Locating projectivism in intentionalism debates

Brown, D. H. (2010) Locating projectivism in intentionalism debates. Philosophical Studies, 148(1), pp. 69-78. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-010-9509-0)

Abstract

Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades,1 and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can be witnessed from an often-ignored and lonely perspective, that of the sense-datum theorist, and in particular of the projectivist2 (Sect. 2). In my view we have been so wary of sense-datum theory in recent years that we have failed to see that, even if false, it may permit perspectives on intentionalism issues difficult to occupy from other views.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Brown, Dr Derek
• Authors: Brown, D. H.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Philosophical Studies
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0031-8116
• ISSN (Online): 1573-0883
• Published Online: 07 February 2010