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Supplementary Material-Appendix

The description below is intended to give my discussion in the main text additional context.

1.1. Example of theorists that looks at digital cinema through the lenses of analogue film are Anne Friedberg (2000), Mark Wolf (2000) and Stewart, Garrett (2007). Only few scholars, such as Tom Gunning (2004) and Marks (2002), argue that digital image has a link to its reference. Also, Marks applies Islamic concepts to her discussion on pixels.

Rodowick, for example, argues that a digital-image cannot be “perceptually representational” because it is made up of many smaller parts that lose their connection to represented objects in the process of digitisation. Questioning digital-image’s “existence” as a singular and stable image, he states that the digital-image is not “an 'image'” and hence its relation to time, particularly the past, is in doubt.


1.2. Seeing Deleuze and Sadrā together:

Both Sadrā and Deleuze favour process and becoming over fixity. This shared worldview in the context of process philosophy and their theistical differences makes the bringing together of their philosophies fruitful for developing creative thinking on digital video. In Substantial Motion, the invisible and internal motion continuously forms the being of matter. Matter is only fixed ‘in’ perception. The Divine act of Being, is continuously putting entities in motion while the Being of God stays unchanged. Substance, which constitutes matter, is constantly and invisibly changing. In an interconnected universe (held together through the Divine being, and changing through His act of being) entities are interconnected; the change of each entity changes the whole. This is akin to Deleuze’s concept of becoming where the process of becoming at the
molecular level forms the molar, the being. The stability of form at the molar level, in fact, depends on the interwoven aspects of molar and molecular and the constant change at the molecular level.

At the time when algorithmic information and images become more and more dominant and affect what we see and know to be real, Sadrā’s concepts, such as the Real and Substantial Motion, can shed a new light on our understanding of the material world and its properties, and the way in which our perception is challenged by technology. Furthermore, Jalal Toufic (1999) argues that contemporary cinematic techniques are “very close to the predominant Islamic conception of time” (p. 56). Marks (2010) also demonstrates that practices and concepts we understand to be Western in digital media arts are rooted in Islamic culture. Sadrā’s theories of im/materiality and Substantial Motion helps us to understand the pixel and digital video in a new light, providing space for new cinematic aesthetics and theories, but also encourages us to re-examine the current understanding of im/materiality in digital moving image.


1.3. Open universe from the Islamic perspective:

“Islam proposes a whole that can be thought as open” (p.12). Islam concerns with the unity of God, as the only One from which all beings emanate and will fold back into at the end of time. Even though all beings share a similarity through their connection with an infinite Divine unity, there is diversity within the infinity that suggests that the apparently closed universe of theologians must also be infinitely open. Marks [7] pp. 1 – 35. Also see Sadrā [6] pp. 24 - 25.

1.4. Bergson’s concept of time and video:

It is important to mention that Deleuze’s thinking on time is informed by Bergson. For Bergson (1912), memory is the preservation and accumulation of the past in the present, in relation to what is to become (the future). It forms duration. Memory involves an “active or intelligent recognition” of recollected images (past), providing a capacity for actions and feelings, rather than automatic responses to perceived images (Lazzarato, 2007, p. 96). This capacity to feel and
to act affects the preceding images/events (the future). Consequently, the present is always divided into the past and the future, always becoming the past that is present in the future.

In reference to analogue video, Maurizio Lazzarato (2007) makes a connection between Bergson’s theory and video technology by discussing the video’s ability to imitate memory and time. While analogue film is mainly concerned with the light (i.e. the capability to capture traces of light on film), analogue video is mainly concerned with time. The video camera is “a machine that crystallizes time” as it “accumulates and produces duration and time” (113). Video brings together the past and future in one space. Like a memory, it preserves and accumulates time to replay in the future. In the “real time” playback, the past, the recollected images, becomes part of the actualised memory, dividing time to past and future. It is also tempting to discuss pixels’ time in relation to memory because they seem to recollect and divide time. Yet, equating pixels’ time to memory can become limited to human experience of time that can eventually prevent new understandings of the pixel, as, for instance, being linked to an infinite presence while mediating linear time. A pixel’s experience of time is closer to Bergson’s concept of pure perception. Pure perception, that is, perception without memory, but “absorbed in the present and capable” (p. 26), is a state in which an image can be experienced in its fullest and without any preceding images (the future).