Rossian conceptual intuitionism

Cowan, R. (2017) Rossian conceptual intuitionism. Ethics, 127(4), pp. 821-851. (doi:10.1086/691566)

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In this article I assess Rossian Intuitionism, which is the view that the Rossian Principles of Duty are self-evident. I begin by motivating and clarifying a version of the view—Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism—that hasn’t been adequately considered by Rossians. After defending it against a series of significant objections, I show that enthusiasm for Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism should be muted. Specifically, I argue that we lack sufficient reason for thinking that the Rossian Principles are self-evident, and that insisting that they are self-evident (perhaps in an attenuated sense) may commit Rossians to radically expanding the scope of self-evidence.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Cowan, Dr Robert
Authors: Cowan, R.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Ethics
Publisher:University of Chicago Press
ISSN (Online):1539-297X
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2017 The University of Chicago
First Published:First published in Ethics 127(4):821-851
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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