Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies

Lombardi, M. and Yoshihara, N. (2017) Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies. International Journal of Game Theory, 46, pp. 1015-1036. (doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0568-8)

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We study Nash implementation by natural price–quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer besides her material well-being. A semi-responsible agent is an agent who, given what her opponents do, acts in an irresponsible manner when a responsible behavior poses obstacles to her material well-being. The class of efficient allocation rules that are Nash implementable is identified provided that there is at least one agent who is semi-responsible. The Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lombardi, Dr Michele
Authors: Lombardi, M., and Yoshihara, N.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Journal of Game Theory
ISSN (Online):1432-1270
Published Online:20 February 2017
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2017 Springer
First Published:First published in International Journal of Game Theory 46:1015-1036
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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