Meekness and ‘moral’ anger

Pettigrove, G. (2012) Meekness and ‘moral’ anger. Ethics, 122(2), pp. 341-370. (doi:10.1086/663230)

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Abstract

If asked to generate a list of virtues, most people would not include meekness. So it is surprising that Hume deems it not only a virtue, but one whose “tendency to the good of society no one can doubt of.” After explaining what Hume and his contemporaries meant by ‘meekness’, the essay proceeds to argue that meekness is a virtue we, too, should endorse.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Pettigrove, Professor Glen
Authors: Pettigrove, G.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Ethics
Publisher:University of Chicago Press
ISSN:0014-1704
ISSN (Online):1539-297X

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