Implicit commitment in theory choice

Krämer, S. (2014) Implicit commitment in theory choice. Synthese, 191(10), pp. 2147-2165. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0388-8)

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Abstract

The proper evaluation of a theory's virtues seems to require taking into account what the theory is indirectly or implicitly committed to, in addition to what it explicitly says. Most extant proposals for criteria of theory choice in the literature spell out the relevant notion of implicit commitment via some notion of entailment. I show that such criteria behave implausibly in application to theories that differ over matters of entailment. A recent defence by Howard Peacock of such a criterion against this objection is examined and rejected. I go on to a develop a better proposal on which, roughly speaking, a theory is counted committed to a claim if and only if its best fully explicit extension is explicitly committed to the claim. Such extensions in turn are evaluated by ordinary standards of theory choice adapted to the case of theories assumed to articulate their intended content in a fully explicit fashion.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kraemer, Dr Stephan
Authors: Krämer, S.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Synthese
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0039-7857
ISSN (Online):1573-0964
Published Online:31 December 2013
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media
First Published:First published in Synthese 191(10): 2147-2165
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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