The defeasibility of knowledge-how

Carter, J. A. and Navarro, J. (2017) The defeasibility of knowledge-how. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(3), pp. 662-685. (doi:10.1111/phpr.12441)

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Abstract

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge-how and knowledge-that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge-how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge-how is in fact resilient to being undermined by the very kinds of traditional (propositional) epistemic defeaters which clearly defeat the items of propositional knowledge which intellectualists identify with knowledge-how. Second, we aim to fill an important lacuna in the contemporary debate, which is to develop an alternative way in which epistemic defeat for knowledge-how could be modelled within an anti-intellectualist framework.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr Joseph
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Navarro, J.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:0031-8205
ISSN (Online):1933-1592
Published Online:03 September 2017
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2017 The Authors
First Published:First published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95(3): 662-685
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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