Pain

Bain, D. (2015) Pain. In: Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy. Oxford University Press. (doi: 10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0280)

Abstract

Philosophers think of pain less and less as a paradigmatic instance of mentality, for which they seek a general account, and increasingly as a rich and fruitful topic in its own right. Pain raises specific questions: about mentality and consciousness certainly, but also about embodiment, affect, motivation, and value, to name a few. The growth of philosophical interest in pain has gone hand-in-hand with the growth of pain science, which burgeoned in the 1960s. This is no accident: developments in pain science have prompted philosophers to take account of empirical data and to revisit their assumptions about pain. Pain, in short, demands interdisciplinary investigation; hence, while this article focuses on the philosophy of pain, it makes liberal reference to empirical literature along the way. The focus of this article is on physical pains, that is, pains that are felt in bodily locations, not emotional suffering more broadly, such as grief or disappointment. The article also does not address the place of pain in ethical theories; rather, its focus is on issues that arise within the philosophy of mind. Even so, part of what makes pain such an interesting and important topic is that the questions it raises span boundaries, and normative questions concerning pain’s badness, on the one hand, and its value, on the other, are never far away.

• Item Type: Book Sections
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Bain, Dr David
• Authors: Bain, D.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Oxford Bibliographies
• Publisher: Oxford University Press