Justified belief: knowledge first-style

Kelp, C. (2016) Justified belief: knowledge first-style. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(1), pp. 79-100. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12272)

Abstract

Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton (2005, 2007), Littlejohn (Forthcoming a, b), Williamson (2000, 2010), a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar (2010) and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird (2007). This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a number of problems that its competition encounters.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kelp, Professor Christoph
• Authors: Kelp, C.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
• Publisher: Wiley
• ISSN: 0031-8205
• ISSN (Online): 1933-1592
• Published Online: 26 January 2016
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2016 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
• First Published: First published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93(1): 79-100
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy