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3 Integrative music history: rethinking music since 1900

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Some years have passed since David Clarke (2007) envisaged a historiography of music that would, in his words, narrate ‘Elvis and Darmstadt’ together. As Clarke would be the first to admit, his call was not entirely novel even then. He cites a number of precursors (although, possibly because it typically doesn’t ‘narrate’ music history, he neglects to mention cultural studies, an entire field for which the switching between and comparative study of high art and popular culture is arguably constitutive). Since then or concurrently, there have been many related projects, some of the most prominent of which are Nicholas Cook and Anthony Pople’s multi-stranded Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Music (2004) and Georgina Born’s idea of ‘relational musicology’ (2010); many others have similarly combined investigation of classical and popular traditions without much explicit methodological argument (see, for example, Metzer 2003; Katz 2010; Piekut 2011; Kutschke and Norton 2013 cite many more examples). If my idea of an integrative music history seems therefore to follow a well-trodden path, there are several reasons why I think it is worth pursuing that path further. One is that, despite our best methodological intentions and some laudable counterexamples, we seem to mostly continue to neatly compartmentalise music in our daily practice, whether in teaching or research. Most courses on twentieth-century music at UK universities or conservatoires are really about western classical music, and they may or may not be complemented by similar courses in popular, jazz, traditional or non-western music. Similarly, most music histories are scrupulously single-stranded: Richard Taruskin’s monumental Oxford History of Western Music (2010) is a prominent case in point. Taruskin’s (2010, xii–xiii) rationale is that he is focusing on the ‘literature tradition’, yet that doesn’t stop him from devoting a chapter to Rock ’n’ roll/Rock, which really is non-literate, whereas he fails to do so for earlier, notated, traditions of popular music, such as the popular song traditions discussed by Scott (2008), Tin Pan Alley or Big Band Swing. While literateness means more than the use of notation, there remains an inconsistency which can only really be explained by the impact 1960s youth culture had on the author himself. This is perhaps understandable but not a sufficient rationale for a historian, considering too that the effect of earlier forms of popular music was every bit as strongly felt as that of post-1950s ones. Even Cook and Pople’s aforementioned Cambridge History (2004) serves as a counterexample in only a limited sense, since the different strands remain largely separate, presenting several parallel histories, rather than one interconnected one.

Another reason to pursue this path is that my approach is informed by teaching an integrative advanced-level undergraduate course on music since 1900 at the University of Glasgow, titled ‘Aspects of Modernity’. This experience has taught me that, whatever role historiographical and methodological literature may have played in persuading me of the value of such an endeavour, it doesn’t really address the practical difficulties, such as – pace Taruskin et al. – finding appropriate teaching materials. Although a level of methodological and historiographical reflection is appropriate at this level, students have the right to expect some taught content involving discussion of actual music. Here, suitable examples are surprisingly thin on the ground.

In the following, then, I want to not only present further reasons why we should seek to study musical styles, genres and traditions in relation to, rather than in isolation from, one another, but also provide examples of how this can be done. I will focus on the relationship between classical or ‘art’ and popular traditions within the western world. A similar argument can be made about the binary between western and non-western music, but I cannot pursue this here.
Since I don’t share Clarke’s enthusiasm for postmodernist pluralism, I don’t wish to recite the familiar litany of genre-busting, crossovers, iPod shuffle and BBC Radio 3 Late Junction culture (cf. also Gloag 2012). On the contrary, when it comes to questions of style and tradition, I often wish that differences were respected more, and I also believe that we owe it to our students to alert them to the specificities and subtleties of each style and tradition instead of emphasising often superficial similarities. To avoid misunderstanding, then, I am not primarily interested in the mutual influences between essentially separate traditions: as interesting and revealing the boundary-crossings of Debussy, Stravinsky, Charlie Parker, Frank Zappa, Sonic Youth, Brian Eno, Aphex Twin, Uri Caine or Bernard Lang (to name just some) may be, they typically confirm the existence of boundaries rather than negating them. Nor do I wish to argue, as Peter van der Merwe (2004) does with an earlier period, that at some deep-structural level, western music since 1900 is really much more homogeneous than it seems on the surface.

Instead, I wish to suggest that different musical traditions are interconnected by virtue of their stylistic differences. If we follow Andreas Huyssen’s (1986) argument that modernism is a defensive reaction against the emasculating encroachments of mass culture, a contention that provided much of the impetus for Georgina Born’s (1995) study of IRCAM, different musical traditions may implicate one another the more profoundly the more distinct they are stylistically. Despite my reservations against both Huyssen’s and Born’s work, the general contention that certain but by no means all forms of modernist and popular music respectively are united by a mutual repulsion is well-founded and deserving of the same attention as is lavished on supposed mutual influence and boundary-crossings. In this context, Adorno (2002, 292–93) spoke of the ‘flight from the banal [whereby] serious music reflects in reverse [als Negativ] the outlines of light music’, adding that:

the unity of the two [serious and light] spheres of music is ... that of an unresolved contradiction. They do not hang together in such a way that the lower could serve as a port of popular introduction to the higher, or that the higher could renew its lost collective strength by borrowing from the lower [which, in nuce, is van der Merwe’s argument]. The whole cannot be put together by adding the separated halves, but in both there appear, however distantly, the changes of the whole, which only moves in contradiction.

