Pettigrove, G. (2011) Is virtue ethics self-effacing? Journal of Ethics, 15(3), pp. 191-207. (doi: 10.1007/s10892-010-9089-4)
Full text not currently available from Enlighten.
Abstract
Thomas Hurka, Simon Keller, and Julia Annas have recently argued that virtue ethics is self-effacing. I contend that these arguments are rooted in a mistaken understanding of the role that ideal agency and agent flourishing (should) play in virtue ethics. I then show how a virtue ethical theory can avoid the charge of self-effacement and why it is important that it do so.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Pettigrove, Professor Glen |
| Authors: | Pettigrove, G. |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Journal of Ethics |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 1382-4554 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1572-8609 |
| Published Online: | 16 October 2010 |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record
Deposit and Record Details
Deposit and Record Details