Indirect perceptual realism and demonstratives

Brown, D. H. (2009) Indirect perceptual realism and demonstratives. Philosophical Studies, 145(3), pp. 377-394. (doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9237-x)

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I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. I argue that indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory role in such judgements, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to the criticisms of Snowdon and Smith. The discussion is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brown, Dr Derek
Authors: Brown, D. H.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:10 May 2008

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