Bargaining over common property resources: Applying the Coase Theorem to red deer in the Scottish highlands

Hanley, N. and Summer, C. (1995) Bargaining over common property resources: Applying the Coase Theorem to red deer in the Scottish highlands. Journal of Environmental Management, 43(1), pp. 87-95. (doi:10.1016/S0301-4797(95)90337-2)

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Abstract

The effects of the rising red deer population constitute one of the principle environmental problems facing nature conservation agencies in Scotland. These problems relate both the damages to the ecological value of moorland and to costs imposed on other land users, typically forest owners and farmers. Yet management actions to curtail the red deer population are largely in the hands of private estates, who may have little incentive to reduce deer numbers because of the influence of deer numbers on capital values. In this paper we first briefly describe the red deer problem, then characterize it as an externality over which possible bargains could be struck. The reasons for the lack of such bargains in practice are then investigated.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Hanley, Professor Nicholas
Authors: Hanley, N., and Summer, C.
College/School:College of Medical Veterinary and Life Sciences > Institute of Biodiversity Animal Health and Comparative Medicine
Journal Name:Journal of Environmental Management
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0301-4797
ISSN (Online):1095-8630

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