Indirect perceptual realism and multiple reference

Brown, D. (2008) Indirect perceptual realism and multiple reference. Dialectica, 62(3), pp. 323-334. (doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01157.x)

Abstract

Indirect realists maintain that our perceptions of the external world are mediated by our ‘perceptions’ of subjective intermediaries such as sensations. Multiple reference occurs when a word or an instance of it has more than one reference. I argue that, because indirect realists hold that speakers typically and unknowingly directly perceive something subjective and indirectly perceive something objective, the phenomenon of multiple reference is an important resource for their view. In particular, a challenge that A. D. Smith has recently put forward for indirect realists can be overcome by appreciating how multiple reference is likely to arise when a projectivist variety of indirect realism is interpreted by speakers adhering to a naïve direct realism.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Brown, Dr Derek
• Authors: Brown, D.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Dialectica
• Publisher: Wiley
• ISSN: 0012-2017
• ISSN (Online): 1746-8361
• Published Online: 05 September 2008