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EXPRESSING ENTITLEMENT IN COLONIAL ALGERIA: VILLAGERS, MEDICAL DOCTORS, AND THE STATE IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY

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Abstract:

This article expands our understanding of state-society interactions in rural Algeria under French colonial rule, focusing specifically on villagers in the eastern department of Constantine. I analyze previously untapped administrative records, newspapers, petitions, and complaints to show how sanitary regulations and medical expertise came to shape relationships among villagers, local elites, and the colonial state from the early twentieth century. Villagers responded to state-led medicalization by seeking the protection of medical doctors, not only from disease but also from the state itself. In particular, they hoped to avoid heavy-handed treatment by qaids and local elites who applied emergency disease control measures without appropriate medical knowledge. Furthermore, close examination of petition literature suggests that hardships experienced by rural communities during the First World War accentuated nascent feelings of entitlement towards state medical treatment that crossed demographic, ethnic, and religious communal boundaries.

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In early March 1917, three women and a child in the tiny madshīr (hamlet) of Runda in the Aurès (Awras) Mountains of Algeria died from “a great disease.” The news spread along official channels, first reaching the elders of the village of al-Akhdhara, who told the shaykh of duwwār Ghassira, who informed the agha of the Bani bu Sliman that Runda petitioned for “a doctor to come to the sick.”¹ The agha commanded the shaykh to isolate sufferers and forbade other villagers from visiting them. He then wrote to a local representative of French authority, the administrator of the commune mixte of Belezma based in Corneille (present-day Merouana), asking for a doctor to attend the villagers.² “The characteristics of this illness are that it begins with fever and then red pimples break out on the sick person,” reported the agha, “three or four days afterwards, he becomes deaf, until he dies. Truly they do not know what this disease is, whether it is al-ḥabb al-sūdāʾ or bū zagāgh.”³

The “great disease” was only the most recent misfortune to afflict the villagers in Runda. Four months previously, small-scale acts of resistance to compulsory conscription in neighboring communes mixtes and in Belezma itself had developed into widespread insurrection.⁴ French troops descended on the Aurès region—a contingent of 6,142 soldiers and 106 officers in November 1916, increasing to 13,892 soldiers and 217 officers in January 1917—and engaged in a range of repressive tactics to quell resistance and enforce conscription.⁵ Soldiers seized livestock and grain, destroyed silos, took hostages from the families of men refusing conscription, and burned villages; the air force bombarded the presumed mountain hideouts of deserters and resisters.⁶ Predictably, epidemic disease followed in the wake of misery. In the month prior to the outbreak of disease in Runda, ninety-three of the hostages taken in the communes mixtes of Aîn Touta (ʿAin al-Tuta), Batna, Belezma, and Corneille died from typhus.⁷ The “great disease” in Runda may itself have been typhus, the symptoms of which were known...
to include fever, a rash, and altered mental states. By appealing to local authority figures for a doctor to treat a terrifying affliction, villagers and elders sought the protection of the state. They did so even as French soldiers were depriving households of their men, beasts, and grain, and civil agents of the state were rounding up and isolating vulnerable members of their community.

How was it that villagers in the remote mountain hamlet of Runda came to seek the aid of a French doctor? Why did they view the provision of a doctor as the authorities’ responsibility? In contrast to scholarship on medicine and the state in sub-Saharan Africa and Egypt, the majority of work the history of medicine in Algeria has had little to say about how ordinary people responded to state medicine. The reasons for this are partly methodological, and partly due to the perception that state medicine was solely a vehicle for colonial ideology and settlement, and that there was not much of it in rural Algeria. Yet, as I will demonstrate, the petition from Runda was not an isolated incident but part of a broader trend in which communities and individuals in Algeria expected and asked for medical attention from the colonial authorities—even if they did not ultimately receive it.

This article draws upon official correspondence, ethnography, and popular petitions written in Arabic, French, and Judeo-Arabic originating in Eastern Algeria to explicate the role that doctors and their expertise played in relationships among villagers, local elites, and the colonial state from the early 20th century. The origins and early history of French public health legislation and medical infrastructures introduced to Algeria in the early 20th-century have not previously received the attention of professional historians, and neither have these source materials. I find that while inhabitants of major rural centers were more likely to encounter state medical services such as doctor’s consultations, vaccination, and drug distribution, all villagers lived in the shadow of sanitary policing. They responded to the expansion of the state and its
medical rhetoric with “medicalization from below,” by seeking the protection of doctors, not only from disease but also from the state itself.\textsuperscript{11} Top-down measures served as a locus of self-articulation for villagers of all different religious and legal categories to begin speaking back to the state and make demands that served their own collective interests.

This article builds on a generation of scholarship on social and political relations in Algeria under colonialism that has challenged the “dichotomized representation of two societies, ‘dominant’ and ‘subject.’”\textsuperscript{12} Such a representation followed naturally from colonial legal and discursive categories, which imposed French subjecthood on Algeria’s majority Muslim population and Saharan Jews, and extended French citizenship to European settlers and the remaining indigenous Jewish population. It has continued to be reinforced by national ideology, even as scholars have insisted on presenting Muslim, Jewish, and European populations as internally differentiated by class and ethnic origin.\textsuperscript{13} This study introduces further complexity and dynamism into our understanding of social relations and the exercise of power in Algeria, in two ways.

First, it takes a regional and local history approach, excavating sources that shed light on ordinary villagers in eastern Algeria. In particular, evidence from Châteaudun-du-Rhumel (Shalghum al-ʿAid) and La Meskiana (Miskiyyana) during World War I shows that villagers experienced entitlement to medical services in ways that crossed the dividing lines of religion and legal status, and could even take collective action that bridged these boundaries. This bears out Gilbert Meynier’s conjecture that the adversities of the war may have resulted in solidarity or a “modus vivendi” between settlers and fellāh (peasants).\textsuperscript{14} It also suggests that colony is not the appropriate unit of analysis for understanding how communities and individuals within them came to feel entitlement towards medical services, since entitlement was formed by specific
experiences within local environments, including but not limited to the degree of contact with the French administrative apparatus.\textsuperscript{15}

Second, and relatedly, the article makes sources in local languages central to its method of research and analysis. These range from qaids’ \textit{akkār} (reports) to collective and individual \textit{shikāyāt} (complaints) and petitions. The latter have served as important sources of evidence for scholars of the Ottoman Empire and its successor states, but historians of Algeria who reference such documentation have tended to focus on urban and elite petitions, and have all but neglected petitions which the regional archives of Constantine hold in abundance and which can also be obtained off-catalogue at the Centre des archives d’Outre-mer in Aix-en-Provence.\textsuperscript{16} These sources should not be viewed as “purer,” more “authentic” reflections of the Algerian experience, but as one element in a conversation. That is, they must be read in tandem with their French translations, commentaries, and responses. As I show here, examination of the discrepancies between petition documents and their translations yields revealing insights into the different ways that Muslim and settler populations sought to engage with the state and assert their entitlement to medical attention.

\textbf{Medical Policing in Algeria}

Medicine as a tool of European settlement and the consolidation of colonial rule in Algeria was a recurring motif in official rhetoric from the 19\textsuperscript{th} century until decolonization.\textsuperscript{17} However, in reality, comparatively few European physicians were willing to practice medicine in rural zones. Those that did often described themselves colloquially as the \textit{toubīb du bled} (ṭabīb al-\textit{bilād}), with the pejorative meaning of “backcountry doctor.” The majority of European-licensed physicians who were driven to rusticate themselves took up posts as \textit{médecins de colonisation} (doctors of
colonization) in *circonscriptions médicales* (medical circumscriptions). The *Service médical de colonisation* of which they were a part was established in 1853 to support and ensure the survival of fledgling European settlements. Each *médecin de colonisation* attempted to cultivate a private practice and received a stipend from state coffers for performing a statutory number of free public consultations in addition to medical rounds; a monthly inspection of schoolchildren and sex-workers; food and water quality inspections; and various administrative functions. The post attracted men (and more rarely women) in pursuit of a variety of objects. Some were those who could not afford to establish their own practice or who sought opportunities denied them because of sexism or xenophobia in the profession; some were drawn by a romantic or religious vision of life in the desert. Others had retired from naval or army medicine and took the position to supplement their military pension. A small number were fleeing from poor life choices—such as romantic entanglements and gambling debts.\(^\text{18}\) Given that the *circonscriptions médicales* served by *médecins de colonisation* covered vast territories in which the only communications between centers, farms, and *duwwār* might be unpaved mule tracks, this was a daunting career prospect.