An important aspect of my argument concerns the development of listening habits. Here, recent years have seen significant changes, even in our immediate environment: while among older generations of academics, the exclusive or near-exclusive commitment to only one type of music is still common, this is highly exceptional in my own generation. All the indications are that it is nearly unheard of among students (among whom, additionally, classical music is very much a minority concern). These admittedly informal and anecdotal observations are backed up by a wealth of sociological studies on musical taste (which are rarely cited in musicology, as if it didn’t matter what people actually listen to). One of the most hotly debated issues in this field is the theory of ‘omnivorousness’, proposed originally by Richard A. Peterson and Albert Simkus (1992). Where earlier research, such as Pierre Bourdieu’s (2013) classic study had suggested that high status is expressed in a preference for supposedly prestigious genres such as opera and classical music, Peterson and Simkus found that what they, somewhat contentiously, call ‘high-brows’ demonstrate their status by their omnivorous appreciation of a wide range of genres (cf. also Warde, Tomlinson, and McKeekin 2000). Although ‘experts’ are a special category, it is fair to say that the general thrust of the theory chimes in with informal observations of the musical tastes of music students and lecturers.
What this illustrates is the need to remain alert to the specificities of each style and genre, which, given such listening habits, could otherwise too easily disappear in an undifferentiated cultural mêlée. Nevertheless, what is demonstrated even more clearly is that the neatly compartmentalised musical culture depicted in traditional courses and textbooks is far from the reality most of us experience in our daily lives. While these two insights may occasionally be at cross-purposes, they do not necessarily contradict one another: the understanding that various styles, genres and traditions inhabit the same universe, variously attracting, repelling and interacting with one another can make us more rather than less aware of their differences.

What I am concerned with, then, is a social history of music, one that is interested in patterns of consumption as much as production, performance as much as composition, social functions as much as works. What I am arguing is that classical and popular traditions respond to the same underlying technological, political, economic and social developments, although they often do so in diametrically opposed ways. A comparative study of how different styles and traditions respond to such changes not only provides us with a bigger picture, but also reveals more clearly what is specific to each of them. I will present two such studies, one focusing on the impact of the incipient record industry on jazz and classical performance and one on the responses to and potentially involvement with the events of 1968 by classical, jazz and rock musicians. The first of these illustrates a divergence of musical developments, driven seemingly by mutual antagonism, the second if not a convergence, a certain parallelism between them.

**Economy and technology: the impact of recording on jazz and classical music performance**

It goes without saying that the impact of recording and, to a lesser extent, broadcasting on popular music was profound: the triumph of popular music in the twentieth century rested on the use of recording as the primary mode of dissemination. The same cannot be said about classical music, which by that time already had a long history behind it. Indeed, it is perhaps no coincidence that its entire canon is, if not pre-Edisonian, pre-recording in its fully commercial form.

Recording’s impact on classical composition in particular is hard to gauge, but what is perhaps most remarkable is how stubbornly most composers have stuck to a model of dissemination that, in terms of media technology, has long been obsolete. With some notable exceptions, instrumental composers in the classical tradition produce works or pieces in the form of scores for live performance, which may or may not be recorded or broadcast. Similarly, although its history aligns it closely with the radio, radiophonic and electronic composition are now largely separate, if closely aligned fields. Furthermore, electronic composers in the classical tradition have largely been resistant to associate their work too closely with a dissemination medium. By and large, they produce ‘works’, not tracks, albums or CDs. Only the increasing dematerialisation of music as sound files distributed over the internet may have brought about a closer alignment of classical and popular traditions in this respect (in general, it is in electronic music that distinctions between popular and classical traditions are most difficult to undertake). That said, the extent to which the wider aesthetics of classical music since 1900 and the musical imagination of composers have been affected by the development of recording and related technologies is impossible to gauge. The widely observed impact of electronic music on instrumental composition would suggest that this effect has been profound albeit often indirect.
When it comes to performance and consumption, however, the impact of recording and broadcasting has been felt every bit as profoundly in classical as in popular music. Most commentators agree that performance practice of classical music changed radically at around the time that recording became an economically significant activity (the 1910s–1920s) and, although it can be difficult to isolate it from other factors, most regard recording as one of the catalysts for those changes (Day 2000; Philip 2004; Katz 2010; Cottrell 2012). Generally speaking, this period saw a homogenisation of performance practice and a move towards fidelity to the written text. Informal practices, such as non-synchronised rubato, portamento, variant articulation and often extreme tempi were driven out in favour of a comparatively streamlined international style. Although the ideas of urtext and werktreue are of earlier origin, they came of age during this period (cf. Stephan 1994). According to Philip (2004), not only can the drastic changes in recorded performances be largely explained with the introduction of recording, but the latter also impacted significantly on concert culture. Up to the 1920s and 1930s, it was still common to play encores of individual movements, make significant cuts and so forth. A famous virtuoso such as Fritz Kreisler deliberately eschewed detailed preparation and rehearsal since he valued spontaneity more highly than polished, flawless execution (Philip 2004, 22). The availability of supposedly authoritative recordings and audiences’ ability to compare what they heard with existing records soon put a stop to such practices. Similarly, the influential magazine Gramophone, founded in 1923, railed against cuts from the start, at a time when the playing time on 10 inch records effectively made this a technical necessity (Philip 2004, 30).

The recorded history of performance practices in popular traditions reveals the flipside of this story. The first form of popular music to fully embrace recording was arguably jazz. What distinguishes jazz from its precursors, such as blues, ragtime and marching band music, which largely stuck to notation or oral transmission, is that it adopted recording as its dissemination medium of choice. But this was far from a straightforward process: the cornettist Freddie Keppard, for instance, whom contemporaries regarded as Louis Armstrong’s equal, was said to have refused a recording date since he feared that other players might steal his music (Souchon 1957, 45; see also Berliner 1994, 55); others, such as the legendary Buddy Bolden, never had the chance. Armstrong, by contrast, who, at this time, earned his bread in Fletcher Henderson’s band, put all his faith in the still fledgling medium when he made his famous 1926–27 recordings with his Hot Five and Hot Seven, pure studio bands that did not play together live (Horn 2003, 13). In retrospect, it seems obvious to us why Armstrong is still a household name, whereas Keppard and Bolden are known only to specialists, but at the time Keppard’s stance would have made good business sense to most. From then on, jazz’s history is intimately connected with recording. It is the mobility of recordings that allowed performers from all over the world to pick up what used to be one of many local styles practised in the South-East of the United States and catapult it to global prominence with astonishing speed (Chanan 1995, 18–19), and it is its ability to capture the individual nuances of the playing of admired masters that enabled others to follow in their footsteps (Berliner 1994, 23–24; Rasula 1995, 141–42). As Frederick Garber (1995, 74), citing James Lincoln Collier, has put it: ‘jazz would not have developed as it did, perhaps would not have developed at all, were it not for the phonograph’. Not only players relied on recordings, so did historians: what we know of the history of jazz, its genealogy of styles – New Orleans, Chicago, swing, bebop etc. – recited in textbook after textbook is based on recording. In this case, exceptions really do prove the rule: consider the importance of the recording ban between 1942 and 1944 in the history of bebop (DeVeaux 1988). An 18-month delay between a stylistic innovation and its global dissemination had already become exceptional.

