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The challenges of the integration of religious minorities: case studies in the EU and Russian Federation.

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Summary
This article provides a critical examination and comparison of the contemporary position of three religious minorities: the Muslims in Glasgow; the Sikhs in Novellara and the Kryashens in Tatarstan. This is initially accomplished through an overview of the socio-economic, cultural and political impact of the religious minorities as three important case studies and through their relationship with the dominant form of religion and religious identity. The article will then analyse this information and these relationships using two lenses. First, we will use the four types of claims for recognition proposed by Koenig (2015): (1) claims for recognition of difference (2); claims for more autonomy in public spheres (3); claims for tolerance and (4) call for greater recognition for equal participation in organization of the state. Second, we will use the four acculturation strategies proposed by Berry (1997): (1) integration; (2) assimilation; (3) separation; and (4) marginalisation. The article will conclude with some final comments on gender and youth.

Keywords: religious minorities, Muslims, Sikhs, Kryashens.
Introduction

This article originates in a series of shared papers and symposia presented by the three authors on the topic of the position of minority religious groups in Scotland, Italy and the Russian Federation. The papers/symposia were delivered at conferences associated with the ALLMEET project in Bologna (20 April 2015), Glasgow (30 June 2015) and Lisbon (23 November 2015). The ALLMEET project, co-funded by Tempus, is a collaboration between Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) in The Russian Federation and Europe. The project is focused on the topic of cultural integration and, in particular, in the HEIs in Russia to enable them to engage with the wider international community. The project posed some serious questions about the processes of cultural integration and identified some of the key features of cultural integration: language; customs and religion. These key features can also be potential barriers to cultural integration.

The focus of this article draws on the presentations listed above and examines three case studies that explore the impact of these key features of cultural integration. The three cases studies address; the contemporary position of the Muslim community in Glasgow, Scotland, the Sikh community in Novellara, Italy and the Kryashens in Tatarstan, Russian Federation. There are fascinating comparisons and contrasts to be drawn between these three case studies.

We can gain insights into the contemporary position of a religious minority through the examination of their socio-economic, cultural and political impact and through their relationship with the dominant form of religion and religious identity. Religious identity in Scotland, Italy and Russia became increasingly conflated with the concepts of nation and national identity that were deepened and intensified in the 19th century (Nielsen, 1999). In Scotland the religious identity was predominantly Protestant and in Italy Catholic and these were often conceived in exclusive terms (Greggs, 2010). In pre-communist Russia the religious identity was Orthodox Christianity and was similarly perceived in exclusive terms. This conception of religion co-joined to national identity in exclusive terms can lead to a one-dimensional concept of culture and a rigidity in forms of identity that can be counter to the promotion of social cohesion and inclusion of other forms of religious and national identity (Guerreiro, 2005).

There are intense contemporary debates about the continued privileging of these dominant religious groups in Scotland and Italy and the position that they command in the state within contexts of greater religious diversity – privileges and positions they are reluctant to surrender or share with religious minorities (Nielsen, 1991; Scuderi, 2015). This is juxtaposed with the low practice rate for Christianity in Scotland and Italy and the debates on the secular status of the state and the organization of the state (Bruce et al., 2004; Pastorelli, 2012; Ventura, 2102). Nevertheless, there remains a residual, if uneasy, acceptance that these religious identities, or forms of these religious identities, are still linked in some way to national identity in Italy and Scotland. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the Orthodox
Christian Church has reclaimed and recovered an important position and role in Russian identity in the Russian Federation (Koesel, 2014). The special role of the Orthodox Church has been publicly supported by a series of Presidents, including President Putin.

This chapter will examine the Muslims in Glasgow, the Sikhs in Novellara and the Kryashens in Tatarstan and the challenges that they have faced, and continue to face in their local contexts. The three case studies have been selected on a number of grounds. The Muslims in Glasgow and the Sikhs in Novellara were selected because they are essentially two migrant groups that have arrived, in some number, in the city of Glasgow and town of Novellara within the last sixty to seventy years. They have a different religion and have brought a distinctive language, culture and sets of customs to their new places of dwelling. They are members of a religious minority. They present the opportunity for intercultural and inter-religious encounter and dialogue but also, as distinctive from the conception of national and religious identity, potential for discord. The Kryashens in Tatarstan have been much longer established and do not constitute a recent migrant group but they do constitute a religious minority in two respects. First, as Christians, they are a religious minority within Tatarstan where the majority of the religious adherents are Muslim. Second, they are a minority branch of Christianity within the Christian population of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation and, similar to the Muslims in Glasgow and the Sikhs in Novellara, claim a distinctive culture and sets of customs and a unique dialect of the Tatar language. Arguably, the Kryashen Christians, at times, are more vulnerable in this dual and complex role as religious minority in the local context and minority branch of Christianity in the local and national context. The presence of the Kryashens provides the opportunity for inter-religious, interdenominational and intercultural encounter and dialogue but, as will be seen, is more likely to result in discord.