The lack of interest from European physicians created limited employment opportunities in rural regions for autochthonous Jewish and Muslim medics, otherwise disregarded within their profession on the grounds of religion. For example, a decade prior to the outbreak of World War I, an official training program was established to provide *médecins de colonisation* with an *auxiliaire médical indigène* (medical auxiliary). Medical auxiliaries were recruited exclusively among Muslim youths aged between nineteen and twenty-four who held the *Certificat d’études primaires*. They received truncated medical training, were paid a fraction of the salary of the *médecin de colonisation*, and—so it was thought—would accept difficult rural postings without complaint.\(^\text{19}\)
The creation of secondary personnel was part of the colonial authorities in Algeria having to adapt to new social legislation introduced in France. A key piece of legislation was the *loi du 30 novembre 1892 sur l’exercice de la médecine*, which revised the licensing laws for doctors, health officers, and midwives, and required certified professionals to declare cases of infectious diseases to public authorities. Another was the *loi du 15 juillet 1893 sur l’assistance médicale gratuite*, which pledged free home visits or hospitalization to indigent citizens and charged licensed medical professionals and communal authorities with responsibility for medical policing and public declaration of infectious disease. A final piece of legislation, the *loi du 15 février 1902 relative à la protection de la Santé publique*, expanded the professional responsibilities of doctors to include compulsory declaration and disinfection of thirteen diseases—exanthematic typhus among them. The 1902 law also established mechanisms for policing health at the local level by requiring each mayor, in consultation with the municipal council, to draw up a statement of sanitary regulations (*règlement sanitaire*) for his commune.  

These items of legislation did not apply mechanically to France’s three Algerian departments, in particular because they entailed fiscal liabilities that members of the assembly with voting powers over the colonial budget, the *Délégations financières algériennes*, were unwilling to meet. Thus medical assistance for indigent European settlers followed the 1893 law, but Algeria’s Muslims were excluded from its protection. It was only in 1904 that the notion of an *Assistance médicale des indigènes* was proposed for Muslims in rural areas. Subsequently, so-called “native” infirmaries were introduced in some *centres de colonisation* (centers of colonization) but these did not become an extensive network: in 1906, there were twelve infirmaries where a European *médecin de colonisation* provided consultations and a Muslim *auxiliaire médical* provided full-time staffing; this number increased to twenty by 1907,
had reached thirty by 1908, and doubled to sixty by 1914. These installations were intended to reduce communal expenses by keeping indigent Muslims out of public hospitals. They were also touted as bringing French medicine to rural areas. In some cases, local administrators attempted to imitate Islamic discursive practice and used the Arabic language—often with imperfect results—to promote notions of medicine and hygiene and state medical services.

“Come to the French doctor,” urged the administrator of Oum el-Bouaghi in eastern Algeria in a pamphlet rendered into awkward Arabic, “he will treat you extremely and freely.” However, these services were concentrated in centres de colonisation, not in the duwwār where the vast majority of Algerian Muslims lived; and because of the parsimony of communal budgets (and the attitude of some doctors), free consultations were offered to only a tiny fraction of those who needed them.

Similarly, the law on the protection of public health was not applied automatically in Algeria, for it was deemed necessary first to adapt it to the perceived environmental, pathological, and social conditions of the colony. The legal instrument underwent scrutiny by numerous government bodies, shuttling back and forth between the Conseil d’état in Paris and the Conseil de gouvernement in Algiers, the Académie de médecine, and the Conseil supérieur d’hygiène (a new national organism established to oversee the 1902 law). Eventually Governor General Charles Jonnart issued a decree on compulsory vaccination on 27 May 1907, and agreed the terms of the décret du 5 août 1908, relatif à l’application à l’Algérie de la loi sur la protection de la santé publique, to take effect on 5 August 1909. In some respects, the Algerian decree resembled its metropolitan precursor: it required each commune to declare and publish sanitary regulations, and reproduced the same numbered system of diseases requiring compulsory declaration and disinfection. In other respects, the document contained variations
specific to rural Arab and Muslim bodies, reflecting the guiding belief that the ill health of the autochthonous population posed a constant threat to European settlements. For example, the putative relationship between variolization, “native” smallpox, and European victims gave rise to racialized smallpox vaccination legislation in the communes mixtes.27

Other differences were more subtle, but no less significant for villagers in the duwwār. Sanitary regulations were to be distributed in bilingual format, both French and Arabic. The regional archives in Constantine hold several boxes of these booklets, the contents of which were also spelled out on six-foot high bills suitable for affixing to a wall at the administrator’s burj (fort, office). A number of clauses in the regulations handed greater powers to state agents and increased the intrusiveness of the law substantially in regard to Muslims’ business interests. Owners of fanādiq (hotels) and maqāḥ/cafés maures (coffeehouses, “Moorish coffeehouses”), establishments which typically provided overnight accommodation for migrant laborers and travelers, as well as managers of hammams/bain maures (public baths, “Moorish baths”), were deemed responsible legally for declaring cases of illness among their lodgers and clients.28 These duties did not apply to owners of comparable establishments for Europeans. The regulations also placed communities and their sick under strict rules of behavior. In the event that one of thirteen legally declarable diseases was detected in a commune mixte, regulations stipulated the immediate removal of the sick person to a purpose-built or makeshift public isolation hut located no fewer than 150 meters from other habitations. According to printed directives, the hut was to offer separate rooms for men and women. Entrance to the hut was to be limited to the sick and those persons responsible for their nursing or treatment. Regulations authorized frequent disinfection of linens, clothing, personal items, and other objects used during the care of the sick. The decision to burn a victim’s clothing, as well as his gourbi (qūrbī, pl. qarāba, hut or shack),
wooden branches, straw, and other effects, was left to a doctor’s discretion. In some communes, the Arabic version tempered the severity of these measures by promising compensation (muʿāwaḍa) in cash or in kind to individuals whose belongings had been destroyed. According to one set of Arabic-language regulations, compensation would apply in “special circumstances” (fī aḥyān khusūṣiya), but no form of reparations is mentioned anywhere in the French version of the regulations—and nor is there indication in the archives to suggest that such monies were ever paid.

The most fundamental distinction between regulations in France and in Algeria’s major towns and colonial settlements on the one hand, and those affecting Muslim villagers in the duwwār on the other, was one of application and enforcement. In communes, mayoral officials concerned with re-election could choose to ignore unwelcome sanitary legislation rather than enforce it. Doctors’ syndicates vigorously defended private, market-based care against institutionalization. Individuals with resources to obtain a second medical opinion were able to evade isolation and other sanitary measures. To consider but one example, the police commissioner of Tiaret complained that he was unable to force the hospitalisation of a Mrs Vigiano because after she had been certified as typhique her husband produced second medical certificate testifying that she was not ill with typhus. Even though it was clear that the sick woman could not be satisfactorily isolated and cared for amidst her family in a small two-roomed dwelling, the police commissioner was unable to prevail: “As you know, discord has long reigned among the doctors of Tiaret, and today’s case that I am telling you about is one that has happened before. It seems that doctors don’t always give much consideration to the general interest and public health.” In contrast, Algeria’s communes mixtes, administrators were appointed, not elected, and a cadre of doctors was already partly institutionalized within the
Service médical de colonisation. Above all, villagers in the duwwār had limited or no regular access to a medical doctor, and no option of a second medical opinion.

Since licensed medical professionals were too thin on the ground to police populations and their diseases reliably, responsibility for enforcing sanitary regulations fell upon the indigenous leadership, particularly the qaids who represented French authority in the duwwār. Under communal sanitary regulations, qaids and other local leaders who identified unusual levels of morbidity or mortality in their areas (shiddat al-wafā‘), or a case of declarable disease or suspicious death, were required to notify the administrator immediately via a khabr (pl. akhbar, report). Each household required its own khabr, which related in narrative format the name, age, duwwār of residence, parentage, and age of each victim, and the presumed illness or cause of death. This data was used for identification and cross checking in the civil register, in order to enter new information or correct possible errors. Records after World War I show that routine, timely reporting of morbidity and mortality was expected of qaids and earned them favorable comments in their annual review and a pay bonus. In contrast, qaids’ failure to report disease or a suspicious death could lead to an investigation or even dismissal. Sanitary policing provided a language and operational framework by which administrators evaluated the efficiency and trustworthiness of “native” leadership in the communes mixtes; indeed, the evidence of akhbar suggests that medical policing became a mechanism through which indigenous leaders sought to build their relationship with colonial officials and gain their trust.