As I see it, jazz’s reliance on recording had a seemingly paradoxical consequence: the primacy of live performance in jazz myth. There are countless examples in jazz lore, attributed to this famous
musician or that influential critic – the wording changes, but the essence is the same: in Rasula’s (1995, 135) formulation, recording is ‘a secondary substitute for the “living presence” of actual performance’. The reason for this rhetorical emphasis has to be found in the fact that live performance’s status can no longer be taken for granted. This may also explain another rhetorical trope within jazz, namely the importance of improvisation. Jazz isn’t the first and not the last form of music that makes use of improvisation, but, as far as I know, it is the only one to have elevated improvisation to the status of an ideology. This exalted status can only be understood through the fraught dynamics of recording and live performance in jazz: it is improvisation that guarantees the uniqueness of live performance. In a further twist, many famous improvisations have of course been recorded – and only that made them famous. In other words, although, as Walter Benjamin (1999) famously observed, recordings are subject to mechanical reproduction, what is captured on them is a unique unrepeatable moment – or that at least is jazz’s promise, a promise underwritten by the ideology of improvisation (cf. Heile forthcoming). In actual fact, as Katz (2010, 83–85) has pointed out, during the 1920s and 1930s influential jazz recordings by the likes of Louise Armstrong, Duke Ellington, Jelly Roll Morton or Fletcher Henderson, contained much less improvisation than is typically assumed – indeed in many cases none at all – and were typically much shorter than live performances, which probably involved more improvisation. So, in that sense, the introduction of recording had a similar levelling and standardising effect on jazz as it did on classical music. However, in terms of the values associated with both musical traditions, recording had diametrically opposed effects on the worlds of jazz and classical performance respectively, the former leading to a celebration of spontaneity as embodied in improvisation, the latter to the hardening of werktreue ideals and the streamlining of performance practice and concert culture.

This comparison is instructive in itself, but there is also evidence that both cultures affected one another, essentially by depicting themselves as one another’s opposite. Consider the relation between notation and improvisation. From around the 1920s onwards, the two appear as polar opposites, something we are still familiar with, although attitudes have softened in recent years. This dichotomy is a historical anomaly, however. Well into the nineteenth century and beyond, the two were part of a continuum. Even in classical performance, notation was rarely afforded absolute authority and forms of improvisation, notably by virtuosos, persisted (remnants of that practice, such as organ improvisation, have survived much longer, although that is arguably a special case) (Moore 1992). Similarly, the popular notion that jazz performers spontaneously pluck notes out of thin air is wide off the mark for most forms of jazz. In the 1920s and 1930s, there were probably fewer jazz musicians who were unable to read music than who were unable to improvise; Bix Beiderbecke’s troubled career is an indication. Nicholas Cook (Cook and Pople 2014, 224–47) has compared Corelli’s Op. 5 with a lead sheet for a jazz standard, arguing that, particularly in the slow movements of the Corelli, performers were expected to richly ornament the skeletal notation. A similar comparison can be undertaken between how a nineteenth-century opera singer would treat an aria and how a performer in an oral tradition renders a tune. There is no unbridgeable gap between these traditions.

My contention is that, concurrent with the development of the recording industry, practitioners in each genre, jazz and classical music, increasingly emphasised what they regarded as distinctive about their art. It is admittedly difficult to find unequivocal proof for this hypothesis, but it is instructive that many scholars have voiced similar ideas. For instance, Philip (2004, 180–81) has argued that:

one of the points that recordings make is that performance of classical music used to have rather more of the free elements of jazz performance.... In the early twentieth
century some of the freedoms we now associate with jazz were still allowed in classical music. The old rubato in which the melody frees itself from the accompaniment – a practice for which there is evidence as far back as the seventeenth century – is the essence of jazz performance but is now frowned upon in performance of classical music. Indeed, it is possible that its adoption and exaggeration in jazz and other popular genres is one of the reasons that classical performers began to adopt a more literal interpretation of the composer’s notation.

Note that Philip is discussing a specific field, rubato, rather than general principles like the practice of improvisation, yet he clearly regards rubato as symptomatic of wider notions of freedom and spontaneity, even though he does not pursue these ideas further. If anything, Timothy Day (2000) is even more cautious, only mentioning jazz on a few occasions in very specific contexts. Like Philip, however, he describes its influence in negative terms, as providing an example that classical performers would strive very hard to avoid. For example, writing about the curious avoidance of vibrato among classical clarinet players, Day (2000, 167) suggests that they wished to distance themselves from a tonal quality associated with jazz (or related styles).

At this point I don’t need to recount the often hysterical, and not least racially motivated, responses to jazz during the 1920s and 1930s; maybe Alfred Einstein’s description of it as ‘the most abominable treason against all the music of Western civilization’ (quoted from Day 2000, 207) would suffice. In such a climate, is it any wonder that classical musicians would go out of their way to avoid any association with this threat to civilisation, notably when, through the changes brought about by recording and broadcasting, popular music had become a much more potent force and competitor than ever before? On the other side of the divide one doesn’t have to look long and hard to find examples of jazz musicians or critics disparaging classical performers for their conservatoire training and alleged lack of creativity and spontaneity. Thus, what is behind the seemingly innocuous questions of performance practice is the fraught cultural dynamic of the inter-war years, characterised as it is by such dichotomies as black/white, America/Europe, popular culture/high art, spontaneity/formal rigour. Both jazz and classical performance formed parts of this dynamic, being shaped by it, while simultaneously contributing to its formation. Neither can be understood autonomously, without also considering its counterpart.

