Re-conceiving character: The social ontology of Humean virtue

Pettigrove, G. (2015) Re-conceiving character: The social ontology of Humean virtue. Res Philosophica, 92(3), pp. 595-619. (doi:10.11612/resphil.2015.92.3.3)

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Abstract

Most twenty-first century ethicists conceive of character as a stable, enduring state that is internal to the agent who possesses it. This paper argues that writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not share this conceptions: as they conceived of it, character is fragile and has a social ontology. The paper goes on to show that Hume’s conception of character was more like his contemporaries than like ours. It concludes with a look at the significance of such a conception for current debates about the place of character in ethics.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Pettigrove, Professor Glen
Authors: Pettigrove, G.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Res Philosophica
Publisher:Philosophy Documentation Centre
ISSN:2168-9105
ISSN (Online):2168-9113

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