The result of the close connection between sanitary policing and administrative performance reviews was qaids’ enthusiastic enforcement of sanitary measures. As if measures such as the isolation of sick or recovering persons from his or her family and the destruction of individuals’ shelter and clothing were not distressing enough, the manner in which they were
applied could have far reaching consequences for entire communities, as indicated by a petition from western Algeria. In January 1929, Kaddour ould Benaissa Smaïne (Qadur awlad bin ‘Aissa Isma’il) and Tahar ould Abed Belkhamessa (Tahar awlad ‘Abid ben al-Khamissa) wrote in French to the Administrator of Tiaret, appealing for an isolation order to be lifted:

The civil doctor and native rural policeman of douar Guertoufa came the two of them to the *douar* and came into our two tents only they found one native Boubeker ould abdel Kader ill [.] Seven or eight days after the departure of the doctor and the policeman he died—since then no death. Following the order given by the qaid saying that by the order of M. Administrator that Smaïn Kaddour ould Benaïssa and Belkhamessa Tahar ould Abed are forbidden to go to the centre of Guertoufa and to the markets of Tiaret[.] At present there are 31 people in two Arab tents who are dying of hunger[.] They are not working and they cannot go to the markets to sell their animals to live because of the order of the qaid[.] We just want you to follow up our request or to make a doctor come to [see] if there are sick people.”^40

Sanitary legislation in colonial Algeria, as in metropolitan France, was driven by concerns about acute epidemic disease. However, as this section has shown, local regulations and the manner of their enforcement presumed that epidemic disease originated with Arab and Muslim villagers and businesses in the *communes mixtes*. Much of what we can learn of qaids’ activities can understood as efforts to sequester the inhabitants of the *duwwār* in order to preserve residents of *centres de colonisation* and urban settings from injury. At its most extreme, sanitary measures ordered by administrators took the form of a cordon sanitaire around villagers enforced by
soldiers. Villagers in the duwwâr could not evade quarantine rules in the way that poor Europeans in centres de colonisation could. The expert diagnosis of the state doctor was their only counterweight to heavy-handed treatment by local leadership and colonial officials.

**Medical Pluralism in the Aurès**

The suffering villagers of Runda, with whom this article began, provide a further concrete example of how these regulations were applied. The elders in the village of al-Akhdhara called for a doctor after learning of the frightening deaths of three women and a child. Before the agha of the Bani bu Sliman had communicated the request to the administrator in Batna, the former had already commanded the shaykh to isolate sufferers and to forbid villagers from visiting them. The agha’s orders conformed to municipal sanitary regulations but were an inversion of local practices of disease management.

Archives founded under the auspices of the colonial state distort the nature of predecessors and alternatives to French medicine, by mentioning these only in the punitive context of “illegal” medical practice. However, in this particular instance, contemporary ethnographic materials gathered in the vicinity of Runda can supplement the silence of the colonial archive. Oxford postgraduate student in anthropology Melville Hilton-Simpson and his wife Helen traveled to Algeria in 1913–14 and immediately following World War I to conduct research for a thesis on “Medicine among the Berbers of the Aurès.” Local French officials informed the Hilton-Simpsons of the futility of their research task. As Hilton-Simpson explained in the thesis, the reason for this was that,
The practice of surgery by persons who do not possess the necessary French qualification is, of course, prohibited by law and, consequently, the native practitioner is not only reticent about his methods but even refuses to admit that he practises medicine and surgery at all. Indeed one French district medical officer whom I consulted assured me that I should never see either a surgeon or an instrument although, he stated, operations were frequently performed in the area I was visiting.43

Strictly speaking, the practice of surgery by Muslim persons on Muslim patients was not prohibited in Algeria de jure. An imperial decree of 12 July 1851 had first extended French medical licensing laws to Algeria but explicitly exempted from prosecution “natives, Muslims or Jews, who practice medicine, surgery and midwifery on behalf of their coreligionists.”44 Subsequent decrees in 1896, 1927, and 1935 restricted medicine to licensed practitioners (and, in the case of the loi du 16 août 1940 sur l’exercice de la médecine, banned Jews and persons “born of a foreign father” from the medical profession, Algerian Muslims included). However, the 1851 decree remained on the law books and colonial officials were encouraged discreetly to ignore the implications of the 1896 decree for “native” healers: Governor General Jules Cambon, who judged that its application would be “fatal” to these practitioners and the populations they tended.45 Cambon also recognized the impossibility of eradicating various and essential medical, surgical, and birthing practices performed by nonlicensed healers, given the sheer numbers of indigenous Algerians and the tiny number of licensed practitioners (see above). But this did not prevent French officials locally from acting as if there was a de facto prohibition.

Melville and Helen Hilton-Simpson were assigned Arab and Shawi assistants to accompany them on their travels in the region. Given the restrictions described above, it is
possible that the presence of these assistants actively inhibited, rather than helped, their inquiries, except that some of the assistants were related to local healers and surgeons. Hilton-Simpson claimed his nationality was also an asset in his research, suggesting that “the general practitioners of the Aurès” were more willing to talk openly to an Englishman, in contrast to the usual attitude of “extreme secrecy” they showed towards outsiders.\textsuperscript{46} Indeed, Melville and Helen Hilton-Simpson’s efforts generated more than 200 slips of paper of notes on surgical and medical practices, photographs, surgical instruments, and even bone fragments that they gathered in the vicinity of Biskra and Batna. The couple therefore had access to therapeutic and preventive resources that escaped the sight of French officials, but which may have been available to the villagers of Runda.

According to the surgeons and healers with whom Hilton-Simpson conversed, cholera and other epidemic diseases were “combated by withdrawing the population of the stricken village to the shelter of the high-lying pine forests which are considered impregnable by the armies of ‘jenoun,’ or demons, which are believed to cause the out-break.”\textsuperscript{47} Thus sanitary regulations whereby the healthy stayed put and the sick were expelled and isolated contradicted local practice whereby healthy and sick fled their village, to evade malevolent spirits.\textsuperscript{48} Hilton-Simpson noted the use of Qur’anic texts, “worn, or, written on paper…burnt for fumigating patient[s]” for the treatment of fever. He also recorded encountering a layman in a desert oasis who “advised fumigation in the smoke of burning date-stones as a remedy for fever,” and a “sorceress” who proposed fumigation in “hoopoe’s feathers, black sheep’s wool, and oleander leaves.” The combination of smoke and Holy Scripture was intended to irritate and expel jinn. This contrasted with official regulations that were not conducted under the auspices of Islam, and which required burning and disinfecting personal objects, rather than fumigating the individual
person. Two measures considered to be effective against the jinn that caused fever were charms made of the head of a viper and, more prosaically, quinine. This antipyretic, used principally to treat malaria, had been introduced to Muslim physicians over the course of the 19th century. By the pre-World War I period, the Englishman observed, it had become widely appreciated and obtainable “in tablet form in the large towns,” but was difficult to obtain in rural areas (see below).

Had the villagers of Runda attempted evasive measures and remedies such as these before the women and child died? We lack positive proof that they did. It is understandable that the elders of al-Akhdhara would remain silent on this issue given the prejudice shown towards indigenous healers. However, the report transmitted verbally by the elders to the shaykh, and in writing to the agha and the administrator, provides a clue that someone had examined the sick carefully, perhaps in order to explore therapeutic options. After all, the elders were able to report in concise detail the natural history of the infection, and at least four days had elapsed between the first signs of sickness and their informing the authorities of the presence of a “great disease.”

In the literature on colonial medicine, the manner in which the villagers selected among different therapeutic options might be termed “medical pluralism.” A 1978 study by anthropologist John Janzen, *The Quest for Therapy: Medical Pluralism in the Zaire*, proposed “medical pluralism” and “lay therapy management” as analytic tools for comprehending the way in which people navigated “differently designed and conceived medical systems.” Jansen’s innovation during his research among the BaKongo was to observe the different individuals involved in medical experience—patients, kinship groups, and various experts—and the symbolic meaning and practical consequences of different types of therapy, rather than assuming the primacy of the doctor-patient relationship. Historians of Africa (and of other contexts
besides) have found “medical pluralism” to be the default under colonialism. Historian Megan Vaughan showed the limitations of colonial biopower to form African subjectivities; colonial states such as the British dependencies in East and Central Africa from the 1890s to 1950s were not modern states and so lacked sufficient information and coercive capacity to impose biopower. As Vaughan explained, “In Africa at least, colonial medics were simply too thin on the ground and their instruments too blunt to be viewed either as agents of oppression or as liberators from disease, and studies of African demography confirm this view.” In Vaughan’s assessment, a “clash” of medicines or the victory of biomedicine would have required far greater organization on the part of the state medical apparatus.