**Politics and society: 1968 and its immediate aftermath**

The repercussions of the student revolts of 1968 were felt throughout the world of music. Although their impact on popular music is more widely known, classical music and jazz have by no means remained unaffected. Musicians’ involvement with and responses to the events were as diverse as those of the wider population of which they formed a subset, so the rationale for this section is not to present a representative cross-section. Rather, I will discuss three examples from the areas of classical composition, jazz and rock, illustrating parallels between different artistic domains which throw light on all of them. In this, I will be guided by similar approaches as those adopted in a recent collection on the topic (Kutschke and Norton 2013).

My examples, Mauricio Kagel’s *Ludwig van* (specifically the record version), the *Art Ensemble of Chicago’s Live in Paris* (The Art Ensemble of Chicago 2008) and Jimi Hendrix’s performance of ‘Star-Spangled Banner’ at the Woodstock Festival (Wadleigh 1970), all date from 1969, the immediate aftermath of the events of 1968. Hendrix’s performance is arguably the most ‘iconic’ and has been
widely regarded as epitomising the zeitgeist. As will be seen, however, it is in some ways further from the spirit of the times than the others.

Depending on one’s viewpoint, Kagel’s composition exists in two or three versions (he himself spoke of it as a ‘concept’): a film for Beethoven’s bicentenary in 1970, entitled Ludwig van: Ein Bericht (‘A Report’, Kagel 2008); a score, entitled Ludwig van: Hommage von Beethoven (‘Homage by Beethoven’, Kagel 1970a) based on still shots from the film’s ‘music room’ scene (or, more likely, photos taken on the set), in which all surfaces are plastered with scraps of Beethoven’s compositions and which can be performed in almost any conceivable way; and a record (Kagel 1970a) consisting of another collage of Beethoven’s music, carried out live (by musicians performing different snippets simultaneously in the studio) and edited by the composer. The record version uses different, and generally longer and more easily identifiable, fragments from the ones used in the score. This too can be justified with a performance option called ‘Montage’ given in the Preface to the score, according to which performers would play from an original part for their instrument or different passages from various Beethoven works. Indeed, a footnote states that these options have been chosen for the record version. Ignoring the actual notes but following a basic instruction seems to reduce the notion of ‘score’ ad absurdum, however. The question then becomes why we need another composer’s authority to perform Beethoven’s works in unusual ways and why Kagel’s name and work title appear on programmes and record sleeves. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that, although he worked with regular collaborators on both occasions, the record version has been performed with a completely different set of musicians from the live premiere of the score version, as if Kagel wanted to ensure that the two are separate and that musicians would not be guided by their experience with one in their interpretation of the other. It is perhaps best to regard the score and record as parallel realisations of the same underlying idea. Although all versions were premiered or released in 1970, ‘the composition’ was completed in 1969.

I am focusing on the record version since that allows concentration on music qua sound and comparison with Hendrix and the AEC. As already pointed out, the piece is a collage, or as Kagel insisted a ‘meta-collage’, consisting entirely of fragments from Beethoven’s compositions, combined vertically (played simultaneously) as well as horizontally (in succession). Some of these are quite extended. For instance, in the liner notes Kagel (1970a) explained that he remedied the absence of a viola sonata in Beethoven’s oeuvre by combining the fourth movement of the String Quartet op. 131 with the Largo of the Hammerklavier Sonata Op. 106, since both are in A Major. He also draws attention to a long-fragmented treatment of the largo from the ‘ghost trio’ Op. 70 No. 1, which he calls a ‘potentiated ghost trio’ (side 1, 11′35” – 15′40”). On other occasions, the music consists of short segments, such as repeated cadences (side 1, 1′25”–1′35”), countering the overexposure of characteristic themes and hummable tunes notably during an anniversary – all the ‘Freude, schöner Götterfunken’ and rumpumpum-tum fate motifs – with a preference for the anonymous nuts and bolts of the music. Likewise, recognisable elements can be fleetingly glimpsed among a stream of musical material whose provenance may be detectable but whose identification is frustratingly just beyond reach. Despite Kagel’s (1970a) protestations against ‘anecdotal identification’, like many quotation and collage-based works from the period, Ludwig van plays with memory, identity (and non-identity), recontextualisation and defamiliarisation.

Kagel explained some of his intentions in two widely publicised interviews, one (Kagel 1970a) published on the record sleeve and reprinted in the Preface to the score, the other (Kagel and Schmidt 1970) in the widely read weekly Der Spiegel and reprinted in a collection of his writings and interviews (Kagel 1975). In both, he seems at pains to contradict the popular image of the enfant terrible of the avant-garde who is intent only on shocking his audiences and profaning the most holy
of art, that of Beethoven, which is how most reviewers understood the film version in particular. Rather, his stance can be characterised as ‘enlightened historicism’: the declared aim is to reclaim Beethoven, to reveal the radicalism of his music, which had been stifled by bourgeois culture with its mixture of conventionality, habituation, reverence and commerce, and to show the way towards a creative engagement with it. In other words, if we are to believe Kagel, his critique is not directed at Beethoven, for whom he professes great respect, but at Beethoven’s co-optation, arguing for instance, that one shouldn’t perform individual works by ‘the masters’ over and over but instead interpret ‘their essence’, something for which he explicitly claims the idea of Werktreue (Kagel 1970a) – alternatively, it could be considered to stop performing canonic composers altogether for a while, as he also suggests (Kagel and Schmidt 1970, 196). Characteristically, the seriousness of his arguments is enlivened (or undermined) by quips, as when, for instance, he appears to caricature the idea of historical authenticity by arguing that Beethoven’s music should be performed the way he himself heard it: badly (Kagel and Schmidt 1970, 196).

