C.D. Broad on moral sense theories in ethics

Cowan, R. (2015) C.D. Broad on moral sense theories in ethics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue 3: Methods In Ethics, pp. 171-182.

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C.D. Broad’s Reflections (as I will call it) stands out as one of the few serious examinations of Moral Sense Theory in twentieth century analytic philosophy. It also constitutes an excellent discussion of the interconnections that allegedly exist between questions concerning what Broad calls the ‘logical analysis’ of moral judgments and questions about their epistemology. In this paper I make three points concerning the interconnectedness of the analytical and epistemological elements of versions of Moral Sense Theory. First, I make a general point about Broad’s association between the Naïve Realist Moral Sense Theory (an epistemological view) and Objectivist Moral Sense Theory (a ‘logical analysis’). Second, I raise doubts about one of Broad’s arguments that Trans-Subjectivist Moral Sense Theory (logical analysis) can account for the apparent synthetic necessity of general moral propositions (epistemological). Third, I briefly discuss a view about logical analysis that should be of interest to contemporary Moral Sense Theorists – Neo-Sentimentalism – and respond to an argument whose conclusion is that this analysis is incompatible with a particular kind of epistemological view.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Cowan, Dr Robert
Authors: Cowan, R.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue 3: Methods In Ethics
Publisher:The Aristotelian Society
ISSN (Online):1467-9264
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