We will examine: the origins and current population of the minority; the socio-economic, cultural and political position of the minority; the tensions and discrimination they experience and their relationship with the dominant religion. Once these issues have been examined, we propose to deepen the discussion by adopting two analytical lenses. First, the four types of claims for recognition of Muslim migrants proposed by Koenig (2015) and adapting them to our three religious minorities as claims for recognition. This will facilitate a closer analysis of the three case studies. These claims for recognition are: (1) claims for recognition of difference, for example, in dress and of other public symbols of religious affiliation (2) claims for more autonomy in public spheres – this can be exemplified in calls for religious schooling and permission to convert existing buildings into places of worship or construct new places for worship; (3) claims for tolerance that can call for greater national recognition of religious holidays and extension of blasphemy laws and (4) call for greater recognition for equal participation in organization of the state.
Second, we will adopt and adapt the four acculturation strategies proposed by Berry (1997). (1) Integration refers to migrants who retain a ‘degree of cultural integrity’ yet also participate in the ‘wider social network. (2) Assimilation refers to a migrant group that chooses to ‘adapt wholly to the host culture while abandoning their original culture’. (3) Separation refers to those migrants who retain their own culture and do not aspire to ‘become part of the host culture’. (4) Marginalisation refers to those migrants who do not wish to have relations with ‘representatives of their host culture’ nor with those of their original culture. We will extend Berry’s theory by arguing for a fifth category: (5) segregation and for ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forms of the different categories.

The Muslim community in Glasgow

It is difficult to estimate the Muslim population of Glasgow and Scotland until the early twentieth century and the later census data of 2001 and 2011 because the historical travellers or migrants to Scotland were often identified as being Asians rather than being designated by their religion. There is some speculation that Muslim diplomats or traders may have arrived in Scotland before the fifteenth century, but there is more concrete evidence of a small Muslim presence from the sixteenth century onwards (Mann, 2008). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the number of Muslims slowly increased as Scots returning from working and living in India brought their servants home with them to resettle in Scotland. During this period, Indian seamen (or lascars) became more common in the ports (Dunlop, 2015). On some of the docks in Glasgow, special washing facilities were constructed for the Muslim lascars (Prescott, 1992). In the late nineteenth century, a number of Indians came to Scotland to study medicine and engineering in the universities and by the early twentieth century there were around 300 Indian students in Scotland. In the nineteen twenties, Indians became involved in peddling clothing and by the late nineteen thirties there were about 300 Muslims in Scotland (Mann, 1992, 2008). In 1944, the first Mosque was opened in Glasgow. In the nineteen fifties, Muslims were recruited for unskilled and semi-skilled labour (industrial and transport jobs) and their number grew to 3,000 by 1960 (Mann, 2008). The numbers increased steadily to 15,000 in 1970, 25,000 in 1980 and 35,000 in 1990. Many members of the Muslim community worked in retail and restaurants. According to the Census data of 2001 and 2011, the Muslim population of Scotland grew from 42,600 in 2001 to 77,000 in 2011 (0.84% of the population to 1.4%). In Glasgow the Muslim population grew from 17,792 in 2001 to 32,117 in 2011 (3.1% to 5.4% of the population of the city) (The Scottish Government, 2005; Glasgow City Council, 2013). The Muslims are the largest religious group after the Christians in Glasgow and Scotland.

Despite being a small proportion of the population in Glasgow, the Muslims have established a significant presence in the city. This Muslim presence is symbolised by the impressive Glasgow Central Mosque that was opened in 1984. This was the first purpose-built Mosque in Glasgow and is
the largest Mosque in Scotland. The Mosque operates as a space for worship but also as a centre for community activities. Some members of the Muslim community have prospered in retail and the catering industry. Members of the Muslim community have played important roles in Scottish and Glasgow public life. Notable figures include Mohammad Sarwar, a prominent member of Parliament (1997-2010) and members of the Scottish Parliament who have represented parts of Glasgow: Bashir Ahmad (2007-2009) and the widely known Scottish Nationalist Party MSP Humza Yousaf (2011-).

There has been significant discussion in the UK about the question of assimilation or integration of the Muslim community since the 1960s/1970s (Weller and Cheruvallil-Contractor, 2015). Before the series of events that began with the riots of 2001 in England and continued with 9/11 and 7/7 and November 2015, British identity was beginning to accommodate and include Muslim migrants. After these events this became more problematic. There is a perception that Muslims and Asian people in general are well integrated in Scotland and have experienced less discrimination than in other parts of the United Kingdom. Possible reasons for this perception include the ideas that Scotland is more egalitarian than England or religious conflict is focused on the inter-denominational sectarianism between Catholics and Protestants and less focused on discrimination against other religious groups such as Muslims (Hopkins and Smith, 2008; McCrone and Bechhofer, 2008). It may be that the Muslims in Scotland are still perceived to constitute a minority and can be understood to pose no real threat to Scottish society (Devine, 2006). There are arguments that Muslims in Scotland are more likely to identify as Scottish than Muslims in England associating with national identity (Hussain and Miller, 2006). There are many young Muslim people in Scotland who hold multiple identities and consider themselves to be, among other identities, both Muslim and Scottish. There was a serious terrorist incident on the 30th of June 2007 when a car loaded with gas canisters was rammed into the doors of the terminal building at Glasgow airport. It was pointed out at the time that neither of the assailants were from Glasgow or Scotland.

