Kelp, C. (2011) In defence of virtue epistemology. Synthese, 179(3), pp. 409-433. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-009-9681-y)
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Abstract
In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology’s central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard’s objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kelp, Professor Christoph |
| Authors: | Kelp, C. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Synthese |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1573-0964 |
| Published Online: | 24 October 2009 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media |
| First Published: | First published in Synthese 179(3): 409-433 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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