The elimination of broker voting in director elections

Akyol, A. C., Raff, K. and Verwijmeren, P. (2017) The elimination of broker voting in director elections. Finance Research Letters, 21, pp. 34-39. (doi: 10.1016/

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In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed shareholder voting by eliminating uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We use this reform as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the value of shareholder empowerment. Using different control groups and various cross-sectional tests, we find that the reform did not increase average equity values.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Verwijmeren, Professor Patrick
Authors: Akyol, A. C., Raff, K., and Verwijmeren, P.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Accounting and Finance
Journal Name:Finance Research Letters
ISSN (Online):1544-6131
Published Online:03 February 2017
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc.
First Published:First published in Finance Research Letters 21: 34-39
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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