others whom they like and so minimise their potential consequences and turn a blind eye, becoming a passive threat themselves.

Second, they are anxious about the personal impact of reporting during an ongoing period of change and uncertainty; they do not want to make themselves more vulnerable to managerial attention and so do not voice their concerns, again becoming passive threats through their inaction.

Third, employees believe that reporting issues is something done by leaders and therefore not in their job description. This is a rule-focused organisation, which historically attracts those with a preference for authority and structure, namely the ex-military, police or civil service.

Further, the organisation’s science and technology focus make it attractive to another group of rule-followers, namely those on the autistic spectrum. Accordingly, the organisation has a strong sense of hierarchy and as a result, the detection and reporting of security issues can easily be pushed up the organisation, becoming a matter for leaders. Indeed, more insidiously, employees watch and learn from certain leaders who they witness undertaking CWB, especially acts of withdrawal and interpersonal aggression; individuals work in contexts with informal norms that make it tacitly acceptable to break certain rules.

Lastly, given the level of security clearance individuals must obtain to gain employment at this organisation, there is evidence of the ‘dark side’ of trust at work, where individuals are considered trustworthy due to their membership of the organisation, this can create complacency among teams and further discourage the sharing of concerns about others’ behaviours.

6.1 INSIDER THREAT TYPOLOGIES

Our report shows four types of perpetrator who are potential insider threats for this organisation. While our case studies included two in the top category, the other types are also apparent through results from the survey and additional interviews:

**Omitters** - Those who undertake CWB through an incapacity to effectively self-regulate their actions, depleting their capacity to function fully at work. They often lack appreciation of the consequences of their actions. They unintentionally breach rules and put the organisation at risk through their reduced capacity to curb obsessive tendencies (pattern detecting and hoarding tendencies - Case 3), or by virtue of being psychologically overwhelmed (depression, home-work overspill - Case 1). These individuals require help from others around them to detect these omissions, to support them to reduce the potential insider threat risk they present.

**Slippers** - Those who occasionally undertake single acts of CWB, such as taking home ‘on-site only’ documents, and being rude and aggressive towards others (survey). These are temporary behaviours, but they are important as impact on others’ work experiences. If the individual is senior, these behaviours can become amplified and viewed as the norm by their subordinates.

**Retaliators** - Those who deliberately undertake small acts designed to deliberately harm the organisation.
These individuals feel angry at the organisation and therefore feel justified in their actions. They comprise two forms: the passive withdrawer, who reduces their effort, co-operation and attention on the tasks they are doing, leaving early or arriving late, having extended breaks or lunches, taking unnecessary sick leave (survey); they may also deviate from the formal rules and so put themselves and others at risk; or the active revenger, an individual who deliberately overpowers organisational systems with unnecessary volumes of paperwork, or specific acts of revenge and aggression against key actors (Case 2, context interviews and survey). Over time, if unchallenged and uncorrected both of these forms create new norms of transgressive behaviour, causing anxiety and worry to their victims and incurring additional costs and risks for the organisation. They can go on to undertake more serious actions. If these individuals are senior, their actions reduce the perceived fairness and safety of the organisation, institutionalising CWB. They become distrusted by others which reduces their capacity to effectively manage and lead others. Their lack of integrity can trigger moral disengagement among others.

Serial Transgressors - These individuals undertake a wide array of categories of CWB as a matter of routine. Their actions have remained unchecked or unchallenged, which undermines the authority of management and increases the security risks of those they work with (Case 1 and survey). Such individuals are abetted by a passive group-level response to CWB, or by managers who are in the retaliator category.

Further these threats are potentially increased through the following four key factors:

6.1.1 INEFFECTIVE OR INCONSISTENT USE OF ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEMS

Case study analysis revealed an ineffective or inconsistent use of organisational control systems in this organisation. These include input controls, specifically recruitment processes that did not detect poor job and organisational fit for job applicants (Case 1). Further examples include late or inconsistent support for those with mental health concerns (Case 1), which affects their capacity to function effectively and safely in their role. We also found little attention towards detecting and supporting autistic spectrum (ASD) employees in a tailored manner, especially when working in contexts with ongoing organisational change. Vetting, while critical to the entry of employees to this organisation, may also make staff both complacent that other employees do not engage in CWB, or anxious about the impact of reporting CWB for themselves or others. Daily security reminders are a further input control tool that may have little more than assurance value for this organisation. Rather than making security matters more salient, employees respond habitually and potentially mindlessly to security messages that need to be clicked through to unblock their access to the IT system.