The evidence provided by the Hilton-Simpsons and the model of medical pluralism are helpful insofar as they suggest why villagers in Runda might not have notified French authorities immediately of the “great disease.” However, they miss the role that the doctor’s expertise played outside of the field of therapeutics, in that of colonial law and administration. In Algeria, the “blunt instrument” and “agents of oppression” in question were not medicine and colonial medics, but sanitary regulations and heavy-handed local elites and administrators. The elders of al-Akhdhara did not simply formulate a request for a doctor because family and neighbors had reached the limits of local medical knowledge, or because care by family and friends was unable to provide relief. They called for a French doctor to come to their aid because the shaykh and his assistants policed and shut away the sick, but did not care for them appropriately.

What is more, the sufferers, kinship groups, and elders who navigated multiple medicines in the Aurès were operating under multiple technologies of rule and domination. The government was taking young men in conscription while collectively punishing the inhabitants of the region for resistance to the measure. From another archival find, it appears that ninety villagers in
T’kout—barely six kilometers from Runda—resorted to the expedient of writing to the Prefect of Constantine “in total peace” to secure the safety of their tribe and restore their livelihoods (maʿāsh). Their lengthy shikāya denounced certain tribes for rising up against the government and conscription, insisting that they had presented their children on the appointed day and had tried to persuade the “corrupt” (the men resisting conscription) to change their ways.55 In a similar way, by requesting a doctor the villagers in Runda opened up a channel for peaceful communication with the government in the midst of violence and distrust. In retrospect, it seems an almost poignant expression of villagers’ faith that the authorities might have something to offer other than repression.

**Medicalization from Above**

Unfortunately for the villagers of Runda, the administrator in Batna was unable to provide access to a licensed physician. A medical officer stationed some ninety kilometers away, Schmitko (first name unknown), refused to leave his post in Batna to attend to the villagers in Runda on the basis that he was waiting for orders to join the Armée d’Orient on campaign. There were no other licensed physicians to be found in the entire Aurès. In fact, the region had never known regular state medical services of any kind. Dorothée Chellier, the first female doctor to practice in Algeria, had carried out an official government medical mission to the women of the region from 1895 to 1899, and a Catholic religious society, the Pères Blans, established a hospital for Muslims at Arris in 1895, but the post of médecin de colonisation for the Aurès had been only intermittently filled.56

It was not only the Aurès that lacked a licensed medical professional in 1917. An estimated 10,490 medics fought for France during World War I, and career army medics
comprised barely 15 percent of this contingent, a mere 1,495 doctors and 126 pharmacists.\textsuperscript{57} This meant that staffing levels in the Service de santé des armées were met by the de-medicalization of France and Algeria. Within weeks of Germany’s declaration of war on 3 August 1914, the colony saw the hasty and ill-planned deployment of physicians to serve in medical units on the front, in North African military hospitals, or in the reserves, and later as intendants in Algerian prisoner of war camps. Twenty-three out of ninety-six Muslim auxiliaires médicaux left their posts in Algeria to serve as conscripts or as volunteers in theaters of conflict and campaigns in France, Egypt, Greece, and the Hijaz.\textsuperscript{58} The ranks of médecins de colonisation were specifically targeted for medical mobilization. In 1915 the subprefect of Mostaganem suggested that so many doctors were called up that, for a time, the communes of the interior of Oran were stripped of their licensed physicians.\textsuperscript{59} In spite of a 21 April 1916 circular that ordered special treatment and demobilization for Algeria’s médecins de colonisation, by 1917 only 53 out of 100 of those in service before the war remained at their posts.\textsuperscript{60}

The department of Constantine had been considered severely under-medicalized even before the war, both by metropolitan standards and in comparison to Algeria’s other French departments. It had the highest proportion of médecins de colonisation of the three departments, and the lowest number of private practitioners, pharmacists, and midwives, because most centres de colonisation in the department were too poor to support their livelihoods. A total of 106 private and communal physicians and médecins de colonisation worked in the department during peacetime, supplying an area the size of Portugal—this compared with at least 190 and 111 in the departments of Algiers and Oran respectively.\textsuperscript{61} By the winter of 1914, only forty-two of these 106 doctors remained in service along with twenty-five Muslim auxiliaires médicaux.\textsuperscript{62} Nine of the forty-two remaining physicians were médecins de colonisation providing free
services: two had been exempted from military service because of age, two were injured or disabled, two were discharged, and one was in the army reserves. This meant that the effects of medical mobilization were felt disproportionately in areas that lost their médecin de colonisation, who was typically the only licensed medical practitioner in these locales.

In view of the scarcity of médecins de colonisation, auxiliaries médicaux, and infirmaries, the vast majority of rural populations existed without regular access to state medical services during peacetime. Did the removal of these doctors during wartime make any difference? Were there noticeable effects on levels of morbidity or mortality at the macro-level? Was the absence of doctors remarked upon at the microlevel, where communities must have been relying on alternative therapies and healers for relief anyway? We find preliminary answers to these questions in official correspondence, for when doctors were mobilized, infirmaries and medical rounds had to be suspended. Mayors and administrators dispatched plaintive letters and urgent telegraphs to the authorities in Algiers concerning the sanitary situation in their communes. Across the variety of communications, four sets of problems stand out as common concerns: disease levels, budgets, the malfunctioning of regulatory systems, and the waste of medical resources.

Local authorities expressed concern about specific categories of disease and social groups. Infectious diseases such as measles and scarlet fever, and seasonal fevers, were cause for alarm. Some health problems were uncommon but caused disproportionate levels of social anxiety. For instance, when a European woman gave birth to a stillborn infant in the commune mixte of Sédrata, the lack of medical attention was blamed; the news item was relayed by urgent telegram to the governor general. The management of malaria in particular was disrupted during the war, not only because the mobilization of médecins de colonisation put an end to the
distribution of free quinine sulfate tablets, but also because shortages disrupted supply. Without quinine prophylaxis, levels of absenteeism among agricultural labor increased. These problems were no doubt sensationalized by local officials in order to attract attention from prefects, but there does seem to have been a statistical basis for alarm: for instance, the mayor of Oued-Zenati drew on his commune’s sanitary records to point to abnormal mortality levels compared with the previous year.64

Disease and death were not the sum total of the problem from the perspective of local authorities, however. Without a medical doctor on hand to diagnose and treat epidemic diseases, those suffering their effects might press for admittance to a hospital. Authority figures were apprehensive about the fiscal implications of this behavior on the communal budget. According to the Mayor of Robertville, near Philippeville (Skikda),

Our free consultations and dispensary service, with which we had achieved remarkable results in terms of the number of natives treated and the economy, not only the costs of hospitalization, is suspended.

There are many native and even European poor in my commune, and so I am assailed every day by the sick demanding either the doctor or a ticket for entry to the hospital. Unable to satisfy their legitimate request for the doctor and unwilling to hand out hospital admission except in serious cases, which one needs an understanding of science to recognize, the sick who have the means go off to the town to consult a doctor, who at their request simply admits them for [hospital] treatment, causing my communal budget to bear extremely high costs.65
In the mayor’s view, the difficulty in Robertville arose not from disease itself, but from the lack of scientific expertise available locally—expertise that enabled the commune to make a triage of the sick during peacetime. Sufferers with means were able to use private physicians to manipulate the system. From the language of the mayor’s request, we can see that his concerns were dramatized to achieve the return of the médecin de colonisation (“remarkable results,” “assailed…by the sick,” and “extremely high costs”). Nonetheless, overall these responses from officials suggest that, whatever their medical effects, the médecin de colonisation, auxiliaire médical, and infirmerie were proving effective in reducing demands on communal budgets during peacetime.

Medical mobilization also meant that there were not enough doctors to register births and deaths, or to conduct autopsies and provide evidence for criminal courts. Some auxiliaires médicaux received authorization from the local judiciary to carry out autopsies and sign death certificates, and documents they produced were used as evidence in criminal and civil cases, until the authorities in Algiers demanded an end to the practice.66 Significantly, it was not the judiciary that objected to the expedient, but an official in the security services who learned that a Muslim medical assistant had prepared forensic evidence against a European in a criminal prosecution; this caused the Governor General to intervene.67 In addition to the impact on judicial proceedings, the cessation or interruption of medical services also stood in the way of processing medical exams for workers cudgeled into “volunteering” en masse for factory work in France, especially as these men did not turn up for examination on fixed days.68 For instance, the administrator of La Meskiana despaired when the médecin de colonisation for the commune left his post—the third to do so in as many years. Not only had this departure caused the infirmary to
close and consultations and medical checks in the duwwār to cease, explained the administrator, but also, “The recruitment of workers volunteering for engagements [venant spontanément s’engager] in the factories of France is impossible without a doctor in place.” A shortage of physicians threatened to paralyze the judiciary and the smooth functioning of a French war machine that depended on a constant flow of migrant labor. These documents make clear that the importance of the doctor to colonial governance extended beyond sanitary and medical matters; the doctor played a vital role in ensuring the functioning of the legal, fiscal, and economic regime under colonialism.

Some official communications insisted upon a rights-based understanding of medical care in order to strengthen their argument; with the doctor mobilized, “it [was] impossible for the population of Gounod to receive the medical assistance to which it has the right,” wrote the administrator of the commune mixte of Oued-Cherf to the sub-prefect of Guelma, in reference to both settler and Muslim inhabitants. It is possible that officials were encouraged to apply pressure by mobilized doctors themselves, in cases where these had been displaced within Algeria to military hospitals. Having been the target of many requests, the prefect of Constantine wrote to the governor general that, “certain mobilized doctors have told me that they have barely an hour of work per day.” Jewish physician André Attal from the city of Constantine was among those who wrote to the Prefect to complain about this situation. Attal had been mobilized and posted to Biskra, where he considered himself underemployed inspecting prisoners of war for disease. Meanwhile, he asserted, “The number of doctors [in the city of Constantine] is insufficient, and the native population in particular—Arab and Jewish—is almost deprived of medical care since the departure of the doctors who routinely visited them.” Attal asked the Prefect of Constantine to intercede with the Inspecteur général du service de santé de l’armée de
l’Afrique du Nord, in order to arrange his release from the post. The request included an unsubtle rebuke: “I would like to believe that the military authority would not wish to show any less solicitude to [the native population] than it does to German prisoners.” As the above vignettes show, authority figures made a strong case for the importance of public health and medical services as scientific instruments of the state and the trans-Mediterranean economy, but also insisted that state medical services served an important public function.

Medicalization from Below

Consultations by the médecin de colonisation and auxiliaire médical were a recent development, and an extremely limited one at that. Nonetheless, it is apparent that some rural populations had developed expectations of the state regarding the provision of medical doctors. This point is demonstrated by a petition formulated in August 1915 and signed by 161 residents of Châteaudun-du-Rhumel, a rich cereal-growing region some fifty-five kilometers to the southwest of the city of Constantine. The petition demanded the immediate return of a médecin de colonisation, ideally doctor Jean Nicolaï who had served the commune until his mobilization to join the war effort. Within eleven days of the petition reaching the attention of the prefectural authorities, Nicolaï was released from military service and returned to his appreciative community.

The instigator behind the Châteaudun-du-Rhumel petition was Paul Francheschi, the son of a notable local landowner of Corsican extraction. Francheschi’s letter began by asserting the importance of Châteaudun. It echoed official discourse and its concern with facts and figures: the commune mixte was one of the largest and most populous in Algeria; it comprised a population of 35,000 dispersed across four centres de colonisation, as well as many large farms; these were
connected only by simple tracks. The provision of “immediate and frequent healthcare” was challenging enough, given these logistical issues, but had been notably aggravated by the mobilization of Nicolai. Yet it was “important to ensure the sanitary service of such a large population, deprived of any medical help, at the time of farm work during the season of high temperatures, and later when plowing during the rainy season.” The connection between this agenda and Francheschi’s private interests is clear, as he required able-bodied labor in his own fields.

However, it was not merely the European landowning-class that supported the petition. Indeed, two of the first signatures sought by Francheschi were those of `Ali bu Ahmad and Muhammad Hadbum (occupations unknown). Many of the signatures are illegible, but crossreferencing with the birth and death registers for the commune mixte yields some data about individual identities. For instance, there was considerable support for the petition from the sizeable Algerian Jewish population of the commune. Businessmen Moise Amar, Mordechai Attal, and David Aouzerats, the belt-maker Jatron Atlan, and clerk Rahman Guedj signed in French; other Châteaudun Jews used Arabic, such as Musa bin Yusuf and Amram al-Harbi al-Rahman; David ben Zaken signed in Judeo-Arabic script. Twenty-five Algerian Muslim men added their signatures, the majority in Arabic script. Finally, the Europeans of Corsican, Maltese, Italian, Alsatian, and French origin who signed came from diverse occupational backgrounds. Some were men whose wives had lost children at birth or in early infancy, such as the road-mender Alfred Moutin, his brother-in-law the cultivator Noël Balibouze, and the nightwatchman Paul Deschamps. Nine wives and widows also signed. Even without background details for every signatory, the onomastic evidence alone makes clear that the doctor and the infirmary had generated feelings of entitlement across the lines of religion, class, and gender.
A second petition originated in the commune mixte of La Meskiana in July 1917. Official figures from the turn of the century recorded an estimated population of 57,802 seminomadic “natives” and 1,919 Europeans spread over 448,480 hectares. It took administrative orders at least two days to reach the administrator of La Meskiana from the Prefecture of Constantine, which was situated two hundred and twenty kilometers away. The duwwār sixty or seventy kilometers distant from the infirmary in La Meskiana were barely accessible by mule tracks. Whereas the previous petition united the European, Muslim, and Jewish inhabitants of Châteaudun, the Muslim landowners, tradesmen, and their servants who signed the shikāya from La Meskiana did so independently of Europeans and Jews. Seventy-three individuals signed the shikāya, which was written in local Arabic dialect and was probably drawn up by Salah bin [illegible] bin Gharbal al-Jarbi, whose signature resembles the handwriting closely. The petition drew a considerable portion of its support—nine of its total seventy-three signatures—from men belonging to families from the Tunisian island of Jerba.

This shikāya was addressed to the Prefect of Constantine in Arabic:

Your Grace, Sir, Administrator of the District of Miskiyyana, peace upon you, from your servants presenting their petition to your exalted eminence, God’s blessings.

We the inhabitants of the village of Miskiyyana ask you kindly that there be a doctor in the circumscription as there was in the past. Illness has befallen our area and the place is known for its diseases during the hot season and the quinine is not sufficient. It is well known, your Grace, that diseases are different and every disease requires its own remedy. The doctor treats each disease according to the patient.
Second, it is clear your Grace that ‘Ain al-Baida’ and Tbissa are a known distance away. The sick person grows weak on his walk to the doctor and does harm to himself.

Thus we appeal to and crave from your eminence that you designate [a doctor] according to our demand.80

The general message of the shikāya evoked a central element of the Châteaudun petition—that medical assistance was essential during the hot season—and added that it was detrimental for the sick to travel far for treatment. The shikāya was also reminiscent of the report from the Mayor of Robertville; while the mayor had complained that only the doctor had the ability to recognize diseases and to decide upon the appropriate course of action, the Meskianis declared that “the doctor treats each disease according to the patient” (wa-l-ṭabīḥ yuʾālij kull marīṭ ḥasab marẓihī [sic]). In these carefully crafted phrases, the petitioners of La Meskiana recognized the médecin de colonisation as a gatekeeper to resources and an expert of the state. Where the shikāya differed from the Châteaudun document and official requests was in its tone: only the Meskianis framed their request as a plea from servants to a gracious and exalted master.

A nameless translator at the Prefecture in Constantine phrased the appeal quite differently:

We, the undersigned, inhabitants of the village of La Meskiana, have the honor to request to kindly arrange to appoint a doctor to our center where he will practice as in the past.
It is not unknown to you that our village, because of its position, is a hotbed of fever par excellence, especially in the hot season, and quinine is not enough by itself.