The perceptions of greater integration and less discrimination in Scotland, however, deserve closer scrutiny. These perceptions need to be balanced by research which suggests that Muslims, like other religious-ethnic groups, are more likely to be accepted as Scottish if they adopt the prevalent modes of behavior and cultural mores of Scottish society (Virdee et al., 2006). This has the potential to blur the ‘otherness’ of the Muslims. Further, the Scottish Government report, *Experiences of Muslims living in Scotland* (2011), reports some significant challenges faced by many members of the Muslim community. There have been assumptions that Muslims in Scotland, as in other parts of the United Kingdom, engage in forms of self-segregation in particular areas of cities including Glasgow (Ansari, 2002). This assumption of self-segregation disguises the seriousness of the plight of many members of the Muslim community. Many Muslims are located in areas characterized by poverty and deprivation and, in fact, the alleged self-segregation reflects the low social-economic status of many
Muslims and their lack of choice and lack of social mobility. Muslim women, in particular, have a high rate of unemployment at 18% throughout Britain (University of Bristol, 2015). This can be attributed to a number of causes. The women may have limited access to child-care. They may have limited English language skills. Some employers may be reluctant to employ them because of their distinctive dress (the wearing of the hijab). The latest figures for the number of Muslims in prison in Scotland indicate that the 201 Muslims in prison are 2.54% of the overall prison population (Scottish Government, 2015). This figure is significant because, as has been seen, the overall Muslim population of the country is 1.4%.

There is also recorded evidence of discrimination against Muslims. There has been opposition to the construction of mosques in residential (and wealthy) areas such as the Glasgow suburbs of Bearsden in 1999 and Newton Mearns in 2001 (Ansdell, 1999; MacKay, 2001). There were repercussions for Scottish Muslims as a result of 9/11 and 7/7 and increasing evidence of religiously aggravated offences against Muslims. Since records have been kept of religiously aggravated offences, the number of police charges for religiously aggravated offences against Muslims in Scotland has fluctuated from 19 (2% of all charges) in 2011-2012 to 80 (12% of all charges) in 2012-2013 to 48 (8% of all charges) in 2013-2014 to 71 (12% of all charges) in 2014-2015 (Davidson, 2015). These offences include: breach of the peace; threatening or abusive behavior, assault; offensive communications and acting in a racially aggravated manner. There is no separate record for Glasgow but, given the Muslim population of Glasgow accounts for almost half the Scottish population of Muslims, it can be reasonably assumed that the Muslims in Glasgow have experienced a significant proportion of the attacks. The situation has been exacerbated by the highly publicized stories of Scots who have become jihadists, though this number is small compared to England. Ruhul Amin, a Jihadist fighter from Aberdeen was killed in a drone attack in Syria (Maddox, 2015). Aqsa Mahmood who came from an affluent family in Glasgow left for Syria to become an ISIS bride and tries to recruit other young Muslim women from the UK (Fantz and Shubert, 2015). There are some Scottish Muslim organisations that attempt to counter the misinterpretations of Islam. The Solas Foundation was established in 2009, by two Scottish Muslim scholars, to educate Scottish Muslims in mainstream Islam with authentic and authoritative scholarship. The Foundation has produced an iSyllabus Islamic Studies Course.

There are reports, however, that discrimination intensified and escalated in the period immediately after the attacks in Paris on Friday 13 November 2015. A disturbing number and variety of incidents were reported in this period. The Police stated that 64 hate crimes against Muslims had been reported in the week after the attack (Diamond, 2015). These may not all be pursued as formal police charges. The 2014-2015 Report for religiously aggravated offences was published prior to the attacks in Paris, yet the number of offences collated in one week which could potentially be included in the 2015-
2016 Report almost match the total figure for 2014-2015. On 17th November, a Mosque in Bishopbriggs, a small town adjacent to Glasgow, was deliberately set on fire (McCall, 2015). Humza Yousaf, the prominent Muslim Scottish Parliament MP based in Glasgow, was subjected to dozens of abusive comments on Facebook and Twitter claiming that he supported ISIS (Braiden, 2015). There have been death threats targeted at Strathclyde University Muslim Students’ Association in Glasgow (Henderson, 2015). There are reports of Muslims, especially women wearing the hijab, feeling intimidated in the streets by the hostility of passers-by. Ms Ali, a young woman who wears the hijab commented on the hostility she encountered in the streets of Glasgow (Diamond, 2015):

Why should I be afraid? Why should I live in fear? I am one of you. I was born and brought up in Scotland. I know no other life. We may be Muslims but we are also Scots.

