Tegen Scepticisme over de Waarde van Kennis

Kelp, C. (2012) Tegen Scepticisme over de Waarde van Kennis. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 74(3), pp. 513-521. (doi:10.2143/TVF.74.3.2174107)

Kelp, C. (2012) Tegen Scepticisme over de Waarde van Kennis. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 74(3), pp. 513-521. (doi:10.2143/TVF.74.3.2174107)

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Abstract

It has recently been argued that, contrary to first appearances, knowledge is not distinctively valuable. The argumentative strategy of value sceptics in epistemology is to identify a challenge that any satisfactory account of the distinctive value of knowledge will have to meet and to argue that no viable theory of knowledge does the job. This paper argues that the value sceptical argument is unsuccessful in that it does not establish that a virtue epistemological account of the value of knowledge fails.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Dr Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Publisher:Peeters Publishers
ISSN:1370-575X
ISSN (Online):2031-8952

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