Knowledge, assertion and intellectual humility

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2016) Knowledge, assertion and intellectual humility. Logos and Episteme, 7(4), pp. 489-502. (doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme20167444)

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This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility in social-epistemic practice.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Gordon, Dr Emma and Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Gordon, E. C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Logos and Episteme
Publisher:Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy.
ISSN (Online):2069-3052
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 Logos and Episteme
First Published:First published in Logos and Episteme 7(4): 489-502
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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