Causal powers and the necessity of realization

Baysan, U. (2017) Causal powers and the necessity of realization. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 25(4), pp. 525-531. (doi: 10.1080/09672559.2017.1332081)

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Abstract

Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are realized by physical properties. The realization relation is typically taken to be a metaphysical necessitation relation. Here, I explore how the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can be explained by what is known as ‘the subset view’ of realization. The subset view holds that the causal powers that are associated with a realized property are a proper subset of the causal powers that are associated with the realizer property. I argue that the said explanation of the metaphysical necessitation feature requires a careful treatment of the relationship between properties and causal powers.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:This work was supported by John Templeton Foundation.
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Baysan, Dr Emin
Authors: Baysan, U.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:International Journal of Philosophical Studies
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN:0967-2559
ISSN (Online):1466-4542
Published Online:02 June 2017
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor and Francis Group
First Published:First published in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25(4):525-531
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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