It appears that the rise in Islamophobia and the related offences resulting from the Paris attacks may be more intense than in the aftermath of 9/11, 7/7 and the attack on Glasgow airport (Diamond, 2015). However, it may be that Muslims are now more willing to report incidents of discrimination. This serious backlash may abate but will potentially resurge in the wake of further attacks on the UK or Europe. This raises questions about the fragility of the integration of Muslims in Glasgow and Scotland.

The Sikh community in the town of Novellara
In this chapter the word Sikh refers to the religious persuasion of a group of Indian migrants from a specific area (Punjab) and who share a common language (the Punjabi) and a shared history and culture (Pashaura and Barrier, 1996). The history of Sikh migration typifies the history of the larger Indian diaspora and has been divided into three phases, characterized by different goals and different social backgrounds (Dusembury, 1989; MacLeod, 1989).

The first and second phases, which took place in the nineteenth century and after World War II, were characterized by labor migration to more developed countries in Asia and the United States and Canada. The third phase began in 1984 and was closely linked to political turmoil between Sikh groups and the Hindu Indian central government. During this period Sikhs moved to Italy and other parts of Europe. The first Sikhs that arrived in Italy were young men who migrated for political and economic reasons. Some of them found jobs in the circus, others in agricultural activities. Their presence in the central areas of the Po Valley has grown considerably since 2000, mainly as a result of family reunifications. The town of Novellara currently has 13,690 inhabitants 2,160 of these are new arrivals (15.78%). The Indian community (488 people) is the second largest new arrival
community after Chinese. The data is significant, considering that in 2002 there were only 167 Indians (though the number has decreased from 552 in 2012).

The preference for the town of Novellara, and more generally for the Po Valley, is because it is a rural area. This represents an element of continuity with the Punjab. The Punjab has always been a largely rural region; the population lives mainly in the villages and the predominant occupation is farming. The people who decided to migrate are mostly farmers from the plains of Doaba. Their livelihoods were ruined by competition with the large food companies and they were forced to abandon their lands. They immediately found employment because of their work skills in the small, medium and large farms in the Po Valley. Their ability to work with cattle enabled them to find employment in the dairies, in the breeding farms of cows and in the industries that produce Parmesan cheese.

The arrival of the first Sikh immigrants was quite traumatic for the citizens of Novellara. They had been used to encountering migrants from southern Italy. The dense network of social ties, traditionally based on deep local roots, common traditional cultural references and dialect, was perceived to be at risk because of the presence of these new people who have a different physical appearance, language and culture. The initial communication difficulties were quickly overcome through interaction in the workplace, the provision of language courses for adults and the work of linguistic-cultural mediators. Although the men and children speak Italian fluently, the language problem persists for those women who have recently arrived for family reunification. For the most part, these women are not engaged in work activities, but they remain at home, and have few opportunities for contact and communication with local Italian people. The city administration organizes regular Italian language courses for them and lessons to prepare for a driver’s license.

The Sikhs are marked out by their distinctive behavior and mode of dress - both closely related to their religious beliefs. The Sikhs pray five times a day, do not eat meat, do not drink alcohol and do not consume tobacco. This way of life can present barriers in certain social occasions, especially for younger Sikhs and for Sikhs working alongside Italians, in a geographical area that has always been renowned for the production and consumption of wine and foods made from pork. Moreover, the obligation for Sikhs to wear the kachera (undershorts), grow a beard and to cover their long uncut hair under a turban constitute very visual differences. The tradition of carrying the kirpan (dagger, the symbol of justice) can be misinterpreted and cause anxiety. Some of the first migrants took off their turbans and cut their hair in an attempt to conform with the local norms of dress and appearance.

The growth and consolidation of the Sikh community in Novellara meant that Italian residents became used to these differences and they are now accepted as part of the cityscape (Comune di Novellara, 2012).
A decisive moment for the successful integration of the Sikhs was the construction of the Gurdwara temple, opened in 2000. It is the second largest Sikh temple in Europe, attended by about four thousand people every Sunday (some Sikhs attend daily). The temple is always open to the public and is now one of the major tourist and cultural attractions of the town. Periodically, important Sikh preachers from India and overseas come to visit it, attracting thousands of people to listen to them. The presence of this temple has facilitated the arrival of new Sikh migrants and is part of the municipal policy for the promotion of different religious identities through the support for the opening of holy places. In addition to the Sikh temple and the Catholic churches in the town of Novellara there are currently two mosques, a Hindu temple and an Orthodox church. The protection of religious pluralism was identified early on as a key element to promote the integration of migrants aiming for mutual understanding and coexistence among cultures and ethnic groups. This is explained by a recent mayor Raul Daoli:

I try to help these religious groups, but without using public contributions. I help them by granting them permission to change the function of the buildings they have acquired. We must fight for the affirmation of good people; it is not appropriate to send these people to pray in garages or less decent places, where extremism and radicalization can be more easily hidden. Beautiful and spacious places of worship facilitates the participation of the more educated and forward-looking believers, they produce forms of self-control.