Output control issues were manifest in two ways. First was a perceived lack of communication regarding changes to HR policies. Specifically, new and adapted roles and their associated access restrictions were not clarified across the organisation, which was found to impact on the CWB activities of some employees. ASD staff in particular require transparency about any changes that are made to their role. Similarly, changes to progression processes were not sufficiently addressed, which was a factor that instigated insider threat in Case 3, as searches for information resulted in unauthorised access. Second, performance-management systems do not draw attention to self-serving individuals who prioritise either personal or work-related goals above, or at the expense of, wider organisational goals. Again such omissions were factors in insider threat Cases 1 and 2. We found examples where organisational protocol was disregarded in order to fulfil desired objectives or to avoid inconveniencing oneself (Cases 1 and 3); self-preservation actions (Cases 1-3) were undertaken with little appreciation of the impact of their behaviour on colleagues or the organisation (Case 1 and 3); and proactive sabotage was tentatively identified as a means of revenge for a perceived managerial injustice (potentially Case 2). There were also examples in the survey of staff knowingly deviating from organisational rules and procedures, and of theft.

6.1.2 UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITY CULTURE

Our analysis identified some unintended consequences of the security culture. First, to some extent there is a fear-focused security climate, emerging first from the anxiety around initial security vetting, but then further intensified in the negative experiences (or at least the
perception of negative experiences) of those who raised security concerns. As a result, levels of speaking-up are curbed through a false sense of high trust derived from initial vetting, accompanied by the second mechanism – the strong *need to know* culture, which constrained attention towards other co-workers’ behaviour. Direct and indirect exposure (e.g., through storytelling among teams) to the negative consequences of whistleblowing, coupled with a lack of confidence in organisational reporting systems (specifically perceptions of inappropriately harsh HR or security sanctions towards perpetrators), reduces the willingness of employees to raise concerns (e.g., Cases 1 and 3).

### 6.1.3 Moral Disengagement and Passive Insider Threat

Moral disengagement was a factor in individual level CWB, but also a further type of organisational risk - passive group level insider threat (case studies 1-3). Linked to the aforementioned ‘speak-up’ concerns, many of those working with perpetrators showed signs of disengagement in the face of others’ evident rule breaches. The operation of strong formal hierarchies combined with their reporting concerns induced the triggering of forms of moral disengagement including *displacement* and *diffusion of responsibility* e.g., ‘it’s not my job to monitor people’, and *distortion of the consequences*, e.g., ‘it’s not really a big deal’. Passive threat was also triggered when individuals felt psychologically close to, and protective of, perpetrators, making them less likely to flag their inappropriate behaviour. Passive threat was found to intensify when colleagues could directly or indirectly benefit from a perpetrator’s actions, or if they felt partly responsible for these CWB (e.g., Case 3).

### 6.1.4 Staff Dissatisfaction About Changes

Finally, there is dissatisfaction among staff following the ongoing changes in this organisation. There is a sense of aggrievement towards Plan B and its senior management concerning the types of changes occurring both currently and in the recent past, the adequacy of the communication employees receive about changes and their ability to direct change. Novel and defining changes including restructuring and pensions remove individuals’ previously high job security and upset many individuals’ personal goals and future financial security. This is especially the case for longstanding employees who have been prevented from taking voluntary redundancy. While the pension dispute has since been officially resolved, at the time of data collection for this study, dissatisfaction with pension changes was evident among staff and recounted as having a pernicious impact on some staff in terms of engagement and job satisfaction.

Results from the survey revealed two clear groups – those who feel secure and content in their employment, and those who were anxious and tired. 33% of employees who completed the survey indicated that they had at least occasionally undertaken CWB, with incivility and teasing the most common form of transgression. Research indicates that those who are disengaged from their organisation are less concerned about the potential harm to their organisation from insider threat and that they may also feel morally justified in passively or actively seeking redress from the organisation through undertaking such behaviour. We found evidence that the organisation (or management) had inadvertently provoked insider threats (e.g., Case 2) through unaddressed discontent within teams.

The potential outcome is that despite the many positive elements of this organisation’s general and security-specific culture, the resilience of the organisation towards change and towards insider threat is limited.

### 6.2 Improving the Management of CWB

The organisation, like many others, has traditionally viewed threats and security risks as something emanating from outside the walls of the organisation. There is now a growing acknowledgement of the need to consider internal sources of threat. In particular, there needs to be more awareness of how insider threat risk can become raised where changes are perceived as unnecessary and delivered in seemingly unfair ways which reduce certainty and breach trust. In this high-stakes context, risk potential is increased through long-standing and disengaged staff who are displeased with the organisation’s actions, causing their active retaliation and disruption; or through more passive forms of resistance or omission. Exposure to the activities of disengaged or depleted staff can spread to other employees, either as the targets for transgression...
or through witnessing others’ poor treatment. The net effect of all of this is to normalise CWB to some extent, with some who consider CWB counter to their values deciding to exit the organisation. Thus, the capacity of the organisation to push-back against CWB becomes diminished through the formation of these different harm chains.