In addition, the length of travel to the centers closest to us (Aïn Beida and Tébessa) worsens the condition of the patient. In view of the numerous drawbacks that may result, the presence of a physician is indispensable.

Accordingly, we beg you Mr. Administrator to kindly respond favorably to our request.\textsuperscript{81}

The essential message of the petition was carried over, but the translation displayed marked differences in format and register. The \textit{shikāya} scribe had demonstrated some familiarity with bureaucratic norms, to the extent that he placed a date at the head and wrote only on the left-hand side of the page, leaving the right-hand side blank for a translation. Nonetheless, the \textit{shikāya} opened with \textit{al-ḥamd li-llāh}, an element not typically included in administrative correspondence in the French language, and invoked God’s blessings on the Prefect. The translator’s text conformed the petition to the conventions of secular, bureaucratic French, eliminating the religious formulas and employing impersonal phrases.\textsuperscript{82}

Significantly, the translator also purified the servile language of the original petition. The original choice of terminology expressed the subordination and acquiescence to state authority of Muslim subjects (\textit{khuddām}, servants). The translation elevated the petitioner’s of La Meskiana from the status of \textit{khuddām} (servants) to the less subservient, more neutral position of “we, the undersigned.” It also erased evidence of villagers’ concern for health and their enthusiasm for state medicine and expertise.
Additional background provided by a series of correspondence between the prefect, administrator, and inhabitants of La Meskiana reveals just how deep the latter’s enthusiasm for the expertise of the doctor ran. The petitioners’ phrase “in the past” gave time-honored status to a medical post that was barely a decade old. An infirmary had been opened in La Meskiana in December 1908 under the direction of médecin de colonisation Marc Savin-Vaillant and auxiliaire médical Ammar ben Ahmed Selmi (ʿAmmar bin Ahmad Salmi). Savin-Vaillant wrote to a government commission in 1911 to say that the infirmary was functioning well with excellent results. Selmi assisted him ably by writing up patient notes, dispensing drugs, applying bandages, acting as anesthetist and performing vaccinations. But after a few attempts, Savin-Vaillant gave up taking Selmi on house calls, since Meskianis refused to expose their female kin to his sight. Husbands and fathers were willing to let a “Rumi” (European, or Christian) doctor physically examine their womenfolk, since Savin-Vaillant was an unbeliever and so existed outside the pale of their community, but would not contravene strict local practices of female seclusion for his Muslim assistant. The orthodox Muslim population of La Meskiana accepted the French doctor and his Muslim assistant on their own terms.83

Following the mobilization of Savin-Vaillant in the first weeks of the war, Schmitko—the very same Schmitko who refused to attend the villagers of Runda in March 1917—was found as a replacement.84 The new médecin de colonisation rapidly fell out with the administrator and the entire local population.85 While drawing a government salary, Schmitko refused to interrupt his “meals or rest” to see patients, would not leave his home when it was “too hot to go out,” declined to hospitalize the chronically ill on the grounds that it was “useless from a medical point of view,” and refused to treat sick children whose parents were behind with their bills.86 He also seems to have extorted domestic labor from patients in return for hospitalization or treatment.87
Europeans in the *commune mixte* did not organize a collective complaint, but instead sent individual petitions to the authorities. A war widow, Mrs. Tomati, made a heartfelt appeal in broken French to the prefect of Constantine on behalf of herself and her ten children:

He gave me until September 2 [to pay]. I have sick children. I don’t know if I can manage [to bring in the harvest] and leave my family on their own. I think he must receive the *collisation* [sic] allowance.  

Schmitko had refused to treat two of Widow Tomati’s daughters, Emilie and Cyprienne, on the basis that she had not paid for medical treatment received by an eleventh child Louis, who had died from his illness. As a result, Widow Tomati had had to carry Emilie on her back the forty kilometers from La Meskiana to Aïn Beïda to seek a cure: the same difficult trek of which the Muslim Meskianis complained. Widow Tomati may have been semiliterate, but she recognized that Schmitko held a rank of responsibility to the “*collisation*” [sic] of the area, and was not unaware of the state’s undertaking towards its citizens. Schmitko received a salary from the central government, which, Widow Tomati believed, obliged him to treat all villagers—regardless of whether they were entitled to free care and medicines.

An uncertain supply of drugs and medical treatment was dangerous in a place like La Meskiana, “known for its fevers,” where the greengrocer of the village could only occasionally furnish supplies of quinine. Those unable to carry their sick to Aïn Beïda (‘Ain al-Baida’) or worried about the cost of doctor’s fees sought alternative healing in the vicinity. The war had disrupted the smallpox vaccination sessions once conducted by Savin-Vaillant and Selmi, which meant that families concerned about the disease took alternative precautions: the administrator
arrested a woman he claimed to have found “going to variolize her neighbours” and locked her in the courtyard of his office (she was released after a warning). One of the many Tomati children refused treatment by Schmitko almost died after her desperate mother obtained an illegal vaccination for her from an unknown source. Another inhabitant of the district, Meziane Tebessi, suffered a serious case of poisoning after taking a remedy from a druggist in Aïn Beïda. All of these incidents were attributed to Schmitko’s neglect. After nearly a year of medical negligence, intriguing, and petitioning, Schmitko was given his marching orders and dispatched to the Aurès, from whence he ignored the people of Runda. It was at this point that the Jerbis of La Meskiana organized a petition to the prefect. As in the case of Châteaudun-du-Rhumel, the prefect responded with alacrity, and dispatched the Jewish physician Haïm Achour to the post.

Schmitko’s appalling reputation does not seem to have damaged the institution of médecin de colonisation in the eyes of petitioners, since they were willing to take a chance on his replacement. But why were they willing to take this chance? Perhaps it was because men from Jerba were prominent in the grocery trade in Aïn Beïda and the commune mixte, in all likelihood belonging to the network of Ibadi artisans and traders that stretched from Jerba to the Mzab valley. These traders, along with the other signatories, were concerned to defend their business interests. Indeed, the scribe helpfully annotated the list of signatures appended to the shikāya with each man’s occupation: the signatories included seven traders, five butchers, two coffeehouse owners, a bath attendant, a night watchman, a barber, a landowner, and four servants. The traders, coffeehouse owners, and bath attendant would be the first to be affected by disease control policies if an epidemic was announced. As we have seen, in the event of an outbreak of disease, establishments such as coffeehouses and bathhouses were down by the municipality and a sanitary cordon might be raised around entire villages, preventing
transportation of trade goods and movement of buyers and sellers. Although many in the colonial chain of command were authorized to impose sanitary regulations, only a medical doctor could provide access to free drugs such as quinine and determine when disease outbreaks were no longer a threat requiring quarantine.

Conclusions

Popular petitions and shikāyat from the archives of the communes mixtes remain uncharted and relatively untapped sources for historians of Algeria. This article has demonstrated that such documents in their original languages, as well as a wealth of administrative records located in Algerian and French archives, not only constitute precious sources for writing local histories of colonialism, adding new detail to our understanding of the lived experience of French colonial occupation and rule. They can also contribute to broadening existing narratives of political and social relations in Algeria. Popular petitions and official communications reveal a mutually intelligible vocabulary of need for medical attention, expert judgment, and drug supplies shared across state and rural society. They suggest that historians should place state sanitary structures and medicine at the heart of their understanding of the dynamics of power in the communes mixtes from the early 20th century onwards.

These dynamics become clearly visible during World War I. The medical service in the department of Constantine disposed of a mere 106 doctors, and so Muslim and settler villagers alike depended on alternative healers and therapies, resources that government officials defined as “illegal” but were mostly powerless to prevent. Yet the mobilization of state-appointed doctors resulted in complaints and petitions from officials and villagers alike, who insisted on the importance of a doctor to the survival of their communities. In part, this was because sanitary...
regulations introduced barely a decade earlier had established a new area of life in which
government and laws intruded, taking the form of forced quarantines, the burning of *gourbis*, and
other measures that were distressing to individuals and families, and injurious to communal
livelihoods. The doctor might appear at the vanguard of these unwelcome intrusions in people’s
lives and livelihoods, but at least his presence also offered some small guarantee of mitigating
more unpleasant interference from local leadership and administrators.

