Akyol, A. C., Raff, K. and Verwijmeren, P. (2017) The elimination of broker voting in director elections. Finance Research Letters, 21, pp. 34-39. (doi: 10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001)
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Abstract
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed shareholder voting by eliminating uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We use this reform as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the value of shareholder empowerment. Using different control groups and various cross-sectional tests, we find that the reform did not increase average equity values.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Verwijmeren, Professor Patrick |
| Authors: | Akyol, A. C., Raff, K., and Verwijmeren, P. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Accounting and Finance |
| Journal Name: | Finance Research Letters |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 1544-6123 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1544-6131 |
| Published Online: | 03 February 2017 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. |
| First Published: | First published in Finance Research Letters 21: 34-39 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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