What is interesting to see, though, is that, however anti-bourgeois Kagel’s work often appeared, in his own working practices he found it hard to relinquish conventional hierarchies. As pointed out above, as a piece, Ludwig van arguably liberates performers, and Kagel’s own authorial signature on it is of questionable legitimacy. Like most of his work from the 1960s and early 1970s it is the result of collaborative processes, involving the musicians from the Kölner Ensemble für Neue Musik or the fellow artists of the Labor zur Erforschung akustischer und visueller Ereignisse e. V. (‘Laboratory for Research on Acoustic and Visual Events, registered association’), a kind of artists’ collective. His working method for the record and, it would appear, live performances, was different though: it was he who told the musicians what to play (although he responded to their wishes) and it was he, too, who edited the recording. This is symptomatic: Kagel seemed to have been unwilling to or incapable of giving up artistic control and authorship, which often led to tensions with his collaborators (Kunkel 2011).

One aspect of the record is of particular importance here: the frequent use of unusual or extended playing techniques (also suggested in the Preface to the score). The strings make frequent use of unconventional techniques and unusual mutes, and one of the pianos is prepared. Also noteworthy are Kagel’s editing and production techniques. Not content with the naturalism of traditional classical record production, he has included bewildering panning and other spatial effects, distorted some of the signal and also run it through a chopper. These techniques are used sparingly, though, so the experience is of a naturalistic space and signal to be occasionally transformed into a surreal and nightmarish aural space, in which instruments move around or suddenly change place irrationally and sounds appear defamiliarised. It is difficult to convey what makes this DIY Beethoven so special, even revelatory: it often sounds scratchy and unbalanced, even amateurish, but also joyful, fresh and radical.

Much the same can be said of Jimi Hendrix’s famous performance of the ‘Star-Spangled Banner’ at the Woodstock Festival. There are a number of recurring claims about this performance: that the downward glissandi, followed by erupting noise clusters in the low register depict the rockets and bombs mentioned in the lyrics at this point (which is convincing) and that this acted as a sonic representation of the Vietnam War, thus galvanising the peaceful atmosphere at the Festival and making Hendrix a spokesperson for his generation (which is debatable). As Murray (quoted from Daley 2006, 57) put it:

[T]he ‘Star-Spangled Banner’ is probably the most complex and powerful work of American art to deal with the Vietnam War and its corrupting, distorting effect on
successive generations of the American psyche. One man with one guitar said more in three and a half minutes about that peculiarly disgusting war and its reverberations than all the novels, memoirs and movies put together.

The reality is somewhat more prosaic. As Shapiro (in Daley 2006, 56–57) has shown, Hendrix, a former paratrooper with the 101st Airborne Division, actually supported the Vietnam War (however cautiously), and, in a televised interview on the Dick Cavett Show (The Dick Cavett Show, Sept. 9, 1969 - Jimi Hendrix 2013), he played down the host’s suggestion of a ‘controversy’ surrounding the performance and rejected his characterisation of it as ‘unorthodox’, saying instead that he ‘thought it was beautiful’. At the Isle of Wight Festival, he opened his set with ‘God Save the Queen’, and, although this performance seems a pale shadow of ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ at Woodstock, it does indicate that Hendrix was quite relaxed about national anthems and their various meanings and associations.

Overall the evidence suggests that any connection with the Vietnam War is a matter of reception not production (although that is by no means illegitimate). Moreover, as Daley (2006, 55) has demonstrated, the significance of Hendrix’s performance itself is a largely retrospective construction: by the time of his set, the last, most of the audience of originally around 400,000 had left and many of the remaining around 30,000 were in the course of leaving. Early reviewers of the event typically mentioned Hendrix only fleetingly or not at all. Only by the late 1980s and based on compilations of the event, does the current interpretation of the performance take hold (Daley 2006, 56). That the black Hendrix could ever have acted as a spokesperson for the largely white, middle-class hippies is probably a romantic assumption to start with.

Even if the authenticity of Hendrix’s performance as the embodiment of the 1968 spirit is in doubt, there are good reasons why it is commonly understood in this way. Without wanting to minimise the differences, there are some parallels with Kagel. Both were associated with the social movements of 1968, although in neither case unproblematically so (for Kagel’s relation to the new social movements, see Heile 2007). Both chose an iconic model as the basis for their work, whose performance or alleged desecration tend to evoke strong emotions (if for slightly different reasons). Both defamiliarised this model with critical intent, particularly through the use of extreme instrumental timbres and noise. Although any metaphorical connection between political and musical authority can be taken only so far, both also seem to claim to respect their respective models and to protest primarily against what they regard as their misuse.

Although, like the other artists discussed here, the Art Ensemble of Chicago were reticent about describing their work as explicitly political, Paul Steinbeck (2013) has subtly argued that there are good reasons to view them as politically committed, and Robin Kelley (1997), for one, has established an explicit link with 1968. The group grew out of Chicago’s Association for the Advancement of Creative Musicians in the late 1960s and embodied the AACM’s revolutionary political and artistic ideas. On their website, the AACM (2013) describes itself in the following terms:

[The AACM is a] non-profit organization ... [and] a collective of musicians and composers dedicated to nurturing, performing, and recording serious, original music. ... The AACM first coined the phrase Great Black Music to describe its unique direction in music ... [and it] pays homage to the diverse styles of expression within the body of Black Music in the USA, Africa and throughout the world. This experience extends from the ancient musics of Africa to the music of the future. ... Another equally important aspect of AACM’s
The Art Ensemble of Chicago was founded at the end of the 1960s in Paris, where many of the AACM’s members were then staying. Like so many African-American musicians before them, they relished the attention and respect with which they were greeted, and the AEC’s first concert at the Théâtre du Lucernaire in Montparnasse, on 12 June 1969, was an immediate sensation, something Edwin Pouncey, in his liner notes to Live in Paris, relates to the ‘new sense of political and artistic liberation ... during the aftermath of [the] social and cultural upheaval [of the student riots]’.

However, as Lewis (Lewis 2009, 222–23) points out, their success also had a lot to do with continuing racial and exoticist stereotypes, leading him to a comparison with the use of the ‘jungle’ trope during the Parisian reception of Josephine Baker.