More attention is required towards the active and passive behaviour of all organisational members, which reach well beyond the ‘typical’ security flags of excessive photocopying, staying late and so on. However, it is important that this change does not undermine relationships within the organisation and simply transfer the anxiety and fear to those on the inside. Instead, there is considerable merit in shifting to a welfare-focused security reporting system that emphasises the importance and value of reporting unusual or counterproductive behaviour as a means of looking out for staff. This is likely to increase reporting, and to be of real value in the retention of technical expertise. The proposed shift to a welfare-focused security system has particular value to the ASD and military staff groups, whom evidence suggests can have poorer mental health outcomes (Cassidy et al., 2014). Further, the limited capacity of those with mental health issues and ASD to quickly and effectively cope with change increases the risk of these individuals becoming unintentional insider threats. The resilience of the overall organisation might therefore be enhanced through such a shift.

6.2.1 KNOWING HOW CWB DEVELOPS DURING CHANGE

A further way that this organisation and others may become more resilient to handling insider threats is to be aware of the different mechanisms that encourage the development of CWB. From our analysis, we propose the following, which may be applicable to other contexts:

6.2.1.1 Psychological contract breach – leaders and injustice

The most universal impact of organisational changes arises from the violation to the psychological contract of employees (Aselage and Eisenberger, 2003; Kickul and Lester, 2001; Zhao et al., 2007). Psychological contract breach is likely, however, to be more enduring in this context or others, where there is frequent changes of top management. As a result, there is cynicism towards top leaders, and reduced confidence in their capacity to simply remain in post long enough for employees to have faith in their ability to deliver on past or future objectives (Bankins, 2015). In this way, a crucial route to repairing breached trust is removed and so repair is likely to be difficult to achieve (Bachmann et al., 2015; Dirks et al., 2011; Kramer and Lewicki, 2010). Critically, employees’ experience of change in this organisation has included all forms of injustice – related to processes, people, information and outcomes. Research shows perceived injustice is an important precursor for CWB (Jensen et al., 2010; Jones and Martens, 2009).

6.2.1.2 Negative emotional climate – normalisation of CWB

A second factor contributing to CWB is the pervasive negative emotional climate found in this context. The speed and frequency of change impacts on organisational trust, through raising questions about the competence of the organisation and its leaders and about how much the organisation values the welfare of its employees (affective trust) who continually experience change and its often negative effects. As a result, cynicism and disengagement emerges and the presence of this attitude reduces organisational commitment and citizenship behaviour. However, coupled with some level of incivility and hostility that is either directly or vicariously experienced within this workplace, a cycle of interpersonal aggression is being formed (Ferguson and Barry, 2011). Importantly, this normalises CWB, which is more evident in some departments than others. Working in hostile environments depletes individuals’ coping resources (Fox et al., 2001; Spector and Fox, 2005), and causes emotional exhaustion, which is an antecedent of CWB (Bolton et al., 2012). Through this route both one-off ‘slippers’ and more regular ‘omitters’ emerge. Concurrently, employees fail to notice and raise concerns about transgressive actions. Further exposure to CWB is likely to insidiously cause incivility to become more widespread (Ferguson and Barry, 2011). The mechanism for such a progression is through shifts in cognitions in the form of moral disengagement which allows employees to excuse their wrongdoing (Fida et al., 2015) and justify their retaliation behaviour (Tripp et al., 2007).
6.2.1.3 Specific impacts on specific groups

That said, individuals do not experience change in a uniform fashion, instead, it is important to identify categories for whom the impact and strength of change is likely to be different (Morgeson et al., 2015; Searle et al., in press). From our study, we have derived three distinct sets of employees who may be particularly affected by organisational change and thus vulnerable to consequent CWB, through slightly different but related mechanisms. One group is long-standing employees who have experienced transitions in recent years, shifting from one type of organisation into another with different values and often, reduced work benefits. As a result, these employees’ initial identity has been negatively altered which makes them at risk for CWB (Aquino and Douglas, 2003; Jones, 2009). Those with long tenure are more likely to feel trapped into remaining in an organisation where their final reward is now significantly reduced, but redundancy options often not available. This is a special form of psychological contract breach, which appears to punish those who have been loyal and committed to the organisation and which impacts on long-term personal goals. CWB in all its forms may be likely as this group seeks to retaliate against the organisation as a whole, or towards those they view as responsible (Bies and Tripp, 1996; 1998; Aquino et al., 2006; Tripp et al., 2007). A critical factor underlying such behaviour are key negative emotions - anger and frustration (Fox et al., 2001; Spector and Fox, 2002; 2005; Samnani et al., 2013), that are also linked to CWB. Clearly such experiences are likely to trigger the need for sensemaking (Maitlis et al., 2013; Steigenberger, 2015). Where organisational leaders devote time and attention towards communicating how previous organisational values are enduring in new contexts, and long-serving staff are valued, such transitions are likely to be less dramatic and thus produce fewer negative emotions. Further where job satisfaction remains high, the decline into CWB is likely to be less marked (Fida et al., 2015).

A second defined group are put at risk due to the inconsistency and ambiguity that change causes. Being a STEM context, this workplace is likely to have significant numbers of employees with ASD/ neurodiversity (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; Ruzich et al., 2015). Importantly, these individuals’ capacity to handle change is likely to be limited, but their preference for routine, order and clarity can be the anathema of change. For those with ASD the impact of change is likely to be more pronounced and negative, exacerbated by the poor and imprecise use of communication about change, which may also create a sense of informational injustice (Jones, 2009), a further amplifier of CWB. Vital in ameliorating the adverse impact of change is the interventions of colleagues, managers and those with specific employee skills e.g., HR, counsellors and change managers (Fida et al., 2015; Kurtessis et al., 2015).
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7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 PUSH FACTORS

In conclusion, we have identified three types of ‘push’ factors from our data which appear potentially relevant to a broad range of organisations, i.e., factors which push individuals towards acting counterproductively themselves, or push them away from reporting the CWB of others. They are:

7.1.1 INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS

Perceived injustice and integrity breach from the organisation and its leaders. Such a perception is a strong motivator of both active and passive insider threat behaviour, or at least in reducing citizenship behaviour towards the organisation. It is particularly likely following organisational change.

Psychological closeness. When individuals feel empathy towards perpetrators, they appear less likely to flag their inappropriate behaviour. This is intensified if the perpetrator is assisting them in some way in their work or they feel partly responsible for the perpetrator’s actions.

Goal alignment. Accordingly, where there is a value to the perpetrators transgressive actions for other individuals, their reporting is less likely. This can occur through an active sharing in their gains, or through their efforts providing information that can reduce uncertainty during change.

7.1.2 TEAM MATTERS

The negative experiences of those who speak up. This involves either direct or indirect knowledge (or perceptions) of the negative consequences of whistleblowing. In this organisation, these experiences are centred on a lack of confidence in organisational systems; namely, the perception of inappropriately harsh sanctions from HR or security towards perpetrators. Given the level of vetting employees must obtain and maintain throughout their employment in this organisation, anything which may jeopardise this for self or others is often avoided entirely.

Fair and consistent
Be fair and consistent with HR procedures and managing people during change.

Organisational citizenship
Make Counterproductive Work Behaviour reporting a part of employee safeguarding.

Communicate change
Communicate change initiatives transparently, consistently, regularly and collaboratively.

Assess your environments
Assess both individual and team environments for their vulnerabilities and tailor change initiatives accordingly.

Lead by example
Leaders act as role models for the organisation, demonstrating acceptable behaviours and morals for employees.

Fig. 7.1 Overall recommendations and core skills for managers: FOCAL
A feeling of anxiety in the team. When individuals around the perpetrator are worried or uncertain about their working lives, and the consequences speaking up about CWB will have directly for them, they are less inclined to register concerns about potential harm to the organisation. This was the case, for example, in Case 2 where there was clear discontent among the team, and where there were wider organisational events occurring, such as restructuring, which occupied individuals’ thinking.

Local CWB culture. Contexts in which counterproductive work behaviour are the norm reduce the capacity of individuals to discern right from wrong. This is especially likely where the decline into CWB occurs over a longer period of time and so the individual is less likely to be aware that it has occurred.

Moral disengagement. When individuals around the perpetrator feel able to morally disengage from the CWB behaviour they witness, they are less likely to speak out. There are seven mechanisms through which this can arise. Here evidence was found of a Displacement or diffusion of responsibility which is cultivated by strong formal hierarchies, e.g., “It’s not my job to monitor him”, or, for example, through a Distortion of the consequences, e.g., “It’s not really a big deal”. Other mechanisms include Moral justification, e.g., “Doing my job well is more important that helping my colleague”, Euphemistic labelling, e.g., “Well, they are on the spectrum”, or Advantageous comparison, e.g., “My not stepping in is tiny compared to other’s behaviour with this person”. Further mechanisms include Dehumanization and Attribution of blame, e.g., “If you employ people like that, what do you expect?” These mechanisms are critical in the creation and maintenance of passive insider threat.

