The tertiary value problem and the superiority of knowledge

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2016) The tertiary value problem and the superiority of knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(4), pp. 397-409.

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2016) The tertiary value problem and the superiority of knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(4), pp. 397-409.

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Abstract

According to the achievement account (AA) of the value of knowledge, knowledge is finally valuable because it is a species of a finally valuable genus, achievement. The achievement account is said to solve Pritchard's tertiary value problem (TVP), the problem of showing that knowledge enjoys a different kind of value than mere true belief. This paper argues, first, that AA fails to solve TVP, and, second, that Pritchard's motivations for TVP are inadequate. They do, however, motivate a weaker value problem, one that can be solved by showing that knowledge is weakly superior to mere true belief. Finally, third, we argue that knowledge does enjoy this form of weak superiority. Since this argument rests on AA's key species-genus claim, AA can retain the upper hand in the debate.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Dr Christoph and Simionescu, Dr Mona Ioana
Authors: Simion, M., and Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:American Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher:University of Illinois Press
ISSN:0003-0481
ISSN (Online):2152-1123
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
First Published:First published in American Philosophical Quarterly 53(4): 397-409
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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