Although their music is typically described as ‘free jazz’, the AEC, following the AACM, preferred to speak of ‘Great Black Music – Ancient to the Future’ (for a critique of this notion see Berry 1997). What arguably set them apart is the isomorphism between their form of organisation and their music. As Lewis (2009, 227) has put it, the AEC was ‘one of the AACM ensembles that most radically exemplified the collective conception of the AACM as a whole’, taking all decisions as a collective. Likewise, in their music, there is no clear leader or hierarchy and there don’t appear to be any pre-established rules; instead the flow of the music emerges out of the negotiation between the performers. As we have seen, these ideals were shared with Kagel in principle, although the latter found it harder to actually realise them. It is worth noting, though, that the same could be said about other AACM groups, notably those headed by Anthony Braxton (Lewis 2009, 227–28).

‘Oh strange – part one’, the first track on Live in Paris, starts innocently enough with a lyrical and tuneful saxophone melody which could well qualify as a ‘tune’ in jazz parlance, not unlike a standard. Other instruments – some identifiable, others not – join in, hesitantly and tenderly at first, but increasingly assertive. Although, at this point, the saxophone’s lead is unchallenged, resulting in a more or less conventional melody-and-accompaniment texture, the harmonies created by the musicians can’t be found in any textbook and seem to be freely emerging from the player’s linear statements. This incongruence between the recognisable, largely jazz-derived idioms (in however radical form) on the level of individual instrumental line and gesture on one hand and the resulting totality in terms of harmony and form, for which no such model is perceptible, on the other, is noticeable throughout the double-CD. As Tucker (1997, 34) points out, the AEC’s eschewal of a piano (or, as he could have added, other harmony-bearing instruments used in jazz such as guitar or vibraphone) can be seen ‘to signal freedom from the tyranny of pianism and harmony’ – and a similar point can be made about the liberation from pulsed rhythm and metre which is facilitated by sidestepping the conventional drum kit, although not percussion.

As time goes on, the music grows louder and increasingly more ecstatic and cacophonous (which is not to be understood as a negative term), leading to what, following Lewis (quoted in Steinbeck 2008, 415) is often called an ‘intensity structure’. This development is coupled with the increasing dominance of percussion: while the music is pitch-dominated at first, dense drumming patterns provide much of the connective tissue throughout the 24-minute track; at around 14 minutes, cymbals cover much of the texture, before melodic solos (notably an extended blues-drenched growl by Lester Bowie) provide the denouement. This track is not necessarily representative of the album as a whole; for instance, part two of ‘Oh Strange’ starts with a dreamy, dense polyphony, characterised not least by Malachi Favors’s bowed bass (which remained seemingly unused in part one, during which Favors must have played percussion) and a much gentler flow, due to the absence
(initially) and low prominence (later on) of un-pitched percussion. Later the music morphs into a sound field of sustained pitches, punctuated with rippling solo gestures.\textsuperscript{18}

What interests me here is, once again, instrumental timbre, its expressive function and any metaphorical meaning we may ascribe to it. Among the most characteristic instrumental sonorities are what Archie Shepp (quoted in Steinbeck 2008, 415) has called ‘energy-sounds’, typically squeals and honks, particularly from the saxophones (Roscoe Mitchell and/or Joseph Jarman – both play soprano as well as alto sax and their sound and playing became quite similar over the years, which makes them hard to distinguish on an audio recording: cf. Jost 1994, 176). This has become a bit of a free jazz cliché, and it is worth stressing that the musicians employ a diverse and subtle mixture of timbres and textures, rather than the undifferentiated sonic barrage some may associate with the idiom. Indeed, some of the playing features a ‘beautiful tone’ as traditionally conceived, but this is only one option among many, and the performers are willing to explore harsher and more extreme sonorities.

It is in this area that the most direct parallels with Kagel and Hendrix can be found. All are investigating the outer ranges of instrumental possibilities where pitch blends into noise and traditionally sanctioned, pure sound into squeals, scratches and rasps. To be sure, the results of these explorations are as different as the instrumental means on which they are executed: the effects produced by \textit{col legno sul ponticello} string playing, piano preparation, an overdriven guitar with wah-wah pedal, an overblown saxophone or a trumpet growl are not at all alike, but the rationale and spirit behind these expressive means may not be that dissimilar. In the case of Kagel and Hendrix, the use of technology to defamiliarise sound is also noteworthy: although the electric guitar had by that time become a conventional composite sonority, Hendrix’s subtle use of the specific qualities of the Leslie speaker, as revealed by Clarke (2005, 49), goes beyond accepted models.

At the risk of banality or of overstretching what are essentially metaphors or homologies, this transgression beyond the traditionally approved ways of playing musical instruments, the liberation from sanctioned ideas of beauty and musical expressivity and the search for new forms of musical collaboration and creativity should be seen in conjunction with the challenge to tradition, authority and convention issued by the generation of 1968 and its experimentation with alternative social models and lifestyles. Of particular importance here is the expressive gesture of the (instrumental) scream that can be heard in Hendrix’s overdriven guitar just as much as in Mitchell and Jarman’s overblown saxes (less so in the Kagel, admittedly, although it occurs in other of his pieces). As an iconic (in a Peircean sense) expressive gesture, it is immediately and viscerally experienced, without any need to ‘understand its meaning’. Indeed, it is beyond meaning as denotation: we scream for joy, out of rage or protest, in terror, out of grief or in sexual ecstasy, or indeed out of a combination or mixture of those. Particularly in its musical variant, it is perhaps the sheer intensity that matters, more than the specific emotion that we may ascribe to it. Seen in this way, Murray’s interpretation of Hendrix’s performance may be spot on after all, even if any assumption of intentionality on Hendrix’s part is problematic. This too is symptomatic of 1968: many of the new social movements cultivated the scream (Kutschke 2009) and there was a lot of the kind of passion that may give rise to it: anger and protest, but also joy and eroticism.

