Best agendas in multi-issue bargaining

Flamini, F. (2007) Best agendas in multi-issue bargaining. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 7(1), pp. 1-11. (doi: 10.2202/1935-1704.1368)

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Abstract

We study the agenda selection problem faced by a multi-issue committee when there can be (small) delays between the negotiations of different issues. We show that the presence of these delays affects the interplay of the forces in the bargaining game and solves the indeterminacy of equilibria. In particular, a unique SPE can be established among sequential bargaining procedures. In equilibrium, players discuss the most important issue first.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Flamini, Dr Francesca
Authors: Flamini, F.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Publisher:De Gruyter
ISSN:1935-1704
ISSN (Online):1935-1704
Published Online:10 May 2007

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