Kelp, C. (2014) Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology: response to Vaesen. Erkenntnis, 79(3), pp. 729-732. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9527-3)
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Abstract
In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515–529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245–252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s (Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kelp, Professor Christoph |
Authors: | Kelp, C. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Erkenntnis |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 0165-0106 |
ISSN (Online): | 1572-8420 |
Published Online: | 14 September 2013 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media |
First Published: | First published in Erkenntnis 79(3): 729-732 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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