To sum up, then, their responses to and involvement with the events of 1968 provide a ground for comparison between Kagel’s \textit{Ludwig van}, Hendrix’s Woodstock performance of the ‘Star-Spangled Banner’ and the Art Ensemble of Chicago’s \textit{Live in Paris} album. All artists were largely sympathetic to the new social movements or were at least regarded in this way. The most immediate expression of this affiliation, across the very different styles and technical means employed, can be found in their
exploration of unconventional playing techniques and often extreme timbres. Also noteworthy is the very deliberate engagement with a model that is revered not only for its musical qualities but for the wider associations it evokes. This is quite obvious in the case of Hendrix’s use of the US national anthem and Kagel’s play with Beethovenian fragments. Similar points can be made about the Art Ensemble of Chicago: in their music too, there is a disparity between recognisable traditional idioms (although not identifiable pieces as such) and a more experimental sonic environment. Lewis (1998, 77) has commented on the collage-like aspect of some of their performances and their use of parody and irony. In all cases, the boundary between homage and critique, pastiche and parody is permeable, and the music is suffused with ambiguity. Finally, in the case of the Art Ensemble of Chicago, the search for new musical means of expression was connected and congruent with the experimentation with collective and communitarian social organisations. The same ideas are in evidence in Kagel as well, although he did not put them in practice with any consistency. Whether a similar argument can be made about Hendrix is almost a moot point. By the time of the Woodstock Festival, he had dissolved The Jimi Hendrix Experience due to conflicts, and he did not (yet) gel well with his new collaborators. He was obviously the bandleader and his name overshadowed all of his co-musicians, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that he called all the shots. The irony is that it was Hendrix who, among the musicians considered here, comes closest to having provided the ‘soundtrack to 1968’, but who, in some respects, like his support for the Vietnam war and a traditional, leadership-oriented social organisation, was furthest from its ideals.

None of this is to minimise the differences in tradition, genre and technique between the artists. There is little suggestion here of mutual influence or the crossing, not to mention, breaking of boundaries. As regards the latter, the Art Ensemble of Chicago were very critical of what they regarded as confining categories, such as ‘jazz’, but, although neither artist can be associated with blinkered traditionalism, neither Hendrix nor Kagel seem to have been overly concerned about being largely identified as a blues-rock guitarist or classical composer (whether modernist, experimental or avant-gardist) respectively. Nor do I want to overstate the commonality or parallels between the artistic and political intentions between the artists: there are clear differences between the concerns of an African-American jazz collective, a rock superstar and a white avant-garde composer. The point is, rather, that an informed comparison can be undertaken and that this comparison can tell us more about the larger culture and society in which they all lived and to which they all contributed as well as illuminate what is specific to each of them.

Conclusion

The two case studies in this chapter are just that: they do not claim to present a comprehensive overview of twentieth-century music history, and if they are representative of anything, it is my own interests, concerns and priorities. A number of other topics and areas which allow for or require the comparative study of different traditions could be considered. One issue which suggests a partial convergence or potential mutual influence between popular, jazz and classical contemporary music is the prominent use of quotation and collage techniques during the period discussed here (cf. Metzer 2003; Gloag 2012). The term ‘postmodernism’ may denominate this phenomenon but fails to explain it.

The wide area of music politics likewise demands a holistic approach. For instance, the music policies of totalitarian regimes typically concern very different genres and traditions, composition, performance and consumption in equal measure. Although the effects tend to be less drastic, much the same holds true for any other system of government. While governments may prefer one type
of music over another and subject them to different controls, rules and regulations, the reasons behind such judgments and the nature of the distinctions undertaken need to be properly understood. For example, the Nazis’ conflicted and contradictory attitude to dodecaphony can be better understood through their similar response to jazz (and vice versa), since only that wider perspective allows uncovering the criteria by which music was regarded as desirable or undesirable, useful or harmful (that these criteria were by no means consistent or consistently applied does not affect the force of the argument). Again, the general point holds also for democratic governments: through subsidies, inclusion in or exclusion from teaching programmes and other rules and regulations, all governments have a direct and significant impact on musical culture and they all implicitly or explicitly discriminate between different types of music and music-making. A similar argument can be made about major institutions, such as, in the UK context, the BBC or the Musicians’ Union. Both were and are in principle open to all types of music, but in practice this often led to conflicts as well as constant negotiation over priorities and scarce resources.

None of this, however, means that separate study of distinct musical styles and traditions or specific phenomena should be consigned to the past. Questions of style and compositional technique haven’t lost their relevance, even though the significance we attach to these issues may change. Undoubtedly, the broader perspective I am advocating here can come at the expense of depth. Studying several musical genres and traditions together means that less time can be devoted to each of them. Likewise, any attention paid to what used to be considered ‘contextual issues’ impinges on the time spent on the analysis of compositional technique which used to be the focus of traditional music history understood as compositional innovation. Yet, we cannot escape the complexity of our past and present by reducing it to theoretical models that have no real validity.

A further consequence of an integrative history is that comprehensive, narrative histories are probably no longer possible. It is difficult to imagine a work like Taruskin’s Oxford History incorporating the musical traditions that he has excluded (whether consistently or not) or indeed providing an account of the interaction between western and non-western music. The Cambridge History’s attempt at inclusiveness seems to more often than not have alerted readers to what was excluded after all.

In this respect, the form of case studies I have employed here is of larger significance. Although both encapsulate a pre- and a post-history, they are largely synchronic rather than diachronic. This approach is substantially influenced by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s In 1926: Living at the Edge of Time (2009); comparable examples from music history would be Benjamin Piekut’s Experimentalism Otherwise (2011) or Hugh MacDonald’s Music in 1853 (2012), although the latter is quite narrowly conceived in terms of repertoire. But the comparison I have in mind is to photography: my case studies are a bit like snapshots capturing a ‘decisive moment’ which, in Henri Cartier-Bresson’s (Cartier-Bresson and Sand 1999, 42) words, ‘[highlight] the significance of an event as well as of a precise organization of forms which give that event its proper expression’. They are fragmentary: they cannot tell ‘the whole story’, but ideally they, again in the words of Cartier-Bresson and Sand (1999, 24), ‘depict the content of some event which is in the process of unfolding’ exceptionally well. More than anything else, however, they are at best attuned to the complex social reality and the diversity of the musical culture we find ourselves in, engage with and contribute to.

