Dütting, P., Fischer, F. and Parkes, D. C. (2016) Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions. In: 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Maastricht, The Netherlands, 24-28 Jul 2016, p. 813. ISBN 9781450339360 (doi: 10.1145/2940716.2940731)
|
Text
134756.pdf - Accepted Version 570kB |
Abstract
We exhibit a property of the VCG mechanism that can help explain the surprising rarity with which it is used even in settings with unit demand: a relative lack of robustness to inaccuracies in the choice of its parameters. For a standard position auction environment in which the auctioneer may not know the precise relative values of the positions, we show that under both complete and incomplete information a non-truthful mechanism supports the truthful outcome of the VCG mechanism for a wider range of these values than the VCG mechanism itself. The result for complete information concerns the generalized second-price mechanism and lends additional theoretical support to the use of this mechanism in practice. Particularly interesting from a technical perspective is the case of incomplete information, where a surprising combinatorial equivalence helps us to avoid confrontation with an unwieldy differential equation.
Item Type: | Conference Proceedings |
---|---|
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Fischer, Dr Felix |
Authors: | Dütting, P., Fischer, F., and Parkes, D. C. |
College/School: | College of Science and Engineering > School of Computing Science |
Publisher: | ACM Press |
ISBN: | 9781450339360 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2016 ACM |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record