Kelp, C. (2011) A problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 152(2), pp. 287-292. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-009-9480-9)
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Abstract
This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kelp, Professor Christoph |
Authors: | Kelp, C. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Philosophical Studies |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 0031-8116 |
ISSN (Online): | 1573-0883 |
Published Online: | 21 November 2009 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media |
First Published: | First published in Philosophical Studies 152(2): 287-292 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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