Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology: response to Vaesen

Kelp, C. (2014) Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology: response to Vaesen. Erkenntnis, 79(3), pp. 729-732. (doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9527-3)

Kelp, C. (2014) Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology: response to Vaesen. Erkenntnis, 79(3), pp. 729-732. (doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9527-3)

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Abstract

In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515–529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245–252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s (Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Dr Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Erkenntnis
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0165-0106
ISSN (Online):1572-8420
Published Online:14 September 2013
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media
First Published:First published in Erkenntnis 79(3): 729-732
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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