The Gurdwara temple is now the main meeting place for the Sikh community of Novellara. Among the many religious, cultural and recreational activities organized in the temple and open to all the citizens, students and curious tourists coming from other cities, the celebration of Baisakhi in the historical center of Novellara is organized in collaboration with associations and municipal authorities. The support for shared festivals has been a deliberate strategy launched by the administration of Raul Daoli:

In the first phase of my mandate I wanted to promote moments of knowledge, recognition and mutual trust. We have identified some places of worship and we have promoted the sharing of festivals, perceived as moments of happiness and gratitude, but above all of recognition and trust.

The celebration is considered the heart of the expression of identity of the various communities and the time par excellence of being together in a free and jovial mood. The sharing of the festival aims to break the religious segregation and self-exclusion avoiding any chance of proselytism and syncretism. Other shared celebrations include the end of the month of Ramadan, Christmas, the Chinese New Year, Easter, as well as the Republic Day and Women’s Day.
The outdoor festivals and the temple have favored integration, newspapers and televisions come to document these realities and the work of Sikh people in the dairy. (Erika Tacchini, municipal officer).

The presence of linguistic and cultural mediators, the integration projects promoted by schools and library, language courses, information points, but especially the frequent opportunities for joint planning among the leaders of the Sikh community, the mayor, councilors and representatives of civil society have allowed the Sikh community to feel integrated and, importantly, to be recognized as integrated. These opportunities for encounter and dialogue between people of different religions and cultures have been crucial in this process of integration.

The generosity shown to the Sikhs has been reciprocated by the Sikh community, as demonstrated by: the presence of some Sikhs in the local pro-loco (local organization to promote the area); the gift of an ambulance to the local Red Cross; assistance with the organisation of blood donation in collaboration with AVIS (Association of the Italian Volunteers for Blood) and support for the displaced persons from the nearby town Finale Emilia, affected in 2011 by a strong earthquake. Nowadays many of the children of the first Sikh migrants have completed their education and are enrolled at university. They speak Italian more fluently than their parents and have a greater understanding of western culture. They have the same ambitions for the future as their Italian peers.

The first Sikhs were employed as farmers. Now the younger Sikh generation that has grown up here shares the same ambitions as our children (Erika Tacchini).

Unfortunately, partly because of the economic crisis, there are few job opportunities that can satisfy the ambitions of young Sikhs in Novellara. Some of them have returned to India, others are migrating to England, the USA and Canada.

My parents are forcing me to go to Canada. I’m trying not to go there but I do not know how long I will resist (Singh, leader of the Sikh community).

Kryashens of Tatarstan

*Kryashen* are the ethno-confessional group of the Tatar population in the Volga and Ural regions (Mukhametshin, 1977; Khalikov, 1978). Kryashens have an independent identity (separate from the identity of Muslim Tatars), their own dialect of the Tatar language and their own cultural and religious traditions (Orthodox Christian). *The Kryashen language* is a dialect of Tatar language, but does not include words from the Farsi and Arabic languages. A special Kryashen literary language in the
Cyrillic script existed till 1930 (Wixman, 1984). Their cultural traditions include distinctive ethnic dress and ethnic celebrations. These are different from the cultural traditions of Tatars and Russians: for example, the Kryashens celebrate the main Tatar celebration, Sabantyi, in July, while Muslim Tatars celebrate it in June. Their religious culture incorporates special Orthodox Christian rituals. Kryashens live in separate settlements in rural areas (more than 152 villages in 23 districts) and also in the urban areas of Tatarstan (Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1985). The Kryashens are the majority population in several districts (municipalities) of the Pestrichinskiy, Mamadushskyi, Nizhnekamskyi, Zainskyi districts.

There is some debate about the size of the Kryashens population. According to the Census-2010, the percentage of Tatars in Tatarstan is 53.2%. The number of Kryashens is 0.8% of the total population of Tatarstan or 1.5% of Tatars in Tatarstan (29,900 people). The official statistical figures for the Kryashens in Tatarstan are disputed (Salagaev, Sergeev and Luchscheva, 2011). Estimates put the Kryashen population at more than 100,000 Chryashians.

Table 1. Statistic of ethnic structure of the population of Tatarstan, 1989-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census</th>
<th>Share of ethnic Tatars</th>
<th>Including share of Kryashens</th>
<th>Share of ethnic Russians</th>
<th>Share of ethnic Muslims</th>
<th>Share of ethnic Orthodoxy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>10%*</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>1.5%**</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimates of some experts and Kryashen intellectuals.
** According to estimates the real number of Kryashens is 100-200,000 people, that is 4-8% of the Tatar population of the Republic of Tatarstan.