Historians have long been aware that government-imposed conscription during World
War I engendered new forms of political consciousness among Algerian Muslims. \(^9^2\) It may be
that the hardships caused by sanitary regulations, along with the contemporary experiences of
state-imposed conscription and military repression, contributed to state medicine’s becoming
more deeply graven onto popular consciousness than the quantity and quality of these services
would otherwise suggest. That is, villagers’ demands for a doctor were a product not only of
anxieties about disease, but also of solidarities and sacrifices borne of wartime. Villagers acted
across a broad range of geographic and demographic constituencies on the basis of the belief that
the government was responsible for providing a doctor during disease outbreaks. They asked for
the doctor and medical services because this was an idiom in which they knew how to engage the
state, and because they anticipated some chance of success. Indeed, officials responded to the
petitions analyzed above with alacrity—no doubt concerned to forestall further civil unrest and
epidemics—ordering doctors to attend distressed populations.

However, and as this article has made clear, villager-subjects and villager-citizens
evined entitlement in their petitions for a doctor—but they did not all speak in one voice. The
Muslim businessmen of La Meskiana showed careful attention to official discourse, turning it
back on the government in their declaration that, “diseases are different and every disease
requires its own remedy.” The Meskianis expressed an attitude of entitlement towards the doctor based on specific local precedent that stretched back only nine years—a stance that seems quite remarkable, given that medical services were limited and intermittent during this period and, according to local opinion, even inhumane under the tenure of Dr Schmitko. This was experience-based entitlement but it was voiced as an appeal for mercy and good will from servants vulnerable to the arbitrary will of an administrative overlord. Meanwhile, French authority and the rhetoric and infrastructures of state medicine were more remote concepts to the hamlet of Runda. Here villagers spoke to power collectively through the medium of the social institutions (the “elders”) and local elites who had real, physical in their lives rather than voicing their concerns directly to distant officials by means of paper, scribe, and individual signatures.

In contrast, in the petition from Châteaudun-du-Rhumel, the scion of a settler landowning family argued point-by-point for the return of the doctor in terms of rights-based entitlement. The text demanded the sanitary services that were due to a large population and necessary for the viability of local agriculture. A settler in La Meskiana, Mrs Tomati, took this sense of prerogative even further. The widow made a moral claim on the administrator, prefect, and the médecin de colonisation in particular. To her, the doctor was a figurehead of “collisation” and thus he should be held responsible by the authorities for ensuring the wellbeing of its infant settlers. European petitioners spoke in a rights-based language of entitlement.

The voices of the citizen, the servant, and the elders—despite shared content between these requests, the disparate form of their composition seems to indicate how rural villagers were destined to experience entitlement in asymmetrical ways under colonialism. Or does it? These petitions suggest that the experience of entitlement was not always a function of an individual’s legal status under colonialism, but was also formed by specific experiences within local social
environments. This is evinced by the fact that the Muslims and Jews joined forces with the settlers of Châteaudun-du-Rhûmel, and expressed themselves as rights-bearing individuals, “We, the undersigned.” It is also suggested by the act of erasure performed by the nameless translator at the Prefecture in Constantine, who reframed the shikāya from La Meskiana and so transformed beseeching servants into villagers conversant with the language of bureaucracy. The translator and the Châteaudun petitions attempted to navigate the space somewhere between the position of “subject” and the fully-fledged “citizen,” and so confound historical frameworks that posit “two societies, dominant and ‘subject’.”

Petitioners traversed multiple linguistic registers; translators and functionaries rendered their words into legible and actionable bureaucracy. As a result, villagers’ determination to engage the state on its terms may not have been visible to French administrators who relied on redacted translations. Similarly, historians of Algeria have tended to underestimate the agency of rural Muslims, and the complex ways in which they related to the colonial state. In performing close readings of shikāyāt and exploring the discrepancies between these texts and their translations, this article has elucidated the ways in which peoples who found themselves the victims of state oppression roundly asserted their entitlement in the face of it.
Duwwr (Fr. douar), the literal meaning of which is “circles,” was an administrative term used to delimit a group of “native” dwellings or encampments. The duwwr discussed in this article were attached to communes mixtes, a form of administrative unit in existence from 1858 to 1956 (although different territories were incorporated into communes mixtes at different times, and boundaries shifted over time). Each commune mixte comprised a centre de colonisation, inhabited by a “mixed” population of Europeans, Jews, and Muslims, and a number of outlying duwwr, the entirety under the sole charge of an administrator appointed in Algiers. Another administrative entity referred to in this article is the commune de plein exercice. These units were comparable in size and organization to French communes, and governed by an elected mayor and municipal councils. On the history of these administrative formations, see Christine Mussard, “La commune mixte: l’espace d’une rencontre,” in Histoire de l’Algérie à la période coloniale, 1830-1962, ed. Abderrahmane Bouchène, Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, Ouanassa Siari Tengour, and Sylvie Thénault (Paris: Découverte, 2012).

Technically the agha should have written to the administrator of the Commune mixte (CM) of the Aurès, into which duwwr Ghassira had been incorporated in 1912.

Archives nationales d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France (hereafter ANOM) CONST B/3/241, letter Agha Bani bu Sliman to Administrator CM Belezma, 19 March 1917. Al-habb al-sūdāʾ (‘the black pustule’) conventionally referred to variety of smallpox. In certain regions of the Aurès, the term bû zagāgh denoted measles. I am grateful to Professor Larbi Abid for this information.

Figures are taken from Ouanassa Siari Tengour, “La révolte de 1916 dans l’Aurès,” Histoire de l’Algérie à la période coloniale, 255–60, reference on 257. The repression officially ran from November 1916 to the autumn of 1917, but patrols of black troops were used to “pacify” rural unrest years after the armistice. See ANOM ALG CONST B3/452, CM Fedj M’Zala, “Surveillance politique des indigènes,” 31 May 1920.


A further thirty of the hostages died from dysentery; twenty-five from smallpox; ten from influenza; and five from pneumonia. ANOM ALG CONST B3/214, “Indigènes en prévention de Commission disciplinaire décédés du typhus” and “CM de Belezma. Année 1917. Mois de février. Déclarations des maladies épidémiques transmises à l’Inspecteur d’Hygiène.”

The letter from the agha of the Bani Bu Sliman was archived alongside tabulated typhus deaths from the prison, which suggests that record-keepers associated the mysterious deaths in Runda with the epidemic of typhus in the prison, even if villagers did not possess this information.

Chicago Press, 2007) both describe Algerians who sought relief from French medicine, but are limited for failing to consider Arabic–language sources. To my knowledge, there are two published articles that look at medicine through Arabic-language sources, but these are very short: Djilali Sari, *A la recherche de notre histoire* (Algiers: Casbah editions, 2003), 58–65 concerns Dr. Mohamed Nekkache, and uses the evidence of family records, the *wilāya* archive of Oran, and the Chambre de Commerce in Tlemcen; an undated article by Adda Ben Daha, “Al-nizam al-sihi fi dawla al-amir ‘Abd al-Qadir (1832-1847),” is based on published sources. The potential of using archives located in Algeria and non-government sources such as oral histories is exemplified by Jennifer Johnson Onyedum, “‘Humanize the Conflict’: Algerian Health Care Organizations and Propaganda Campaigns, 1954–1962,” *IJMES* 44 (2012): 713–31. Johnson adds to our understanding of how the war was waged on the international stage, finding that the Front de Libération National used the language of health and healing to legitimize its struggle and make claims to sovereignty.

11 I owe this term to Beth Linker, *War’s Waste: Rehabilitation in World War 1 America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 126. A more common use of the term “medicalization,” particularly among sociologists, refers to the process by which social or personal problems are reframed as medical issues requiring therapeutic management. Like Linker, I use “medicalization from above/below” to mean the demand for medical care and its institutions.


16 See e.g., Nora Lafi, “La gouvernance ottomane des équilibres locaux: le rôle du bureau central des pétitions à Istanbul et l’usage de ses archives,” in *Les archives, la société et les Sciences*


19 Medical auxiliary training comprised two years of study and one year of apprenticeship. In contrast, university studies in medicine, which were open only to holders of the baccalauréat, required four years of study and completion of a doctoral thesis. Auxiliary training is discussed in Clark, “Doctoring the Bled.”

The Délégations financières algériennes were founded in 1898 to devolve some degree of autonomy to the three départements of Algeria. The assembly comprised three groups of speakers, whose debates were conducted in isolation from one another, representing the interests of rural settlers (délégation des colons, with twenty-four members), urban settlers (délégation des non-colons, twenty-four members), and the autochthonous population (only twenty-one members—fifteen in the Section arabe and six in the Section kabyle). A purely consultative body at its inception, in 1901 the délégations were granted voting rights to determine the colonial budget, a right which became effective from 1902. The inbuilt distortions within the system of representation ensured that the agenda and interests of settlers and large landowners always prevailed. A detailed account of the institution is provided in Jacques Bouveresse, Un parlement colonial? Les délégations financières algériennes (1898-1945), 2 vols. (Mont Saint-Aignan: Publications des Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2008 and 2010).


