Proper bootstrapping

Douven, I. and Kelp, C. (2013) Proper bootstrapping. Synthese, 190(1), pp. 171-185. (doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0115-x)

Douven, I. and Kelp, C. (2013) Proper bootstrapping. Synthese, 190(1), pp. 171-185. (doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0115-x)

[img]
Preview
Text
140949.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.

199kB

Abstract

According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type of reasoning suffices to block the anti-reliabilist argument.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Dr Christoph
Authors: Douven, I., and Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Synthese
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0039-7857
ISSN (Online):1573-0964
Published Online:04 May 2012
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2012 The Authors
First Published:First published in Synthese 190(1): 171-185
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record