There are three main versions of the origins and history of the Kryashens:

- The Kryashens are the descendants of a group of Tatars who converted from Islam to Orthodoxy after the collapse of Kazan Khanate (mid sixteenth century). The Kryashens are, therefore, a consequence of the discriminatory policy against Tatars (Christianization), which was pursued by the Russian authorities in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries (Iskhakov, 2002; Nogumanov, 2005).
- Kryashens are an ancient Turkic group from the Volga region and they have never been Muslims (view expressed by some Kryashen leaders and intellectuals).
- Kryashens have their roots in Finno-Ugric tribes who were under the Turkic influence and were pagans before the collapse of Kazan Khanate (view of several leaders of Tatar ethnonationalism).
These different accounts provoke discussion about the political status of Kryashens. Are they an *ethno-confessional group of Tatars* (official version)? If the Kryashens belong to the Tatars, it means that Orthodox Christianity is part of Tatar culture and this challenges the idea of a common Muslim identity shared by the Tatar people. Are the Kryashens an *independent ethnic group* in relation to the Tatars? This is the view of several Kryashen leaders and intellectuals, who produced the Declaration of Self-Identity of Kryashens as an *independent ethnic group* and also sent a public note to President V. Putin and the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2002-2003 (New Europe, 2008).

The government of the Republic of Tatarstan promotes the idea that Kryashen and Muslim Tatars are one ethnic community and pursues the policy of integration of Kryashens into the regional community. The integration of Kryashens is, however, problematic. First, Kryashen identity is not homogenous (for example, according to the Census-2002, of the sixteen thousand defining themselves as Kryashen, seven thousand self identified as Christian Tatars (or baptized Tatars). It means there are two different understandings of Kryashen identity. Second, the marginal groups of Tatar harbour xenophobic attitudes and stereotypes towards Kryashens. The term *Christian Tatars* is popular for everyday communication, but it has a negative connotation and is used as a form of latent discrimination. Sociological research suggests that there is a greater distance between Tatars and Kryashens than between Tatars and Russians (Salagaev, 2006). Alexander Terent’ev outlined the results of research that demonstrated that 25% of Tatars do not want to see Kryashens in Tatarstan (2013). Tatar etho-nationlists even promote the idea that the Kryashens convert to Islam. The Kryashens have been Orthodox for several generations and, understandably, do not support this idea.

The distance between the Kryashens and the Russians may be less than between the Kryashens and the Tatars because of the strong integration into Orthodox Christianity. There is a danger that convergence between Kryashens and Russians may mean the Russification and assimilation of the Kryashens. During the upsurge of national movements in the 1990s Kryashen intellectuals pushed for the withdrawal of the Kryashen Church (i.e. Orthodox churches where services are in the Kryashens language) from the Russian Orthodox Church to avoid the Russification of the Kryashens. Periodically, some of leaders of the Kryashens protest about the religious challenges that emanate from the regional government (the threat of Islamization) and from the Russian Orthodox Church (Kryashens want to have more special churches, at the moment they have only six Kryashen churches). Kryashens are integrated with the regional political and social system, but they face risks of assimilation into the Russian Orthodox Church and into Tatar Islamic culture. The Kryashens are less active in promoting their political and economic interests than Tatars or Russians, but they have demanded recognition as an *independent ethnic group* over the past few years. This political struggle stalls because the Kryashens do not have an independent political party nor are they an organization - the establishment of a separate political party or an ethnic or religious organization is forbidden.
under Russian legislation. The Kryashen leaders do not appear to have political ambitions but they are very concerned to save their identity and cultural traditions. The Kryashens may be classified as a disadvantaged group, because of the refusal of regional authorities to recognize them as an independent ethnic group. The Kryashens have equal opportunities as citizens of the Russian Federation (equal political, social and economic rights). There is no institutional discrimination against them in the Republic of Tatarstan. As has been stated, they can encounter incidents of implicit racism and xenophobia in everyday life.

The regional government works to integrate the Kryashens into the regional community. The Kryashen Public Organization and young Kryashen organization (Forum of Kryashen young people) were established at 2007 with the support of the regional government. These are non-profit, non-governmental and non-political organizations and these are included in the common framework of public ethnic organizations in the Republic of Tatarstan (Assembly of Peoples of Tatarstan). Kryashens have several folk-art groups for the promotion of Kryashen culture. Kryashen leaders were included into the regional system for representation of ethnic groups (House of Friendship of Peoples of Tatarstan, the Assembly of Peoples of Tatarstan). Sunday schools for children of the Kryashens were also created. The Tatarstan Academy of Science has a special Research centre for the study of Kryashen history and culture. The regional and local officials always participate in the ethnic celebrations of Kryashens. The Kryashen community has a permanent representation at the regional and local authorities (it is not obligatory, but it is the wish of regional authorities). The State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan (regional parliament) has one member who is Kryashen, the regional government includes several Kryashens and there are Kryashen mayors of several municipalities (for example Mamadushskyi district, Elabuzhskyi district and others). On the federal (Russian government) level the non-formal leader of the Kryashens is Mr. Vasilii Likhachev, who is the member of the State Duma (federal parliament) and the vice-president and ex-speaker of Tatarstan regional parliament in 1990s. Mr. Ivan Egorov (Head of the large business corporation Ak Bars) is the formal leader of the Kryashen Public Organization in the Republic of Tatarstan. The regional government took part in special events for the promotion of dialogue with the Kryashens. The Tatarstan Government Executive officers supervising the inner policy concerning the Kryashens took part on the plenary of Human Rights Organization of Whole World Russian people’s Council in Moscow, December 23, 2013. Thus, the regional government respects the cultural traditions of Kryashens in Tatarstan.

