Kelp, C. (2013) How to motivate anti-luck virtue epistemology. Grazer Philosophische Studien: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy, 88, pp. 211-225. (doi: 10.1163/9789401210508_011)
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Abstract
Duncan Pritchard has recently defended an account of knowledge that combines a safety condition with an ability condition on knowledge. In order to explain this bipartite structure of knowledge he appeals to Edward Craig's work on the concept of knowledge. This paper argues that Pritchard's envisaged explanation fails and offers a better alternative.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kelp, Professor Christoph |
Authors: | Kelp, C. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Grazer Philosophische Studien: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy |
Publisher: | Rodopi |
ISSN: | 0165-9227 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV |
First Published: | First published in Grazer Philosophische Studien: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy 88: 211-225 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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