7.2 PULL FACTORS

On the other hand, there are three corresponding positive ‘pull’ factors, which support citizenship behaviour and enable others to speak up about CWB. These are as follows:

7.2.1 INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS

Changes to routine observed behaviour. These actions are typically included in insider threat training and in checklists (such as excessive photocopying or a change in working patterns). Critically, these are unambiguous and so the individual is aware of and sensitised to such activities being important.

Lack of identification or empathy with perpetrators. When perpetrators exhibit behaviour or traits that make it difficult for colleagues to empathise with a perpetrator, e.g., incivility, individuals may be more likely to report their CWB.

Perceived intention to harm. Where the type of action breaches a perceived (and often unspoken) acceptable threshold of behaviour, e.g., ‘overstepping the mark’, an individual is more likely to report the actions of another. Such events trigger a moral emotion, such as anger or disgust, making it more likely that action individuals are provoked to report others.

Moral identity. In contrast to moral disengagement, when individuals feel a strong moral responsibility in the workplace that involves them looking out for the organisation and its members, they are more likely to avoid CWB themselves and to report others’ CWB.
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Moral identity can be fostered through the modelling of leaders, and through a trustworthy wider organisational climate.

7.2.2 TEAM MATTERS
Feelings of support and security in speaking out. CWB reporting is increased in contexts in which individuals see this type of reporting as something that is the norm and where they feel confident that it is safe to raise their concerns. Positive examples and stories are important means of transmitting the acceptability of reporting.

7.2.3 ORGANISATIONAL CLIMATE
Policies applied consistently. In contexts characterised by high levels of justice and trustworthiness, where individuals trust that their concerns will be dealt with in a measured and fair way, employees are happier to share these concerns with management. This of course extends to the general behaviour of an organisation’s management and not just to security and HR personnel.

Active and consistent communication about key changes. In contexts where there is frequent, coherent and participative communication about any changes that are occurring, particularly the necessity for change, individuals feel that they better understand these changes and are a valued part of the organisation.

Safe places and methods for reporting. Individuals are likely to report their concerns where there are multiple simplified routes to report. These should include face to face systems as well as cyber and other anonymised means.

We have produced some wider recommendations from our study. While further research in different organisational contexts is required, from consultation and feedback with a wide array of practitioners, the following recommendations appear likely to be useful for most organisations undergoing organisational change:

Organisational Citizenship: Make reporting CWB part of your organisation’s employee welfare approach which involves shared responsibilities. By creating an organisational value system in which reporting CWB or unusual activities among colleagues is considered a protective rather than punitive measure for the potential perpetrator and others around them, reporting is likely to be increased. A key enabler in this approach is that all employees consider it their responsibility to report concerns, rather than solely managers, HR or security staff. Another is that good practice security norms must be made explicit and clear to all staff, rather than based on assumptions of understanding. The process for reporting concerns should also be made clear and easy for staff as well as confidential and non-discriminatory.

Communicate change initiatives transparently, consistently, regularly and collaboratively. Engage staff of all levels at an early stage in change initiatives. Early dialogue and collaboration with individuals on change projects will enable them to feel more in control of their working life, less vulnerable, and will reduce the sense of unpredictability change provokes.

Lead by example. Leaders act as role models for the organisation, demonstrating acceptable behaviours and morals which act as guides for employees in their everyday lives. When leaders consistently demonstrate concern for their employees and the kinds of citizenship behaviours which engender trust, employees build up resilience in the face of change.

Assess your various individual, local (team) and organisational environments for their vulnerabilities & tailor change initiatives accordingly. Change has different impacts on different individuals. This is due to both individual differences and an individual’s particular vulnerabilities, as well as the particular dynamics and challenges existent in any given team. Impact assessments should be conducted prior to change instigation which enables the identification of the particular support mechanisms which may be required across an organisation.

Be fair & consistent with HR procedures and managing people during times of change and stability. This will leave employees more resilient to the turbulence of organisational change and trusting in the vision that the projected change outcome.
8. REFERENCES


REFERENCES
Assessing and mitigating the impact of organisational change on counterproductive work behaviour


Lastly, please let me know if you need any further assistance regarding this document or if there is anything else I can help with. I am here to assist you!


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An operational (dis)trust based framework


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