The Kryashens face some serious contemporary challenges. These are connected with the future of the Kryashen community in the region. There are three possible scenarios for the future of the Kryashens. 1) Assimilation with either the Russians or Tatars. There is a danger that the Kryashens could be assimilated into the Russian Orthodox Church or Tatar Islamic culture. 2) The conservation
of culture and identity of the Kryashens as an ethno-confessional group of Tatars (current situation). The conservation of culture and identity of Kryashens will maintain the current position of Kryashens in the regional community. 3) The Kryashens will receive a new status as an independent ethnic group. This new status of the Kryashen minority will provoke debates about the autonomy of the Kryashens and transform the political situation in Tatarstan. The most likely scenarios are the first or the second scenario, but the third always remains a possibility.

Discussion
These are very useful case studies as they illuminate the contemporary position of the three religious minorities. The Kryashens are by far the oldest minority, the Muslims have been present in Glasgow in numbers for around forty to fifty years and the Sikhs in Novellara are the most recent arrivals. As stated in the introduction, we will now adapt and apply the four claims for recognition to all three religious minorities: (1) claims for recognition of difference; (2) claims for more autonomy in public spheres; (3) claims for tolerance and (4) call for greater recognition for equal participation in organization of the state.

The first claim for recognition for difference (distinctive dress and other symbols of religious affiliation) is applicable to the Muslims in Glasgow and the Sikhs in Novellara but has had markedly different consequences. The religious dress and symbols of the Sikhs initially marked them out as different to the Italians in Novellara and the kirpan (dagger) was perceived as a weapon and as a possible threat. The wearing of the kirpan has been accepted under article 19 of the Italian Constitution, as it is an expression of the Sikh religion (Pastorelli, 2012). By contrast, some of the religious dress of the Muslims in Glasgow has had the opposite effect in the current climate (Diamond, 2015). The hijab identifies a woman as Muslim, as a potential threat, and she is intimidated and feels threatened. The distinctive religious dress can be accepted and celebrated as a sign of diversity (Novellara) or it can, at times, be used to identify members of the religious minorities and can lead to discrimination (Glasgow).

The second claim for recognition of difference (claims for more autonomy in public spheres) is applicable to all three case studies. The Gurdwara Temple in Novellara and the Central Mosque in Glasgow link the religious minority with the local community but also with their place of origin and other diaspora communities (Gallo, 2012). The Mosque and the Temple also function, as many places of worship do for new arrivals, as the focus for wider activities shared by the members of the religious communities (Greiner, 2015). The Sikh temple in Novellara has become a focal point for the Sikhs, a highly visibly symbol of the presence of the Sikhs in Novellara and has become one of the main attractions of the town. Glasgow and the west of Scotland have a more ambivalent attitude to the visible physical presence of the Muslims. Glasgow Central Mosque holds a high profile position in
Glasgow comparable to the position held by the Sikh temple in Novellara, but plans for some proposed mosques have been disputed and a smaller, less well-known mosque was targeted for an arson attack after the Paris attacks (Ansdell, 1999; MacKay, 2001; McCall, 2015).

Similar to religious dress, the place of worship can be accepted and celebrated as a sign of diversity or it can be used to identify a visible and accessible target. In Glasgow the Mosque, as a sign of Muslim presence and the link of the Mosque and the Muslim community to their origins and other Muslims is now perceived to be a threat to national and international security and, to return to a point made in the introduction, to the residual, national Christian identity in Scotland (Gallo, 2012). Ms Ali, who is quoted above, and other Muslims have constructed their Scottish identity in relation to an adherence to Islam and not to Christianity. A sign of the continued autonomy of the Kryashens and the maintenance of their separate identity within Russian Orthodoxy is the continued use of the six special churches and the possibility of further special churches. This appears to be a source of tension and challenge for the Russian Orthodox Church, which has re-established a claim to be a national Church and contributor to national identity. This tension is exacerbated for the Kryashens by the challenges from the majority Muslim Tatars.

The use, symbolism and ambivalence of these places of worship create a useful physical metaphor for the tensions, negotiations and accommodations for religious minorities. The Sikh temple in Novellara has become celebrated as a highly praised and welcome addition to the town. This is within the context of the intercultural and inter-religious encounter and dialogue that is actively promoted in Novellara in an authentic inclusive approach. The Mosque in Glasgow is perceived to be both an important part of the religious architecture of the city but is also a potential site to be attacked in times of heightened Islamophobia. This is within the context of a combination of intercultural and inter-religious encounter and dialogue but also discord. The Kryashens have six designated Kryashen churches which allows them to preserve their distinctive cultural-linguistic form of Orthodox Christianity. These are a source of tension with the exclusivist approach of both the majority Muslims and the Orthodox Christians. This context of inter-religious and interdenominational discord highlights the vulnerability of the Kryashen Christians as a religious minority and as a minority branch of Christianity as they strive to maintain their identity and independence.

