In defence of virtue epistemology

Kelp, C. (2011) In defence of virtue epistemology. Synthese, 179(3), pp. 409-433. (doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9681-y)

Kelp, C. (2011) In defence of virtue epistemology. Synthese, 179(3), pp. 409-433. (doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9681-y)

[img]
Preview
Text
140938.pdf - Accepted Version

466kB

Abstract

In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology’s central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard’s objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Dr Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Synthese
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0039-7857
ISSN (Online):1573-0964
Published Online:24 October 2009
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media
First Published:First published in Synthese 179(3): 409-433
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record