Googled assertion

Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2017) Googled assertion. Philosophical Psychology, 30(4), pp. 490-501. (doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395)

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Abstract

Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr Joseph
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Gordon, E. C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Psychology
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN:0951-5089
ISSN (Online):1465-394X
Published Online:05 June 2017
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
First Published:First published in Philosophical Psychology 30(4):490-501
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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