The third claim for recognition (tolerance and recognition of holidays) is also applicable to all three case studies. The former mayor of Novellara promoted the sharing of Sikh festivals, though this does raise issues about the purpose of a Sikh festival and what can be shared with those who are non-Sikhs. The Kryashens celebrate Sabantyi on a different date from the Muslim Tatars and this marks them out from the Muslim Tatars. It is questionable if Muslims festivals in Glasgow are celebrated beyond the Muslim people but there are concessions for school children who are fasting during the month of Ramadan.
The fourth and final claim for recognition (equal participation in organization of the state) is currently applicable to the Muslims in Glasgow and the Kryashens. There is ample evidence of Muslims and Kryashens willing to serve in public office – not just to protect their interests, but also to serve the common good. There is less evidence of the Sikhs in Novellara holding public office but they are a group that has arrived very recently and still represent a small minority. This Sikh community presents an intriguing case study and there are a number of reasons why this Sikh community appears to be accepted. They are perceived to be good workers who are attentive to their religious duties (Pastorelli, 2012). The Sikhs have also contributed to the common good by supporting social welfare. Their contribution to social welfare and to the common good indicates that they have resources that enable them to make this contribution and they are willing to share these resources.

The wider social and cultural integration of these three religious minorities can also be analysed using theory formulated by Berry (1997). Berry sought to understand patterns in the ways in which migrant groups negotiated the issue of acculturation. He identified two main dimensions to acculturation: cultural maintenance and contact and participation. Cultural maintenance refers to the importance placed on cultural identity and the preservation of cultural identity. Contact and Participation refers to the balance between of being engaged with other cultural groups and being more focused on one’s own cultural group (p. 9). Berry formulated four acculturation strategies: integration; assimilation; separation and marginalisation. Integration refers to migrants who retain a ‘degree of cultural integrity’ yet also participate in the wider social network. Assimilation refers to a migrant group that chooses to adapt to the host culture and do not wish to ‘maintain their culture identity’. Separation refers to those migrants who retain their own culture and ‘wish to avoid interaction with others’. Marginalisation refers to those migrants who do not wish to have relations with the host culture nor with those of their original culture.

Adopting Berry’s theory for our three case studies, the evidence about the Muslim community in Glasgow suggests that some members of the Muslim community, through contribution to public office, success in business and participation in the labour market, have developed a ‘strong’ level of integration, though there are issues about the potential blurring of the ‘otherness’ that may led to a ‘weakening’ of the integration. Integration in this case is not static but a process that is dynamic and can change between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’. Other members of the Muslim community appear to be separated. They do not, however, fit into Berry’s concept of separation as it is not an issue of them not aspiring to become part of the host culture – they face barriers to becoming part of the host culture. These barriers are socio-economic, religious-cultural and linguistic. We have argued against the use of the term self-segregation but now wish to extend the four categories of Berry and we propose the term ‘segregation’. Segregation refers to those migrants who retain their own culture and aspire to become part of the host culture but face socio-economic, religious-cultural and linguistic barriers. As
has been noted above, this is particularly relevant to women. The Sikh community in Novellara initially faced a period of ‘strong’ segregation as they appeared to threaten the local host culture. This was resolved in many aspects and for many members of the Sikh community this has led to a ‘strong’ integration but, similar to the Muslim community in Glasgow, some women remain segregated. The integration could be even stronger if the women were not segregated. The Kryashens, though not a recent migrant group, are a religious minority and share many of the characteristics of the Muslims in Glasgow and the Sikhs in Novellara. The Kryashens have a ‘weak’ and fragile integration and are under pressure to move more towards assimilation. The integration is ‘weak’ and fragile because there are debates within the Kryashens about Kryashen identity and if they are an ethno-confessional group or an independent ethnic group.

**Concluding comments**

We would like to conclude with some brief comments about gender and youth. The Muslim community in Glasgow and the Sikh community in Novellara are recent new arrivals who migrated primarily for economic reasons. There are serious gender and cultural issues for both communities concerning the position of women, the language barrier for some women and their segregation from the local community and the local workforce (Lum, 2012). This can be contrasted with the younger people in the Muslim community in Glasgow and the Sikh community in Novellara who have the appropriate vernacular language skills and appear to be more comfortable with western culture and are more able to identity with people of their own age group and hold multiple identities. These young people are more likely to experience a ‘weak’ level of integration. Kryashen young people have a strong sense of religious and ethnic identity; there is evidence of a high practice rate among the young and they appear to have a stronger sense of belonging to their minority (Titova et al., 2015).

There is still much that could be researched about the three case studies, especially in these areas of gender and youth. The school education of the children and young people and the retention and the continuation of the cultural and religious identity for future generations are important issues. There are deeper questions to be asked surrounding the ways in which the multiple identities of the young people are constructed and manifested and how these may be affected in times of conflict or crisis (Lewis, 2007; Myrvold and Jacobsen, 2015). There are also questions that can be asked about the continuation of gender roles for the women in the Sikh and Muslim communities and the social segregation of the women (Lum, 2012).

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