Bibliography


Warde, Alan, Mark Tomlinson, and Andrew McKeen. 2000. ‘Expanding Tastes?: Cultural Omnivorousness & Social Change in the UK’.


1 I wish to thank John Butt, Nicholas Cook, David McGuinness, Eva Moreda Rodriguez and Ian Pace for advice, suggestions, ideas and materials received while researching and writing this text.

2 Although Clarke’s article was only published in 2007, it is based on a talk given at the Royal Musical Association conference on Music Historiography in 2003 and in guest lectures at several UK universities.

3 I prefer the term ‘classical’ over ‘art’ music. Although its etymology and precise meaning are not without problems, the concept is readily understood and not quite as value-laden as ‘art’.
It is worth interrogating the values underlying Huyssen’s, Born’s and van der Merwe’s work. In all cases, it is suggested that it is somehow morally wrong for modernist music to part company with the popular (although not for popular music to reject its classical sibling). Although this inversion of traditional aesthetics, whereby popular culture is denigrated for its insufficient adherence to the standards of high art, is refreshing, it is only a limited advance.

Clarke (2007, 11) quotes from the same passage.

It is worth mentioning here that the omnivorousness theory has been contested. It is neither possible nor necessary to outline that debate in every detail here, although an awareness of the complexity involved in making judgments about musical taste is relevant. Issues discussed include, for instance, to what extent the phenomenon could be specific to the USA, whether it really affects exclusively or predominantly ‘high-brows’, what changes can be observed over time, and whether high-brows have become genuinely more liberal and open-minded, or whether they simply demonstrate their distinction vis-à-vis ‘univores’ in different ways. Among the most virulent opponents of the theory is Atkinson (2011), according to whom it is based on simplistic questionnaires which don’t provide genuine insight into the way people consume music and how they value it and often use unsuitably broad categories (e.g. ‘Rock/Pop’) which do not reflect the fine distinctions that many listeners undertake (see also Rimmer 2012). But these are relatively rare voices and the broad outlines of the theory are widely accepted (see also Chan and Goldthorpe 2007). While the phenomenon may be more marked and may have arisen earlier in North America, not least since status is typically more directly related to income, rather than education in that region, and although there are very significant national and regional differences, omnivorousness can be observed in a great variety of settings (Coulangeon and Roharik 2005). Furthermore, it appears to be on the increase, with increasing proportions of subjects reporting omnivorous tastes (Peterson and Kern 1996). It is not confined to ‘high-brows’ (Warde, Wright, and Gayo-Cal 2007), but the incidence of the phenomenon remains highest in that group.

Katz (2010, 39–40) lists a number of works which have been specifically composed for records. As will be seen later, Mauricio Kagel’s Ludwig van can be seen as a related case. Nevertheless, the practice remained exceptional and relatively inconsequential for the wider culture of classical music.
Indeed, I contributed to one of a series of conferences organised by one of the editors which presumably played a role in the gestation of that volume – as well as leading directly to two others: (Jacobshagen, Leniger, and Henn 2007; Kutschke 2008), and this experience affected my thinking on the matter. The examples I want to focus on have not been discussed in detail in these publications, however.

Whether Kagel’s title is indebted to Anthony Burgess’s creation Alex from his 1962 novel *A Clockwork Orange* (2012) as popularised in Stanley Kubrick’s (2001) film is uncertain. Even though the parallel is revealing: all three artists shared a sensitivity, if not necessarily approval, for (possible) counter-cultural appropriations of the Beethovenian legacy.

There is also a performance on CD by Alexandre Tharaud (2003), which seems to respond more directly to the score than Kagel himself did in his recording.

The performers on the recording are Carlos Feller (bass), William Pearson (baritone), Bruno Canino and Frederic Rzewski (piano), Saschko Gawriloff and Egbert Ojstersek (violin), Gérard Ruyven (viola) and Siegfried Palm (cello); the premiere of the ‘live version’ was performed by the Kölnner Ensemble für Neue Musik: Gerhard Braun, Wilhelm Bruck, Chistoph Caskel, Vinko Globokar, Edward H. Tarr and Heinz-Georg Thor, under the composer’s direction. The latter version would have been further removed from Beethoven’s sound world on account of the instruments used alone: although the musicians from the KENM did not always perform on their primary instruments, Caskel is a percussionist, Globokar a trombonist and Bruck a guitarist. Only Braun, a flautist, Thor, a double bass player and Tarr, a trumpeter, would have had significant amounts of original music to play.

For Ludwig van see Kutschke (2010) and Heile (2006).

However one interprets it, there is no doubt that the film is controversial, portraying the *Führer* (guide) of the fictional Beethoven-Haus as Adolf Hitler and combining the strains of the choral finale of the Ninth Symphony with images of defecating elephants, among many other things.


This current description is clearly based on the original charter and an ‘Informal Memorandum of Requirements and Expectations’ (Lewis 2009, 116–17).
The homogenising forces of consumer capitalism are not so easily defeated however: the case of the Charly reissue displays the unequivocal demand: ‘file under jazz’.

There are only two pieces on the double-CD: ‘Oh strange’ and ‘Bon voyage’, each divided into two parts of between around 22 and 25 minutes duration. It is to be assumed that these divisions were necessitated by the playing time available on the original LP sides. There is a curious, perhaps superficial parallel with the Kagel here which likewise uses the technical limitation of LP records to demarcate the piece: both sides of the record are about 25 min long.

I treat the music as essentially improvised here, which is the way it is often viewed. Steinbeck (2008) provides a more detailed analysis of another AEC performance from an insider’s perspective, including a discussion of the relation between composition and performance. Jost (1994, 163–79) concurs that there are composed elements. On the CD cover, ‘Oh, strange’ is credited to Jarman and Bowie and ‘Bon voyage’ to Bowie. Without inside knowledge, it is impossible to know for certain which aspects of the music were pre-composed (the opening tune on ‘Oh, strange’?) and this is arguably relatively unimportant for the argument pursued here.

Unfortunately, I only read Piekut’s book after this chapter had been finished in draft form. There are obvious commonalities between his approach and mine.