A problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge

Kelp, C. (2011) A problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 152(2), pp. 287-292. (doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9480-9)

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Abstract

This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Dr Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0031-8116
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:21 November 2009
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media
First Published:First published in Philosophical Studies 152(2): 287-292
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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