Harless, P. and Manjunath, V. (2018) Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate. International Economic Review, 59(2), pp. 557-592. (doi: 10.1111/iere.12280)
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Abstract
Individuals form preferences through search, interviews, discussion, and investigation. In a stylized object allocation model, we characterize the equilibrium learning strategies induced by different allocation rules and trace their welfare consequences. Our analysis reveals that top trading cycles rules dominate serial priority rules under inequality‐averse measures of social welfare.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Harless, Dr Patrick |
Authors: | Harless, P., and Manjunath, V. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | International Economic Review |
Publisher: | Wiley |
ISSN: | 0020-6598 |
ISSN (Online): | 1468-2354 |
Published Online: | 26 March 2018 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © (2018) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association |
First Published: | First published in International Economic Review 59(2):557-592 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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