Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions

Dütting, P., Fischer, F. and Parkes, D. C. (2016) Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions. In: 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Maastricht, The Netherlands, 24-28 Jul 2016, p. 813. ISBN 9781450339360 (doi: 10.1145/2940716.2940731)

[img]
Preview
Text
134756.pdf - Accepted Version

570kB

Abstract

We exhibit a property of the VCG mechanism that can help explain the surprising rarity with which it is used even in settings with unit demand: a relative lack of robustness to inaccuracies in the choice of its parameters. For a standard position auction environment in which the auctioneer may not know the precise relative values of the positions, we show that under both complete and incomplete information a non-truthful mechanism supports the truthful outcome of the VCG mechanism for a wider range of these values than the VCG mechanism itself. The result for complete information concerns the generalized second-price mechanism and lends additional theoretical support to the use of this mechanism in practice. Particularly interesting from a technical perspective is the case of incomplete information, where a surprising combinatorial equivalence helps us to avoid confrontation with an unwieldy differential equation.

Item Type:Conference Proceedings
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Fischer, Dr Felix
Authors: Dütting, P., Fischer, F., and Parkes, D. C.
College/School:College of Science and Engineering > School of Computing Science
Publisher:ACM Press
ISBN:9781450339360
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 ACM
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record