Understanding phenomena

Kelp, C. (2015) Understanding phenomena. Synthese, 192(12), pp. 3799-3816. (doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0616-x)

Kelp, C. (2015) Understanding phenomena. Synthese, 192(12), pp. 3799-3816. (doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0616-x)

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Abstract

The literature on the nature of understanding can be divided into two broad camps. Explanationists believe that it is knowledge of explanations that is key to understanding. In contrast, their manipulationist rivals maintain that understanding essentially involves an ability to manipulate certain representations. The aim of this paper is to provide a novel knowledge based account of understanding. More specifically, it proposes an account of maximal understanding of a given phenomenon in terms of fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of it and of degrees of understanding in terms of approximations to such knowledge. It is completed by a contextualist semantics for outright attributions of understanding according to which an attribution of understanding is true of one just in case one knows enough about it to perform some contextually determined task. It is argued that this account has an edge over both its explanationist and manipulationist competitors.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Dr Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Synthese
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0039-7857
ISSN (Online):1573-0964
Published Online:07 January 2015
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Springer Science+Business Media
First Published:First published in Synthese 192(12): 3799-3816
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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