Flamini, F. (2007) Best agendas in multi-issue bargaining. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 7(1), pp. 1-11. (doi: 10.2202/1935-1704.1368)
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Abstract
We study the agenda selection problem faced by a multi-issue committee when there can be (small) delays between the negotiations of different issues. We show that the presence of these delays affects the interplay of the forces in the bargaining game and solves the indeterminacy of equilibria. In particular, a unique SPE can be established among sequential bargaining procedures. In equilibrium, players discuss the most important issue first.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Flamini, Dr Francesca |
Authors: | Flamini, F. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics |
Publisher: | De Gruyter |
ISSN: | 1935-1704 |
ISSN (Online): | 1935-1704 |
Published Online: | 10 May 2007 |
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