Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate

Harless, P. and Manjunath, V. (2018) Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate. International Economic Review, 59(2), pp. 557-592. (doi: 10.1111/iere.12280)

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Abstract

Individuals form preferences through search, interviews, discussion, and investigation. In a stylized object allocation model, we characterize the equilibrium learning strategies induced by different allocation rules and trace their welfare consequences. Our analysis reveals that top trading cycles rules dominate serial priority rules under inequality‐averse measures of social welfare.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Harless, Dr Patrick
Authors: Harless, P., and Manjunath, V.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Economic Review
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:0020-6598
ISSN (Online):1468-2354
Published Online:26 March 2018
Copyright Holders:Copyright © (2018) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association
First Published:First published in International Economic Review 59(2):557-592
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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