How to motivate anti-luck virtue epistemology

Kelp, C. (2013) How to motivate anti-luck virtue epistemology. Grazer Philosophische Studien: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy, 88, pp. 211-225. (doi:10.1163/9789401210508_011)

Kelp, C. (2013) How to motivate anti-luck virtue epistemology. Grazer Philosophische Studien: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy, 88, pp. 211-225. (doi:10.1163/9789401210508_011)

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Abstract

Duncan Pritchard has recently defended an account of knowledge that combines a safety condition with an ability condition on knowledge. In order to explain this bipartite structure of knowledge he appeals to Edward Craig's work on the concept of knowledge. This paper argues that Pritchard's envisaged explanation fails and offers a better alternative.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Dr Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Grazer Philosophische Studien: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy
Publisher:Rodopi
ISSN:0165-9227
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV
First Published:First published in Grazer Philosophische Studien: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy 88: 211-225
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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