Infirmaries were given limited funding from the central colonial budget, and were mostly supported by municipal receipts and private donations. This was consistent with the manner in which medical assistance was financed in France. See Matthew Ramsey, “Public Health in France,” in The History of Public Health and the Modern State, ed. Dorothy Porter (Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1994), 45–118.


Reparations were offered when sick livestock had to be slaughtered; see discussion of animals with glanders in ANOM ALG AINTE I/9.


34 ANOM CM de Tiaret, letter Commissaire de Police to Mayor of Tiaret, 28 July 1921.


36 Each *khabr* was typically handwritten on a sheet of lined or blank paper folded vertically in half: the left side reserved for the qaid’s handwriting, the right side for a French translation carried out by a secretary. The more sophisticated of these documents were prepared on official communal letterhead (on which a vertical line was traced by black ink or perforations) and signed with an official seal. But many *akhbār* were written hastily on reused paper scraps. *Akhbār* found in ANOM ALG AINTE and Tiaret (uncatalogued) and in ARC 56 Akbou cluster in the 1920s and 30s. The lack of counterparts in the post-WW2 era may be a consequence of the vagaries of archivization, but is plausibly the result of the introduction of the telephone and its generalization in these decades.

37 Archives nationales d’Algérie, Birkhadem, Algiers, Algeria (henceforth ANA) DZ/AN/17E/1395, “Rapport de Tournée, Inspecteur Général des Services d’Hygiène de
l’Algérie,” 5 November 1921. Also ANOM CM Tiaret 34/Santé Publique (uncatalogued),
circular “Typhus. Mesures de defense et de protection.”

One such investigation features in ARC Archives Communales 631, letter Administrator CM
Takitount to Préfet de Constantine, “La Typhus au Douar Maouia,” 25 July 1936. Another
appears in ANOM ALG AINTE I/9, Circular, “Surveillance à exercer sur les populations
indigènes,” 5 March 1931 and a dismissal is mentioned in ANOM ALG AINTE I/9, letter
Administrator CM Aïn el Arba to Préfet d’Oran, 6 December 1926.

See CM Tiaret (uncatalogued), ARC 56 Akbou and Archives Communales. 631. CPE et CM
Letter 21 March 1937, qaid of duwwār Oukaour to Administrator CM Akbou.

ANOM CM Tiaret (uncatalogued) Archives I/21, Santé publique, letter 31 January 1929.

ANOM ALG AINTE/I/9, see correspondence regarding Oued Sebbah, November and
December 1926. The prefect ordered the immediate and “rigorous” isolation of duwwār al-
‘Aya’icha by soldiers in response to a suggestion from the administrator of CM Aïn Temouchent
that the village was infected by plague (there was no evidence, medical or other, to support this
claim). One hundred and fifty sentries camped around the duwwār for more than a week to
prevent movement of villagers. The prefect’s instructions to put up military barricades were sent
in encoded telegrams, so that postal workers would not leak the information.

Hilton-Simpson was not a medic but had formed an interest in medical practice among the
Shawi Berbers after reading a paper in the journal L’anthropologie that discussed Shawi

ANA Territoires du Sud (henceforth TDS) 0531, “Les dispositions précédentes ne sont pas applicables aux indigènes, musulmans ou juifs, qui pratiquent la médecine, la chirurgie et l’art des accouchements à l’égard de leur coreligionnaires.”


PRMMC H-SP, item B: the MS (mainly typescript) of his Arab medicine and surgery OUP 1922, 5, 7–8.

Ibid., 11.

The villagers may also have been aware of a number of ḥadīth that offered advice on correct behaviour in the face of epidemics (al-wabāʾ) and plague (al-ṭaʿūn), such as those from the highly respected collections of al-Bukhari and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj. These were discussed in a text by Muhammad bin Mustafa ibn al-Khuja Kamal, Tanwir al-adhhan fi-l-hathth ‘la al-taharraz wa hafz al-abdan (Algiers: Imprimerie Fontana Frères, 1896), which circulated widely in Algeria at the turn of the 20th century.

PRMMC H-SP, item G, working slip number 72.


PRMMC H-SP, item B, 12–13.

John Janzen, The Quest for Therapy: Medical Pluralism in Lower Zaire (Berkeley: University


55 ANOM CONST B/2/214, undated petition, duwwār Zillatou.


58 Military service records for a number of auxiliaires médicaux were found in the Service des archives de la wilaya d’Alger, Algeria (henceforth SAWA), 3V61.

59 ANA TDS 0531, letter Sous-Préfet Mostaganem to Préfet d’Alger, 21 April 1915.


ANOM ALG CONST B3/452, telegram Préfet de Constantine to Governor General, 25 January 1915.


ANA TDS 0531, telegram Procureur général Mostaganem to Justice de la paix Trézel, August 1914. See also letter, Sous-préfet Mostaganem to Préfet d’Oran, 21 April 1915; letter Procureur Général près de la Cour d’Appel d’Alger to Governor General, 25 May 1915.


69 ANOM ALG CONST B3/452, letter Administrator CM La Meskiana to Préfet de Constantine, 17 August 1917.

70 Ibid., letter Administrator CM Oued-Cherf to Sous-préfet Guelma, 6 March 1917.

71 Ibid., telegraph Préfet de Constantine to Governor General, 25 January 1915.

72 ANOM ALG/CONST B3/430 1915/2e sem, letter Dr Attal to Préfet de Constantine, 23 March 1915.

73 Ibid., letter no. 935M, Médecin Principal 1e classe Bouchereau to Préfet de Constantine, 7 September 1915.


75 ANOM ALG/CONST B3/430, petition, no date.

76 Information on European and Jewish inhabitants of Châteaudun-du-Rhumel was consulted at ANOM, via IREL (instruments de recherché en ligne) état civil records, http://anom.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/caomec2/recherche.php?territoire=ALGERIE (accessed 29 March 2016). It has not yet been possible to consult the état civil for the Muslim population of Châteaudun-du-Rhumel, which is held in CAN.


*Ibid.*, French translation: “Nous, soussignés, habitants du village de La Meskiana, avons l’honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir faire le nécessaire pour nous faire venir un médecin dans notre centre où il exercera comme par le passé. Il ne vous est pas ignoré que notre village, par sa situation, est le foyer de la fièvre par excellence, surtout en cette saison de chaleur et la quinine ne suffirait pas par elle-même. De plus, la longueur du voyage dans les centres les plus rapprochés de nous (Aïn Beida et Tébessa) ne ferait qu’aggraver l’état du malade. Vu les nombreux inconvénients qui peuvent en résulter, la présence d’un médecin nous est indispensable. En conséquence, nous vous prions Monsieur l’Administrateur de bien vouloir donner suite favorable à notre demande. Suivent les signatures des habitants.”

*Colette Establet’s study of qaids in the cercle of Tebessa described how this region was drawn into the French administrative net during the period 1851 to 1915. Establet identified a bureaucratic formalism emerging in the correspondence of the Bureaux arabes, which she argued*

83 ANA TDS 0531 Questionnaire, Marc Savin-Vaillant, La Meskiana, 3 May 1911.

84 ANOM ALG/CONST B3/430.

85 ANOM ALG/CONST B3/452, letter Administrator CM La Meskiana to Préfet de Constantine, 5 December 1916 and reference to complaint made on 27 November 1916. New charges were addressed to the Préfet on 5 December 1916 in response to a complaint made by Schmitko against the administrator. Schmitko’s original letter has not come to light and so it is not possible to see his defense.


92 On the political consequences of wartime services, see Rabah Aissaoui, “Exile and the Politics of Return and Liberation: Algerian Colonial Workers and Anti-Colonialism in France during the

93 For activities carried out by the burj in the *cercle* of Tebessa from 1872 to 1890, see Establet, *Être Caïd dans l’Algérie Coloniale*, 177–190.

94 Similarly, it is possible to find evidence in the archives of distressed Europeans who stepped into an ambiguous position beneath that of citizen deliberately; for example, by marrying a Muslim.