Carter, J. A. (2018) Virtue epistemology, enhancement, and control. Metaphilosophy, 49(3), pp. 283-304. (doi: 10.1111/meta.12304)
|
Text
155052 cover sheet.pdf 105kB | |
|
Text
155052.pdf - Accepted Version 111kB |
Abstract
An interesting aspect of Ernest Sosa’s (2017) recent thinking is that enhanced performances (e.g., the performance of an athlete under the influence of a performance-enhancing drug) fall short of aptness, and this is because such enhanced performances do not issue from genuine competences on the part of the agent. In this paper, I explore in some detail the implications of such thinking in Sosa’s wider virtue epistemology, with a focus on cases of cognitive enhancement. A certain puzzle is then highlighted, and the solution proposed draws from both the recent moral responsibility literature on guidance control (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Fischer 2012) as well as from work on cognitive integration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Pritchard 2010; Palermos 2014; Carter 2017).
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Carter, Professor J Adam |
| Authors: | Carter, J. A. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Metaphilosophy |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| ISSN: | 0026-1068 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1467-9973 |
| Published Online: | 16 April 2018 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2018 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd |
| First Published: | First published in Metaphilosophy 49(3):283-304 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record
Altmetric
Altmetric